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ABSTRACT 
This thesis adopts a bottom-up, qualitative approach to Palestinian identity 
construction in East Jerusalem and asks how the new politics and altered 
geography of the city since Oslo are recreating Palestinian subjectivities and 
redefining Palestinian struggle. I make the case that East Jerusalemites are 
doubly marginalised, first as Palestinians spatially and politically dislocated from 
the West Bank, then as residents of Israel, inside the politics and economy of the 
state but permanently excluded from the national project. Distanced from both 
state projects and from the discursive structures through which Palestinian 
identity was constructed after 1967, East Jerusalem residents are redefining from 
below what it means to be Palestinian in ways that are unfamiliar to Palestinians 
elsewhere in the occupied territories. 
Drawing on the vocabulary and theoretical contours of discourse theory, I 
problematise the top-down optic favoured by mainstream academic approaches 
which essentialises identities and privileges an occupation/resistance binary. I 
suggest that a ground-level approach to everyday practices in East Jerusalem 
sheds light on the extent to which existing nationalist and resistance discourses 
have either lost or changed meaning for Palestinian residents and makes evident 
the complexities of domination which are not visible from an elevated perspective. 
I suggest that the view from the ground in East Jerusalem is significantly 
underexplored and that from this position, the assumptions underlying existing 
analytic approaches to Palestinian identity and struggle are called into question. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Viewed from on high, de Certeau (1984) reminds us that the opaque mobility of 
the city becomes fixed in a transparent text and its vast complexity is made 
readable. From this elevated perspective, Jerusalem is a polarised city, the object 
of competing national projects and an urban frontier in the intractable ethno-
national conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. From this vantage point, 
issues of borders and sovereignty are fundamental and identities appear 
necessary and fixed.  
Mainstream studies, which typically approach even quotidian practices in East 
Jerusalem from the broader perspective of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, privilege a 
top-down analytic optic which often fails to challenge the essentialist 
representations of identity favoured by nationalist discourses. Rarely is the praxis 
of everyday life uncoupled from a binary analytic framework that objectifies 
antagonism and anticipates resistance. I make the case here that this approach 
produces a distorted understanding of quotidian practices in East Jerusalem, 
within which meanings are imposed and the everyday adaptations demanded by 
Israeli domination are significantly underestimated. 
In this thesis, I offer an alternative perspective, that draws on the praxis of 
everyday life in the city and the meanings that residents themselves attach to 
their quotidian experience. I emphasise East Jerusalem’s divergent political 
trajectory and make the case that this constituency’s dual marginality has 
implications for Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city which cannot be 
fully explained within an occupation/resistance binary. 
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While demonstrating that macro-level processes impact significantly on everyday 
Palestinian life in East Jerusalem, my point of departure from the existing 
literature is to analyse these top-down factors from the bottom up, by considering 
their meaning on the ground, from the perspective of those on the ground. A 
bottom-up analysis of everyday practices sheds light on the extent to which 
existing nationalist and resistance discourses have either lost or changed 
meaning for Palestinian residents and makes evident the complexities of 
domination which are not visible from a top-down perspective. I suggest that the 
view from the ground in East Jerusalem is significantly underexplored and that 
from this position, the assumptions underlying existing analytic approaches to 
Palestinian identity and struggle are called into question. 
1 The Complexities of Domination 
There is broad international consensus, in official discourses at least, that the 
future of the occupied Palestinian territories should be settled in accordance with 
United Nations resolutions and through direct negotiations between the State of 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The international community rejects the 
legality of Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and repudiates unilateral moves 
to alter the status or ethnic balance of the city.1 I argue below, however, that the 
quotidian reality is quite different. From a ground level perspective, East 
Jerusalem Palestinians are residents of Israel, whose everyday lives are 
conducted within the borders, politics and economy of the Jewish state. The 
                                            
1 For a fuller discussion of the legal issues surrounding Jerusalem see LAPIDOTH, R. 2002. 
Jerusalem: Some Legal Aspects. In: BREGER, M. J. & AHIMIER, O. (eds.) Jerusalem: A City 
and Its Future. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press. For a summary of the positions 
held by key international players on the future of Jerusalem since 1967, see p229-258 of 
DUMPER, M. 1997. The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967, New York, Columbia University 
Press. 
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prospects of (and local support for) a Palestinian capital in the city have receded 
so far, that residents no longer experience the occupation as temporary and are 
increasingly concerned with ways to improve their lives and livelihoods within the 
context of long term Israeli rule. 
This disparity, between East Jerusalem’s international legal status on the one 
hand, and the everyday experience of its residents on the other, presents 
academic researchers with complex challenges. Not least among these is how to 
build new ‘facts on the ground’ into their analysis without appearing to accept or 
endorse them. Dumper (2002) addressed this problem when he argued for a shift 
in the focus of academic research after Oslo to reflect the improbability of a 
complete Israeli withdrawal to Jerusalem’s 1967 borders. In seeking to redirect 
the focus of study, Dumper recognised that he ran “the risk of affirming and 
contributing, at least intellectually, to the trend that runs against Palestinian 
interests and may be accused of providing support to an Israeli perspective for a 
solution” (Dumper, 2002: 7). 
I argue here that mainstream academic approaches to East Jerusalem continue 
to privilege an international legal perspective that has little everyday relevance 
for Palestinians in the city. The routine treatment of East Jerusalem as part of the 
occupied Palestinian territories, despite the quotidian experience of residents 
inside Israel, means that researchers continue to ‘bracket out’ circumstances in 
the city as temporary and awaiting resolution.2 This framing of the East Jerusalem 
                                            
2 I draw here on Yiftachel’s argument that the routine treatment of Israel as democratic and 
Western leads to the ‘bracketing out’ of the refugee issue from analyses of Israeli politics. See 
page 293 of YIFTACHEL, O. 2012. Naqab/Negev Bedouins and the (Internal) Colonial 
Paradigm. In: AMARA, A., ABU-SAAD, I. & YIFTACHEL, O. (eds.) Indigenous (in)Justice: 
Human Rights Law and Bedouin Arabs in the Naqab/Negev. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
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context allows Israel to claim sovereignty over the city, integrating it into the 
state’s legal and s ecurity apparatus, while simultaneously denying full rights to 
Palestinian residents and constructing them as an external minority and a threat 
to the state. In this sense, I suggest that a shift in the academic focus to reflect 
the everyday reality in East Jerusalem might more effectively preserve the 
Palestinian presence in the city than existing approaches that sustain the 
conditions of ambiguity in which that presence is being eroded. 
A top-down optic also empowers the researcher, rather than the subject, to 
identify the source of oppression and the behaviours that constitute resistance 
(Rose, 2002). In positing Israeli domination and Palestinian resistance as 
objective positions which are somehow prior or external to the data, researchers 
limit their own analysis of the everyday actions and practices through which 
subjectivity and struggle are enacted in East Jerusalem. Insufficient attention is 
given to internal Palestinian political complexities or to the multiplicity of projects 
in which residents are involved. The meanings that subjects attach to their own 
actions and experience are overlooked within this framework, which interrogates 
everyday Palestinian life for evidence of resistance in order to counterbalance 
assessments of Israel’s disproportionate power. The everyday ways in which 
residents adapt to Israeli rule encourage speculative debates about processes of 
normalisation or Israelification, misreading behaviours that manifest significant 
power inequalities as straightforward political preferences.  
This practice also creates a false impression of equivalence between the forces 
of oppression and resistance that obscures the depth of domination in East 
Jerusalem and the myriad ways in which Israeli power penetrates everyday 
practices. I argue that a top-down optic overlooks the extent to which East 
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Jerusalem residents repeatedly negotiate their agency and their identity vis-à-vis 
the structures of power or how systemic power relations can be ‘internalised’, 
thereby shaping the individual’s sense of self and of their future possibilities 
(Maiguashca, 2013). Few studies address the adaptations demanded of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians within the context of long term occupation or the extent 
to which the experience of residents inside the Israeli state informs their positions 
within internal Palestinian struggles, personal and political.  
Finally, I suggest that within this top-down anaytic framework, antagonism is 
objectified and the contigency of discursive structures through which identities 
are constructed is overlooked. I argue below that the dual marginality of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians is recreating subjectivities and producing new modes of 
struggle in the city. In the narrow space in which East Jerusalem Palestinians are 
able to enact meaningful agency, I find that their rejection of Palestinian Authority 
leadership and legitimacy is influencing attiudes towards and perceptions of 
Israeli rule that potentially distance them from Palestinians elsewhere in the 
occupied territories. 
In relationships of power, I recognise that the subordinate may have cause to be 
ambivalent about resisting, while the dominant side often has much to offer, 
though always at the cost of continuing in power (Ortner, 1995). Existing scholarly 
approaches that privilege a domination/resistance binary fail to recognise the 
emergence of new subjectivities and mobilisations in East Jerusalem arising from 
the altered political geography of the city since Oslo, and the situation of residents 
between dislocation and exclusion. In this sense, they are denying residents their 
own form and moment of agency. I argue below that understanding resistance 
requires recognition of the multiple projects in which subjects are engaged and 
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of those which they choose to construct and enact in a particular historical 
moment. The complexities of domination are made visible by a re-reading of 
everyday Palestinian practices within a theoretical framework in which identities 
are recognised as temporary and strategic and the way in which people act sheds 
light on the choices they face and the decisions they are making about their own 
identity. 
2 Research Objectives 
The dominant discursive articulation of Israeli-Palestinian relations relies on 
binary distinctions which essentialise identities on both sides, objectify 
antagonism and anticipate resistance. Academic studies which address the issue 
of East Jerusalem from the admittedly important perspective of borders and 
sovereignty, none the less fail to challenge these binaries and overlook the 
complexities of domination and the contingency of discursive structures through 
which identity is constructed. 
This thesis begins with the phenomenon of East Jerusalem’s divergent political 
trajectory and makes evident the dual marginality of residents, first as 
Palestinians spatially and politically dislocated from the West Bank and then as 
residents of Israel, inside the politics and economy of the state but excluded from 
the national project. East Jerusalem Palestinians live with chronic insecurity 
inside Israel’s de facto borders, but beyond the limits of inclusion in the national 
project. Settlements and the separation Barrier have isolated the urban centre 
from its former West Bank hinterland, while Israeli measures aimed at ethnic 
control of the city have effectively erased organised Palestinian political life in the 
city and criminalised opposition to Israeli sovereignty. 
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The Palestinian nationalist movement, meanwhile, has failed to project an 
inclusive political imaginary with plausibility or appeal for the East Jerusalem 
constituency. The Palestinian Authority is excluded from power in the city by the 
terms of an agreement to which the PLO assented and that launched Palestinians 
from East Jerusalem and the West Bank on altogether different political 
trajectories. Spatial and political dislocation from the occupied territories, as well 
as the ‘outsider’ perspective of Palestinian Authority rule that this has imposed, 
have contributed to the reorientation of Palestinian subjectivities away from the 
Palestinian political centre towards inclusion in Israel. Yet even Palestinian 
residents who seek to improve their lives and livelihoods within the context of 
Israeli domination, are confronted inside Israel by structural barriers and 
everyday manifestations of their otherness and exclusion. 
Distanced from both state projects and from the discursive structures through 
which Palestinian identity was constructed after 1967, Jerusalem Palestinians are 
unwilling to relinquish their existing rights and status inside Israel in exchange for 
a version of statehood that fails to meet their minimum personal and nationalist 
expectations. The altered political landscape since the end of Oslo, the collapse 
of Palestinian authority in the city and construction of the separation Barrier, are 
reshaping Palestinian subjectivities in East Jerusalem and producing new modes 
of struggle and mobilisation. 
In this thesis, I set out to challenge the assumptions underlying mainstream 
interpretations of everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem and to make visible, 
through a ground level, bottom-up analysis, the depth of Israeli power in the city 
and the emergence of new subjectivities and modes of struggle. Throughout, I 
draw on a range of critical approaches, in particular the basic concepts and 
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vocabulary of discourse theory, to frame my argument. Recognising that 
structural power limits, but does not determine the subject, I seek to locate the 
contracting space in which agency is meaningful in East Jerusalem and to explore 
how, within that space, Palestinian residents are acting out their identity. 
Circumstances of dislocation and domination limit the opportunities for 
Palestinian agency, but it is also clear that the forms it does take in East 
Jerusalem are not always recognisable within mainstream discourses which 
essentialise Palestinians as one side in an objectified conflict. 
3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. In Chapter II, I set out to establish 
the divergence of East Jerusalem’s political trajectory from that of the West Bank. 
I position the arguments presented here in relation to the existing body of 
knowledge on East Jerusalem and locate this area of investigation within the 
relevant theoretical literature. Adopting a funnel approach, I move from a broad 
typology of the material on East Jerusalem towards a narrower discussion of the 
Israeli project in the city and the collapse of Palestinian political institutions. I then 
focus in on the literature that is most relevant to the specific research questions 
addressed in my thesis and set out how this study intends to contribute to these 
works. 
In Chapter III, I describe and evaluate the qualitative research methods employed 
in the course of this project and the methodology underpinning these choices. I 
address questions of reflexivity and positionality and consider the challenges of 
undertaking fieldwork in East Jerusalem. I emphasise the vital role played by 
issues of access and trust in this study and consider how these have influenced 
both its potential and its limitations. 
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The core argument set out in this thesis is constructed over Chapters IV, V and 
VI, in which I present, analyse and theorise my empirical data, collected from in-
depth qualitative interviews undertaken in East Jerusalem in 2016. Chapters IV 
and V address the dual aspects of this constituency’s marginality, first as 
Palestinians whose divergent political experience alienates them from the 
national leadership and from mainstream nationalist discourses, second as Israeli 
residents who, annexed to the Jewish state, experience structural exclusion, 
exceptional arrangements and everyday discrimination. 
In Chapter IV, I focus on the bifurcation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, 
arguing that separation is contributing to the reorientation of everyday Palestinian 
life in the city away from the occupied territories and towards Israel. First, I set 
out to establish the physical and political dislocation of East Jerusalem residents 
from the West Bank and from mainstream Palestinian nationalist narratives 
emanating from the occupied territories. I then move on to consider the 
implications of this liminality for Palestinians in the city. I argue that East 
Jerusalem Palestinians no longer experience the occupation as temporary and 
find that few can imagine challenging, let alone replacing Israeli hegemony. I also 
demonstrate that East Jerusalem residents experience complex and sometimes 
contradictory feelings towards and relationships with Israel and its citizens that 
are not shared by West Bankers whose political milieu is altogether different. 
Finally, I argue that exclusive Israeli power in East Jerusalem is defining the limits 
of Palestinian political imagination in the city and diminishing the political horizon 
of its residents. Within this context, I make the case that East Jerusalem 
Palestinians are pursuing individualised ‘improvement of life’ tactics which reflect 
the contracting space in which agency has meaning. 
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In Chapter V, I change perspective, addressing the second aspect of this 
constituency’s marginality, this time as an excluded minority within the Israeli 
state. East Jerusalem residents who recognise the robustness of Israeli rule and 
are acting to improve their prospects within it, none the less find that ‘normal life’ 
is beyond their reach. First, I locate Palestinian exclusion at an ideological level, 
arguing that East Jerusalem residents are trapped by the ethnocratic regime 
between territorial inclusion and political alienation. Second, I highlight the ways 
in which state power is deployed in East Jerusalem to further Israel’s colonial 
ambitions and to maintain the othering of Palestinian residents. I highlight the use 
of exclusion and informality as well as more insidious surveillance and control 
tactics and the reliance on collective punishments which underline the otherness 
of East Jerusalem Palestinians in the Israeli state. Third, I address the ways in 
which these manifestations of Israeli power are experienced by East Jerusalem 
Palestinians, paying particular attention to feelings of otherness and permanent 
temporariness. Finally, I recognise that Israeli-Palestinian relations in East 
Jerusalem are not isolated from the national conflict or the enduring impact of 
Palestinian dispossession. 
Together, Chapters IV and V delineate the new political environment of East 
Jerusalem since the end of Oslo, defining the site of Palestinian identity 
construction in the city. In Chapter VI, I move beyond the praxis of everyday 
Palestinian life towards a broader discussion that addresses how Palestinian 
identity in the city is shaped by the experience of Israeli power and the absence 
of a Palestinian liberation discourse with plausibility for this constituency. Drawing 
on a robustly anti-essentialist understanding of identity rooted in discourse 
theory, I consider the ways in which power shapes the opportunities for agency 
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and how East Jerusalem Palestinians are adapting their subjectivity and struggle 
within the context of dislocation and domination. 
First, I problematise the main assumptions which underpin existing analytic 
approaches to East Jerusalem, highlighting the need to de-centre resistance, de-
essentialise identities and de-totalise the agent. Here, I also detail the way in 
which discourse theory can be applied to shed light on the emergence of new 
political subjectivities and the process of identity construction within the context 
of discursive dislocation. Next, I set out my core argument with regard to the 
constitution of Palestinian political subjectivities in East Jerusalem. I find that 
while residents continue to define themselves within the nationalist idiom 
(Bowman, 2007), the composition of their ‘Palestinian’ identity is being 
determined from below by their adaptations to the circumstances of dislocation 
and domination in the city and the contracting space in which self-direction is 
possible. The actions of residents make visible the emergence of new 
subjectivities in the city that are distanced from both the Palestinian political 
leadership and from mainstream nationalist discourses. These are obscured, 
however, within a top-down optic which privileges essentialised representations 
of identity and objectifies Israeli-Palestinian antagonism. 
Third, I move on to consider Palestinian struggle in East Jerusalem. Rejecting the 
term ‘resistance’ which is often too narrowly defined in relation to Israeli 
occupation, I outline three modes of struggle in the city that reflect the multiple 
subject positions from which Palestinian act. First, residents are struggling 
against Israel’s colonial project in East Jerusalem to remain, as Palestinians, in 
the city. Second, I make the case that residents are struggling to protect and 
preserve their existing rights and status within East Jerusalem against any 
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encroachment by the Palestinian Authority in the city. Third, I draw on the 
‘improvement of life’ attitude outlined in Chapter IV to suggest that Palestinians 
in East Jerusalem are struggling to achieve a ‘normal’ life which, in the annexed 
city, is always in view but constantly out of reach. Finally, I recognise that while 
discursive dislocations threaten identities, they are also the foundations from 
which new subjectivities emerge. In this regard, I look at the political dynamics 
influencing identity construction and ask how they are shaping what it means to 
be Palestinian in East Jerusalem and what mobilisations this might take. I focus 
in particular on the mobilising potential of an urban rights discourse and on the 
relationship between oppression and radicalisation of identity. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
I argue in this thesis that East Jerusalem’s divergent political trajectory has 
implications for Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city which are 
obscured within mainstream analytic frameworks. I make the case that East 
Jerusalemites are doubly marginalised, first as a Palestinian constituency 
dislocated from the political centre, then as Israeli residents excluded from the 
state project. In Chapters IV and V, I examine in detail how Palestinian residents 
act in East Jerusalem and how they frame their everyday experience. In Chapter 
VI, I problematise the assumptions underlying existing approaches to Palestinian 
subjectivity and struggle in East Jerusalem and set out an alternative 
interpretation rooted in the accounts of residents themselves and in a robustly 
anti-essentialist conception of identity. In this chapter, I provide essential 
background to these discussions, drawing heavily on both existing studies of East 
Jerusalem and on the relevant theoretical literature. Crucially, I aim to shed light 
on the political dynamics that set East Jerusalem on its divergent trajectory and 
which underpin the discussion of everyday life and practices in the city that 
follows. 
I separate the modern history of Jerusalem here into distinct chronological 
periods: the decline of Ottoman rule and the era of the British mandate up to 1948; 
the division of the city between Israeli and Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967; and 
the period since 1967 in which the city expanded under Israeli rule. Within the 
latter period, the years between 1993 and 2000 are loosely understood here as 
the Oslo period and the years since 2000 as the post-Oslo period. While the 
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Annapolis Conference in 2007 marks in some ways the last gasp of the Oslo 
process, I argue that on the ground in East Jerusalem at least, Palestinian 
confidence in the potential for an equitable resolution of the conflict had petered 
out some time before this. Indeed, Israeli efforts to limit the activity of key 
Palestinian political institutions in the city began in the mid-1990s and the 
alienation of East Jerusalem residents from mainstream Palestinian nationalist 
narratives to some extent mirrored this process. Physical dislocation from the 
West Bank as a result of the separation Barrier compounded the city’s political 
isolation from 2002. 
In the first section below, I take an overview of East Jerusalem research since 
1990, establishing key themes in the literature and highlighting dominant 
analytical approaches. I also set out some of the key theoretical concepts on 
which these studies draw. Next, I locate my discussion of Palestinian subjectivity 
in the city within the body of theoretical material on identity in general and the key 
texts addressing Palestinian identity in particular. The specific focus of this study 
on Palestinian identity in East Jerusalem reflects a central premise of my 
argument, that Israel’s claims to sovereignty over the Eastern part of the city, and 
its integration into the political, legal and security apparatus of the state, have set 
East Jerusalem on a social and political trajectory which is divergent from that of 
the West Bank. I emphasise this divergence with the West Bank above that of 
East Jerusalem with other Palestinian constituencies since the literature 
continues overwhelmingly to define the West Bank as the natural hinterland of 
Jerusalem. While Gaza’s divergent Palestinian experience is fully acknowledged 
in the literature, that of East Jerusalem is not yet fully recognised for reasons 
which I addressed in Chapter I. 
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Third, I address the political bifurcation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the 
circumstances in which this separation came about and how it is addressed in the 
existing literature. I describe Israel’s colonial project in the city and consider the 
way in which it is represented, including the debate over the state’s ambitions in 
East Jerusalem and how its success or failure should be measured. 
Next, I discuss the decline of Palestinian politics in the city, tackling in particular 
how existing works interpret the Palestinian leadership vacuum and how accounts 
of the collapse of Palestinian political life pay insufficient attention to the normative 
potential of Israeli power. I will also consider here the contribution of studies 
detailing the impact of enduring occupation in East Jerusalem on Palestinian life 
in the city and the provision of important services such as health care and 
education. 
Finally, I come to the specific research questions posed in this thesis. How are 
physical and political dislocation from the West Bank and discursive alienation 
from mainstream nationalist narratives shaping the site of identity construction in 
East Jerusalem? How does Israel’s Judaising project in the city influence the 
subjectivity and struggle of East Jerusalem Palestinians who are constructed as 
an external minority in the Israeli national discourse? 
1 Overview of East Jerusalem in the Literature 
The sanctity of Jerusalem within the three main monotheistic religions sheds light 
on the city’s long history of conquest, conflict and bloodshed. In the contemporary 
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period, Jerusalem retains its religious and symbolic relevance, but it is competing 
nationalist claims to the city that today lend urgency to much of the research.3 
Taraki (2006) notes that the bulk of scholarship on Palestine since 1948 adopts a 
macro-level approach, addressing the impact of war, dispossession and 
occupation on the Palestinian polity, economy and society. With the outbreak of 
the first intifada in 1987, the focus broadened slightly, but this top-down approach 
remained unchallenged. The circumstances and conditions in which Palestinians 
in the occupied territories lived out their lives began to draw academic attention, 
but still rarely were Palestinians considered as anything other than one-
dimensional political subjects who resisted or otherwise challenged the 
occupation. Taraki concludes that “the internal dynamics, stresses, and 
contradictions of the social groups and communities within which people live out 
their lives, or the sensibilities and subjectivities of individuals as they negotiate 
their mundane existence away from the barricades, have not received much 
serious attention from most researchers” (Taraki, 2006: xi). In the same vein, 
Abowd (2014) recognises in the introduction to his study of Colonial Jerusalem 
that few ethnographies have been written about “the daily, lived dimensions of 
intercommunal encounters and conflicts that have comprised this urban centre” 
(Abowd, 2014: 9). 
Academic interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was renewed by the Oslo 
process, resulting in a proliferation of studies that addressed the Holy City’s past, 
                                            
3 For an absorbing account of the city’s turbulent history, focusing on the interconnected 
concepts of mythology, symbolism and the sacred, see ARMSTRONG, K. 1996. Jerusalem: 
One City, Three Faiths, New York, Knopf. For a study which links historical conflicts over 
Jerusalem to 20th century events, see also BENVENISTI, M. 1996. City of Stone: The Hidden 
History of Jerusalem, Berkely, University of California Press. 
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present and future (Dumper, 2014).4 The Madrid Conference (1991) produced few 
tangible results, but the secret talks which began in Oslo in January 1993 set in 
motion more than a decade of on-off negotiations that permanently altered the 
dynamics of the conflict. Oslo reoriented the focus of research on Israel and the 
Palestinians towards the key issues of sovereignty and conflict resolution, yet 
after years of negotiations, intense academic interest and considerable 
international pressure, Israelis and Palestinians failed to reach agreement on the 
core issues which divided them. As the peace process stalled, the future of 
Jerusalem and its holy sites emerged as the primary obstacle to a durable 
resolution. The collapse of negotiations at Camp David in 2000 redirected the 
academic focus, this time towards the obstacles to peace, the impact of ‘facts on 
the ground’ and the viability of the two-state solution. 
The end of Oslo coincided with the collapse of Palestinian leadership in East 
Jerusalem and construction of the separation Barrier, separating the city from the 
West Bank. The failure of the peace process and the altered political geography 
of East Jerusalem encouraged a more multi-disciplinary approach to the city’s 
problems, resulting in a number of edited collections that tackle the issue from a 
range of useful perspectives. Foremost among these are those by Misselwitz and 
                                            
4 In 1990, the Institute for Palestine Studies launched The Jerusalem Quarterly in Ramallah and 
this vast, eclectic range of articles has grown into an essential resource for historians and political 
scientists alike. Human rights and civil liberties organisations, as well as United Nations bodies 
such as UNRWA, OCHA-oPt, and UNESCO, have produced a wealth of well-researched reports 
over the last two decades addressing the detrimental impact of Israel’s occupation of East 
Jerusalem on basic Palestinian freedoms including movement, access to healthcare, education 
and housing. 
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Rieniets (2006) and Breger and Ahimier (2002). Both offer well-researched 
insights from academic specialists.  
Salem (2006) classifies the literature of the post-Oslo period, including that by 
Palestinian and Arab writers on Jerusalem, into six main categories. Each of 
these, he suggests, is underpinned by the sovereignty paradigm, a defensive 
position taken to prove or protect the rights of one side or the other over the city. 
The majority of studies fall into Salem’s first category, that of political scenarios. 
The second category comprises descriptive studies, detailing what is happening 
on the ground, particularly with regard to settlement expansion, and describing 
the status of the social, economic and education sectors. The third, fourth and 
fifth categories outlined by Salem comprise legal studies, historical studies and 
works dominated by urban planning issues respectively. The sixth, smallest 
category, addresses people’s needs and processes of adaptation in East 
Jerusalem and are generally descriptive, focusing in on a particular segment of 
society such as the elderly, the sick or the very young. I suggest that while all of 
these categories are significant, the sovereignty approach that dominates existing 
work obscures the extent to which top-down processes influence the construction 
of identity at ground level. 
I argue that the sovereignty paradigm relies on essentialised identities and 
objective antagonism, and overlooks the impact of long term occupation and 
Israeli colonialist policies on individual subjectivities. It also fails to take account 
of the absence of Palestinian leadership in the city and the changing urban reality 
on its Palestinian residents, how they interact with the matrix of power and the 
processes by which they construct their identity. Rarely does the post-Oslo 
literature address the impact of the Israeli project in Jerusalem or the alienation 
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of residents from mainstream nationalist narratives or locate the question of 
identity in East Jerusalem within the context of dislocation and discrimination that 
exists there. I suggest below that the Palestinian experience in East Jerusalem is 
informing both their attitudes towards the occupying power and the position of 
residents in relation to internal Palestinian struggles, thereby reinforcing the 
structures of power in which they act. The structures in which identity is 
constructed shape the moment of identity production and are also transformed by 
that moment (Holland, 2001). 
While the sovereignty paradigm locates debate over the future of East Jerusalem 
firmly within the framework of objective antagonism between two competing 
nationalist narratives, the complexities of domination demand an alternative, 
ground level analysis that takes account of the impact of the city’s particular 
circumstances on the process of Palestinian identity construction there. Below I 
look at several approaches which dominate the recent literature on East 
Jerusalem. Through this study, I aim to build on these works and contribute to 
them. 
1.1 Contested Cities 
In the post-Oslo period, East Jerusalem has been extensively investigated within 
the framework of ‘divided’ or ‘contested cities’ (Bollens, 2000, Dumper, 2014, 
Hepburn, 2004, Klein, 2005, Pullan, 2011, Pullan, 2013b, Yacobi, 2015, Yacobi 
and Pullan, 2014). Hepburn (2004) identifies the contested city as “a major urban 
centre in which two or more ethnically-conscious groups – divided by religion, 
language and/or culture and perceived history – co-exist in a situation where 
neither group is willing to concede supremacy to the other” (Hepburn, 2004: 2). 
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Focusing in detail on six cities - Gdansk, Trieste, Brussels, Montreal, Belfast and 
Jerusalem - he explores the ways in which such problems have occurred, how 
they are managed and how they might be resolved. The conclusion raises a 
number of interesting comparative questions, but Hepburn’s contribution is in 
essence a collection of detailed case studies rather than a unified theoretical 
framework for future study. 
Building on this contribution, the ESRC Conflict in Cities project (2007-2012), 
brought together a multi-disciplinary team of academics to investigate how the 
nature and dynamics of conflicts over state identity and territory manifest 
themselves in divided cities and how these cities and everyday urban life are used 
within the wider conflict. The project identified divided cities as arenas of 
intensified ethno-national conflicts, with particular attention paid to the role of 
architecture and the urban fabric as a backdrop for everyday activities and 
events.5 
Focusing in particular on Jerusalem and Belfast, the working papers and 
publications arising from this project have made a significant contribution to the 
extent and direction of contemporary research on East Jerusalem. The project 
also takes a more theoretical focus, considering in particular the commonalities of 
causation in divided cities. Anderson (2008) locates Hepburn’s contested cities 
category at the centre of a broader continuum with ‘state-divided’ cities at one end 
and ‘ethnically-divided’ ones at the other, and relabels the category ‘ethno-
nationally divided cities’ which combine the problems of both ends. Arguing that 
there is a missing general literature, Anderson begins to lay a theoretical 
                                            
5 http://www.conflictincities.org/aboutus.html 
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groundwork of ethno-nationally divided cities, focusing in particular on the role of 
the contested peripheries of empire in the historical origins of ethnically divided 
cities.  
In Jerusalem, as well as Belfast and beyond, politicised ethnic divisions were pre-
national in origin, Anderson argues, but it was mainly towards the end of empire 
that ethnic divisions were transformed into ethno-national ones. The Ottoman and 
British empires were directly relevant to the creation of the ethno-nationally 
divided city of Jerusalem and Israel, Anderson claims, is today as much, if not 
more, an imperial as a national project – at once the “‘client state’ standard bearer 
of US imperialism in the Middle East and also imperial in its own right” in terms of 
its occupation and aggressive settlement policy (Anderson, 2008: 13). 
There is also a significant body of literature addressing the frontiers of contested 
cities in general and those of East Jerusalem in particular (Dumper, 1997, 
Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999, Pullan, 2011, Pullan, 2013a, Pullan et al., 2007). 
Despite Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and its designation of the 
‘reunified’ city as Israel’s eternal capital, Klein has argued that Jerusalem is still 
very much a frontier city, that “East Jerusalem remains the east-looking 
metropolitan centre of the West Bank” and that the city’s deep ethnic-national, 
social, economic and political divisions must be recognised (Klein, 2008). 
Frontiers between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem undoubtedly persist, but 
a number of recent studies emphasise their essential ambiguity. Weizman (2007) 
describes frontiers as “deep, shifting, fragmented and elastic territories” in which 
the “distinctions between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ cannot be clearly marked” 
(Weizman, 2007: 4). Busbridge (2014), meanwhile, focuses on the “dynamic of 
blurred separation in the city” and recommends a re-examination of the frontier 
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in Jerusalem as “a site of conflict, contestation and dispossession”, but also one 
that “binds the settler and native together.” Pullan (2011) describes the frontier 
as “a place of contradiction, where the ‘wild’ and the ‘tamed’ do not cancel each 
other but play out different roles, sometimes in reciprocity, and with different 
levels of impact” (Pullan, 2001: 17). Frontiers are places of increased constraint, 
surveillance and special security measures, but lawlessness is never fully 
controlled or else the frontier would cease to exist and ‘the other’ would no longer 
be alien or feared. Pullan points to intensive Israeli settlement activity around 
Jerusalem and notes that radical planning of the frontier has dominated the city 
since 1967. She argues, however, that Israel’s Judaisation project in East 
Jerusalem and a programme of aggressive ideological settlement in and around 
the Old City are creating new frontiers at the core of occupied Jerusalem (Pullan, 
2011). 
The ‘divided city’ paradigm has dominated critical research on Jerusalem over the 
last two decades (Shlomo, 2017: 224). Much as recent governmentality 
perspectives argue that top-down processes that have taken place in the city 
during this time beyond the scrutiny of the divided city approach (Shlomo, 2017a), 
I adopt a bottom-up approach here, arguing that unobserved changes are taking 
place in terms of Palestinian subjectivities in the city. 
1.2 Urban Policy and Ethnic Conflict 
Jerusalem has also proved a useful case study for analysts of urban policy and 
planning in contested cities and their contribution to contemporary Jerusalem 
studies has been substantial. A number of important works have addressed the 
relationship between governing ideology and urban policy in today’s contested 
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cities. Bollens (2000) contrasts divided cities in which conflicts are addressed 
within accepted political frameworks with polarised cities where governance is 
often viewed by a substantial segment of the ethnic minority population as 
artificial, imposed or illegitimate (Bollens, 2000: 9-10).  
In these polarised or contested cities, the governing ethnic group may limit the 
territorial expression of the minority through the deliberate expansion of the 
dominant group’s urban space at the expense of that of the subordinate group. 
These issues deflect attention from the root causes of conflict. “In the urban 
setting” Bollens argues, this means that “issues of sovereignty and autonomy 
become reducible to issues over neighbourhoods and suburban growth” (Bollens, 
2000: 15). Yiftachel’s revision of critical urban theory to take account of the 
structural exclusion of marginalised populations in new urban colonial contexts 
highlights the way in which Bollens’ separation of divided and polarised cities 
might be blurred. Identities might be radicalised and struggles transformed from 
agonistic into antagonist “when marginalised groups become politically aware of 
the impregnable barriers to their equality and inclusion” (Yiftachel, 2009a: 254). 
This is discussed in further detail below. 
Since 1967, Israeli planning and development policies in East Jerusalem have 
been designed with the aim of enhancing Israeli control over the whole city. 
Central government ideology has dominated the goals and strategies of local 
planning and municipal objectives have been shaped by perceptions of the 
national interest in relation to politics, demography and security. In terms of the 
Palestinian response to this policy, Bollens argues that self-interest has taken 
priority over the public interest. According to one West Bank urban planner 
interviewed by Bollens, “occupation, fragmentation, and the absence of a national 
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authority have deprived the Palestinian people of the opportunity to develop a 
framework of public interest” (Ibid: 116). Bollens identifies four tactics of 
Palestinian resistance to Israeli control over Jerusalem – the electoral boycott, 
sumud (steadfastness), ‘illegal’ construction, and community activism and protest 
(Ibid:118) – but concludes that these tactics are reactionary. A more “pro-active 
set of strategies aimed at countering Israeli expansionary policies in Jerusalem” 
is required (Ibid: 136). 
However, Bollens also finds that governing ideology does not always translate 
straightforwardly into urban policy. A dominant ethnic group that attempts to 
penetrate an antagonistic ethnic population geographically in order to fragment 
the minority’s sense of community might, paradoxically, reduce the security of the 
majority. For example, in bringing antagonistic groups closer together spatially, 
Bollens argues that Israeli expansionism in East Jerusalem has increased 
tensions as well as Jewish vulnerability. More territory produces fear as well as 
off-limits areas for Jewish Israelis and results in less genuine authority. This 
prompts additional unilateral action to maintain political authority, further 
exacerbating tensions and so on. Bollens concludes that “in the end, Israeli urban 
policy that has facilitated Israeli domination of the urban political landscape may 
be creating the very conditions of Palestinian extremism and antagonism that it 
set out to suppress in the first place” (ibid: 115). 
More recently, the link between urban planning in East Jerusalem and Israel’s 
geopolitical goals in the city has received significant attention, particularly, though 
not exclusively, from a new generation of Israeli political geographers (Braier, 
2013, Chiodelli, 2012, Jabareen, 2010, Legrand and Yiftachel, 2014, Rokem, 
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2012, Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2002). Their work is significant and is discussed in 
more detail in section three below and is revisited throughout the thesis. 
1.3 The Spatialities of Power 
Overlapping the literature on divided or contested cities, is the body of theoretical 
work on the spatialities of power in urban arenas with high levels of ethno-national 
conflict. Recognising that cities are at the epicentre of many existing ethno-
national and religious conflicts, Pullan (2013b) suggests that “the spatial 
ramifications of conflict in urban centres extend well beyond the notion of territory” 
(Pullan, 2013: 19). 
Space is understood here not in relation to bounded territory, but in terms of the 
human experience. “We are always within a situation, not standing outside of it… 
Rather than fixed boundaries, the view from within the situation means that the 
horizon is viewed from within a particular vantage point and moves as we move… 
While modern geometric notions that see space in terms of territory are 
prominent, a more practical and grounded experience of space exists in terms of 
how we carry out our everyday lives, oriented by a moving horizon” (Pullan, 2013: 
20).  
The urban space of East Jerusalem is politically produced; it is inseparable from 
the ethno-national imperative of the Israeli state that is best described within a 
settler-colonial framework. Within this study, I investigate the interactions 
between the state meta-narrative of Judaisation and the Palestinian residents of 
East Jerusalem who exist within the politics and economy of the state beyond the 
desired limits of inclusion in this colonial project. 
36 
 
Central to this project are three related theoretical claims derived from Lefebvrian 
approaches to space. First, space is a social product that reproduces power 
relations. Lefebvre (1991) asks if it is conceivable that the exercise of hegemony 
leaves space untouched. “Could space be nothing more than the passive locus 
of social relations?” Concluding that the answer must be no, he argues that 
ideology amounts to rather little without a space to which it refers. “What we call 
ideology only achieves consistency by intervening in social space and in its 
production and by taking on body. Ideology per se might be described primarily 
as a discourse upon social space.” Cities and their landscapes are not just there, 
but rather they are a product of socio-political relations and struggles for power 
(Nolte and Yacobi, 2015).  
Second, social space as a means of control, domination and power, also escapes 
in part from those who would make use of it (Lefebvre, 1999: 26). Dominant 
groups may produce social space, but they do not always control it. Within the 
representational ‘lived space’ described by Lefebvre, the possibilities for 
resistance and reorganisation may emerge (Fisher and Mennel, 2010). 
Oppositional ideologies may exist among subordinate groups, however loosely 
articulated, which ensure that hegemony is never complete (Kincheloe and 
McLaren, 2002). Urban space is not shaped unidirectionally from above 
therefore, but rather, by living the space produced from above, subordinated 
groups have the power to subvert its intended meaning and purpose. By 
examining the use of space in their everyday lives, we might see East Jerusalem 
Palestinians as political subjects with agency and the potential to produce 
counter-hegemonic or anti-hegemonic meanings of their own.  
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De Certeau (1984) points out the fundamental inversions brought about by the 
users of space. Spatial practices can be diverted from their intended aims by the 
use made of them, not simply through rejection or transforming them from within, 
but in the many different ways of using such practices in the services of rules, 
customs or convictions foreign to the coloniser. In this way, it is possible to 
transform the dominant order and make it function in an alternative register.  
Third, space has a normative effect. “Thanks to the operation of power, practical 
space is the bearer of norms and constraints… As a body of constraints, 
stipulations and rules to be followed, social space acquires a normative and 
repressive efficacy – linked instrumentally to its objectality – that makes the 
efficacy of mere ideologies and representations pale in comparison.” (Lefebvre, 
1991: 358) Central to this thesis is an exploration of the extent to which the 
colonially produced space of East Jerusalem, which reproduces the ethno-
national principles of the state, shapes the behaviour of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians and ultimately influences their sense of self and their future 
possibilities (Maiguashca, 2013).  
This three-part concept facilitates an analysis of the manner in which space is 
appropriated by the powerful who seek to reinforce the hegemonic narrative 
(Yacobi, 2009). Lefebvre’s understanding of the social production of space 
provides a theoretical basis for understanding how East Jerusalem Palestinians 
live the city from below and how the space in which they live is not neutral, but 
ideologically constructed. It also lays the foundations for a micro-scale analysis 
of how the structures of power can be both reinforced and subverted from below.  
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Recent research undertaken by Israeli academics such as Yiftachel, Yacobi, 
Shlomo, Shtern and Braier offer sophisticated and insightful interpretations of the 
state’s colonial project and its impact on urban space. These accounts inform 
much of the analysis that follows. Through this thesis, I aim to build on and add 
to this body of knowledge by considering the implications of these colonial 
processes for Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in East Jerusalem. 
1.4 Critical Urban Theory 
Derived from the writings of Lefebvre, Harvey, Marcuse and Castells, critical 
urban theory emphasises the “politically and ideologically mediated, socially 
contested and therefore malleable character of urban space” (Brenner, 2009: 
198). It is grounded on an antagonistic relationship to existing urban formations, 
insisting that alternative, more just forms of urbanisation are possible, though they 
may be suppressed by dominant practices and ideologies. In short, critical urban 
theory requires the critique of ideology as well as the critique of power, inequality 
and injustice within and between cities (Brenner, 2009: 198). It is this that 
distinguishes critical urban theory from ‘mainstream’ urban theory.  
In his study of the Arab-Jewish city, Yacobi (2009) draws on Lefebvrian thinking 
to analyse the way in which “space is appropriated by those in power who are 
motivated to reinforce the hegemonic narrative” (Yacobi, 2009: 11). Lefebvre’s 
theoretical proposals also facilitate consideration of the way in which 
marginalised populations approach space and produce counter-hegemonic 
meanings of place (ibid: 11). However, Yacobi finds that Lefebvre’s argument 
overlooks important aspects of social space, while marginalising issues such as 
gender, ethnicity and migration. Yacobi aims to go beyond the one-directional 
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understanding of political power as the defining factor in the shaping of space 
and suggests instead an analysis of “the ways in which structures of power are 
encouraged by the powerless” (ibid: 12). By linking Lefebvrian thinking with 
postcolonial theory, Yacobi aims to challenge conventional understandings of 
Israel’s socio-political polarities and shed light on “the spatial counter-products of 
and their role in the production of space. 
In his study of Bedouin Arabs in Israel’s Beersheba metropolitan region, Yiftachel 
(2009a) posits two main theoretical arguments that are of relevance here. First, 
he argues that most critical urban theories have not sufficiently accounted for the 
causes and implications of a new political geography, characterised by ‘gray 
spacing’ and informality, and for the emergence of new urban colonial relations. 
For Yiftachel, the new geography locates the politics of identity at the centre of 
urban regimes, alongside but by no means subsumed under the class or civil 
engines of change typically emphasised by critical urban theory. 
Second, Yiftachel maintains that this new geography is recreating subjectivities 
that do not revolve solely around the state’s central power. The new politics, he 
claims, frequently distances identities and sources of mobilisation from the state, 
“signalling the fragmentation of the apparatus of power ‘from below’” (Yiftachel, 
2009: 248). While these often begin with struggles for ‘insurgent citizenship,’ 
there is potential for them to transform into struggles for multiple sovereignties. 
As such, Yiftachel concludes, there is a paradox in that the central power which 
uses gray spacing as a tool of control is undermined by the process it initiated. 
Political identities and processes are distanced from the state and breed political 
radicalism which is channelled into projects of alternative identity.  
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Critical urban theory often assumes as its point of departure the basic condition 
of formally equal citizenship and political membership and colonial relations are 
notably absent from the debate over the formation of urban social relations 
(Yiftachel, 2009a). Yiftachel (2009) therefore argues that a new critical urban 
theory is required that includes the forces shaping the new colonial order marked 
by informality and ‘gray spacing’.6 This is an extremely valuable concept that I will 
return to frequently below. 
Yiftachel (2009a) defines ‘gray spacing’ as the practice of indefinitely positioning 
populations between legality and full membership and eviction or worse. It refers 
to “developments, enclaves, populations and transactions positioned between the 
‘lightness’ of legality/approval/safety and the ‘darkness’ of 
eviction/destruction/death. Gray spaces are neither integrated nor eliminated, 
forming pseudo-permanent margins of today’s urban regions, which exist partially 
outside the gaze of state authorities and city plans” (Yiftachel, 2009a: 250). 
Roy (2011) welcomes Yiftachel’s conceptualisation of gray spacing as an 
example of the new itineraries of research and analysis being charted in the field 
of urban studies which are helping to disrupt, from within, the study of subaltern 
urbanism. For Roy, gray spacing makes evident the flexibility of sovereign power 
and offers a way of analysing the manner in which state power formalises and 
criminalises different spatial configurations. For Roy, gray spacing, along with 
other emergent concepts such as peripheries, urban informality and zones of 
exception, is what Chantal Mouffe describes a ‘constitutive outside’, that is an 
                                            
6 Following other scholars in the field, I retain Yiftachel’s use of the US spelling of ‘gray’ rather 
the British spelling ‘grey’ in order to maintain consistency with other works. 
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outside that by being brought inside introduces a ‘radical undecidability’ to the 
analysis of urbanism (Mouffe, 2000). 
East Jerusalem continues to receive considerable academic attention, but rarely 
is the micro-level impact of top down processes considered from the perspective 
of those on the ground without essentialising Palestinian residents as resistors of 
external domination. The urgency of issues pertaining to sovereignty and borders 
means that top-down approaches to East Jerusalem continue to dominate the 
existing literature. Studies which emphasise Israel’s asymmetrical power and the 
harnessing of urban planning to the state’s colonial ambitions are increasingly 
cognisant of ground-level processes, but none the less broadly emphasise, in 
response, the agency of oppressed populations and acts which define the limits 
of state control. 
 Rarely, do they dare to consider the normative impact of lived space on 
Palestinian subjectivity and struggle. Yiftachel and Yacobi (2003) note that “even 
the important recent work on cities within ethnonational conflicts (Benvenisti, 
1996; Bollens, 1999; Dumper, 1997) has tended to privilege issues of national 
control and territory.” Salem (2006) argues that “unless the issue of citizens’ 
sovereignty versus formal sovereignty is tackled, people’s adaptations to 
occupation cannot be analysed.”  I suggest in the chapters which follow that the 
privileging of a top-down analytic optic distorts interpretations of everyday 
Palestinian life in East Jerusalem and severely over-estimates the opportunities 
for Palestinian agency in the city. I suggest that it also obscures the multiple 
subject positions occupied by East Jerusalem Palestinians and the multitude of 
potential meanings and motivations which inform their actions. 
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Map 1: Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories (United Nations, January 
2004). 
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2 The Emergence of Palestinian Identity 
In this section I locate the issue of Palestinian subjectivity formation within the 
literature on Palestinian identity in particular and processes of identity 
construction in general. In Chapter VI, I draw on the vocabulary of discourse 
theory to discuss Palestinian subjectivity and identity in East Jerusalem, and 
these terms are touched on here, but addressed in greater detail below. 
In his seminal work on Palestinian identity, Khalidi (2013) emphasises that several 
overlapping identities operate in the way that Palestinians have come to define 
themselves as a people. These identities are not necessarily perceived as 
contradictory by Palestinians themselves, but are not always accurately 
understood by others. The existence of such overlapping perceptions of identity 
is unsurprising, he argues, where new national narratives have historically 
developed amidst the existence of many separate loyalties.  
Khalidi chronicles the emergence of a uniform Palestinian identity through three 
historical stages. In the first stage, before the First World War, this identity was 
confined to a relatively restricted stratum, composed mainly of a new, middle 
class, urban, educated elite. Within this circle, however, as throughout the wider 
population, “the new sense of Palestinian identity competed and overlapped with 
Ottomanism and Arabism, as well as older religious, local, and familial loyalties.”  
In the second stage, broadly correlating to the period of the British mandate from 
the end of World War One to just before the catastrophic events of 1948, the 
sense of a Palestinian identity spread to include the entire political class. Their 
losing struggles against the British and Zionists deepened this feeling, making it 
the chief category of identity for many Palestinians. Kimmerling (2000) argues that 
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“if one wants to single out one major factor that shaped and built the Palestinian 
collective identity and made the Palestinians into a people, but at the same time 
contributed to their failure – we can point to the role of the British Mandatory 
power” (Kimmerling, 2000: 63-4). The spread of education and literacy as well as 
the expansion of the press during this period, also ensured that the elements of 
Palestinian identity were transmitted to the wider population. However, 
differences of outlook remained in Palestinian society, particularly between the 
urban and rural populations, the well-off and the poor, and the literate and the 
illiterate. 
In the final stage, these differences were largely expunged by the events of 1948, 
which proved a “great leveller” among the Palestinian population. The refugee 
crisis affected both urban and rural communities and in the UNRWA camps all 
children received an education, meaning literacy levels across the population 
increased significantly. The shared experience of the Nakba (catastrophe) and 
the turbulent events of its immediate aftermath completed the process of 
identification. 
Bowman (2007) notes, however, that the Nakba initiated nearly a decade long 
cessation in the elaboration of Palestinian identity. Khalidi also acknowledges the 
apparent hiatus in manifestations of Palestinian identity during the 1950s and 
1960s, in part explained by the devastating impact of events between 1947 and 
1948 and partly due to the appeal of pan-Arabism. With the territorial division of 
Palestine between Israel, Jordan and Egypt and the flight or expulsion of much of 
the Arab population, there no longer seemed to exist a central locus of Palestinian 
identity. Bowman describes this as the “loss of reference points around which to 
reconstitute identities.” As a result of the diverse experience of Palestinians after 
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1948, “communities in the various milieu of Palestinian life began to reconstitute 
themselves in relation to their settings rather than with reference to a shared 
‘Palestinian’ identity” (Bowman, 2007: 124-5)  
However, Khalidi notes that a generation of nascent Palestinian nationalist groups 
was developing during this period, clandestinely at first, and more openly in the 
mid-1960s. The resounding defeat of pan-Arabism in 1967 revived particularlist 
Palestinian nationalist movements and facilitated Fatah’s rise to dominance over 
Palestinian politics. Bowman argues that as a guerrilla organisation committed to 
military attacks on Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was able to 
represent the common ambition of Palestinians in exile and under occupation to 
fight back. “For the first time, there was an objective correlate to Palestinians’ 
disparate desires for restitution” (Bowman, 2007: 126). Crucially, it was the PLO’s 
claim to represent all the diverse Palestinian constituencies dispossessed by the 
creation of Israel that made it a successful symbol for Palestinian national identity. 
“Its programme was solely that of reinstituting a Palestinian national entity on the 
territory of Mandate Palestine, and it made no effort to articulate the nature of that 
future entity save to say that it would be ‘Palestinian.’ ‘Palestinians’ were able to 
recognise themselves as addressed by the oppositional rhetoric of the PLO 
insofar as that rhetoric did not specify any particular identity to its addressees 
other than their recognition of themselves as somehow striped of their rights by 
the antagonism of the ‘Zionist entity’” (ibid: 126). 
Cohen (2011) suggests that Israel’s conquest of East Jerusalem in 1967 occurred 
“in the midst of a process of strengthening of Palestinian national identity” among 
the city’s inhabitants (Cohen, 2011: 6). If there was a sense within the local 
political leadership that Jerusalem remained an inseparable part of Jordan (or at 
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least that internal disagreements should be settled at a later date), the Fatah 
movement was in no doubt that Jerusalem was the capital of Palestine. Cohen 
puts the organisation’s rapid mobilisation and reorganisation in East Jerusalem 
and the West Bank after the defeat of June 1967 down to its concern that a 
political agreement might be reached that would see Israeli forces withdraw and 
the newly occupied territories returned to Jordan (ibid: 7).  
When the Palestinian National Council restructured its composition in July 1968, 
Fatah representation increased and in February 1969 Yasser Arafat was elected 
from among the movement’s leaders to head the PLO. Cohen maintains that 
“these developments meant the strengthening of the unique Palestinian identity 
and led to greater support for the PLO in East Jerusalem as well” (ibid: 8). It was 
not until the 1980s, however, that Fatah began to organise politically in the 
occupied territories and to develop its socio-political network, later known as the 
Tanzim. Among this network’s founders in East Jerusalem was Faisal Husseini 
who, limited by an Israeli restraining order to the municipal boundaries of 
Jerusalem for a five-year period (1982-1987), devoted himself to local action. 
(ibid: 12-13). 
East Jerusalem Palestinians were highly active during the early weeks of the first 
intifada, but Israeli security forces responded severely and participation subsided 
somewhat thereafter relative to the West Bank. Commercial strikes, stone-
throwing, the burning of vehicles belonging to Jews and attacks on other symbols 
of ‘Israeliness’ continued, however, though the result was a decline in service 
provision to Palestinian resident as well as a reduction in the enforcement of 
Israeli law (Cohen, 2011). The leadership’s call for Palestinians to detach 
themselves from Israeli institutions was more complex for East Jerusalem 
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residents than for Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories. Cohen 
maintains that “the Intifada raised the level of tension and violence between Jews 
and Palestinians living in the city, while revealing at the same time, the 
uniqueness of East Jerusalem, and the differences between it and the other 
regions occupied by Israel in 1967” (Cohen, 2011: 16). 
When political negotiations between Israel and the ‘internal’ Palestinian 
leadership were eclipsed by the secret Oslo channel, the PLO’s willingness to 
compromise on the issue of Jerusalem clinched the deal. For Cohen, “there is no 
doubt that excluding Arab Jerusalem from the jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Authority increased the distance between Jerusalem residents and the residents 
of the West Bank, reinforced their status as being connected to Israel no less than 
to the Occupied Territories, and augmented the creation of a unique Jerusalem 
Palestinian identity” (Cohen, 2011: 18). 
Bowman points to a wider dislocation arising from the Oslo agreement. In the 
Palestinian nationalist imaginary before this, he claims, “all Palestinians were ‘the 
same’ insofar as all of them – as Palestinians – could recognise their true selves 
as mutilated and denied by the violence of the Zionist enemy.” The diverse 
experience of Palestinians was ‘fixed’ in relation to antagonism with Israel, and 
the specificities of each constituency’s circumstances defined their mode of 
struggle. However, it was the progress towards a settlement with Israel, brought 
about by the success of the first intifada, which shattered the broad consensus by 
raising the possibility of an actual state and with it questions about what that state 
would look like. 
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In the context of fragmentation and dispersion, and without generalised 
characteristics which define all Palestinians, members imagine their co-nationals 
to be those who experience similar antagonisms to them. “They are unlikely to 
recognise as ‘like themselves’ others who suffer from different forms of assault 
on their identities, insofar as those other assaults are not the same as those they 
see constituting a ‘Palestinian’ identity” (Bowman, 1994). 
Thus, Bowman concludes that “at the moment the boundary dividing the 
antagonist from the object of its violence breaks down, the consensus on identity 
discursively structured around that antagonism loses its coherence. The wide field 
of Palestinian experience was ‘fixed’ by the perceived antagonism which made 
the various experiences of those who occupied it coherent in nationalist terms. 
When perceptions of the nature of that antagonism are transformed by events 
such as the Oslo agreement, various occupants of the formerly ‘sutured’ field find 
that former enemies have become allies and, respectively, that former allies 
appear as antagonists.” This apparent disappearance of the “constitutive 
antagonism,” he argued, would “only lead to new searches for matrices of 
identification” (Bowman, 2007: 128). 
Bowman (2007) suggests that “national identity is an historical construct which 
emerges from a reformulation of one’s relation to a social field rather than 
something essential and non-contingent.” Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s 
definition of antagonism as a radical threat to the socially constructed subjectivity 
of the individual which disrupts a previously constituted identity, Bowman stresses 
the role of perceived violence from an ‘other’ in the formulation of national identity. 
National movements emerged in Mandatory Palestine and pre-dissolution 
Yugoslavia only when antagonisms between the groups occupying these 
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territories required it. I consider below the extent to which us and them boundaries 
are blurred in the post-Oslo period and how far the externalisation of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians within Israel (and Palestinian efforts to ‘exclude the 
excluder’) are preventing fuller integration in the absence of a two-state solution. 
In Chapter VI, I provide a fuller explanation of the discourse theory approach to 
identity construction touched on by Bowman and on which I draw below. 
Throughout this thesis, I argue that identity is contingent, fluid and strategically 
constructed. Holland (2001) maintains that identities are always vulnerable to 
change and subject to improvisation. Through this process, identities make a 
modicum of self-direction possible and, as such, provide opportunities for the 
mediation of agency. The sites of the self, therefore, are plural, even competing.  
In this thesis, I lend support to the view that the space in which subjectivities are 
constructed both shapes identity and is itself transformed by that moment of 
identity production. In this sense, agents operate within and upon power 
structures. Grossberg (1996) has urged a relocation of the study of identity within 
the context of modern formations of power, suggesting that questions of identity 
should be rearticulated to include the possibility of constructing historical agency 
and to let go of notions of resistance that assume the subject stands entirely 
outside of and against established power structures. This thesis will approach 
identity as a construction, emphasising that it is always an unfinished process, 
improvised through social practice in historically specific contexts (Holland, 2001). 
I locate the site of Palestinian identity construction in East Jerusalem within the 
context of de facto Israeli control and the narrowing opportunities for political 
agency. A bottom-up perspective provides far greater scope for unsettling 
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essentialised identities and recognising the recreation of subjectivities in 
circumstances of dislocation. 
3 East Jerusalem’s Divergent Political Trajectory 
The diversity of the Palestinian experience is widely acknowledged within 
mainstream studies, but the political trajectory of East Jerusalem Palestinians - 
after 1948 and since 1967 - is seldom distinguished from that of other West 
Bankers who found themselves first absorbed by Jordan and then occupied by 
Israel. The literature documents local identities in Palestine, but typically 
emphasises the nationalist narrative that binds them together. In this section, I 
set out to make clear that Israel’s colonial, Judaising ambitions in East Jerusalem 
have established this Palestinian constituency on a tangential political trajectory 
which I will later argue has significant implications for Palestinian subjectivity and 
struggle in the city. 
3.1  From Partition to Occupation 
In May 1948, the last remaining mandatory forces withdrew from Palestine, 
drawing to a close a period of British rule that had effectively begun in 1917. In 
the conflict that escalated as British authority waned, a United Nations plan to 
establish Jerusalem as a corpus separatum, administered by a special 
international regime, was stillborn. Revisionist historical accounts of the period 
conclude that in Jerusalem it was the Jewish side that seized the initiative in May 
1948, violated the agreement and launched a vigorous offensive to capture the 
Old City. Transjordanian forces responded in kind and after more than a week of 
fierce fighting, the Jewish Quarter surrendered to Transjordanian forces (Rogan 
and Shlaim, 2007). At the end of the conflict, the 56% of mandate Palestine 
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allocated to the Zionists in the UN plan had expanded to 78% and Jerusalem was 
divided into separate Israeli and Jordanian controlled territories. The boundary 
known as the Green Line was officially recognised by Israel and Jordan in the 
1949 Armistice agreement. 
Dumper (1997) describes the marked divergence between Israeli controlled West 
Jerusalem and Jordanian controlled East Jerusalem during the 19 years of 
partition. Population numbers in East Jerusalem remained static while investment 
in infrastructure and services was neglected by a Jordanian government unwilling 
to support the development of a ‘Palestinian’ capital in Jerusalem at the expense 
of the Jordanian one in Amman. The Jordanian government worked “persistently 
and vigorously” to establish Amman as the kingdom’s only political and economic 
centre, purposely holding back Jerusalem’s development, depriving it of any 
political power base and abolishing its limited administrative independence 
(Benvenisti, 1996: 32). In this context, East Jerusalem “declined into a provincial 
backwater” (Dumper, 1997: 21). The Jordanian government stripped the city of 
the status it had enjoyed during the mandate period, targeting in particular the 
traditional authority of local notable families (Rekhess, 2008). 
By contrast, during the same period the Western side of the city was appointed 
capital of the fledgling Israeli state and its Jewish population doubled in number 
to 200,000. Unlike other Israeli cities, however, West Jerusalem was heavily 
dependent on government investment and public sector employment. There was, 
of course, no access to holy sites on the Jordanian side of the divide and the 
western part of the city had little to offer tourists or industry. Thus, while one side 
of Jerusalem was starved of government investment, the other seemed only to 
survive as a result of it (Dumper, 1997: 21). This situation was dramatically 
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altered by Israel’s victory in the Six Day War. Territorial gains brought all of 
mandatory Palestine including East Jerusalem under Israeli authority in 1967.7  
3.2 The Israeli Project in East Jerusalem 
Israeli rule in East Jerusalem is framed by the state’s ethno-national project in the 
city. Defining the aims of this project, the practices involved and their implications 
for Palestinian residents and for the peace process is a recurring theme in the 
Oslo and post-Oslo literature. It is directly relevant to an understanding of 
Palestinian politics and identity in East Jerusalem and sheds light on the failure 
of the Palestinian national leadership to project a nationalist narrative with 
plausibility for its constituency there. 
Here, I outline the collection of Israeli policies and practices that define the state’s 
project in East Jerusalem. I consider the treatment of the Israeli project in 
Jerusalem in the existing literature and assess the arguments regarding its 
success or failure. I then move on to explain how this thesis intends to go beyond 
these arguments, linking the Israeli project in Jerusalem to the hegemonisation of 
the Palestinian political imagination and the atomisation of Palestinian society. 
The strategic impetus of the Israeli project in East Jerusalem is broadly defined 
as the Judaisation and de-Palestinianisation of the city and both municipality and 
state have been resolute in their pursuit of these goals (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014). 
This twofold policy – to promote Zionist expansion while limiting Palestinian 
growth – involves the expansion of Jewish demographic, territorial, political and 
economic control of Jerusalem alongside severe restrictions on Palestinian 
development, expansion and growth. 
                                            
7 The Golan Heights were also captured, from Syria, and the Sinai Peninsula, from Egypt. 
53 
 
The Israeli project in East Jerusalem began immediately following the 1967 
victory that brought East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli 
military occupation. From that moment on, “Israel embarked on a campaign to 
manipulate the demographic and geographic realities of Jerusalem in order to 
consolidate its claim of sovereignty over the entire city” (Isaac and Khalilieh, 201: 
109). Below, I focus on three key aspects of this policy – territory, demography 
and planning. 
3.2.1 Territory 
While sovereignty over Jerusalem is contested now as it has been in the past, the 
physical borders of the city have not remained constant in the modern period. 
Dumper (1997) explains that the Palestinian territories are being fragmented “by 
the wedge of an ever-expanding entity” labelled Jerusalem, but which 
geographically bears little resemblance to the historic city. Indeed, there is no 
sense in which the boundaries of the modern city as defined by Israel can be 
understood as a pre-existing entity that was ‘re-united’ by Israel’s victory in 1967 
(Lustick, 2000). 
On 27 June 1967, approximately 70 sq. km of territory including the Old City and 
around 28 adjacent West Bank villages were unilaterally annexed to the state of 
Israel, transforming Jerusalem from a city of 37 km2 to one of around 120 km2, 
larger than Tel Aviv and Haifa combined. The capital was declared united and 
while Israeli legislation avoided explicit use of the term annexation, this “semantic 
ambiguity” did not obscure the reality (Dumper, 1997: 39). Amirav (2009) 
maintains that the decision to annex Jerusalem’s holy places and Old City to Israel 
and to demarcate the new borders of the city was made in haste, with little 
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consultation and with excessive self-confidence. None the less, the Israeli state 
promptly began an intensive project to preclude the possibility that Jerusalem 
could be re-divided in future. 
Benvenisti (1996) highlights the connection between the act of designating 
Jerusalem’s boundaries and the nationalist-religious sentiments they evoke, 
noting that in the period after 1967, the optimal boundaries of Jerusalem, including 
westward expansion, “were not to be determined according to the criteria of 
economy of scale or efficiency of service delivery to its citizens, but in conformity 
with national parameters.” Since all territory within the municipal boundary is 
imbued with Jerusalem’s sanctity by the religious establishment, the designation 
of territory as ‘Jerusalem’ strengthens the spiritual and nationalist ties of Jews to 
the land (Benvenisti, 1996: 51-2). Weizman notes that the delimitations of the new 
city “sought to ‘unite’ within a single metropolitan area the western Israeli city, the 
Old City, the rest of the previously Jordanian-administered city, 28 Palestinian 
villages, their fields, orchards and tracts of desert, into a single ‘holy’, ‘eternal’ and 
‘indivisible’ Jewish capital” (Weizman, 2007: 25). 
As the borders of Jerusalem expanded, the state also acted to reconfigure the 
urban character of the city to meet Israeli national goals. Before the ceasefire was 
even reached, Israel undertook the destruction of the entire Maghariba Quarter, 
located immediately in front of the Wailing Wall, in an act that made explicit the 
military’s determination that it would not retreat from this occupied area 
(Weizman, 2007: 37). The forcible removal or expulsion of the Palestinian 
population of the Jewish Quarter and its archaeological reconstruction after 1967 
embodies the state’s attempt to synthesise religious and nationalist traditions and 
to impose a Zionist ideological interpretation of history onto the urban fabric of 
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Jerusalem (Ricca, 2007). Israel would use biblical archaeology “to validate the 
claim that Palestinian vernacular architecture was in fact Jewish at source” 
(Weizman, 2007: 38-9). 
Archaeology continues to be used as a political and ideological tool in the city and 
EU representatives in East Jerusalem have repeatedly expressed grave concern 
at the strategy to consolidate Israeli control over the Holy Basin and detach it from 
its Palestinian surroundings by imposing a single, hegemonic Jewish narrative on 
archaeology and tourism in the Old City.8 The rezoning of land for specific uses, 
restrictive controls on land use and land confiscation have also served Israel’s 
Judaising intentions while aggressive, ideologically-driven settlement 
construction in and around Jewish residential neighbourhoods has brought the 
radical urban frontier to the historic centre (Pullan, 2011). 
3.2.2 Demography 
The Palestinian population of East Jerusalem was not annexed in tandem with 
the land in 1967 and Israel’s efforts to manipulate the demographic balance in 
the city in favour of its colonial ambitions are well documented in the literature. 
Dumper notes that “to a large extent, the attainment of demographic parity or 
even superiority in the annexed areas points to the Israeli government’s 
overwhelming success in meeting its strategic aim of making its control over the 
city irreversible” (Dumper, 1997: 81). 
                                            
8 Unofficially published annual report by the EU Heads of Missions in East Jerusalem, 2014. 
See also PULLAN, W. & GWIAZDA, M. 2009. Designing the Biblical Present in Jerusalem's 
'City of David';PULLAN, W. & GWIAZDA, M. 2011. Jerusalem's Holy Basin: Who Needs It? 
Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, 17, 172-179;PULLAN, W. & 
STERNBERG, M. 2012. The Making of Jerusalem's 'Holy Basin'. Planning Perspectives, 27, 
225-248. 
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Immediately following its conquest, the Israeli state conducted a population 
census on the newly occupied territory. Only Palestinians physically counted 
within the annexed area of East Jerusalem at that time were granted legal status 
in the city. Regardless of any family ties, origin in the city, land ownership or 
habitual residence prior to the census, those who were counted elsewhere in the 
Palestinian territories and those outside the country at the time of the count, 
including any who had fled the war, were systematically excluded from legal 
status within Israel. Approximately 30,000 Palestinian residents of East 
Jerusalem who were absent at the time of the 1967 Israeli population census lost 
their right under Israeli law to return and live in the city.9  
Palestinians who were present for the census were granted ‘permanent resident’ 
status in the State of Israel, the implications of which are described in detail 
below. The separate legal status of Palestinians in occupied East Jerusalem – as 
residents of the state but not full citizens - is regulated by the Entry into Israel 
Law (1952) and the Entry to Israel Regulations (1974) which give wide 
discretionary powers to the Israeli Minister of Interior in the grant of various types 
of visas to enter and stay in Israel. Permanent residency can only be passed on 
to children in particular circumstances. 
The precarious legal status of Palestinians in East Jerusalem is well documented 
and its detrimental impact on Palestinian family life in the city has been explored 
in the publications of a range of governmental, human rights, civil liberties and 
humanitarian organisations, local and international. Residency status can also be 
revoked and in this way the Israeli authorities have used it as a further means of 
                                            
9 http://www.civiccoalition-jerusalem.org/system/files/joint_ngo_report_-_east_jerusalem.pdf 
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demographic manipulation since 1995.10 HaMoked, the Israeli Centre for the 
Defence of the Individual, reveals that between 1967 and 2013 the Israeli state 
revoked the residency status of 14,309 Palestinians from East Jerusalem. Interior 
Ministry statistics show that 4,577 Palestinians from East Jerusalem were 
stripped of their residency in 2008 alone.11 
A report prepared by the European Union Heads of Mission in Jerusalem in 2014 
found that restrictive measures continue to apply to the residency status of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians, linked to Israel’s official demographic policy that aims to 
prevent Palestinians exceeding 40% of the total municipal population.12 
According to the US State Department, meanwhile, the continued Israeli practice 
of revoking the identity cards of Jerusalem residents amounted to forced exile to 
the occupied territories or abroad. 
3.2.3 Planning 
From the earliest days of the occupation, planning tools and regulations were 
employed by the state to further its geopolitical ends in the city (Benvenisti, 1996, 
Bollens, 2000, Braier, 2013, Jabareen, 2010). From the early 1970’s onwards, 
urban planning in the city ceased to exist, replaced by political planning, the sole 
focus of which was to tighten Israel’s hold on the annexed areas. Amirav, himself 
a former advisor to Teddy Kollek and Ehud Barak, is unequivocal: the two guiding 
principles of Israeli policy in East Jerusalem since that time have been the 
                                            
10 Zink suggest that this policy was overturned in 1999, but that revocations continued in a 
modified fashion. See ZINK, V. 2009. A Quiet Transfer: The Judaization of Jerusalem. 
Contemporary Arab Affairs, 2, 122-133. In fact, this policy was accelerated in the mid-2000s, 
peaking in 2008. 
11 B’Tselem http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_statistics 
12 See the Jerusalem Master Plan 2000 that was ratified by the Jerusalem Municipality in 2007. 
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achievement of maximum territorial control and the attainment of demographic 
hegemony so as to ensure an overwhelmingly Jewish city. While Israel’s 
demographic ambitions are clearly outlined in political masterplans, in local 
policies “these intentions are camouflaged within the techno-professional 
language of planning” and “implemented by manipulating seemingly mundane 
categories” (Weizman, 2007: 49). 
The demographic threat was keenly felt. The 1978 Master Plan for Jerusalem, 
cited by Amirav, states that “any part of the city that is not settled with Jews is in 
danger of being detached from the territory of Israel and delivered to Arab rule, 
and therefore the administrative ruling regarding municipal jurisdiction must be 
translated into action by means of construction in every part of this territory, 
beginning at its farthest edges” (Amirav, 2008). This policy also necessitated a 
reduction in the scope of Palestinian settlement and territorial control in East 
Jerusalem. In order to achieve this, Israel adopted a ‘blatantly discriminatory’ 
policy designed to shrink the Arab grip on territory in East Jerusalem while 
simultaneously encouraging them to leave the city. Amirav cites former 
Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek who wrote in 1994 that “whatever the 
governments of Israel could do to make life difficult for the Arabs in East 
Jerusalem, they did; whatever they could do… to prevent them from developing, 
from expanding, from building, from improving the quality of their housing, they 
did” (Amirav, 2009: 74). Thus, Weizman concludes that “horizontally limited by 
the green zones around them, and vertically by a ‘preservation’ policy, the 
Palestinian neighbourhoods of Jerusalem were transformed into an archipelago 
of small islands of conjured ‘authenticity’ within an ocean of Jewish construction” 
(Weizman, 2007: 51). 
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 In August 1980, Israel’s ‘Basic Law: Jerusalem’ constitutionalised the redrawn 
city as the ‘united and complete’ capital of the state of Israel, although reference 
to the exact municipal borders was excluded. According to Dumper, the new 
Basic Law did not legislate any particular changes, but was rather a “mere 
legalism” that “underlined the political reality” already in existence (Dumper, 
1997: 41-42). The international community, upholding the terms of UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 (1967), has consistently refused to recognise the legality 
of Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and remains committed to Israel’s 
withdrawal from the occupied territory and the pursuit of a negotiated settlement 
of the territorial issue. 
3.3 Swallowed but not Digested? 
According to Musallam (1996), Faisal Husseini identified three aims underlying 
Israeli policies towards East Jerusalem. The first, to cause Palestinian institutional 
identity, activity and presence in the holy city to wither away. This would ensure 
Palestinians dealt only with Israeli institutions in the city and accustom them to 
not dealing with Palestinian institutions. The second, to isolate East Jerusalem 
from its Palestinian milieu by detaching Palestinians in and around the city from 
the wider Palestinian community. Palestinian commerce and trade would have to 
look for markets in Israel. The third, to isolate the city internationally, accustoming 
the international community to dealing with the Palestinians without Jerusalem 
and to dealing with Jerusalem as a city dominated by Israel. 
Musallam contrasts these aims with the official Israeli position, enshrined in a 
letter from Shimon Peres to Norwegian minister Johan Holst, committing Israel 
not to interfere with Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem. This letter, 
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Musallam claims, was the sine qua non for Palestinian approval of the Oslo 
agreement, while Israeli government actions negated the spirit and text of the 
commitments it offered within it. Instead, Israel escalated its campaign to exclude 
the Palestinian Authority from the city at the municipal, national and international 
levels.  
In terms of the holy places, Israel sought to promote the role of Jordan. Musallam 
claims that even Arafat was surprised when the 1994 Washington Declaration that 
ended the belligerency between Jordan and Israel declared: “Israel respects the 
present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Muslim holy 
shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, 
Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines” (cited in 
Musallam, 1996). While Israel intended that the agreement drive a wedge 
between Jordan and the Palestinian leadership, the ‘concession’ which saw 
Christian holy sites omitted from Jordanian jurisdiction was further intended to 
diversify the custodianship of Jerusalem’s holy places and divide the Muslim and 
Christian leaderships of the city. 
The Israeli state’s ambiguous legal position on East Jerusalem – part of the ‘united 
capital’ of Israel, but with key limitations on its jurisdiction – allows for full territorial 
control of the city but does not require the assimilation of its Palestinian 
population. This ambiguity has led to debate over the limits of Israeli hegemony 
in the city and the opportunities for the assertion of Palestinian autonomy in 
particular jurisdictions. In 1993, Lustick argued that the belief of Israelis in the 
immutability of the expanded boundaries of Jerusalem was not hegemonic 
(Lustick, 1993). Support for the claim that ‘united Jerusalem’ would forever remain 
under Israeli sovereignty, he maintained, was unlikely to withstand the political 
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logic of peace. On the eve of the Oslo process, he wrote it was simply that “a 
carefully cultivated fetish of ‘united Jerusalem’ has so far deterred public 
examination of the options that exist.” 
Dumper (2014) agrees that Jerusalem is a city of multiple fragments rather than 
of just two parts. It is the many crisscrossing and overlapping borders of 
Jerusalem as well as the local and international constraints on Israeli power in the 
city that combine to explain the resilience of Palestinians there after decades of 
occupation. Dumper stresses the significance of Lustick’s fundamental point, that 
Israel has treated East Jerusalem differently. This, he claims, sets it apart from 
the rest of Israel and infuses the Palestinian enclaves with “a sense of difference 
based on political and legal realities” (Dumper, 2014: 64). In Chapter IV, I revisit 
this issue, arguing for a reformulation of the hegemonic boundary debate to take 
account of the impact of enduring occupation on East Jerusalem residents 
themselves. In this sense, I argue, a hegemonic boundary may perhaps have 
been crossed. 
The creation of facts on the ground prompted a shift in academic and activist focus 
towards Israeli policies and actions in East Jerusalem and their political and 
humanitarian impact on Palestinians in the city. The significance of these policies 
is most frequently understood within the context of the sovereignty paradigm and 
the extent to which they impact the viability of the two-state solution. However, 
Israeli attempts to consolidate the occupation of land without the absorption of 
people are also key to understanding the complex situation in which Palestinian 
Jerusalemites live and the way in which they frame their everyday actions.  
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The literature is divided over how far Israel has succeeded in realising the 
hegemonic Jewish-Israeli narrative of a unified Jerusalem. Rarely, however, is the 
issue considered from the perspective of East Jerusalem residents and the way 
in which they frame their own experience of Israeli rule. The failure of Oslo and 
the apparent intractability of the Jerusalem problem has prompted significant 
research into alternative paths to a resolution of the issue. The viability of 
Palestinian statehood with a capital in East Jerusalem is challenged by those who 
emphasise the devastating impact of the Israeli project in East Jerusalem on the 
prospects for Palestinian sovereignty in the city. Others, meanwhile, downplay the 
impact of Israel’s expansionist policies. 
Nolte and Yacobi (2015) examine official Israeli representations of Jerusalem’s 
Light Rail project (as a neutral, modern and efficient means of transportation for 
the Jerusalem ‘metropolis’), demonstrating that these form part of a wider strategy 
to strengthen the state’s physical and discursive control over the ‘unified’ city. 
However, beyond official attempts to control representations of space in the public 
discourse, the literature asks how real Israeli control over East Jerusalem actually 
is. Klein (2008) argues that after forty years of Israeli occupation, Jerusalem 
remains a frontier city. Israel’s annexationist project has failed and the Jewish 
state has developed a series of strategies to overcome and disguise the failure, 
not recognising that the goal is unattainable. East Jerusalem remains the east-
looking metropolitan centre of the West Bank, he concludes, and those who seek 
to reunite Jerusalem and achieve Israeli dominance in its geographical space are 
doomed to fail (Klein, 2008). 
In Chapter IV, I challenge the claims that East Jerusalem remains the 
metropolitan centre of the West Bank or that the city remains entirely eastward 
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looking. Very real ties undoubtedly remain and there are concrete ways in which 
East Jerusalem remains outside Israeli governmental and administrative norms. 
However, Klein’s analysis relies on an uncritical acceptance of the constancy of 
historically contingent circumstances, reflecting a not uncommon agenda in the 
literature – particularly on the Israeli Left - to demonstrate the continued viability 
and pressing necessity of a redivision of the city. Klein argues, therefore, “for 
accepting the unavoidable partition of the city into separate Palestinian and Israeli 
municipalities due to its social, economic, and geographic realities” (ibid: 54). I 
suggest that these realities are changing, not simply as a result of ‘facts on 
ground’ but because Palestinian subjectivities in the city are constantly 
renegotiated and remapped in relation to the structures of power and the multiple 
projects in which residents are engaged. 
Amirav (2009) also argues that after 40 years of occupation, not one of the five 
national goals set by the Israeli state for Jerusalem has been achieved. From 
1970 onwards, urban planning in Jerusalem became a political weapon focused 
on the sole objective of tightening Israel’s grip on annexed areas. Amirav cites the 
1978 Master Plan for Jerusalem which, he claims, retroactively explained the 
rationale for a building programme in East Jerusalem that was by then almost 
complete: “Any part of the city that is not settled with Jews is in danger of being 
detached from the territory of Israel and delivered to Arab rule, and therefore the 
administrative ruling regarding municipal jurisdiction must be translated into action 
by means of construction in every part of this territory, beginning at its farthest 
edges.” This policy of expanding Israel’s territorial control was accompanied by a 
simultaneous policy of shrinking the Palestinian hold on the city. Despite these 
combined tactics, however, Amirav concludes that Israel has failed to achieve any 
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of its goals in East Jerusalem and that it doggedly pursued a clearly failing policy 
for more than 40 years. 
Larkin and Dumper (2012) also argue that “there is no sense in which the Zionist 
imaginary of a Jewish city has been achieved or is irreversible.” Their argument 
stresses, however, that the significance of Israel’s creation of facts on the ground 
is “the contradiction that lies at the heart of the Israeli project in Jerusalem.” This, 
they claim, is that “Zionism as an ideology which promotes Jewish nationalism, is 
also an ideology of exclusiveness that is unwilling to incorporate non-Jewish 
groups into its political and cultural sphere… Promoting Zionism in Jerusalem has 
led, on one hand, to the colonization of Palestinian land and property and, on the 
other hand, leaves non-Jewish groups in the margins where they are left to 
provide their own services and support systems.” 
The success or failure of the Israeli project in East Jerusalem relates directly to 
questions regarding the viability of a re-division of the city. In this thesis, I intend 
to address the ongoing Judaisation of the city not from within the sovereignty 
paradigm, but from the perspective of Palestinian identity and agency in the city. 
How hegemonic does Israeli rule in East Jerusalem feel for Palestinians? How 
does the conflict and its manifestations affect the everyday life of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians and to what extent do existing approaches rely on the notion of an 
objective Palestinian identity in East Jerusalem that is resilient to the Israeli 
project there? How do East Jerusalem Palestinians, as active agents, individually 
and collectively, cope, adapt or resist? In Chapter V, I argue that informality and 
exception, which are often referenced in support of the argument that important 
exclusions to Israel rule remain, are in fact part of the working of Israeli power in 
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the East Jerusalem that facilitates the exclusion of residents while territorial 
objectives are met. 
4 The Decline of Palestinian Politics in East Jerusalem 
Notwithstanding the success or failure of Israel’s hegemonic project or the need 
to reframe this question, the post Oslo period has without doubt witnessed the 
near total collapse of Palestinian political authority in East Jerusalem. Israeli 
policies and practices contributing to the strangulation of the city and its 
dislocation from the West Bank are well documented. These have been 
instrumental in reorienting Palestinian political life in Jerusalem away from the 
occupied territories and the Palestinian national leadership there. 
This section will look in more detail at Palestinian responses to the Israeli project 
in East Jerusalem, the impact on Palestinian politics in the city and its 
consequences for this Palestinian constituency. I argue that the crisis of 
leadership has led to the ‘atomisation’ of East Jerusalem Palestinians and left a 
vacuum that is readily filled by other groups and affiliations, including Islamic 
organisations supported by the Islamist movement inside Israel (Larkin and 
Dumper, 2012, Salem, 2006) and grassroots Islamic activism in the city. It will 
also examine the individual (horizontal) strategies of East Jerusalem Palestinians 
to adapt to occupation and leaderlessness which are often overlooked. 
4.1 The Collapse of Palestinian Leadership  
A 1995 PASSIA report on the dynamics of Palestinian resistance in Jerusalem 
(Latendresse, 1995) challenges deterministic approaches that paint Palestinians 
as victims and emphasises the dialectical relationship between Israelis and 
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Palestinians in the city. It resists definitions of the ‘destructuring/restructuring’ of 
East Jerusalem as the straightforward consequence of Israeli interventions, 
arguing that the transformation of various structures is as much the result of 
Palestinian opposing actions; through survival and resistance, Palestinians have 
taken part in the process of transformation. Essential to the continuation of the 
Palestinian presence, the author claims, is the survival of existing Palestinian 
institutions and associations in the city and the creation of new ones. 
Through an analysis of the practices of resistance in East Jerusalem between 
1967 and 1994, Latendresse identifies two parallel strategies developed by 
Palestinians to preserve their presence in East Jerusalem. First, non-cooperation 
with the municipality. Second, the protection of social, economic, religious and 
cultural institutions that existed prior to 1967 – for example, the Chamber of 
Commerce, al-Maqassad Hospital, the Jerusalem Electric Corporation – and to 
establish new ones, to help defend Palestinians against the integrationist policies 
of the municipality. 
There is merit in Latendresse’s argument. In this context, the ‘return’ of the PLO 
at the expense of the local, ‘inside’ leadership signalled the beginning of the end 
for existing strategies to preserve Palestinian Jerusalem. The fact that the 
‘outside’ PLO was ultimately compliant in the exclusion of Jerusalem from the 
proposed interim phase of the Oslo process overcame what had been a major 
stumbling block for the Israeli side (Dumper, 2002). Under Prime Ministers Yitzhak 
Rabin (1992-95) and Shimon Peres (1995-96), the Israeli authorities tolerated a 
low level of Palestinian Authority activity in East Jerusalem (ICG, 2012: 3). 
Despite the Oslo provisions that forbade such activity, during this period the PA 
managed to establish a wide network of organisations in East Jerusalem, political, 
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social, cultural, economic, religious and professional (Rekhess, 2008). Foremost 
among these was Orient House, which under the leadership of Faisal Husseini, 
became “the PLO’s political address in East Jerusalem” and enabled the city to 
“emerge as the centre of gravity of Palestinian political activity” (ICG, 2012). 
Under Benjamin Netanyahu (1996-1999), however, Israeli policy towards PA 
activity in East Jerusalem hardened and Orient House in particular was targeted. 
In the following years, Palestinian political authority in East Jerusalem took a 
series of fatal blows. The outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, the 
death of Faisal Husseini in May 2001, the permanent closure of Orient House by 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in August 2001, the arrest of PA Jerusalem 
Affairs Minister Ziad Abu Zayyad a month later and the closure of a number of 
Palestinian institutions in the city suspected of ties with Ramallah (ICG, 2012) are 
widely recognised as important turning points in the fortunes of Palestinian 
authority in Jerusalem. A comprehensive report by the International Crisis Group 
in 2012 found these to be steps from which Palestinian political life in East 
Jerusalem failed to recover. “Israel banned national activity in the city, and no 
alternative leadership was able to take root” (ICG, 2012: 4). 
Israel’s marginalisation of traditional sources of authority in Jerusalem left Fatah 
in the city fractured and fragmented. One interviewee told ICG that “Fatah per se 
doesn’t really exist in Jerusalem. Omar Shalabi [Fatah’s Secretary General in 
Jerusalem] has a small group of ten or fifteen people who work with him. That’s 
it. The rest are just ordinary people who might label themselves Fatah, but that 
doesn’t mean they consider themselves loyal to the movement’s elected 
leadership” (ICG, 2012). 
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The success of Hamas candidates in Jerusalem in the 2006 Palestinian 
Legislative Council elections was a political high point for the movement which 
can be attributed in large part to its works on the ground in the community. All 
factions, however, have experienced a downturn in popularity in East Jerusalem 
as each fails to project a national narrative with any sustainable relevance for 
residents and their activities are suppressed by Israel. This is discussed further in 
Chapter IV.  
4.2 Social Implications 
The suppression of organised political life in East Jerusalem has contributed to 
the atomisation of Palestinian society in the city and the necessity of individual 
solutions to collective problems. The absence of structures of authority that 
possess legitimacy for the community is another factor. The 2012 ICG report 
maintains that East Jerusalem is suffering a social crisis resulting from the 
collapse of the urban leadership, the ineffectiveness of the PA in the city and the 
tensions fuelled by the second intifada. The report highlights the rise of drug-
related crime and the rapid proliferation of organised criminal gangs, many of 
which operate through the strongest clans in the city: “The city’s large families to 
some extent filled the authority gap, but they could not stop the dissolution of the 
social fabric and even became one of its agents” (ICG, 2012: i).  
Dumper (2013a) explains that Israeli policing priorities in East Jerusalem are 
directed principally towards the maintenance of public order rather than law 
enforcement. This type of policing does not tolerate any activity perceived as 
‘subversive’ or a threat to public order. A significant operational effect of this 
approach, Dumper argues, is the concentration of Israeli policing in areas around 
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the commercial centre of East Jerusalem and in particular inside tourist-related 
sites in and around the Old City. This has led to the effective suspension of 
policing on the periphery, facilitating the flagrant operation of criminal gangs.  
In Palestinian communities that lie on the eastern side of the separation Barrier 
but still within the Jerusalem municipality, the problem of policing is particularly 
acute. The Palestinian Authority has no jurisdiction and its police and security 
forces are not allowed entry. Israeli police forces are reluctant to go there despite 
the fact that residents live inside the municipal boundary and pay municipal taxes. 
Within Palestinian communities on the Israeli side of the wall, the situation is little 
better. Thrall (2014) claims that crime is pervasive and Israeli security forces, 
largely comprising paramilitary units, tend only to enter these areas in response 
to a perceived threat to Jewish Israelis. The Israeli security presence, he argues 
is “there essentially to quash dissent and prevent attacks on settlers rather than 
to protect Palestinians” (Thrall, 2014). 
The opportunities for political participation in East Jerusalem have been limited 
by the criminalisation of Palestinian political parties and their activities – Israel’s 
internal security agency, Shin Bet, is mandated with counter-terrorism and 
intelligence activities as well as combatting ‘political subversion.’ According to a 
former security official interviewed by the ICG in 2011, political subversion 
includes lawful opposition to Israeli control in Jerusalem (ICG, 2012: 1). Since all 
Palestinian parties oppose the occupation, Thrall explains, “they and their 
activities have, in effect, been criminalised” (Thrall, 2014). 
The criminalisation of opposition to Israeli authority in Jerusalem is one element 
of what this thesis suggests is a broader effort to depoliticise East Jerusalem 
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Palestinians and as such minimise the challenge they represent to the Israeli 
project in the city. The benefits of residency, including social security, health 
insurance and freedom of movement, are understood as the incentive for ‘good 
behaviour.’ The chairman of the Israeli Movement for Strengthening Jerusalem, 
Arie Hess, told the ICG in 2011 that satisfying Palestinian material needs in 
Jerusalem helped to minimise their politicisation: “The investment in paying 
national insurance to East Jerusalem’s Palestinian population is the best security 
policy we have and is worth every shekel.” Another interviewee, a former defence 
official, added that Israeli policy encouraged Palestinians “to focus on their income 
rather than their national project” (ICG, 2012: 1). 
Salem (2006) argues that even before the collapse of Palestinian institutions in 
East Jerusalem after 2000, the move away from inclusive resistance towards 
state building during the Oslo years resulted in the exclusion of the population 
from decision-making and a loss of collective identity. This was replaced by 
fragmentation and atomisation; Palestinian Jerusalemites “found themselves 
obliged to find individual ways to cope with the realities” of life in the city and 
“began to look after their own interests in a very atomised way” (Salem, 2006: 8). 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem are fearful of losing their residency rights in their 
own city as well as the social security benefits and health care for which they pay 
and which are far superior to those available in territories under the limited control 
of the Palestinian Authority. Dislocated from the national leadership and from the 
national narrative it espouses, they lack political leadership or inspiration. 
Meanwhile, the cost of living is as high for Palestinians in Jerusalem as for Jews 
in the city, but wages are lower and services are not evenly or equitably 
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distributed. Haaretz reported in June 2016 that 82% of East Jerusalem residents 
lived under the poverty line in 2014 (rising to 86.6% among children), compared 
to 22% of Israelis as a whole and 48% across all communities in Jerusalem. The 
figures, issued by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies based on data from 
the Central Bureau of Statistics and the National Insurance Institute, 
demonstrated that the Palestinian poverty rate in East Jerusalem had worsened 
dramatically since 2006, when the figure stood at 76%. Haaretz speculates the 
separation Barrier had caused severe damage to businesses that relied on West 
Bank customers and also raised the cost of living in the city as a result of fewer 
cheap imports from the West Bank. The upsurge in violence during 2014 may also 
be contributing to rising poverty statistics, with a sharp drop in tourist numbers 
and tighter checkpoint security making imports from the West Bank more difficult 
and the prices in Jerusalem higher as a result. Despite greater poverty among 
Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, the Workers Advice Centre in the city 
maintains that only 7% of East Jerusalem families receive income support 
benefits, compared to 10% of Jewish Israeli families (Hasson, 2016b). 
The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI, 2012) argues that “the gravity of 
the situation in East Jerusalem is the product, first and foremost, of Israeli policy 
making… The cumulative effects of annexation, neglect, rights violations, and the 
completion of the separation Barrier have led to an unprecedented deterioration 
in the conditions of Palestinian East Jerusalemites” (ACRI, 2012: 2). ACRI points 
out that the relative strength of the neighbouring West Jerusalem economy leads 
many Palestinian residents to seek employment there. As well as language and 
educational disparities that exclude Palestinian residents from many jobs, 
“Palestinian job seekers face additional obstacles stemming from the political 
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situation and the particular circumstances in Jerusalem.” Social and cultural 
tensions impact everyday life and “at times of political crisis, social tensions mount 
and there have been extreme cases of physical violence as well as demands 
made upon Jewish business owners not to hire Arab workers” (ACRI, 2012: 8). 
With the Israeli state committed to a Zionist project that neglects the welfare of 
Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem and limits the activities of their national 
institutions, Palestinian NGOs in the city provide a “critical minimum level of 
welfare provision” (Dumper, 2014: 134). Dumper defines the emergence of 
Palestinian civil society organisations as a form of resistance to the 
encroachments of the Israeli state. The Palestinian Welfare Association, for 
example, cited by Dumper, has had considerable success in the field of property 
renovation and restoration in the Old City.  
There is a well explored link, however, between the discourse of development and 
the depoliticisation of resistance. Tabar’s case study of the reconstruction of Jenin 
refugee camp following Israel’s invasion in April 2002 underlines the depoliticising 
impact of the technical ‘professional’ vision of international aid agencies and 
argues that the donor aid system established to support the Oslo process 
disrupted the national movement by “helping to sever the ties between social 
movements and organisations and the national struggle.” Tabar (2012) cites 
Ferguson’s study of the development apparatus in Lesotho in which he argues 
that international aid agencies seek to exclude politics from “even the most 
sensitive political operations and insist on framing these matters as technical 
problems.” He describes these bureaucratic agencies as ‘anti politics machines,’ 
arguing that they depoliticise marginalised populations by promoting professional 
and technical responses to inherently political issues of powerlessness. In East 
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Jerusalem, the professionalization of NGOs and the necessity of their conformity 
to a non-political ideal, combined with Israel’s criminalisation of political opposition 
to its sovereignty in the city, are stripping this constituency of locally-constructed 
liberation discourses. 
4.3 Palestinian Political Participation 
The theoretical literature on voting behaviour highlights the difference between 
non-voting and boycotting in elections, while Bollens argues that hegemony can 
be achieved by one side if the other rejects its legitimacy and refuses to cooperate 
with its authority (Bollens, 2000). 
East Jerusalem Palestinians are entitled to participate in Israeli municipal (though 
not national) elections as well as in Palestinian legislative council elections. While 
turnout in East Jerusalem has been higher in PLC elections, a top-down 
perspective recognises that the boycott of engagement with Israeli institutions and 
voting in Israeli elections has largely held since 1967. The non-participation of 
East Jerusalem Palestinians in Israeli municipal elections equates, from this 
perspective, to a “total rejection of Israel’s occupation and annexation of East 
Jerusalem” (Badil Resource Centre, cited in Bavli and Gerver, 2010). In Chapter 
VI below, I challenge perceptions that Palestinian non-voting in Israeli municipal 
elections is an unambiguous, politically motivated boycott, as opposed to non-
voting which is rooted in a range of factors beyond rejection of Israeli occupation. 
Indeed, the increasingly ambivalent attitude of East Jerusalem residents to Israeli 
rule in the city further undermines an ethically absolute interpretation. Just as non-
participation in violent resistance does not necessarily equate to a moral refusal 
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(Kelly, 2008), so too the non-participation of Palestinians in elections is potentially 
more complex than a straightforward moral boycott. 
According to Cohen (2011), towards the end of the 1990’s, political life in East 
Jerusalem was characterised by passivity. “The conflicting interests of the 
inhabitants – situated between Israel and the PA, between local and national 
Palestinian leadership, between personal interests and national struggle – 
transformed the absence of action into the default option” (Cohen, 2011). As far 
as Cohen is concerned, “the Oslo years brought about an almost absolute 
standstill of political activity in Jerusalem.” 
This understanding of the absence of Palestinian political activity during Oslo and 
after might be challenged if we relocate our conceptualisation of the political within 
the realm of the everyday. This is addressed in detail below. Accusations of 
Palestinian political passivity in East Jerusalem must also be situated within the 
context of the criminalisation of political activity by the state and deliberate 
atomisation of society that encourages Palestinians to focus on their individual 
material needs. 
Cohen has offered a further theory regarding the political behaviour of Palestinian 
Jerusalemites in his study of Fatah Jerusalem’s activities during the al-Aqsa 
intifada (Cohen, 2013b). Cohen considers the minimal participation of Fatah 
Jerusalem members, in contrast to Fatah members from other Palestinian cities 
and towns, in suicide attacks on Israeli civilians during the second intifada. A 
crucial factor in explaining this behaviour, he claims, was the relationship between 
Fatah Jerusalem and the Israeli peace camp. That is not personal relations 
between Israelis and Palestinians, but, rather, the joint political struggle and a joint 
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vision for the city. Cohen undertakes a detailed analysis of the participation of 
East Jerusalem Palestinians in armed resistance during the second intifada, 
critiquing a range of explanations for their role. Rejecting the essential tenets of 
contact theory, that people who know each other are less likely to kill each other, 
Cohen posits the argument that rather than dialogue and individual encounters 
between Jewish Israelis and East Jerusalem Palestinians, it was a shared vision 
and joint political activity towards these goals that influenced the rejection by 
Fatah Jerusalem of indiscriminate killing. Jerusalemites had developed their own 
practices of resistance that were built on sumud, NGO activities and popular joint 
struggle. 
4.4 Religion as a Ready Alternative 
Larkin and Dumper (2012) have examined the growing involvement of the 
Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel (IM) in Jerusalem, focussing 
on how the al-Aqsa mosque is employed as a symbol of political empowerment 
and as a focus of religious renewal. They conclude that in the absence of 
Palestinian political leadership in East Jerusalem, the IM is contributing to the 
establishment of a new form of Palestinian Islamic resistance that crosses political 
and territorial divides, and which challenges Israel from both within and without. 
A 2012 ICG report also addresses the emergence of the Northern Branch of the 
IM, headed by Sheikh Raed Salah, and the group’s potential to mobilise East 
Jerusalem Palestinians, usually in protest of perceived infringements of Islamic 
sovereignty over the Haram. Salah is not without Palestinian critics, but with 
traditional leadership structures undermined if not destroyed, this charismatic 
figure has broad appeal. However, his repeated arrest, release and re-arrest 
means that this movement struggles to maintain its presence and influence in the 
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city. Local mobilisations, particularly in relation to protection of the Haram al-Sharif 
by the Murabiteen, have gone some way towards eclipsing the influence of the 
IM. 
Salem (2006) has also suggested that a domestic society revolving around the 
mosque is filling the political vacuum in East Jerusalem. Hamas’ success in the 
2006 PLC elections, despite the fact they were unable to run an electoral 
campaign in the city, is attributed to their existing social and welfare networks in 
East Jerusalem and their willingness to go door to door to garner support. The 
failure of Hamas to consolidate and build on this victory, however, is addressed 
below. The 2012 ICG report explains the growing centrality of the Haram al-Sharif 
to Jerusalem’s politics. Restrictions on collective Palestinian activity in the city 
mean that the Haram is now one of the few sites in which Palestinians can gather 
freely in large numbers, while increased Jewish nationalist activism directed at 
the Temple Mount is perceived as a growing threat to Muslim control of and 
access to the Haram and East Jerusalemites have responded. East Jerusalem’s 
Muslims are also alarmed by controversial archaeological and restoration works 
conducted in and around the Haram by Israel and the Jordanian Waqf. 
This thesis will locate the Islamic identity of East Jerusalem Muslims within the 
context of overlapping and competing subject positions, the holiness of the city’s 
Muslim shrines, the collapse of Palestinian politics in the city and the absence of 
secular leadership. The perception of a Jewish threat to the-Haram al-Sharif 
ensures that this issue has huge mobilising potential for Palestinian Muslims. 
While this might potentially trigger wider nationalist conflict between Israelis and 
Palestinians, clashes over the installation of metal detectors in 2017 made clear 
that locally generated and religiously inspired resistance to Israeli encroachments 
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on the Haram do not necessarily correlate to nationalist mobilisation against 
occupation. Without a nationalist liberation narrative to struggle for, successful 
mobilisation over the Haram soon petered out once its immediate objectives were 
achieved (See Chapter VI). 
5 Palestinian Adaptations to the Israeli Project 
Israeli hegemony in East Jerusalem is shaping the Palestinian political imaginary 
and the space in which identity in the city is constructed. Cohen (2011) addresses 
directly the issue of Palestinian identity in East Jerusalem since 1967, arguing 
that a unique political discourse has emerged in the city as a result of the 
formation over many years of a distinct Jerusalem identity. In Cohen’s analysis, a 
combination of “factors have combined to create a different type of Palestinian, a 
sort of hybrid between an Israeli Arab and a Palestinian from the territories” 
(Cohen, 2011: xix). These factors include Israel’s declared annexation of East 
Jerusalem as well as its deep intelligence-gathering penetration of the city; the 
more frequent contact East Jerusalem Palestinians have with Jewish Israelis; the 
physical barriers separating the city from the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and the 
special legal status of East Jerusalem Palestinians in Israel and the benefits this 
entitles them to (Cohen, 2011: xviii). 
The emergence of a distinct East Jerusalem Palestinian identity is a key theme of 
Cohen’s work and there has been significant media interest in the apparent 
‘normalisation’ of East Jerusalem residents under Israeli rule. In 2011, a rare 
survey of Palestinian opinion in East Jerusalem was found to demonstrate “a real 
discrepancy between what policy-makers here [in the US], in Israel and in the 
territories assume about the Palestinians of East Jerusalem and what they 
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actually want” (Mozgovaya, 2011)13. Asked to choose between full citizenship of 
a Palestinian state, or citizenship of the state of Israel with all the rights and 
privileges attached to that, 30% of East Jerusalem respondents chose Palestinian 
citizenship, while 35% chose Israeli citizenship and another 35% declined to 
answer or said they were undecided.  
Asked what they would do if it was decided that their neighbourhood in Jerusalem 
was to be brought under Palestinian sovereignty, 40% of Palestinian respondents 
said they were likely to move to an area inside Israel compared to 37% who said 
they would not move. If the situation were reversed, and their neighbourhood of 
Jerusalem was to become part of Israel in a future settlement, 27% said they 
would likely move, against 54% who said they would not. Among those who 
favoured Israeli citizenship in these scenarios, freedom of movement inside 
Israel, higher income, better employment opportunities and access to Israeli 
health care were cited as their top considerations.14 The Pechter findings were 
lent credibility by a 2015 poll, conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Public 
Opinion, which similarly found that 52% of Palestinians living in East Jerusalem 
would prefer to be citizens of Israel with equal rights, compared to 42% who said 
that they would choose to be citizens of a Palestinian state (Pollock, 2015). 
The notion that East Jerusalem Palestinians are undergoing a process of 
Israelification has received significant attention and a number of newspaper and 
web articles have begun to explore the idea of what East Jerusalem Palestinians 
really want (Abu Toameh, 2012, Barakat, 2012, Hasson, 2012). The increasing 
                                            
13 My italics 
14 Pechter Middle East Poll conducted in partnership with the US-based Council on Foreign Relations, 
2011. 
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number of Palestinian Jerusalemites applying for Israeli citizenship, the trend 
towards Israeli high school exams and Hebrew language studies, changing 
shopping habits and a rise in the number of East Jerusalem youths joining the 
Israeli police force or applying for national service have all been proffered as 
indicators of the ‘Israelification’ of Palestinian Jerusalem. More often than not, 
such trends are perceived as confirmation that East Jerusalem Palestinians know 
‘what side their bread is buttered,’ that they recognise the value of the health care 
and social security benefits that come with their Israeli identity cards and value 
these above their national identity. 
Some reports point to other, less quantifiable factors too. “For example, there is 
the pronounced presence of Palestinians in the centre of West Jerusalem, in 
malls, on the light-rail train and in the opens shopping area in Mamilla, adjacent 
to the Old City’s Jaffa Gate. These people are not street cleaners or dishwashers, 
but consumers and salespeople. Another phenomenon is the growing 
cooperation between merchants in the old city and the municipality.” While most 
of these changes are occurring below the radar of the Israeli public, “it is very 
possible that Jerusalem has already chosen the binational solution” (Hasson, 
2012). 
For many years, the acquisition of citizenship has been taboo, but East Jerusalem 
Palestinians are now increasingly open about and accepting of Israeli citizenship 
as the only real security available to them. A 2012 report by the International 
Crisis Group on the decline of Arab Jerusalem recognises that attitudes appear 
to be changing. It claims that East Jerusalem Palestinians  are increasingly 
cognisant of the permanence of Israel’s occupation of their city: “with the 
Palestinian leadership in disarray and largely ineffectual, some believe a 
80 
 
meaningful Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital, has become little more 
than a fantasy” (ICG, 2012). The upward trend in Palestinian applications for 
Israeli citizenship is discussed in detail in Chapter IV, but the Israeli newspaper 
Haaretz reported in 2012 that there had been a significant upsurge in applications 
over the previous two years, even though the number of successful applications 
had dropped.15 According to the Gatestone Institute, the Fatah Minister in charge 
of the Jerusalem Portfolio, Hatem Abdul Kader, attributed the rising number of 
applications for Israeli citizenship to the failure of the Palestinian Authority and 
neighbouring Arab states to provide sufficient support East Jerusalem 
Palestinians. While I reject the Gatestone Institute’s conclusion that East 
Jerusalem resident obviously prefer to live under Israeli rather than Palestinian 
rule, it is clear that that there is considerably less stigma attached to Israeli 
citizenship today than there was in previous decades. This is discussed in detail 
below. 
Cohen concludes that the dislocation of East Jerusalem from the West Bank is 
part of a broader process to divide the Palestinian people and territory. Israel’s 
ultimate goal, he claims, is “that this will eventually lead to a weakening of the 
Palestinian national identity” overall. “In a way, all this could be considered a giant 
experiment in the construction of identities.” Palestinian national identity, as 
distinct from Arab national identity, took only a few decades to construct and 
might just as quickly disintegrate (Cohen, 2011: 129). 
Cohen presents an interesting argument, but ultimately, he fails to address the 
demographic paradox of Israeli attempts to weaken Palestinian national identity. 
                                            
15 Haaretz, 21 October 2012, ‘3,374 East Jerusalem residents received full Israeli citizenship in 
past decade’ 
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While elements within the Israeli political or religious establishment may find this 
prospect appealing, the more significant problem then become what to do with a 
large non-Jewish population brought inside Zionist state. Ultimately, the model of 
a Jewish democratic state cannot sustain a significant non-Jewish population. 
Demonstrating the problem Cohen (2011) discusses the semantic debate over 
whether or not East Jerusalem should be described as occupied territory. Israel 
applies its own laws there, while the annexation is widely held to be invalid in 
international law. Cohen concludes that the existential reality is that the 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are occupied. He makes the distinction 
therefore, that “when using the word ‘occupation’ I am referring to the people and 
not necessarily to the territory” (Cohen, 2011: xi). This paradox centres upon the 
exclusionary nature of Zionism as a Jewish nationalist ideology that has led to 
the colonisation of Palestinian land in East Jerusalem, but for which the 
absorption of non-Jewish populations is not only undesirable but ultimately 
untenable. 
This contradiction presents a problem for Israel, which it has sought to overcome 
by subjecting East Jerusalem Palestinians to a regime of control rather than 
inclusion. I will explore in this study the possibility that Israel’s territorial ambitions 
and policies have led to the dislocation of East Jerusalem Palestinians so 
thoroughly from their nationalist narrative that Palestinian identity is being 
reoriented, temporarily at least, towards Israel, which is unwilling to accept them. 
According to Escobar (cited in Jean-Klein, 2001), we should approach quotidian 
practices and performances as influential in the “collective production of novel 
political and cultural identities” and in the production of nationalist-cum-national 
subjectivities and communities. 
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Yousef (2011) recognises the deteriorating spatial reality felt by Palestinians in 
the East Jerusalem and argues that the emotional experiences of everyday life 
influence individual attitudes. This ‘social hum’ is highly significant, he claims, 
because “it can confirm or alienate people’s narratives from the official discourse” 
(Yousef, 2011: 45). Spaces therefore become “sites of identification, and 
everyday life becomes an incubator of change in attitudes and behaviours” (Ibid: 
45-46). Yousef details the fragmentation and dismemberment of the urban fabric 
of East Jerusalem from the Palestinian territories during the Oslo period, and hints 
at the discriminatory practices of the municipality which leave East Jerusalemites 
under no illusion about integration into Israeli society. “Feeling helpless and 
alienated at the level of national politics, negotiations and the promised peace,” 
he says, “Palestinians in Jerusalem give more weight to the problems of their daily 
urban existence. This is leading not to normalisation with Israel, as such, but 
towards what one of Yousef’s interviewees describes as a “normalisation of 
resistance” (Ibid: 51). The East Jerusalem situation, Yousef concludes, is 
generating new challenges. 
Yousef offers an engaging insight into the alienation felt by many young East 
Jerusalemites from the national narrative and hints at the atomisation of 
Palestinian society. In focusing in on those East Jerusalemites who are reframing 
‘normalisation’ and the struggle for civil rights vis-à-vis the municipality as a new 
‘narrative of resistance,’ Yousef leaves much unsaid about those who are still 
“flying in all directions, following their own paths without meaningful patterns” (ibid: 
50). This thesis will explore in more detail the alienation of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians from the national narrative and the emergence of new subjectivities 
among residents who also find themselves outside the Israeli national project. 
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The political isolation of East Jerusalem from the national leadership in Ramallah 
is leading some Palestinians in the city to seek out new opportunities. The ICG 
argue that after more than 40 years of boycotting the Israeli state, a small but 
growing number of East Jerusalem Palestinians are looking for ways to engage it 
(ICG, 2012: 16). However, I make the case here that in the fragmented and 
atomised environment of East Jerusalem, and in the absence of collective 
understandings of key signifiers, that these efforts are very much individualised. 
The actions of many residents “reflect a process of atomisation, whereby 
individuals become preoccupied with their own interests and try to find some kind 
of solution to their problems, rather than pursuing collective action” (Salem, 2011: 
69).  
Salem (2006) addresses the post-Oslo period as ‘imposed inclusion without 
integration’. While the pre-Oslo period from 1967 to 1993 was characterised by 
adaptation while resisting among East Jerusalem people, factions and political 
leadership, the period from 1993 until 2006 in East Jerusalem argues that the 
paucity of studies on the social, communal and psychological ways in which East 
Jerusalem Palestinian cope with the Israeli occupation of the city is problematic 
because “it leaves space for different claims over the political orientation of the 
Palestinian Jerusalemites. Few studies have sought to explain the impact of 
occupation on Palestinian Jerusalemites or “to explain systematically how the 
Palestinian Jerusalemites perceive their current and future relationships with 
Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and in the Diaspora; or how the 
Oslo process, which postponed negotiations on Jerusalem to a later stage, has 
influenced these perceptions” (Salem, 2006: 1). 
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Beyond the competing claims over what Palestinian Jerusalemites really want, 
lies the sovereignty paradigm which Salem argues dominates the debate over 
Jerusalem. The point of departure for Salem is that “unless the issue of citizens’ 
sovereignty versus formal sovereignty is tackled, people’s adaptations to 
occupation cannot be analysed” (Ibid: 2). For Salem, adaptation means “all those 
types of voluntary and compulsory (i.e. forced, or imposed) actions taken by the 
Palestinian Jerusalemites in regard to their relations with Israeli official authorities 
in the city” (Salem, 2011: 3).  
Mitchell (1990) has challenged much of the theoretical literature on resistance, 
arguing that the popular distinction between persuasion and coercion acts as a 
“single, master metaphor” that limits the value of most power and resistance 
studies. Mitchell highlights James C. Scott’s study of everyday forms of peasant 
resistance, in which Scott sets out to determine whether power works by 
persuading the populace of its legitimacy or simply by coercing their actions. To 
what extent, he asks, are elites able to impose their own image of a just social 
order, not simply on the behaviour of non-elites but on their consciousness as 
well. Mitchell takes issue with Scott’s analysis, arguing that the complexities of 
domination do not fit the binary opposition between a physical and a mental form 
of power. Attempts to make them fit, he claims, arise for the desire to present 
“certain political groups as self-formed political subjects, meaning political 
subjects who preserve against an essentially physical coercion a space of mental 
autonomy” (Mitchell, 1990: 573). 
Mitchell’s critique attributes the persistence of the persuasion-coercion metaphor 
in part to the everyday conception of the person as a unique and self-constituted 
site of autonomy. From this perspective, we are required to consider the exercise 
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of power as “an external process that can coerce the behaviour of the body 
without necessarily penetrating and controlling the mind.” In this way, much of the 
literature on power and resistance seeks to portray the oppressed or neglected 
as genuine political subjects, self-formed and internally autonomous. The 
complexities of domination, exploitation and control, however, can never properly 
be reduced to an artificial binary between these two forms of power. Throughout 
this thesis, I emphasise the coercive power of domination, not simply on the 
behaviours of East Jerusalem Palestinians, but on their sense of self and their 
perceptions of what is possible. In this sense, I argue that identity is constituted 
through everyday social practices which are enacted within existing power 
structures. 
6 Conclusion   
In this chapter I have identified key analytical approaches to the study of East 
Jerusalem since Oslo and located this study within the relevant theoretical 
literature. I have tried to make clear how annexation and the terms negotiated by 
the PLO at Oslo have set East Jerusalem on a divergent political trajectory and 
to consider how Palestinian residents are impacted by Israel’s Judaisation project 
in the city. In the following chapters, I explore in detail how dislocation from the 
occupied territories combines with permanent, structural exclusion from the Israeli 
project to shape the site of Palestinian identity construction in the city and discuss 
how subjectivities are being recreated within that space as residents adapt to 
conditions in the city. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis, I explore the dual marginality of East Jerusalem residents and ask 
how it is shaping Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city. How do East 
Jerusalemites experience dislocation and exclusion? How do they frame these 
experiences and what meanings do they attach to their everyday choices and 
actions? How do dominant theoretical approaches understand the praxis of 
everyday life in East Jerusalem and what alternative interpretations are possible? 
These questions raise a number of methodological issues upon which I reflect in 
this chapter. How, for example, can I know with any certainty that my 
interpretation of the meaning East Jerusalem residents attach to their everyday 
practices comes close to their own? What is my role in the shared construction 
of knowledge? By recognising the structural constraints imposed by Israeli power 
in East Jerusalem, do I risk reinforcing or reproducing this construct? How am I 
personally positioned in relation to this research and what implications might this 
have had during both data collection and data analysis? 
I do not arrive here at conclusive positions on all of these issues, but aim to set 
out how I have approached them in the course of this research. First, I describe 
and reflect on my choice of research methods and then move on to discuss the 
final sample on which this study is based. Following this, I address the question 
of reflexivity and position myself in relation to the research. Finally, I discuss the 
question of objectivity in the field and during the writing up process. 
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1 Research Design 
In this section I set out the data collection methods employed in the course of this 
project and the past experience that informed it. I explain and problematise the 
sampling techniques underpinning the study and discuss the final sample upon 
which it is based. 
1.1 Retrospective Participant Observation 
During each stage of this study, from conception, through data collection and 
analysis to completion, I have drawn on my experience of total immersion in the 
research setting acquired over a sustained period, from June-2008 to November 
2011. Throughout these three and a half years, I lived in the Old City of 
Jerusalem, within and as part of a Palestinian family. I spent one month, at the 
end of 2008, in the UK, but was otherwise permanently resident in East 
Jerusalem, fully immersed in a Palestinian setting. This period afforded me the 
opportunity to observe from the inside the daily activities and every day cares and 
concerns of a Palestinian Jerusalemite family. While in no sense did I regard them 
at the time as research subjects, there is no doubt that my experience then 
informs this study. 
Bulmer (1982) refers to this “experience recollected in academia”, as 
retrospective participant observation, concluding that “a number of distinguished 
studies have been conducted (at least partially) retrospectively, after the event” 
(Bulmer, 1982: 254). Bulmer offers Ned Polsky’s 1969 study of poolroom hustling 
(Polsky, 1969) as a prime example of retrospective participant observation. While 
Polsky’s research was ostensibly carried out over an eight-month period in 1962-
3, his work was essentially “grounded in and inseparable from his own experience 
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in poolrooms.” Polsky had frequented poolrooms for more than 20 years and “he 
knew and had played regularly with several of the hustlers who were the subject 
of the research” (Bulmer, 1982: 254). 
Retrospective participant observation reverses the conventional research role 
sequence. The established ‘academic researcher → total participant (researcher) 
→ academic researcher again’ progression thus becomes ‘total participant (non-
researcher) → academic researcher → retrospective observer (researcher).’ As 
a total participant in the second sequence, the observer is entirely immersed in 
the setting to be studied, but has not yet developed a research interest in it.  
Bryman (2004) addresses the ethical dimensions of such a retrospective 
ethnography. Even within a universalist approach to research ethics, he argues, 
“retrospective covert observation, which occurs when a researcher writes up his 
or her experiences in social settings in which he or she participated but not as a 
researcher” may be acceptable (Bryman, 2004: 508). Bulmer is unambiguous. 
No deception of research subjects is involved and no breach of informed consent 
takes place during such covert ethnographic observation “since no scientific 
study was in view at the time the study was carried out” (Bulmer, 1982: 255). 
Much of this study is grounded in and inseparable from my past immersion in the 
research setting. For three and a half years I participated in the daily life of a 
Palestinian home and family, through feasts and fasts, births and bereavements, 
but more importantly through the ebb and flow of everyday life in East Jerusalem. 
In this sense, at least, this study is in part a retrospective ethnography. 
According to Schatz (2014), “ethnography helps ensure an empirically sound, 
theoretically vibrant, epistemologically innovative and normatively grounded 
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study of politics.” Ethnography is defined by two core principles. Most academics 
equate ethnography with participant observation, where immersion is regarded 
as the defining characteristic of this approach. A second core principle identified 
by Schatz, however, is an ethnographic ‘sensibility’ that “cares to glean the 
meanings that the people under study attribute to their social and political reality” 
(Schatz, 2014: 4-5). This sensibility to the meanings that East Jerusalem 
Palestinians attach to their everyday experience goes to core of what this study 
hopes to achieve. In order to protect the complete anonymity of participants, I 
avoid direct references to events, experiences or conversations which relate 
directly to this period of participant observation. There is no doubt, however, that 
both the ethnographic experience and the ethnographic sensibility underpin this 
study. 
1.2 In-Depth Interviews and Informal Conversations  
The retrospective participant observation detailed above informed and in part 
facilitated my subsequent fieldwork and data collection, undertaken over two 
months during 2016. In March-April 2016, I conducted twenty qualitative 
interviews with East Jerusalem residents, some of whom I had known for many 
years, others who I met in the course of my research. Interviews were semi-
structured and questions were open-ended, allowing in-depth responses and 
allocating a degree of authority to the interviewee.16 
                                            
16 Like any other conversation, interviewing involves a dynamic of power and control. In an 
interview context, this is loaded in favour of the interviewer. See SOSS, J. 2006. Talking Our 
Way to Meaningful Explanations: A Practice-Centred View of Interviewing for Interpretive 
Research. In: YANOW, D. & SCHWARTZ-SHEA, P. (eds.) Interpretation and Methods: 
Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn. Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe Inc. 
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Kelly (2010) argues that qualitative interviews are of most value when the 
researcher aims to achieve insight into the world of others, when she “wishes to 
gain an understanding of how participants view, experience, or conceptualise an 
aspect of social life” (Kelly, 2010: 309). While participant observation permitted 
me to observe a broad range of settings, behaviours, and interactions that would 
not otherwise have been accessible, in-depth interviewing offered a method by 
which to explore the meanings that individuals themselves attached to these 
choices and actions. As an observer, I had formed, to some extent, my own 
interpretation of the behaviours and practices I witnessed. In the interview 
context, the interviewee was able to select their own stories and was more 
centrally positioned as the interpreter of their own experience (Soss, 2006: 142). 
Through in-depth interviewing I also hoped to gained access to the detailed 
personal narratives of East Jerusalem Palestinians who are doubly marginalised 
and whose experience is excluded from dominant nationalist discourses. 
Soss (2006) argues that “interpretive research, in particular, requires the pursuit 
of thick descriptions and this means working hard to encourage elaboration, 
clarification, reflection, and illustration” (Soss, 2006: 136). In this activity, the 
researcher conducting in depth interviews carries the experience away from that 
of an everyday conversation and the dynamics of power and authority, present in 
all conversations, is magnified in an interview context. 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2006) suggest that interview questions are 
typically framed from the researcher’s perspective and may guide the respondent 
to frame their response in line with the interviewer’s expectations. By contrast, 
they argue that storytelling retains the storyteller’s point of view and with it “much 
of the ambiguity, contradictions, and complexity of social life.” In essence, they 
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are “the embodiment of the storyteller’s interpretations” (Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno, 2006: 329-30). 
However, I maintain that the interview setting also offers opportunities for 
storytelling. Recognising that my questions, however open-ended, were authored 
by me, I encouraged respondents to share their own personal narrative as 
thoroughly as possible and to organise their own priorities in responding. I 
resisted overtly political lines of questioning which might guide the interviewee 
towards the familiar discourses of occupation and resistance typical of most 
conversations between Palestinians and unfamiliar ‘ajaanib’ (foreigners)17. I also 
sought to avoid questions that directly probed the interviewee’s feelings on issues 
familiar in the national discourse and instead spent much of the interview 
discussing the interviewee’s family, education, work and everyday life in the city 
and allowed them to interpret that experience themselves. As a result, I felt that 
the interview provided a valuable platform for storytelling; the terms in which 
respondents framed their experience and the stories they chose to tell to give it 
meaning to me might also be regarded as a personal narrative and the 
embodiment of their own interpretation.  
In this context, in-depth qualitative interviews forefront the agency of individuals 
and “offer an excellent way to map the conceptual world of participants in ways 
that illuminate both coherence and inconsistency.” During the course of 
interviews, disjuncture, ambivalence and inner conflict “bubble to the surface as 
individuals traverse complex issues” (Soss, 2006: 143). This was very much the 
                                            
17 After a number of years lived in East Jerusalem and having visited the occupied territories 
including the West Bank and Gaza on a score of other occasions, I was familiar with (and 
impressed by) the proficiency of most Palestinians in the English-language vocabulary of the 
occupation. 
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case during my interviews. I frequently felt that respondents were navigating 
challenging issues about their own agency and identity for the first time and more 
than once interviewees themselves recognised and acknowledged the internal 
inconsistency of their statements. Rather than causing them to feel defensive or 
confused, however, this ambivalence was generally met with wry amusement and 
raised arms that suggested this somehow captured the essence of the East 
Jerusalem problem. As Maynes et al. (2008) observe, read carefully, personal life 
stories provide “unique insights into the connections between individual life 
trajectories and collective forces and institutions beyond the individual”, thus 
offering “a methodologically privileged location from which to comprehend human 
agency” (Maynes, 2008: 3). 
All interviews were conducted in English, but respondents occasionally reverted 
to Arabic in order to express themselves accurately or if they could not recall 
specific words in English. My understanding of spoken Arabic was often good 
enough for me to offer the word they were looking for and for the interview to 
continue in English. On occasion, the interviewee spoke at length in Arabic and 
while I followed the gist of their meaning at the time, I always undertook a fuller 
translation after the interview. On odd occasions, a third party who was present 
in the home or office was called in by the interviewee to help translate their 
thoughts into English. 
Interviews lasted between one and a half and three and a half hours. Most took 
place in the home or workplace of the interviewee, while a small number took 
place at my accommodation in the Old City. Almost all were audio recorded, 
though the conversation sometimes continued after the recording was ended. 
Bryman (2004) notes that this is the point at which some interviewees choose to 
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‘open up’ (Bryman, 2004: 333). Fortunately, this was rarely the case during my 
interviews. One interviewee refused to be recorded, but allowed me to take 
detailed notes. 
2 Sample and Participant Selection 
The target population of this study is East Jerusalem Palestinians and the 
inclusion criteria were left deliberately broad. Participants were required to be in 
possession of a valid Israeli identity card, compulsory from the age of 16 in Israel, 
which identified them as a permanent resident or citizen of the Israeli state. Such 
cards are blue in colour and are clearly distinguishable from the green identity 
cards issued by the Palestinian Authority to Palestinians officially resident in the 
West Bank. 
While Israeli identity cards issued since 2005 no longer explicitly state the official 
ethnicity of the holder (for example Jewish, Arab, Druze, or Circassian), 
participants were required to have obtained residency status in Israel directly, or 
indirectly in the case of those born after 1967, through the acquisition and 
annexation of Palestinian territory by Israel following the 1967 war. Participants 
were required to be officially resident in Jerusalem. The official address of 
residents is recorded on their identity card. Palestinians in possession of Israeli 
residency status whose official address was registered in Jerusalem, but who in 
reality were resident day to day in the West Bank, were also eligible for inclusion. 
Participants were also required to be aged 18 or over and to be able to give their 
full and informed consent. 
Individuals who lived in Jerusalem and identified as Palestinian but who did not 
possess permanent residency status in Israel were excluded. So too were 
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individuals identifying as Palestinian and resident in Jerusalem but whose Israeli 
citizenship was acquired as a result of Israel’s acquisition of Palestinian territory 
before 1967, for example, Palestinian Israelis from within Israel’s 1948 borders. 
Children under the age of 18 were excluded from participation, as were other 
individuals considered at risk or vulnerable. 
2.1 Access and Trust 
As a trusted member of a local Palestinian family which I had known for almost 
fifteen years before coming to live with them in 2008, I acquired ‘insider’ access 
to the practice of everyday life in East Jerusalem. Family members spoke openly 
in front of me, argued in front of me, and shared equally their sorrows and their 
celebrations with me. Their friends soon became my friends and we would 
sometimes socialise together. Meanwhile, my circle of close acquaintances also 
grew as my daughter made new friends at school in the Old City and at the YMCA 
in East Jerusalem where she took part in after-school activities. When my son 
was born at the Palestinian Red Crescent Hospital on the Mount of Olives in 
2009, the number of people I knew and spoke to regularly seemed to grow 
exponentially. It is through these relationships that I began to perceive a 
disjuncture between public and academic representations of everyday 
Palestinian life in East Jerusalem and the way in which Palestinian residents 
framed their everyday activities and struggles in private.  
This awareness developed later into a research proposal, to test the extent to 
which such a disjuncture existed and to consider its implications for Palestinian 
identity and struggle in the city. Thomas (1993) notes that the critical 
ethnographer should not set out to gather data to prove a point. However, it is 
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appropriate for the researcher to identify a concrete problem through first-hand 
experience of a setting and then to seek to establish through data gathering if the 
problem in fact exists. This is very much the approach undertaken here, but 
returning to Jerusalem as an academic researcher, the main problem I faced was 
how to achieve the level of trust required to approach personal and sensitive 
issues with Jerusalem residents beyond my circle of close family and friends. 
As discussed below, East Jerusalem Palestinians live with a level of fear and 
insecurity that discourages openness with strangers, or even acquaintances. 
Achieving a level of trust with respondents sufficient for them to share with me 
personal and often incriminating details that could see their residency rights in 
Jerusalem revoked was always going to be challenging. Providing a sufficiently 
safe environment for the mother of a young Hamas martyr, for example, to tell 
me without hesitation that she would rather live under Israeli rule than that of the 
Palestinian Authority, was not something I would have been able to achieve 
alone. 
Seeking out and gaining the trust of “the ordinary practitioners of the city” who 
live “below the threshold at which visibility begins” (de Certeau, 1984: 93) became 
my main challenge. Lefebvre (1991) notes that “the silence of the users is indeed 
a problem – and it is the entire problem” (Lefebvre, 1991: 365). Power aims to 
control space entirely and “no space can or may be allowed to escape 
domination, except in so far as appearances are concerned” (Lefebvre, 1991: 
387). As I discuss in detail in Chapter V, “Palestinians experience a generalised 
feeling of being watched and surveilled” (Zureik, 2016) and, with the stakes so 
high, this is particularly acute in East Jerusalem. 
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Shtern (2017) points to a “fundamental difficulty in collecting reliable data on East 
Jerusalem residents” who are reluctant to cooperate, particularly with Israeli 
researchers. Suspicion leads to a refusal to participate or to answers intended to 
pacify the researcher (Shtern, 2017: 8). This was also a concern in seeking to 
gain the confidence of residents. Trust thus became a key factor in my fieldwork 
and I relied on a snowball sampling technique to gain access beyond my own 
circle of acquaintances. I began my interviews with a small number of key 
informants on whom I then relied, not only to put me in contact with other potential 
respondents, but to establish a level of trust between us sufficient to make the 
interview of value to the overall aims of the research. 
Atkinson and Flint (2001) note that “the main value of snowball sampling is as a 
method for obtaining respondents where they are few in number or where some 
degree of trust is required to initiate contact.” Once the interview had taken place, 
a respondent was then able to introduce me more widely with the assurance that 
they had already taken part. This technique of ‘chain referral’ extended the insider 
or group member status I held within a small circle to a much broader group 
(Atkinson and Flint, 2001).  
While Atkinson and Flint (2001) recognise the problems of snowball sampling, in 
particular with reference to issues of generalisability, they conclude that snowball-
based methodologies offer a valuable means of accessing groups located outside 
mainstream research. “The real promise of snowball sampling lies in its ability to 
uncover aspects of social experience often hidden from both the researcher’s and 
layperson’s view of social life” (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). 
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2.2 Sample 
My sample size of twenty in-depth interviews reflects the very time consuming 
nature of this method, but also the sensitivity of the subject matter and the 
inherent difficulties of reaching a population that is usually inaccessible to 
researchers without the benefit of insider status. While East Jerusalem 
Palestinians are not entirely absent from the academic literature, the way in which 
they themselves frame their everyday experience is generally overlooked within 
mainstream studies that typically rely on descending methodologies or which reify 
essentialised identities. Alternatively, “ascending methodologies, such as the use 
of snowball techniques, can be used to look upwards and locate those on the 
ground who are needed to fill the gaps in our knowledge on a variety of social 
contexts” (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). 
While the sample here is not large, I argue that it quickly reached a point of 
saturation. Mason (2010) notes that “there is a point of diminishing return to a 
qualitative sample – as the study goes on more data does not necessarily lead to 
more information” (Mason, 2010: 1). I began the interviewing process with the 
expectation that I would find a diverse range of opinions on key issues such as 
Palestinian leadership, adaptation to occupation and Israeli governance. Instead, 
I found a startling degree of consensus that is nowhere reflected in the 
mainstream literature. As the interviews progressed, respondents shared a 
plethora of personal narratives and stories, but from the outset there was 
surprisingly little variation in terms of interviewees’ views on key political issues. 
Mason concludes that sample size should follow the concept of saturation as 
defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), “when the collection of new data does not 
shed any further light on the issue under investigation” (Mason, 2010).  
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This is not to claim that the sample presented here is representative of the East 
Jerusalem Palestinian population as a whole. I do not attempt to reflect the 
opinions of all Palestinian residents or to capture the quotidian experience of 
every individual. I believe I have done sufficient, however, to demonstrate that 
the preoccupation of mainstream studies with top-down issues such as borders 
and sovereignty fails to take account of the divergent experience of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians and the potential implications of their dual marginality for 
Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city. 
Within the snowballing method adopted, I sought to vary the sample as broadly 
as possible. In order to access as best I could the unique personal narratives of 
a broad range of residents, I aimed to avoid altogether interviews with East 
Jerusalem Palestinians who spoke on behalf of a faction, local NGO or political 
grouping, or whose views on the political situation in the city were already in the 
public domain. My concern was that such individuals might struggle to let go of 
either their public persona or the dominant discursive articulations of Palestinian 
life in East Jerusalem with which I was already familiar and which they might 
expect to be of primary interest a British researcher. In the event, my sampling 
methods led me to only one such figure, who, in the nicest possible way, 
confirmed these fears. Beyond my interviewees, in informal conversations too, 
those for whom dealings with the international NGO community or media were a 
familiar occurrence seemed less willing or able to engage with the more personal 
and seemingly mundane issues that were of interest to me. Rather, I found that 
they anticipated and rarely deviated from a more familiar set of concerns that 
produced an equally familiar vocabulary and narrative. Interviews and 
conversations were far more natural with residents who were not professionally 
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involved with international journalists or NGOs. These interviewees often found 
more personal ways to connect with me, either as women, as mothers, or as 
academics, for example. 
While I was ultimately reliant on key informants and those I had already 
interviewed to lead me to new respondents, as we discussed potential 
participants I was able to shape the sample to some extent with reference to 
factors such as gender and social background. In this way, I achieved a pleasing 
balance of male and female respondents (nine male and eleven female) and a 
broad mix of professional and non-professional interviewees (twelve non-
professional and eight professional). The final sample also reflects a wide age 
range. Forty percent of interviewees were aged between 18 and 30, a further 
40% were aged between 31 and 55 and the final 20% were aged 55 and over. 
It was rather more difficult to ensure a balanced representation of respondents 
from different geographical locations throughout East Jerusalem. While many 
East Jerusalem Palestinians remain in or close to family homes, building 
restrictions and the high cost of living in the city mean that many others have little 
choice but to relocate to less expensive neighbourhoods, particularly those in the 
seam zone or outside the separation Wall. As such, there is significant movement 
of East Jerusalem residents within the municipal boundaries of the city and even 
beyond. While areas such as Beit Hanina, Shufat, the Old City, Tur and Abu Tur 
are well represented in this sample, neighbourhoods such as Issawiya are less 
so. This absence is to some extent compensated for by the informal contacts I 
made with Palestinians who had moved to Issawiya due to the relatively 
inexpensive cost of renting property. Among these were a number of non-
professional, newly-wed couples unable to afford homes nearer the commercial 
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centre. The relative isolation and deprivation of an area such as Issawiya is 
significant, but the main advantage of capturing a good geographic spread among 
the respondents would be to achieve a sense of the concerns of particular 
neighbourhoods with regard to possible outcomes for East Jerusalem in future 
negotiations or unilateral Israeli actions. Residents of the Old City, for example, 
might confidently predict that Israel would never relinquish control of their 
neighbourhood, while Palestinians in more outlying areas, closer to the borders 
of the West Bank, might have good reason to wonder whether jurisdiction over 
them could be ceded to the Palestinian Authority in a future settlement.  
By far the most serious problem I encountered with regard to sample was my 
relative inability to access East Jerusalem’s Christian community. The genuinely 
warm relationships I had established with Palestinian Christians over more than 
three years living in East Jerusalem could not overcome apparent communal 
suspicions or replace the trust extended to me through key informants. As Muslim 
Palestinians, my key informants often had Christian acquaintances, but not 
sufficiently close it transpired to build a bridge between them and me on such 
difficult and intimate issues. I was consistently told by East Jerusalem Muslims 
that there were no tensions between communities, but Palestinian Christians in 
the city were often more circumspect. Only one of my interviewees was able to 
persuade a Christian acquaintance to speak to me, but even then, he refused to 
allow me to record the interview. I approached a number of my Christian 
acquaintances myself. The shopkeeper, for example, whose mini-market I had 
frequented almost daily for three and a half years, whose home I had visited and 
whose son I had assisted with his visa application to the UK, agreed to participate, 
but then withdrew. The bookseller on Salah ad-Din Street who agreed to chat to 
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me informally, but refused to be interviewed and intimated that few Christians 
would be willing to participate without understanding more fully why I was 
interested in these issues and what the information would be used for.  
Dumper (2014) notes that the Christian community in Jerusalem is in steep 
decline. In 1946 Christian Palestinians comprised over 19% of the population of 
the city, yet by 2010 this figure was estimated to have fallen to less than 2% 
(Dumper, 2014: 111). According to my sole Christian informant, even this statistic 
is inflated since many Christians registered as resident in East Jerusalem in fact 
now live abroad, but take steps to preserve the appearance of living in the city in 
order to retain their residency status. The reluctance of my Christian 
acquaintances to engage with this study reflects in part the importance of a 
trusted intermediary in securing participation and the absence of sufficient trust 
between them and myself or my informants. In total, six Christian Palestinian 
residents of East Jerusalem whom I approached to participate refused outright, 
in contrast to only one Muslim Palestinian resident. It might be fair to conclude, 
therefore, that the trust and temporary insider status I was able to achieve through 
my key informants with their Muslim contacts did not extend to Christian 
Palestinians with whom we were acquainted. 
While Christian Palestinians are therefore slightly under-represented in this 
study, the candid contribution offered by the one Christian respondent who did 
agree to take part and the data accumulated through many informal 
conversations with Christians in the city suggest that my analysis might not have 
been significantly different had I found more to take part.  
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3 Data Analysis and Representation 
In this section I address the theoretical and epistemological positions that 
underpin this study. I examine the question of what knowledge is and how it is 
produced and position myself and this thesis within this debate. I consider the 
type of knowledge created through ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth 
interviewing, then move on to consider my own role as researcher in the 
construction of knowledge. Finally, I reflect on the issue of researcher objectivity. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
Throughout this study, I seek to problematise interpretations of everyday life in 
East Jerusalem that are rooted in mainstream discursive articulations of 
Palestinians as one side in an objectified conflict. I aim to shed light, as far as 
possible, on the meanings that individuals themselves attach to their everyday 
experience and to situate these within a new analytic framework that recognises 
the everyday as a relevant site for the discursive construction of identities. 
Discourse theory, which is centrally concerned with the way in which social 
agents obtain and live out their identities, offers a useful framework within which 
to analyse the impact of dislocation and domination on the constitution of political 
subjectivities in East Jerusalem.18 The analysis offered here is not a rigorous 
discourse theoretical case study and is not intended to be such. Discourse theory 
is ‘problem-driven’ rather than ‘method’ or ‘theory-driven’ in the sense that it is 
                                            
18 This approach is rooted in the research programme pursued by the Essex University 
programme in Ideology and Discourse Analysis and which has come to be known as the Essex 
School. The discourse theoretic approach which has emerged from this school is rooted in the 
work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, in particular LACLAU, E. & MOUFFE, C. 1985. 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso. 
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the empirical phenomena under investigation which drive the study. That is very 
much the case here. I set out at the start of this project with the aim of 
understanding a specific problematised phenomenon and found significant value 
in the application of discourse theory as a theoretical perspective, but not as an 
exclusive one. To this extent, I draw on the underlying assumptions and concepts 
of this approach among others, but do not exhaustively apply all of its conceptual 
elements. 
Discourse theory is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that can be applied a priori 
to all problems (Howarth, 2005), but it is well suited to a specific range of research 
problems, including the constitution of political identities and the establishment of 
political frontiers. These are especially relevant to this study. Discourse theory 
seeks to provide new interpretations of specific issues by problematising existing 
accounts and making visible processes or phenomena that were previously 
obscured by dominant theoretical approaches.19 This is also a central aim of this 
study. 
In sections of this thesis, I draw on a problem-driven discourse theoretic approach 
that begins with a political issue in the present and which seeks to analyse and 
critique the historical and structural conditions within which it emerged. For 
Howarth (2005), “problem-driven discourse theory not only constitutes new 
objects of inquiry through interrogating particular phenomena… most importantly, 
                                            
19 Discourse theory is distinct from discourse analysis in that the former operates at an 
ontological level as a range of necessary theoretical presuppositions– for example, the 
contingency of identity and the primacy of politics – while discourse analysis is more narrowly 
defined as a toolkit or set of techniques for analysing language in context. 
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it begins with and challenges the political circumstances within which such 
theories emerge and operate.” I come back to this final point below. 
There is a recognised methodological deficit within discourse theory (Howarth, 
2005, Karakatsanis, 2012, Torfing, 2005), derived in large part from its anti-
epistemological stance. Within discourse theory, “the fact that every object is 
constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a 
world external to thought… What is denied is not that such objects exist externally 
to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves 
as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence” (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 108). 
Since discourse theory holds that there is no extra-discursive truth – that truth is 
not part of an external reality, but a feature of language that is always local and 
flexible – it rejects the notion of a general set of methodological rules. According 
to Torfing, an unfortunate consequence of this anti-epistemological stance is that 
discourse theory has effectively “thrown the methodological baby out with the 
epistemological bathwater” (Torfing, 2005: 27). While a universal method 
consisting of rigid methodological rules is problematic, this should not prevent 
discourse theorists from addressing methodological questions as they present 
themselves within problem-driven studies (Torfing, 2005: 28). 
The practice of ‘doing fieldwork’ is only just starting to gain attention among 
discourse theorists (Howarth, 2005, Karakatsanis, 2012, Müller, 2011, Torfing, 
2005). There is no single statement of the discursive method, but discourse 
analysts may collect qualitative data from a range of textual sources and make 
good use of in-depth interviews and other ethnographic forms of investigation 
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(Howarth, 2010: 140). For Howarth, “primary documents, in-depth interviews, 
newspaper reports, observed and unobserved social practices, images, 
quantitative data, even buildings and historical monuments, are grist to the mill of 
problem-driven discourse theory” (Howarth, 2005). 
 Since discourse theory emphasises the value of subjectivity in explaining social 
reality, in-depth interviews offer a valuable source for generating primary texts. 
Howarth recognises the difficulties common to interviewing, for example, 
retrospective rationalisations and hyperbolic representations as well as the 
methodological difficulties of accessing information that is deliberately or 
unintentionally hidden. Meanwhile he argues that “a critical reflexivity about one’s 
own theoretical assumptions and research project, while adopting an ‘ethos of 
openness’ to the other, are useful ways of guarding against the temptation to 
reduce the other’s discourse to familiar and self-serving purposes.” 
3.2 Reflexivity 
Such an approach locates the researcher centrally as an active participant in the 
process of data gathering and in the presentation of data to an audience. 
Following this approach, it is essential therefore to consider the position of myself 
as researcher in the intersubjective creation of knowledge. Fontana and Frey 
(2005) recognise that the researcher is not a “neutral tool” but rather “a person, 
historically and contextually located, carrying unavoidable conscious and 
unconscious motives, desires, feelings and biases” (Fontana and Frey, 2005: 
696). Following this, I accept Geertz’s claim that “what we call data are really our 
own construction of other people’s construction” (Geertz, 1973: 9). 
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Such a recognition requires a reflexive response. Reflexivity is defined by 
Shehata (2006) as “being self-conscious about fieldwork and the role of the 
ethnographer in the production of knowledge” (Shehata, 2006: 246). The power 
of the traditional ethnographer in the construction of knowledge is clear from the 
outset as she repeatedly decides in the field what to make note of. Even in 
recorded interviews, the researcher selects what to recount. From the choice of 
research topic, through the formulation of questions and the interview process to 
the decisions I have made about what to recount here, I have been an active 
participant in the construction of this data rather than a straightforward conductor 
of knowledge. 
Karakatsanis (2012) argues that discourse theory, on which I draw in Chapter VI, 
needs to reflect more on methodological issues and to devise a creative, self-
reflexive approach to the researcher’s presence in the field. “Being there, in the 
field of research, tracing, connecting, finding links and access to, recording and 
collecting, ‘material’ i.e. enacting the bodily performance of gathering those 
‘discourses’ to be analysed as parts of a problem is also an active part of the 
problematisation procedure itself” (Karakatsansis, 2012: 11). 
Throughout this project, I have tried to reflect on my role as observer and 
researcher and to identify the multiple variables which might influence encounters 
in the field as well as my interpretation of them. Knowledge gathered through in-
depth interviewing is intersubjectively created and power-laden; the ethnographic 
encounter enacts power relations, but its position within power structures is also 
complex and potentially counter-hegemonic (Clifford, 1986: 9). A range of factors 
might influence the mutual construction of knowledge, including language, 
location and timing, as well as the way in which my own identity is interpreted by 
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interviewees. The relative significance of each of these factors during my 
fieldwork depended very much on the specifics of each encounter.  
While it is important to recognise that interviews are implicated in power relations, 
I avoid the reification of cultural difference or the essentialisation of identities. 
Through various subject positions, I occupied the position of both ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’ in relation to interviewees, be it as a friend (or a friend of a friend), a 
woman, a parent, an academic, or a British person with experience living in East 
Jerusalem. Indeed, for Abu-Lughod (1989), “to recognise that the self may not be 
so unitary and that the other might actually consist of many others who may not 
be so ‘other’ after all is to raise the theoretically interesting problem of how to 
build in ways of accepting or describing differences without denying similarities 
or turning these various differences into a single, frozen Difference” (Abu Lughod, 
1989: 277). Ultimately, it was the interviewees’ understanding that I had shared 
in some way in their experience in East Jerusalem and that I was broadly 
sympathetic to Palestinian national aspirations there that secured me access to 
them in the first place and which was most formative during our encounters. 
If there is perhaps one area in which the perception of ‘cultural difference’ was 
influential, however, it was in my conversations with male participants. Reading 
the transcripts and listening again to interviews after my fieldwork, I detected a 
slight but discernible (to me) difference in my approach to male interviewees that 
rather took me by surprise. In some, though not all, of these conversations, I 
recognise myself as a more passive participant than in others and these 
interviews are perhaps less conversational than those with female informants. In 
this sense, I came to recognise that I had perhaps brought to the interviews my 
own constructed understanding of the ‘cultural difference’ in power relations 
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between men and women in East Jerusalem and the extra ‘sensitivity’ I felt was 
required as a result of my ‘foreignness.’  
3.3 Objectivity and Partiality 
In order to gain access, to build trust and to position myself openly with 
interviewees, I or my key informants made participants aware of my precise 
relationship to the city and to the issues addressed by my research. Following 
Fontana and Frey (2005), I aimed for rapport with interviewees rather than a 
professional sense of detachment or neutrality: in treating the other as a human 
being and asking them to reveal them self, it becomes impossible to remain an 
objective, faceless interviewer; the interviewer is also a person and must disclose 
them self (Fontana and Frey, 2005: 373-4). In the spirit of being equally open with 
my audience, I offer here a very brief biographical note. 
I visited Jerusalem for the first time in 1990 when I was sixteen years old, on a 
tour organised by the Federation of Zionist Youth. As an undergraduate, I studied 
Arabic then History, specialising in the Early Islamic period and the Modern 
Middle East. While at university, I met and married a Palestinian from East 
Jerusalem. I went on to complete a Master’s degree in the International Politics 
of the Middle East, then worked in a number of roles that took me often to the 
region, in particular to East Jerusalem, Gaza, the West Bank and the Palestinian 
refugee camps in Lebanon. When, in 2008, we learnt that my husband’s 
residency rights had been revoked, we relocated with our young daughter to East 
Jerusalem in order to re-establish our family’s centre of life in the city. 
This background sheds light on my immersion in the setting over a number of 
years, but also raises questions about researcher objectivity and positionality. 
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Rejecting any claims to objective knowledge, I recognise that “ethnographic 
truths are thus inherently partial – committed and incomplete” (Clifford, 1986: 7). 
Following Clifford and Abu Lughod, I argue that all knowledge is also positioned. 
From this perspective, the notion that any researcher stands outside the subject 
of their research is untenable as it become clear that “every view is a view from 
somewhere and every act of speaking a speaking from somewhere” (Abu 
Lughod, 1991: 468). 
Abu Lughod focuses on feminist anthropologists and ‘halfies’ – “people whose 
national or cultural identity is mixed by virtue of migration, overseas education, or 
parentage” (Abu Lughod, 1991: 467). While feminist and halfie researchers 
cannot avoid the issue of positionality, the persistence of concerns regarding their 
partiality suggests that the researcher is still defined as one who should stand 
apart from the Other. What Abu Lughod makes clear, is that “what we call the 
outside is a position within a larger political-historical complex. No less than the 
halfie, the ‘wholie’ is in a specific position vis-a-vis the community being studied” 
(Abu Lughod, 1991: 468). Thus, it is dubious to maintain that the relationship 
between self and other is ever innocent of power. 
I acknowledge that I am also politically positioned with regard to the implications 
of my findings. I argue that the researcher should do more than seek simply to 
understand or interpret the world, but should also aim to challenge both existing 
interpretations and the political circumstances within which they emerge. 
Research can thus be “simultaneously hermeneutic and emancipatory” (Thomas, 
1993) and in this sense, I adopt a broadly critical theoretical perspective. For 
Lather, “doing critical inquiry means taking into account how our lives are 
mediated by systems of inequality” (Lather, 2004: 205). In line with this, I hold 
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that both the social construction of knowledge and the methods used for 
gathering empirical data are “inescapably tied to issues of power” (Lather, 2004), 
and that there is no “trans-historical, culture-free, disinterested way of knowing” 
(Lather, 2004: 207). In challenging the top-down optic through which East 
Jerusalem is commonly viewed, a central aim of this thesis is to make visible the 
impact of deeply asymmetrical power relations on Palestinian subjectivity and 
struggle in the city. 
4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I set out to describe the methods employed in the course of this 
study and the theoretical perspectives which underpin them. I have shed light on 
some of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of discourse theory and 
demonstrated how a broadly discourse theoretical approach may be applied to 
problematise existing accounts of Palestinian identity in East Jerusalem and to 
articulate alternative interpretations. The everyday is a relevant site for the 
discursive construction of identities and the ethnographic approach adopted here 
has generated significant data which reflects the importance of subjectivity in the 
constitution of political identities. I have also reflected on my experience as a 
researcher in the field and the nature of the ethnographic encounter. 
I have made it my goal to present a ground-level perspective from East Jerusalem 
that sheds light on the impact of top-down processes and geopolitical concerns 
on the everyday lives of Palestinian residents and the space in which they 
understand their agency to have meaning. Having lived in East Jerusalem, 
immersed in a Palestinian setting, I had a sense of the divergence between 
mainstream discursive articulations pertaining to East Jerusalem and the 
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observable reality around me. Yet during my fieldwork, I was still surprised by the 
extent of this disparity as well as the willingness and the ability of residents to 
communicate it. This signalled to me the rootedness of these views in the 
everyday discourse of East Jerusalem despite their absence from the Palestinian 
nationalist discourse and the academic literature. Recognising that subjectivity is 
how people act and that identities are constituted through everyday practice, this 
also directed me towards a more theoretical discussion of Palestinian subjectivity 
and struggle in East Jerusalem and their relevance to the wider issues that 
dominate the existing literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
112 
 
CHAPTER IV 
EVERYDAY PALESTINIAN LIFE IN THE DISLOCATED CITY: EAST 
JERUSALEM RESIDENTS AS AN ISOLATED PALESTINIAN 
CONSTITUENCY  
To all intents and purposes, East Jerusalem Palestinians live inside Israel’s de 
facto borders, physically and politically dislocated from the West Bank and its 
residents. Mainstream academic approaches typically emphasise a form of 
Palestinian agency enacted through efforts to subvert and resist. However, the 
ground level perspective adopted here makes visible the extent to which the 
experience of dislocation from the occupied territories has penetrated quotidian 
practices and shifted the space in which Palestinian agency is meaningful. As the 
bearer of norms and constraints, practical space has normative and repressive 
efficacy beyond that which can be achieved through ideology alone (Lefebvre, 
1991). While East Jerusalem Palestinians refuse to positively acquiesce in or give 
legitimacy to Israel’s occupation, none the less the state and its institutions are 
pervasive and engagement with them is an inextricable fact of life for most in the 
city.  
In this chapter, I explore how this Palestinian constituency’s divergent experience 
of Israeli occupation impacts everyday life and decision making in the city, laying 
the foundations for a detailed discussion of Palestinian subjectivity in East 
Jerusalem in Chapter VI. First, I explore the extent and implications of East 
Jerusalem’s physical and political isolation from the Palestinian inside. I address 
East Jerusalem’s physical dislocation, arguing that the ‘hard’ borders of this 
many-bordered city (Dumper, 2014: 5) are reorienting everyday life in the urban 
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centre away from Jerusalem’s traditional hinterland and fostering a sense of 
isolation within this Palestinian constituency. Despite broad international rejection 
of the legality of Israel’s annexation, the quotidian experience of Palestinians in 
East Jerusalem leaves them in no doubt that they live very much inside the Israeli 
state. 
I also detail the collapse of Palestinian political authority in East Jerusalem and 
the atomisation of a community which finds itself physically separated and 
politically alienated from the body politic. While these processes might yet be 
reversible, the enduring reality of Israeli political rule in East Jerusalem and the 
everyday experience of its Palestinian residents are shaping conceptions of what 
is realistic. They also have a discernible impact on Jerusalemite experiences of 
and attitudes towards the West Bank and West Bankers (and vice versa). 
Second, I argue that the prospects of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem have 
receded so far (Dumper and Pullan, 2010) that Palestinian residents of the city 
no longer experience Israeli occupation as temporary (ICG, 2012) nor engage 
with the Israeli state straightforwardly as an occupation authority. Rejection of the 
leadership in Ramallah as an illegitimate and ultimately undesirable political 
authority, leaves Palestinians in Jerusalem with no plausible alternative to an 
occupation which has already lasted 50 years and to which there is no 
foreseeable end. For most Palestinian residents, it is impossible to see how 
challenging, let alone replacing, Israeli state hegemony in East Jerusalem is 
possible (Yiftachel, 2009a).  
Third, I will make clear that East Jerusalem Palestinians experience a matrix of 
complex and often ambivalent feelings towards and relationships with Israel and 
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its Jewish citizens. The quotidian experiences out of which these entangled 
feelings emerge differ from those of West Bank Palestinians whose political milieu 
is altogether dissimilar and who experience occupation day to day through the 
conduit of the Palestinian Authority. Here, I challenge mainstream Israeli and 
Palestinian nationalist discourses which typically favour essentialist 
representations of identity (Sherwell, 2006). Much of the existing literature on 
East Jerusalem, which takes as its starting point the conflict between Israel and 
the Palestinians, accepts these representations at face value and as such gives 
insufficient attention to the implications of East Jerusalem’s spatial and political 
dislocation for Palestinian subjectivities in the city.  
Fourth, I will conclude that the subject positions adopted and everyday choices 
made by individual agents are restricted (though not determined) by power 
relations and that the particular power complex in which East Jerusalemites 
operate is defining the limits of their political imagination and diminishing their 
political horizons. Isolated and criminalised but determined to remain in the city 
and not entirely without opportunity, East Jerusalem Palestinians are pursuing 
individualised strategies aimed at achieving a ‘normal’ life for themselves and 
their families and improving their material prospects where possible. While the 
first intifada period was characterised by “suspension of life” strategies (Jean‐
Klein, 2001) and the second intifada period witnessed a shift towards “affirmation 
of life” tactics (Junka, 2006, Richter-Devroe, 2011), I will argue that a combination 
of factors in East Jerusalem in the post second intifada period have produced an 
individualised “improvement of life” attitude among Palestinians in the city that 
has little to do with the resistance/normalisation binary and much to do with the 
power complex in the city and the opportunities for agency.   
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1.    The Inside, Outside: Physical and Political Dislocation 
In this section, I discuss the physical and political dislocation of East Jerusalem 
from the West Bank and begin to explore the impact of this separation on 
Palestinian life in the city. Addressing first the spatial reality, I focus on the 
separation Barrier which isolates East Jerusalem from its traditional hinterland. 
Israeli settlement construction in and around East Jerusalem, as well as the use 
of national parks to encircle the city’s historic inner core (further restricting land 
use by Palestinians) are tremendously damaging to the viability of a future 
Palestinian state and to the territorial contiguity of East Jerusalem and the West 
Bank. However, I focus here on the separation Barrier since this is the most 
tangible manifestation of the everyday dislocation experienced in East Jerusalem 
and that which impacts the quotidian practices of residents as opposed to the 
feasibility of statehood. Reviled and rejected by East Jerusalemites and West 
Bankers alike, the separation Barrier none the less has normative impact on both 
communities, the frequency with which they encounter each other and their 
understanding of the other.  
1.1 The Barrier in the Jerusalem Area 
Israel’s separation Barrier (also known as a separation Wall or Fence) starts at 
the northern end of the West Bank and roughly traces the Green Line south, 
generally on the Palestinian side of the boundary and often cutting deep into the 
West Bank, annexing large portions of land. The impact of this Barrier on 
individuals and communities across the West Bank and East Jerusalem is well 
documented. In particular, United Nations bodies, local and international human 
rights organisations and other NGOs have published a wealth of detailed reports 
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and studies relating in particular to the human rights violations arising from the 
Barrier’s construction.20 Here I will provide only a brief summary of the general 
issues relating to the Barrier in the Jerusalem area before proceeding to examine 
how Palestinian residents in the city frame its impact on their everyday life and 
attitudes. 
The Government of Israel approved construction of a separating Barrier in 2002 
following a spate of bomb attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli civilians. 
While security considerations thus underpinned official Israeli justifications for the 
Barrier, its construction also facilitated the annexation of additional occupied 
Palestinian territory (a further 160km² in addition to 70km² annexed in 1967), 
enforced Israel’s de facto political borders and produced a new urban geopolitics 
in Jerusalem (Yacobi, 2016).  
In the Jerusalem area, the Barrier disregards both the Green Line and the Israeli-
defined municipal border, dramatically impacting the geography and the 
economic and social life of the area (UNOCHA, March, 2011). In the context of 
East Jerusalem, Yacobi (2016) links construction of the separation Barrier to a 
shift away from urban ethnocracy towards a more radical policy of apartheid. 
A brief typology of East Jerusalem Palestinians with reference to the Barrier 
demonstrates that its presence and the route it takes do not impact the city 
uniformly. 
  
                                            
20 See, for example, LEIN, Y. & COHEN-LIFSHITZ, A. 2005. Under the Guise of Security: 
Routing the Separation Barrier to Enable the Expansion of Israeli Settlements in the West Bank. 
Jerusalem: Bimkom and B'Tselem;UNOCHA, O. 2011. Special Focus: Barrier 
Update;UNOCHA, O. March, 2011. East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns. Special 
Focus.  
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Map 2: (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs in the 
occupied Palestinian territories, UN OCHA oPt) 
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East Jerusalem Residents on the ‘Israeli’ Side of the Barrier: The majority of 
East Jerusalem Palestinians live on the western side of the Barrier on land 
directly administered by the State of Israel. These Palestinians possess Israeli 
issued identity cards which are blue in colour. They are regularly required to 
provide detailed evidence of their everyday life in East Jerusalem, for example 
when amending their ID cards (required upon marriage or for the addition of a 
child) or renewing their Israeli issued travel document (Laissez-Passer). East 
Jerusalem residents have full access to all of historic Palestine, but must access 
the West Bank through designated crossing terminals along the Barrier. 
East Jerusalem Communities on the West Bank side of the Barrier: A 
conservative estimate by ACRI, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, indicates 
that more than 120,000 Palestinians with Israeli identity cards live within 
Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries but on the West Bank side of the Barrier, cut 
off from schools, healthcare and other services to which they are entitled and for 
which they continue to pay through compulsory municipal taxes (Thrall, 2014). 
These Jerusalemites suffer daily violations of their rights as Israeli residents. 
Other than the police and military personnel who staff the checkpoints at the 
entrances to these neighbourhoods, no Israeli authority has a presence there. 
The Jerusalem municipality on the whole prohibits its employees from entering 
these villages and offers no solution for residents who lack municipal services 
and who effectively reside in a security vacuum, susceptible to growing 
lawlessness and crime.  
West Bank Communities on the ‘Jerusalem’ side of the Barrier: Arising from 
the deviation of the Barrier from the Green Line, an estimated 3,870 West 
Bankers now find themselves living on the western side of the Barrier (UNOCHA-
119 
 
oPt, November 2013). Palestinians in these communities do not possess 
residency rights in Israel and are not entitled to live within Jerusalem’s municipal 
boundaries. Their access to urban centres on both sides of the barrier is severely 
restricted and their lives are perpetually complicated by road blocks and police 
checks. A special regime of coordination mechanisms and Israeli-issued permits 
is required simply for them to continue residing in their current location, impeding 
their freedom of movement and access to services. 
East Jerusalem residents seeking better quality of life across the Barrier: 
Construction of the Barrier prompted an exodus of residents with Jerusalem 
identity cards from suburban communities cut off from the urban centre by the 
Barrier into neighbourhoods on the ‘Israeli’ side. While the value of land and 
property on the West Bank side plummeted, this reverse migration to East 
Jerusalem created an increase in population density and a demand for property 
on the ‘Jerusalem’ side of the Barrier that sent prices soaring. The exorbitant cost 
of renting in East Jerusalem and the overall cost of living in Israel mean that a 
significant number of Palestinians, still officially resident in the city, in fact live on 
the Eastern side of the Barrier, often crossing the checkpoints daily to reach work 
and school. Others, married to West Bankers who do not possess residency 
rights in Jerusalem, choose to live together on the West Bank side of the Barrier, 
particularly in East Jerusalem neighbourhoods such as Kufr ‘Aqab, which are cut 
off from the centre by the Barrier. Those residents who live on the West Bank 
side of the Barrier go to extraordinary lengths to preserve the appearance of 
permanent residency in East Jerusalem and live with the added insecurity that 
their status could be revoked if their deception is discovered by the Israeli 
authorities. There are no official figures for the number of Palestinians in this 
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situation, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the numbers are not 
insignificant.21 
I have selected as the population of this study those Palestinians who are resident 
in East Jerusalem, who possess a blue Israeli identity card and who live day to 
day on the Western side of the Barrier. Also included are a small number of East 
Jerusalem residents who in fact live day to day in the West Bank, but who 
maintain the pretence of permanent residency on the western side of the Barrier 
and of centre of life in the city.  
1.2 The Barrier and Everyday Life 
Today, physical barriers and a repressive permit regime preclude the free 
movement of West Bank Palestinians across Israel’s de facto borders into 
Jerusalem. Approximately four million Palestinians from the occupied territories 
are prohibited from entering the city unless they have Israeli-issued permits, 
which are notoriously difficult to obtain (UNOCHA, 2014). Palestinians who 
possess Israeli residency status are permitted free movement between Israel and 
the West Bank but, in reality, are subject to the same checks, queues and delays 
that beset West Bankers with permission to cross. 
In addition to the physical barriers that separate East Jerusalem from the West 
Bank, Israel operates a ‘centre of life’ policy which necessarily orients the 
                                            
21 As well as interviewing a number of East Jerusalem residents who live semi-permanently on 
the West Bank side of the Barrier, I was unable to locate several potential interviewees because 
there was never anyone at home at the small Jerusalem address where they were supposed to 
live. Neighbours confirmed informally that they lived semi-permanently elsewhere, maintaining 
this address for official residency purposes only. 
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everyday life of East Jerusalem Palestinians away from the West Bank. By 
making the residency status of Palestinians in the city conditional on their ability 
to provide detailed evidence that their life is based in Jerusalem rather than 
elsewhere in the occupied territories or abroad, East Jerusalemites live with the 
fear of their residency status being revoked if they live, work or go to school 
beyond the Barrier. Such a policy contributes to the vulnerability of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians and to the weakening of ties between Jerusalem and the 
West Bank. 
In this section, I explore the extent to which, for the majority of East Jerusalem 
residents who live, work and study in the city, the impediments to free movement 
between Jerusalem and the West Bank are influencing behaviour and attitudes. 
There is little evidence to suggest that East Jerusalem residents have devised 
tactics to circumvent Israel’s isolation of their city from the West Bank. Rather, 
the data collected here indicates that those for whom travel between East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank is not a daily necessity, are increasingly reluctant 
to subject themselves to the inconvenience and humiliation it entails. 
Nasser, for example, owns a successful fashion retail business in Salah al-Din 
Street. His work occasionally requires him to travel to the West Bank, but he is 
reluctant to go because the journey is difficult, time consuming and often 
humiliating. If he can avoid it, he will. 
“The way to there is very hard, it’s very complicated. Because there is a Wall and 
a checkpoint and because the people, you know, they are not intelligent, they are 
passing from here and from there and they are fighting along the way and I don’t 
like it. Sometimes, when I need to go, when I really need to go, then I go, but I 
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am suffering a lot if I go… I am going for only one hour or one and a half hours 
and I am fed up to be there. And I am saying, when I get back to Jerusalem, 
thanks God, really, thanks God! I am saying every time like that!” 
Hanan, a headmistress in East Jerusalem, was born in Ramallah and acquired a 
blue identity card through her marriage to a Jerusalem resident. The couple wed 
in 1984, and lived together in Ramallah until 1989 despite the fact that both 
worked in Jerusalem. The relative freedom of movement prior to the outbreak of 
the first intifada allowed them to remain close to family in the West Bank while 
retaining easy access to Jerusalem. 
“We came every day to Jerusalem and sometimes, you know, we came in the 
morning to Jerusalem to work and then we went home, ate and relaxed a while 
and thought, ‘Okay, let’s go for a drive’ and we would go back to Jerusalem! It 
was only 20 minutes... So we were living as if it were the same city, Ramallah 
and Jerusalem. It was nothing. The people in Jerusalem if they wanted to eat ice 
cream they would go to Rukab22 in the evening. Now, Rukab? What? I don’t want 
to eat ice cream! I will stay here! Anything you want to do just to go outside 
Jerusalem, you remember that there is a checkpoint. You say, Qalandiya, no way! 
I will not go!”  
Dr Sharif is from a long-established Jerusalem family. He also visits the West 
Bank less now than in previous years. 
“We go to the West Bank, but not often. Qalandiya is miserable. It can take two 
hours to cross 100m… In the West Bank, they are living more comfortably than 
                                            
22 Rukab is a popular ice cream restaurant in Ramallah 
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us, but if they see our cars with the yellow number plates, the price of everything 
is going up for us. If something costs $10, it will be for us $20 dollars immediately. 
We don’t feel that we are, you know. Well, the West Bank is something else now. 
This is from politics.” 
Khalid owns a number of small businesses in East Jerusalem. When construction 
on the Barrier began in 2002 he moved from al-Ram to Beit Hanina in order to 
protect his residency rights and to avoid the delays that the Barrier would add to 
his daily commute. He still travels often to al-Ram to visit family, but does so late 
in the evening when the crossing is clearer. Before the Barrier, he explains, the 
journey from Beit Hanina to al-Ram took only around ten minutes or so on foot. 
Now, during the day it can take over an hour by car. 
This is not to say that all travel by East Jerusalem Palestinians to the West Bank 
has ceased. Jerusalem residents retain the right of free travel between Israel and 
the West Bank and clearly, despite the obstacles, many still make the journey 
there, be it to visit relatives, to attend weddings or funerals, to shop and even to 
work. It is clear, however, that for many Palestinians, their attitude to visiting the 
West Bank is changing. The fluidity of the pre-first intifada period described by 
Hanan is gone and the effort of crossing the Barrier now usually warrants a 
purpose. Several interviewees pointed to the fact that many goods are less 
expensive in the West Bank. For shopping and recreation, Ramallah and Jericho 
offer a familiar ‘Arab’ experience at much lower prices than East Jerusalem. 
Meanwhile, the relative ease of access to Jericho means that this is increasingly 
a preferred destination for an afternoon or evening out. Despite its greater 
distance from Jerusalem, the quality of the roads and the relatively minor 
checkpoint on this route means that it is quicker and less stressful for East 
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Jerusalemites to go there than Ramallah. The tensions in East Jerusalem at the 
time of my research also contributed to the popularity of Jericho as a destination 
for East Jerusalem Palestinians in search of recreation. Interviewees who would 
previously have had no hesitation visiting destinations inside Israel to enjoy their 
leisure time said that, while tensions were high, they felt more unwelcome or 
uncomfortable on the beach at Jaffa than they had previously. Jericho offers an 
Arab environment without the challenges of crossing Qalandiya. 
West Bank universities also remain a popular destination for post-Tawjihi 
students from East Jerusalem who wish to pursue undergraduate study (Tawjihi 
is the name of the Palestinian matriculation exam, sat in East Jerusalem and the 
occupied territories. The Israeli equivalent is called Bugrut). Significantly lower 
fees, a Palestinian environment, insufficient Hebrew language skills and the fact 
that most Jerusalem Palestinians complete Tawjihi rather than Bugrut all ensure 
that Palestinian universities remain popular with East Jerusalem students over 
Israeli institutions.  
Examples such as these, however, reinforce the conclusion that East Jerusalem 
Palestinians are adapting to the spatial reality imposed by the Barrier rather than 
devising tactics to subvert it. East Jerusalem Palestinians continue to travel to or 
study in the West Bank, but where this occurs it is generally because there is 
something available there that is not available or is more expensive inside Israel. 
Existing research emphasises the way in which Palestinian movement through 
exclusively Jewish areas, making strategic use of their amenities, transgresses 
the efficacy of borders (Baumann, 2016). A similar approach to the movement of 
East Jerusalem residents into and through the Palestinian space of the West 
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Bank might shed light on the extent to which quotidian practices are being shaped 
by Israeli-imposed boundaries. 
1.3 Background to East Jerusalem’s Political Dislocation 
The de facto boundaries of the Israeli state delimit the extent of the Palestinian 
Authority’s political influence. While at the periphery this border is sometimes 
blurred by disjunctive and conflicting boundaries, throughout the main body of the 
territory defined as East Jerusalem there is no room for confusion over where 
political power resides. East Jerusalem Palestinians live under Israeli rule, well 
beyond the political reach of the Palestinian Authority. The factions have all but 
ceased to exist as a political force in the city and no alternative leadership has 
been allowed to take root (ICG, 2012). 
Jerusalem’s traditional elite, already absent or in decline by the end of the 
mandate period, collapsed in 1948.23 In the period following the defeat of 1967, 
the newly emerging internal leadership of Jerusalem struggled against both 
Israeli rule and the national leadership in exile which upheld the importance of 
Jerusalem as a national symbol and future capital, but would not give succour to 
alternative loci of power. 
The Oslo process solidified the triumph of the outside leadership over that inside 
the territories, but also dealt a severe blow to Palestinian political organisation in 
                                            
23 For a fuller discussion of Palestinian political organisation in Jerusalem in the period before 
1948 see ABOWD, T. P. 2014. Colonial Jerusalem: The Spatial Construction of Identity and 
Difference in a City of Myth, 1948-2012, Syracuse University Press;ANDERSON, J. 2008. From 
Empires to Ethno-National Conflicts: A Framework for Studying 'Divided Cities' in 'Contested 
States'- Part 1. Divided Cities/Contested States Working Papers;KHALIDI, R. 1997. Palestinian 
Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness;KLEIN, M. 2001. Jerusalem: The 
Contested City, C. Hurst;PAPPE, I. 2010. The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The 
Husaynis 1700-1948, London, Saqi Books. 
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East Jerusalem. The Oslo Accords introduced limited Palestinian self-
government to the occupied territories, but, in principle, prohibited Palestinian 
Authority activity in East Jerusalem (ICG, 2012). The 1993 Declaration of 
Principles made clear that “Jurisdiction of the Council [Palestinian Authority] will 
cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated 
in the permanent status negotiations… It is understood that these negotiations 
shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, 
security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, 
and other issues of common interest” (MFA, 1993). 
The PLO negotiating track supplied Israel with an unmissable opportunity to 
secure Palestinian compromise over the future of Jerusalem. Lustick (1993) 
argues that “[t]he single most important reason that Rabin shook hands with 
Arafat on September 13, 1993, was that the delegation from the territories, with 
whom he much preferred to reach an agreement, refused to accept 
postponement of the Jerusalem question.” Former Israeli diplomat Dore Gold 
agrees that “one of the reasons that Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was 
willing to pursue a secret negotiating track with the PLO in Oslo… was precisely 
because the PLO was willing to exclude Jerusalem from any interim self-
governing arrangements for the Palestinians.” Gold contrasts Arafat’s position 
with that of the local Palestinian delegation to peace talks in Washington (in 
preparation for the 1991 Madrid Conference), led by Faisal Husseini, which 
insisted that East Jerusalem be included in any future Palestinian government 
(Gold, 2007). 
In protracted negotiations over the terms of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, 
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres promised “not to hurt existing Palestinian 
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institutions in East Jerusalem, including the Orient House, in exchange for Arafat 
giving in to his demand to remove the city from the jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Authority… Thus, while the Palestinian delegation in Washington was, with the 
encouragement of the PLO leadership, presenting tough positions on the 
Jerusalem question, the same leadership was making its position more flexible in 
the secret Oslo channel” (Klein, 2001: 150). 
Musallam (1996) agrees that the commitment made by Peres not to interfere with 
Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem was fundamental to securing PLO assent to 
the Declaration of Principles, but describes in detail how the Israeli government 
reneged on the deal (see Chapter II). While the interim period should not, in 
theory, have allowed either side to pursue actions which might prejudice the 
outcome of final status negotiations on issues such as Jerusalem, in reality the 
situation proved very different. While both sides entered a race to determine the 
future of East Jerusalem (Klein, 2001), the preponderance of Israeli power in the 
city provided it with an overwhelming advantage. 
1.4 The Palestinian Leadership Vacuum 
The downward spiral in the fortunes of Palestinian political authority in Jerusalem 
from the mid-1990s onwards produced a leadership deficit in the city from which 
there is no sign recovery. On the contrary, this vacuum has deepened since the 
2006 election which confirmed East Jerusalem’s disaffection with the status quo. 
Usher (2006) described the Hamas victory in Palestinian Legislative elections in 
January 2006 as “nothing short of epochal” (Usher, 2006: 20). Overwhelmingly, 
he claimed, Palestinians were not voting for armed resistance or for political 
Islam. Rather, they were giving voice to their disillusionment with negotiations 
128 
 
with Israel that appeared to bring a meaningful peace no closer; their appreciation 
of Hamas’ role as civic provider and vanguard position in the armed resistance; 
and above all, “revulsion from a decade of Fatah’s misrule of the PA” (Usher, 
2006: 21). Hamas won an absolute majority in the 2006 Palestinian legislative 
elections, securing 74 seats out of a total of 132. By comparison, the ruling Fatah 
party, which had dominated the first Palestinian Legislative Council, won only 45 
seats. Thirty-nine thousand East Jerusalem Palestinians cast a ballot in the 
Jerusalem district and while support for Hamas on the national lists was slightly 
lower than average (41% in Jerusalem compared to 44.4 nationally), Fatah 
proved significantly less popular in Jerusalem than elsewhere in the occupied 
territories, securing only 35% of the Jerusalem vote compared to 41.4% 
nationally. Centre-left parties proved more popular in East Jerusalem than 
anywhere else (Cohen, 2011). 
Despite its success in Jerusalem in 2006, winning all four of the district seats it 
contested, Hamas was unable to capitalise politically on its victory; the firmness 
with which Israel dealt with the party’s elected representatives (revoking their 
residency rights) delivered a powerful message to East Jerusalem. According to 
a prominent Islamist educator in Jerusalem, interviewed by the International 
Crisis Group in 2012 (ICG, 2012), Israel all but destroyed the Palestinian factions 
in the city. “The factions might be present in the sense that people identify with 
certain positions or ideologies, but today it makes no sense to try to figure out 
how the political pie is divided among Hamas, Fatah and anyone else. The 
question has no meaning… The factions cannot hold activities. There is nobody 
you can point to as a leader” (ICG, 2012: 7). Moreover, revocation of the 
residency rights of the city’s elected representatives served as a reminder to all 
129 
 
East Jerusalemites, if such were needed, of their underlying vulnerability and 
insecurity. 
The data collected here supports this contention that today there is no individual 
or group offering effective leadership to East Jerusalem Palestinians. It also 
attests to the antagonism between them and the leadership entrenched in 
Ramallah. Israeli actions and policies have stifled Palestinian political activity in 
the city, but East Jerusalemites clearly regard the Palestinian Authority as 
complicit in this collapse. They are forthright in their rejection of the PA as a 
worthy or effective leadership (for all Palestinians) and consistent in the view that 
there is no political authority to which East Jerusalemites can turn. 
Summa, a junior doctor, was vehement. “I do not accept the Palestinians or the 
Israelis. I don’t prefer either. Nobody. I will not choose any of them. We don’t have 
a leader that deserves this place or anyone who deserves to lead us.” Ahmad, a 
graduate engineer, was equally clear. “No one. We have no one. If you want to 
find someone in Jerusalem who tells you that the Palestinian Authority is a leader 
for them, try finding someone who is paid to say this. Abu Mazen represents only 
himself.” 
Hanan, the school headmistress, also explains why she feels East Jerusalem 
Palestinians are without leadership. 
“I don’t consider any of them my leader because they don’t discuss my issue… 
My father’s house [inside Israel’s 1948 borders] is a place for mentally ill people 
now. It’s a very beautiful home so they thought it would be a good place for a 
rehabilitation centre… I need a leader who is aware that Palestine is not only in 
Nablus or Khalil [Hebron] or Ramallah. That there are also people who are 
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Palestinian from Haifa, Yaffa, Akka and that these people, we should discuss 
their right to return to their homeland. Nobody is talking about that. They only 
want to keep the West Bank as Palestine. The West Bank is not Palestine! No 
leader is willing to talk about our rights. No leader is aware that there is 
Palestinian people who need their problem to be solved.” 
Even those who had enjoyed a long association with Fatah said they were now 
disillusioned. “I was part of Fatah from when I was ten years old, during the first 
intifada. I was in jail in 1992 to 1993. After I got out of jail I was involved in Fatah 
in al-Ram but after the peace, here I took the side of Fatah that opposed Oslo. 
When the second intifada began, there was no Oslo anymore and Fatah was one 
again. But after Arafat died, all the situation with the Palestinian Authority 
changed. Now the Palestinian people are cut, between Hamas and Fatah, 
between Gaza and West Bank, between Jerusalem and West Bank. Now Abbas 
is dictator of the Palestinian Authority. The most safety for the Palestinians in 
Jerusalem and the West Bank is for the Palestinian Authority to leave and return 
it to the Jewish. It is better for everyone. The Palestinian Authority is part of the 
Israeli occupation in the West Bank. They will not allow us to a have a leadership 
in Jerusalem because if we love him in Jerusalem then the people of the West 
Bank will love him too and the PA will not allow this. It’s a game for them. They 
are playing with Jerusalem.” 
Ziad, a postgraduate student at the Hebrew University, was vigorous in his 
rejection of the PA, but offered an unusually positive perspective on the 
Palestinian leadership vacuum in the city. 
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“Abu Mazen does not represent me. I represent myself. East Jerusalem people 
have no leaders… Year after year the PLO moved away from the resistance route 
towards the peace route and year after year they were slowly killing the 
Jerusalem case. So now… we don’t have a leader in Jerusalem. And this is a 
positive thing. We have our own ideas… Netanyahu has not found a solution to 
deal with the Jerusalem people. If there was still Orient House, he would make 
some argument or conversation with them and agree a solution. If there is no 
leadership, there is no one to give away our rights or our land. Without Orient 
House, he [Netanyahu] has to sit with every one of us, all three hundred 
thousand, to agree a solution… Abu Mazen doesn’t represent me and he doesn’t 
represent any Jerusalem people. If you do a questionnaire for everyone, you 
won’t find any East Jerusalem person who loves the PA... They are not 
negotiating with Israel; they are giving Jerusalem to Israel.” 
The decline in Palestinian political authority in East Jerusalem was accelerated 
by the exclusion of the city from the interim phase of the Oslo process. Israel may 
bear greater responsibility for the collapse of Palestinian politics in East 
Jerusalem, but the rancour of its residents is reserved largely for the Palestinian 
Authority which many believe has abandoned the city. 
1.5 Relations Across the Barrier 
From the previous section, it is clear that, in addition to the imposition of severe 
restrictions on the free movement of West Bank Palestinians, the Barrier between 
Jerusalem and the West Bank also serves to deter Palestinians on the western 
side from undertaking unnecessary travel to destinations inside the West Bank. 
Construction of the Barrier has also contributed to an escalation in the number of 
132 
 
East Jerusalem Palestinians seeking work in West Jerusalem. Yacobi (2016) 
records that since 2011, almost 50% of East Jerusalem’s labour force has been 
employed in the Jewish sector in West Jerusalem or in other Israeli cities. Thus, 
“while Jerusalem remains a colonial city, its strategy has also been transformed 
by neoliberal economic restructuring.”24 
Next, I turn to the impact of physical and political dislocation on relations between 
Palestinians in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem. How do East Jerusalemites 
understand and frame their growing isolation from Palestinians in the West Bank? 
In this section, I explore the attitudes of East Jerusalem residents and conclude 
that conditions on the ground are influencing social attitudes and relationships.  
Hanan does not claim that East Jerusalem’s isolation from the West Bank has 
set the city on an irreversible trajectory, but she does acknowledge that family 
relations and social life are negatively impacted. “If you want to go to a wedding 
in Ramallah, for example, you say ‘Oh, I have to cross Qalandiya and I will stay 
for an hour there, so I won’t go.’ In this way, you hurt the relationship between 
you and the one who invited you to the wedding.” 
Fenster and Shlomo (2011) demonstrate that the frequency of social gatherings 
between East Jerusalemites and West Bankers has diminished considerably 
since construction of the Barrier, which also disrupts patterns of everyday life in 
areas such as marriage, mourning and burial ceremonies. At the quotidian level, 
the Barrier disrupts the functioning of the people and institutions which 
                                            
24 Citing a 2015 Hebrew language report on East Jerusalemites in the Israeli labour market, 
Yacobi reveals that since 2000, the number of Palestinian workers in the city has increased 
from 40,000 to 70,000, while a significant gap in the average income between Jewish and 
Palestinian workers has been maintained. 
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characterise a “normative modern urban lifestyle” (Fenster and Shlomo, 2011). 
The different civil status of East Jerusalem residents and the associated benefits 
of residency, moreover, are contributing to a sense of social detachment and 
deepening the “social otherness” of relations between them and the West Bank 
(Fenster and Shlomo, 2011).  
The data collected here supports this conclusion. Qudar says she would not 
marry a man from the West Bank as the risk to her residency and the 
complications it would involve would be too great. Those I interviewed who were 
already married to West Bankers spoke of the social differences as well as the 
difficulties they encountered.  
Saha is well placed to consider the ways in which attitudes on both sides are 
shifting. She was born and raised in Jerusalem’s Old City, but when she was in 
her mid- teens, her family moved to the West Bank side of the Barrier where they 
could afford a larger property and enjoy a better quality of life. Saha remained at 
school in Jerusalem, crossing the checkpoints daily. She went on to study 
Dentistry at a West Bank university and lived in the West Bank throughout her 
undergraduate degree. After graduating, Saha married a Palestinian with a West 
Bank ID. They live now in Ramallah, but Saha travels several times a week to 
and from Jerusalem where she works as a kupat holim dentist. 
“I don’t think that the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Palestinians in 
Jerusalem are feeling like one group. There is different thinking now. I see the 
different thinking between both sides. Some of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem 
they are thinking like Israelis, a few they are thinking like Palestinians in the West 
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Bank and many are not thinking at all... I think that there will be a big problem 
between Palestinians if they will be all together in future.” 
Sara is also a Jerusalem resident. Like Saha, she is an observant Muslim who 
wears the hijab. Her husband is originally from Hebron, but she warned him when 
they married that she could never live there. 
“People in the West Bank are much different in their way of thinking. Especially 
about the girls and boys. I am serious. A woman from Jerusalem cannot live in 
the West Bank. She would have to leave a lot of her rights. I can’t live there. Okay, 
not all the West Bank is the same. Hebron has a different mentality. Everything 
is forbidden for the girls. It is very strict. It’s different in Ramallah, Ramallah is 
more open-minded because a lot of people in Ramallah came from America. 
Bethlehem is different again. You can’t say all the places are the same. But they 
don’t think like us [in Jerusalem].” 
Sara also felt that West Bankers had many misconceptions about life in 
Jerusalem.  
“They say we are lucky because we have rights to go to places they can’t go to. 
So they can’t go to the sea, for example, until they have a permission from the 
Israelis to travel. So, they think that we are always going on a vacation, that it’s 
always summertime! They think our life is so easy. Our life is hard. We have a lot 
to pay, I can’t let my children walk alone because in our street because there are 
Jews, there are tourists. There [in the West Bank], they allow their child to walk 
in the street from two years old. They feel it is safe. The mum she can feel relaxed. 
It makes her life easy. But we can’t. Our life is really hard here.”  
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Others echoed this sense that West Bank attitudes towards East Jerusalemites 
are changing and that West Bankers have a false impression of life in the city. A 
number of interviewees related experiences in which their nationalist credentials 
or commitment had been directly challenged by a West Banker simply because 
they are from East Jerusalem. Summa is 25 years old. She was born in East 
Jerusalem and lived there until she was 18. After studying Medicine at a West 
Bank university, she took the Israeli equivalence exam to work in Israel. She went 
on to complete her training year (staj in Hebrew) at an Israeli hospital near Tel 
Aviv. While she applies for residency positions in Israel, she lives at home with 
her family who now, for financial reasons, live on the eastern side of the Barrier. 
“West Bank Palestinians have a bad idea about Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem, they think that we are like the Jewish, that we don’t have any religion, 
that we don’t have any relation with Palestine and we say okay to the Israelis to 
do whatever they want and we are integrated with the Israelis. They think we look 
down on them and that we don’t have morals, or that we have bad morals. Once, 
when I was at university, there were student elections and one of the student 
representatives saw me voting and saw that my ID was blue. He said, ‘You are 
from Jerusalem!’ He said I was Yehudi [Jewish], ‘Inti Yehudi!’ Because there is 
separation and they can’t mix with us, they don’t know us anymore.” 
I asked Summa if she agreed that East Jerusalemites look down on West 
Bankers. 
“Actually, I see that we are lower than them. They have education, they have 
money. People from Jerusalem are jahaleen, yanee ignorant! They are lower 
educated. If you look at teenagers in Jerusalem, a large percentage don’t go to 
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university or even finish Tawjihi. They go to the Israeli side to work, just to make 
money. In the West Bank, they continue their education, they go to university, 
they do sub-speciality, and so on. They have more money and they live their life 
well. I see in Nablus and in Ramallah, for example, they are comfortable more 
than us.” 
George is a Christian Palestinian and an officially registered guide who leads 
tours throughout Israel visiting Christian holy sites. He agrees that lack of 
familiarity is largely to blame for the growing cleavage between East Jerusalem 
Palestinians and West Bankers. He says you can see the differences in the way 
they dress and the way they eat. “They say to us, ‘You take arnona from the 
Yehude!’ They mean tutmeen (social security) but they say arnona, which is the 
council tax we pay to the Israelis. They are totally ignorant about us and about 
our lives in Jerusalem.” 
As a Christian, George is pessimistic about the future. “There has been very 
serious damage in the Palestinian community as a result of the separation from 
the West Bank. This crack can never be repaired. I am sorry to say this to you, 
but it all started with the English. Since the mandate the Palestinian community 
has been divided into groups. It’s still divide and rule.” 
Ziad is 27 years old. As an undergraduate, he also experienced the negative 
attitude of some West Bankers to East Jerusalem Palestinians, but he believes 
that this situation could change. 
“I studied in Bir Zeit. I was in the West Bank and I was often told I was close to 
Jews. They would say that I am not Palestinian and that I have forgotten the 
Palestinian case. And maybe some Jerusalemites look down on West Bankers, 
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but as Hegel said, when there is a big disaster that comes upon all the people, 
all the people think about one thing, to survive. After the Abu Khdeir case all the 
Palestinians are on one side, West Bankers and Jerusalemites.25 They believe 
now that they have the same enemy, which is Israel… Secondly, in past years 
when I was at Bir Zeit university, West Bankers would say to Jerusalemites ‘you 
are not resisting, you are just going to Tel Aviv, swimming in the sea.’ But after 
the case of Abu Khdeir we proved we are in the same boat… Now when I go to 
Ramallah or to Bethlehem they say, ‘Oh, you are from Jerusalem, you did this, 
1,2,3, to resist. And I do so for West Bankers too, ‘Oh, you did so and so to resist.’ 
The disaster came and now we are the same. It has melted the borders between 
us.” 
As a student in the West Bank, Ziad had felt that there were divisions between 
East Jerusalemites and West Bankers as a result of the separation, based largely 
on misunderstandings arising from their unfamiliarity with the world in which the 
other lived. However, he felt strongly that the case of Abu Khdeir had brought 
Palestinians together. 
Despite Hazen’s optimism, the data suggests that many East Jerusalem 
Palestinians do in fact discern a widening gulf between themselves and 
Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories as a result of their divergent 
social and political trajectories. Some already feel the differences quite keenly, 
claiming for example that the social norms recognised and respected by East 
                                            
25 At the beginning of July 2014, days after the bodies of three missing Jewish teenagers were 
found in the West Bank, a 16-year-old East Jerusalem Palestinian, Muhammad Abu Khdeir was 
kidnapped and burnt alive by Jewish extremists on the outskirts of the city. The murder 
triggered an upsurge in violence that has been described as the ‘silent’ or ‘knife’ intifada. See 
THRALL, N. 2014. Rage in Jerusalem. London Review of Books. London. At the time of my 
fieldwork in March 2016, the series of unconnected attacks by individual Palestinians on Israeli 
targets, usually with a knife or vehicle, was ongoing. 
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Jerusalem Palestinians at the Haram al-Sharif are not understood by West 
Bankers visiting the city’s Islamic holy sites. Osama complained that during the 
holy month of Ramadan, when Israel sometimes permits larger than usual 
numbers of West Bankers access to Jerusalem, their presence is disruptive and 
their behaviour on occasion inappropriate. Osama says that when Ramadan 
ends, or Israel revokes the right of access for West Bankers, there is a sense 
among Jerusalemites that al-Aqsa can now “get back to normal.” Rana also felt 
that when West Bankers visit the Haram they fail to adhere to the customary 
etiquette or to respect the sanctity of the compound, shouting, swearing and 
smoking cigarettes or argileh “like they are on holiday.” 
Such attitudes notwithstanding, during periods of confrontation or raised 
tensions, East Jerusalem Palestinians are generally keen to distance themselves 
from Israel and to show solidarity with Palestinians elsewhere in the Occupied 
Territories. During Israel’s military assault on Gaza during the summer of 2014, 
for example, many East Jerusalem Palestinians chose to boycott Israeli retail 
stores and where possible, to avoid purchasing Israeli products.  
However, even East Jerusalem individuals and institutions actively seeking to 
preserve or strengthen ties with the West Bank sometimes find that this is harder 
said than done. In a light-hearted anecdote, Hanan, the headmistress of an all-
girls school in East Jerusalem, explained that when tensions between Israel and 
the Palestinians were high, her staff agreed that they should show solidarity with 
Palestinians in the West Bank, despite the loud protests of their students. 
“Last year we thought that we shouldn’t go to the Israeli side as usual for the 
annual school trip. So, we went to Jenin area. They [the students] were so angry 
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at us that we chose to take them to Jenin. ‘What is in Jenin?’ they cried… We 
explained to them that it is Arab, that the place you are going to it is really nice, 
that we want to give our money to the Palestinians, not to the Israelis. On the 
other hand, it is irony, we faced so many problems! We had a reservation there 
[in Jenin], we made an agreement with them that we would be the only school 
there, but so many buses came with large groups of shabab [young men]. So, we 
told them to come back to school, don’t enter there. And the company had to 
compensate us. And where did we go after that? Ramat Gan in Israel! So, we 
tried [to support the West Bank], but we did not succeed.” 
The disappointment of Hanan’s students at the prospect of a trip to Jenin reflects 
the popular view among East Jerusalem Palestinians with access to both Israeli 
and Palestinian operated sites that Israel offers superior recreational facilities and 
the potential for a far more satisfactory leisure experience. Indeed, East 
Jerusalem Palestinians are increasingly looking beyond the fact of occupation as 
an explanation for Palestinian shortcomings and often hold social and political 
practices in the West Bank responsible. Such assumptions are felt to be validated 
when attempts such as this to show support for West Bank enterprises backfires. 
1.6 Summary 
In this section I have addressed the way in which East Jerusalem residents frame 
the impact of their physical and political dislocation from the West Bank on 
everyday Palestinian life in the city. Familial ties remain and East Jerusalem 
residents continue to access the West Bank for goods and services unavailable, 
inaccessible or overly expensive within Jerusalem. However, it is clear from the 
accounts of East Jerusalem residents that their physical separation and political 
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alienation from the West Bank are influencing practices and perceptions in the 
city. In the following section, I look at how the experience of leaderlessness and 
dislocation is compounded by the longevity of Israel’s occupation and its 
perceived unassailability in the city. 
2. The Limits of Palestinian Political Imagination 
East Jerusalemites, sceptical of the plausibility of Palestinian demands for 
statehood with a capital in East Jerusalem, increasingly define Israeli rule in the 
city as a long-term reality. In international legal terms, Israel’s territorial 
annexation is not recognised nor are its claims that ‘united’ Jerusalem is the 
eternal capital of the Jewish state (UN Security Council Resolutions 252, 267, 
471, 46, 478). In reality, however, little has been done to arrest the proliferation 
of Jewish settlements in and around occupied East Jerusalem or to counter Israeli 
measures which serve to isolate and undermine the Palestinian presence in the 
city. Almost two and a half decades after the Declaration of Principles, a two-state 
solution has never seemed more distant. At present, Israeli rule in East Jerusalem 
is simply a reality and few in the city can imagine challenging its hegemony. 
Moreover, after two decades of Palestinian governance in the West Bank, viewed 
by East Jerusalemites from the outside, this constituency now questions the 
desirability of a two-state solution. Many in the city recognise that in a in which 
they would be required to settle for a truncated Palestinian entity that fell 
significantly short in terms of both their national ambitions and their existing rights 
and opportunities as residents of Israel. 
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2.1 Reframing the Hegemonic Boundary Debate 
A key theme in the literature since Oslo is the extent of Israel’s success in 
‘unifying’ Jerusalem under its control (Dumper, 2014, Klein, 2008, Lustick, 
1996, Lustick, 1997). Eschewing the top-down analytic optic through which this 
debate usually takes place, but not wishing to discard it altogether, I seek to 
reframe the hegemonic boundary issue to account for the impact of Israeli power 
on Palestinian opinion and to ask whether a boundary has been crossed in terms 
of Israel’s hegemonisation of the political imagination in East Jerusalem. Can 
East Jerusalem Palestinians, isolated and atomised, imagine replacing, or even 
challenging Israeli power in the city? I explore Palestinian political horizons in 
East Jerusalem, taking account of the extent to which everyday life is entwined 
with Israel, the failure of the national movement to project an inclusive liberation 
narrative and rejection of the PA. 
Lustick has written extensively on official Israeli attempts since 1967 to project 
‘united’ Jerusalem as the immutable capital of the Jewish state. He argues 
consistently that this hegemonic project has failed to take root in Israeli public 
opinion. Writing at the start of the Oslo period, Lustick argued that while “the 
failure to integrate expanded Jerusalem into the collective Israeli psyche was not 
for want of trying” the fact remains that “Israeli beliefs in the immutability of 
expanded Jerusalem are not hegemonic” (Lustick, 1993).  
In 1996, Lustick urged that the problem of Jerusalem be treated as typical in its 
exemplification of the politics of hegemonic construction and deconstruction. He 
concluded that “the fetish of expanded Jerusalem has not yet achieved 
hegemonic status within Israeli politics”, arguing that the refusal of Palestinians 
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to normalise as citizens or permanent residents and their participation in the 
intifada had “transformed the Arab sections of the city into zones of unfamiliarity 
and fear” (Lustick, 1996). 
After the collapse of Oslo at Camp David in 2000, Lustick further argued that 
Israel’s campaign to present ‘Yerushalayim’ as its united and indivisible capital 
“was successful in some ways, but ultimately failed as a hegemonic project” 
(Lustick, 2000). An examination of the gap between official Israeli platitudes and 
the emotional and political realities would reveal the extent of Israeli flexibility on 
the future of Jerusalem.  
Dumper (2014) argues for a disaggregation of the functional, political and social 
borders of the city, claiming that while the incongruence of these boundaries 
leaves many areas of occupied East Jerusalem in a twilight zone, it also, 
importantly, also suggests areas of greater flexibility over a negotiated agreement 
on the city” (Dumper, 2014: 6). A central theme of his approach here is “the 
tension between the attempt by the Israeli government to assert its political 
control over the new borders and its ability to consolidate a hegemonic presence 
in the eastern part of the city” (Dumper, 2014: 10)  
Amirav (2009) argues that after 40 years of occupation, not one of the five 
national goals set by Israeli policy makers for Jerusalem after the 1967 was 
achieved. Klein (2008) also claims that Israel’s annexationist project has failed 
and that Jerusalem remains very clearly a frontier city. 
Lustick’s exclusive focus on Israeli public opinion as a measure of the success of 
the hegemonic project in Jerusalem fails to take account of its impact on 
Palestinians in the city who are cast in the one-dimensional role of resisters. 
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Dumper pays greater attention to the impact on Palestinians themselves, 
highlighting Israel’s partial and incomplete annexation, important Palestinian 
jurisdictions left intact and the evidence of Palestinian autonomy in these areas 
which challenges the presumption of Israeli sovereignty in the city (Dumper, 
2014). In Chapter V, I discuss how informality and sub-formality as manifestations 
of Israel’s colonial regime facilitate control of East Jerusalem and account for 
these pockets of autonomy. Here, I argue that the hegemonic boundary debate 
should be reframed to take account of the extent to which Palestinian political 
horizons in East Jerusalem are shaped by exclusive Israeli rule. The ground level 
perspective adopted here makes visible these trends, which are typically 
obscured within mainstream approaches that privilege top-down processes. 
2.2 Part of Israel as a fact of Life 
Conceptualising the notion of hegemony in part as the power to define what is 
realistic (Mitchell, 1990), I situate East Jerusalem Palestinians’ accounts of their 
own experience within the context of existing power relations in the city. In the 
following chapter, I address specific aspects of Israeli power and control in East 
Jerusalem, the extent to which it has penetrated the praxis of everyday 
Palestinian life in the city, how surveillance impacts the constitution of 
subjectivities and how the criminalisation of opposition to Israeli sovereignty in 
East Jerusalem limits the opportunities for political participation. Here, I make the 
case that East Jerusalem Palestinians, though not entirely without hope in the 
occupied city, do not see a practical or plausible route to liberation. 
Rooted in the Muslim faith of the majority of Palestinians is the abstract belief that 
all of historic Palestine will ultimately be recovered and returned to Islamic rule. 
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This faith is discordant, however, with the quotidian experience of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians who day to day appear to see no way of realising either the 
Palestinian nationalist imaginary of statehood or the divinely promised end to their 
subjugation.  
Aisha tried to explain this apparent paradox to me: 
“I do believe one day it will happen; in our religion, we have a story about that. 
But I know the reality is something different completely and I don’t think it will ever 
happen. I don’t see how it will ever happen.” 
Hanan is a practicing Muslim and while she accepts Qur’anic revelations as truth, 
she is not optimistic about the future. She holds out little hope that her family will 
ever be able to claim the properties lost to her family in 1948.  
“It’s a whole state, a powerful state. Where is it going to go? This is the reality… 
Like the Armenians and the Kurds, we will always have hope, but where are their 
states? For me, I don’t have any hope that this land will return to me or to my 
children. In Arabic, we say it is ‘min sab3 al-musta7eelat’, it means it’s the seventh 
level of impossibility!” 
The data collected overwhelmingly demonstrates that while East Jerusalem 
Palestinians retain an abstract belief that restitution will one day come, in reality 
they see little prospect of an end to Israeli rule in East Jerusalem. Years of stop-
start negotiations have yielded few positive results, organised Palestinian politics 
in the city have ceased to exist and the threat of imprisonment, deportation or 
145 
 
death deters most from engaging in even peaceful political protests.26 The spate 
of individual acts of violence perpetrated by young East Jerusalem Palestinians 
against Israeli targets while this research was underway in 2015-16 reflected 
Palestinian opposition to Israeli policies on the ground, but also the atomisation 
of East Jerusalem society, the absence of collective understandings of resistance 
and the preponderance of Israeli power. Moreover, the protests that ensued after 
Israel installed metal detectors at al-Haram al-Sharif in 2017 demonstrated the 
mobilising potential of al-Aqsa mosque (discussed further in Chapter VI), but also 
made plain the absence of a political agenda for East Jerusalem Palestinians to 
which the gathering momentum could be harnessed. 
2.3 Pre-Intifada Nostalgia 
East Jerusalem Palestinians are disillusioned with peace efforts after years of 
fruitless negotiations with Israel during which time they have witnessed a marked 
deterioration in their spatial environment. However, many also question what was 
really achieved by the intifadas. Even before construction of the Barrier 
commenced, by the 1990s an “ever-tightening noose” of checkpoints ensured 
that it was already difficult for West Bankers to gain access to Jerusalem 
(Dumper, 2014). Many East Jerusalem residents nostalgically recall the period 
before the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 as a time when there was free 
movement between Jerusalem and the West Bank and when it was sometimes 
possible to forget that there was an occupation. 
                                            
26 Not one of the East Jerusalem Palestinians interviewed formally or informally during the 
course of this research had ever taken part in a demonstration, march or any other form of 
peaceful political protest against the occupation. In Chapter V I address the mobilising potential 
of religious issues such as al-Aqsa. 
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Nasser is almost 70 years old and recalls with clarity the period before Israel’s 
conquest in 1967. When he speaks of better days past, however, it is the period 
before the first intifada about which he reminisces. 
Nasser began his career in the fashion industry when he left school in 1968. By 
1975 he was importing high end haute couture fashion from London and Paris 
and exporting it throughout the West Bank. His own fashion retail business in 
East Jerusalem thrived until the first intifada. After that he lost many Israeli 
customers and everyday life in Jerusalem changed significantly. He still has 
Jewish friends and a small number of Israeli customers, but it’s not like years ago. 
“It feels like old friends that a long time ago would come and pass here. Before 
the first intifada we were really so close friends to each other in Jerusalem, 
Palestinians and Jews, and we forget there is occupation, you know. It’s like we 
lived in France, like in any European country. It was open, free, but now…”  
The second intifada also brought crisis to Jerusalem and impacted Nasser’s 
business relationships. “I was working with very, very good people before the 
intifada, first and second, and we be close friends to each other because we 
forget that we are in occupation. Still, till now, we have friends, we were in Europe 
together, and we go out together… but now it’s very few. Before, it was the same 
life we were living and working, but now it’s not the same.” 
The second intifada had a dramatic influence on the direction of Nasser’s 
business and meant that his passion for haute couture had to take a back seat. 
“The people here, after 2000, after the second intifada, people became more 
religious. Before they were wearing short skirts and short sleeves, but then they 
became more conservative. Now what can we do, we need to change [suppliers] 
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because in Europe there is no long sleeves and long skirt and long dresses. It 
was the same everywhere here, in the West Bank, in Jerusalem, throughout 
Palestine. The way it was we moved towards Turkey because they have a lot of 
things, long sleeve, short sleeve, even evening wear, but its conservative, very 
conservative. That’s what we look for now because the customers they are asking 
for this. After this intifada, it became more conservative, more religious because 
the people they are suffering a lot... The mentality changed, they are asking God 
for help, they go to pray, they wear long sleeves. Fashion is very conservative 
now. Lately we didn’t see one girl or one lady she comes here with a short skirt. 
Maybe in two months we haven’t seen it here. Just maybe the Christian people 
come now with a short sleeve or a short skirt. In this you can see now the 
difference between Muslim and Christian.” 
Dr Sharif also sees little hope for the future. The ‘knife intifada’ which still 
simmered in Jerusalem as we spoke demonstrated the frustrations of the people, 
but would achieve nothing in his view. Life gets worse with intifada, he said. The 
first intifada brought Arafat and the Palestinian Authority, while the second 
brought the Barrier and Separation from the West Bank. 
“Look, the first intifada, how many people died? A lot. So, after that who came? 
All the corrupted from all the countries came here with the Palestinian Authority. 
So, we see them with their big cars. Their families, they never dreamed about 
this; they were living in Europe. The simple people who died for Palestine, they 
have nothing. So, from where to have hope? There is corruption in the Palestinian 
Authority, it is all corruption. And they have Abu Mazen and he is 82 years old 
and he is stuck in power and even there is no state. They work just to take money 
from the Authority and they buy a house. A lot of young people died in the 
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intifadas and they never look to them. These people don’t do anything for 
Jerusalem, not even for the West Bank. These people [in Jerusalem], they are 
out of struggle. There is no struggle here, no revolution… Okay, for Jerusalem 
they will struggle, but why struggle? For what they have in the West Bank?” 
Despite Israel’s proclivity for collective punishment in response to armed 
resistance, East Jerusalem Palestinians remain broadly sympathetic to the 
perpetrators of these isolated knife attacks. Many share the concerns of those 
who act in the name of al-Aqsa, for example, and I was repeatedly told that the 
individuals responsible were simply resisting in their own way. Ruby says that 
Palestinians must make intifada sometimes if only to remind Israelis that this is 
Palestinian land, but she is in no doubt that after two intifadas, life in Jerusalem 
is more difficult than before. “Intifada tells the Jewish that this is our land, but 
really life was better before 1987. They were not stopping and searching 
everyone then. Before the PA, life was okay here, it was better.” Ruby says that 
what she really wants is to live in Jerusalem with the Israelis, for the Barrier to 
come down and for West Bankers to be allowed to come to Jerusalem to pray 
and to shop. 
Most East Jerusalem Palestinians regard acts of violent resistance as a natural 
symptom of occupation, even a necessary one to remind Israel that they have 
not abandoned the struggle. However, few point to any positive outcomes either 
from the intifadas or from isolated attacks on Israeli civilians. East Jerusalem 
Palestinians may hope ultimately for an end to Israeli rule, but very few speak of 
the Palestinian Authority as a realistic or even desirable alternative, while many 
nostalgically recall the pre-first intifada period when the occupation was less 
keenly felt. 
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Crucially, this data does not signal Palestinian satisfaction with the status quo 
ante. Rather, it highlights a significant disjuncture between the quotidian 
experience of East Jerusalem Palestinians, which locates them very much within 
the Israeli state (albeit in agonistic or antagonistic relationship), and the analytic 
standpoint of much of the academic literature on East Jerusalem which regards 
Jerusalem as a divided or polarised city and remains tied to the occupation-
resistance binary. 
2.4 Focus on Hebrew language acquisition in East Jerusalem 
In this section I focus in detail on patterns of Hebrew language acquisition as a 
gauge of Palestinian adaptation in East Jerusalem to the reality of long term 
Israeli rule and improvement of life tactics. Despite the ethnic, linguistic and 
cultural diversity of the communities comprising Israel’s Jewish population, 
Hebrew is, without doubt, the predominant language of the state, from both a top 
down and a bottom up perspective. English also has particular significance in 
Israel, due to the fact that Hebrew is rarely understood beyond Israel, the close 
connections between Israel and the rest of the world and the unofficial status of 
English as the principal international language (Ben-Rafael et al., 2006).  
Arabic, while officially the second language of the state after Hebrew, in fact has 
legal status beyond its real socio-political significance (Saban and Amara, 2002). 
The official status of Arabic in Israel is manifest in a number of obvious ways. 
Primarily, it is the language of instruction within the Palestinian educational 
system. In addition, time is allotted to Arabic programming on public radio and 
television, currency and postage stamps are inscribed in both languages and, 
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following a Supreme Court ruling, Arabic also appears on many road signs 
around the country (Ben-Rafael et al., 2006).  
In practice, however, Arabic is significantly disadvantaged as an official language 
vis-à-vis Hebrew and “the status accorded Arabic in Israeli law is still devoid of 
any practical significance in Israeli public life… The main significance of the status 
of Arabic in Israel appears, then, not with regard to the society as a whole but to 
the extent of protection it affords to the internal life of the minority” (Saban and 
Amara, 2002). 
Yet Palestinian Israelis make up a significant proportion of the overall population. 
In figures published on the eve of Israel’s 68th Independence Day in May 2016, 
Israel’s Bureau of Statistics recorded a population of 8.5 million residents, of 
whom 74.8% are Jewish and 20.8% are Arabs (CBS, May 2016). The vast 
majority of Palestinians living within Israel’s 1948 borders, particularly those in 
the under 50 age group, are fluent in Hebrew. Ninety percent of the employed 
Palestinian population in Israel work outside their own community and come into 
daily contact with Jewish Israelis. As such, “[Israeli] Palestinians are undergoing 
a far-reaching process of language and cultural exposure concurrently with 
modernisation and urbanisation” (Ben-Rafael et al., 2006).  
Unlike Palestinian citizens of Israel living within the state’s 1948 borders, East 
Jerusalem Palestinians are not typically fluent in Hebrew. Nor is Hebrew a 
dominant language in Palestinian public spaces in East Jerusalem. Ben-Rafael 
et al. (2006) have undertaken comparative research into the linguistic landscapes 
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(LL)27 of a number of homogeneous and mixed Israeli cities as well as of East 
Jerusalem, taking into account top down and bottom up flows of linguistic 
landscape elements in which “the former are expected to reflect a general 
commitment to the dominant culture while the latter are designed much more 
freely according to individual strategies.” While Hebrew was predictably the 
predominant language of Jewish localities, (in nearly 100% of LL items, with 
English second and Arabic occurring in less than 6% of the LL items), a more 
surprising result was found in mixed Israeli-Palestinian areas inside Israel, where 
Arabic appeared in only 70% of LL items. Paradoxically, in Palestinian localities 
there was a stronger presence of Hebrew-only items in bottom up items than in 
top down LL items (40% compared to 3.9%). Though Palestinian Israelis might 
be expected to resist the majority language and to assert their identity through 
the use of Arabic while the state insists on Hebrew, in fact Palestinians in Israel 
appeared willing to adapt to the Hebrew speaking majority while the state either 
tolerates the use of Arabic or lacks official policies to restrict it.  
These findings from Palestinian localities inside Israel contrast starkly with those 
from East Jerusalem where Arabic is the dominant language, appearing in all LL 
items. English came in second position, appearing in about 75% of items and 
Hebrew was hardly present at all. The authors of the research conclude that 
“while Palestinian Israelis follow a basic accommodation pattern to their minority 
status, non-Israeli Palestinians in East Jerusalem make use of a strategy of 
resistance, by denying the official language of the country any status in bottom-
                                            
27 Linguistic landscape (LL) refers to objects that mark the public space in a given territory and 
is comprised of both public and private signs. Ben Rafael et al’s work draws on earlier LL works 
and on broader sociological theory. 
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up LL, using Arabic instead as their first and primary linguistic marker” (Ben-
Rafael, 2006: 25). 
A simple walk through any neighbourhood in East Jerusalem will confirm these 
findings; in terms of the pubic space, Arabic is overwhelmingly the predominant 
language, with English second (English is pragmatically employed in tourism in 
particular) and Hebrew barely in evidence at all. As residents of the Israeli state, 
however, East Jerusalem Palestinians encounter Hebrew daily and are severely 
disadvantaged if they have no grasp of the language. While Hebrew language 
learning is absent from the Palestinian Authority curriculum followed by many 
schools in East Jerusalem, the evidence suggests that demand for Hebrew 
language tuition is growing.  
Osama points out that to make sense of his mobile phone bill or to understand 
prices in the supermarket, he needs to be able to read Hebrew. In addition, all 
official forms required by the Interior Ministry need to be completed in Hebrew. 
East Jerusalem Palestinians will queue for hours to get seen at the Dakhaliya, for 
example to add a child to their identity cards or to register their new marital status 
(in contrast to the West Jerusalem office, the East Jerusalem branch of the 
Interior Ministry runs largely without appointments). They are then usually given 
a form to fill in, which must be completed in Hebrew. Outside the office are always 
Hebrew-speaking Palestinians at makeshift desks who, for a fee, will complete 
the form for you.  
The data collected here suggests that East Jerusalem residents are increasingly 
cognisant of the benefits of Hebrew language acquisition and are acting on this 
at an individual level. A range of justifications for Hebrew language acquisition 
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are proffered and it is not uncommon to be told that it is advantageous, even a 
religious obligation, to learn the language of one’s enemy. It is more than 
plausible, however, that the benefits of learning Hebrew are more commonly 
practical ones. 
Ilaiyan (2012) demonstrates clearly that Hebrew language learning among East 
Jerusalem Palestinians does not correlate to an interest in Jewish or Israeli 
culture or in the language itself independent of its practical utility. Hebrew 
language skills are generally acquired by East Jerusalem Palestinians in non-
formal education for the purposes of employment or to communicate with Israelis 
in everyday life; they learn Hebrew for its practical value (Ilaiyan, 2012). It does 
not necessarily follow, however, that once acquired this is all East Jerusalem 
Palestinians use their new Hebrew language skills for. Rana, for example, learnt 
some Hebrew in high school. She has tried to maintain and improve it for practical 
purposes, but also tries often to watch the television news on Israeli channels 
and to receive Hebrew language news alerts through her mobile phone. She says 
that it is good to know what the Israelis are thinking and how they understand and 
interpret events. 
Few Palestinian secondary schools in East Jerusalem give priority to Hebrew 
language learning. The Israeli media, however, has reported increased interest 
in Hebrew language learning among East Jerusalem residents and a growing 
demand for Israeli university places. In order to study at an Israeli higher 
education institution, Palestinian students need to have succeeded in Israeli 
matriculation exams or be willing to undertake a preparatory programme in 
Hebrew language. 
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In 2015, the funding committee of the Council for Higher Education in Israel 
approved the first Hebrew University preparatory programme for East Jerusalem 
Palestinians. Aimed at Palestinians who have passed Tawjihi rather than Bugrut, 
the move came in response to the growing demand by graduates of East 
Jerusalem high schools to attend Israeli higher education institutions. According 
to Haaretz, Hadassah Academic College, which has run a similar programme for 
more than a decade, receives between 800 and 1,000 applications each year, 
from which it accepts 50 applicants (Hasson, 2015). 
Haaretz has also reported an increase in the number of East Jerusalem students 
seeking to take the Israeli matriculation exam, Bugrut, rather than the Palestinian 
Tawjihi. According to Municipality figures, 1,900 Palestinian students took Bugrut 
in 2015, with the number expected to rise to 2,200 in 2016 (Hasson, 2015). While 
these figures still constitute only about 5% of all Palestinian high school graduates 
in East Jerusalem (Kashti and Hasson, 2016), they must also be understood 
within the context of the limited number of places currently available. In addition, 
few East Jerusalem high school students are sufficiently fluent in Hebrew to 
pursue such an option. 
Ahmad studied civil engineering in Jordan. He graduated a few months before I 
met him and had begun a temporary job in Beit Hanina while studying Hebrew in 
a formal setting. He previously attended the Ibrahimiya school in East Jerusalem, 
where he was taught only very basic Hebrew and even this, he says, in a half-
hearted fashion.  
“The thing is that they don’t care about the Hebrew language, I don’t know why. 
This is a very negative thing in our schools… to be realistic here we are living in 
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a city, in a country that half of the population are talking in a language that those 
who don’t speak it will not be able to communicate, to get his rights and the things 
he can have or can get. Okay this is the language of the occupation but we have 
to learn it in order to start to develop our rights and our needs and the things that 
every people under occupation can have, but you have to ask for it in the 
language of the occupier… It is difficult to take your rights, it is a very hard thing. 
I know people with flowing Hebrew but they don’t have their rights… The 
language is the beginning. After that we need to start teaching people about their 
rights. A very large number of the rights we choose to neglect because we don’t 
want to have a headache about them, we don’t want to get involved with them. 
Some people they refuse to accept the rights because they are delivered by the 
Israelis so they say I don’t want it. In every city under occupation [the occupier] 
has to give its duties to the people its occupying. The free movement for 
example.”  
Hanan’s school in East Jerusalem teaches Arabic, English and German, but not 
Hebrew. The staff recognise the importance of Hebrew to their students, but have 
not found the will nor the means to get started. Simply recruiting the staff required 
to introduce Hebrew lessons at the school would require significant expenditure, 
but the problem appears to be one more of apathy or energy. 
“We tried but we couldn’t find. We didn’t put it in our mind really to do it and we 
don’t have the teachers and besides we teach German as well as English… We 
said Hebrew, it will be more effort for the girls, we need the budget for the 
teachers’ fees; so it’s in our mind, but we postpone it. Though we are convinced 
that it is a must to learn it. Any paper, for telephone, for the arnona, for driving 
license, for anything, it comes in Hebrew, no English at all. So, we need it. If we 
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want to go to their hospitals to speak to their doctors, we have to know their 
language.” 
Finding the will and resources to introduce Hebrew language classes to 
secondary education in East Jerusalem is difficult, but increasingly it seems 
schools are making the effort in response to local demand. Palestinian Authority 
official Nasser Shaath told the Independent newspaper in 2013 that the 
introduction of Hebrew lessons to some municipal schools was “part of the 
attempt to totally de-Arabise and de-Palestinianise Jerusalem.” However, 
municipal officials said that the introduction came at the request of Palestinian 
parents who wanted more higher education and job opportunities for their children 
(Lien, 2013, Lynfield, 2013), while a report in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz also 
found that demand was rising as a result of the separation Barrier and the 
difficulties attached to higher education in the West Bank (Hasson, 2015). 
3. Ambivalence Towards Israel 
In this section I argue that East Jerusalem Palestinians experience complex and 
often ambivalent feelings towards and relationships with the Israeli state that are 
generally overlooked within top down analytic paradigms that forefront issues of 
national sovereignty over those of individual agency. Residency status within 
Israel draws East Jerusalemites into a more direct relationship with the occupying 
state than that experienced by West Bank Palestinians and their proximity to 
Israelis also ensures that they have more frequent encounters with the Other. 
Moreover, residency within the de facto boundaries of the Israeli state places 
East Jerusalem Palestinians in the position of external observer in relation to the 
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Palestinian Authority and leads inevitably to the drawing of comparisons between 
Israel and the PA. 
In Chapter V below, I address the marginality of East Jerusalem Palestinians as 
residents of the Israeli state and explore the everyday humiliations and 
depravations of Israel’s colonial project in the city from the perspective of its 
Palestinian residents. In this section, however, I seek to disentangle the matrix of 
feelings experienced by East Jerusalemites who have complex and sometimes 
contradictory attitudes towards the occupying state. First, I examine the 
perceived benefits of residency. Second, I consider the comparisons drawn by 
Palestinians in Jerusalem between the Israeli government and the Palestinian 
Authority. Third, I address the positive attitudes held by East Jerusalem 
Palestinians towards particular aspects of the Israeli modus operandi and finally, 
I look at personal encounters between East Jerusalem Palestinians and Israelis 
and the impact of these encounters on Palestinian attitudes and political opinions. 
 
3.1 The Perceived Advantages of Residency  
In contrast to West Bankers who experience occupation through the conduit of 
the Palestinian Authority, residency status inside Israel draws East Jerusalem 
Palestinians into direct relationships with the occupying state. Palestinian life in 
the city is regularly framed by observers in terms ethno-national conflict, a 
discriminatory urban colonial regime, state violence and demographic 
manipulation28. Such approaches draw much needed attention to the desperate 
                                            
28 See in particular YACOBI, H. 2016. From 'Ethnocracity' to Urban Apartheid: The Changing 
Urban Geopolitics of Jerusalem/Al-Quds. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, 8. 
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circumstances of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, but rarely observe these 
conditions from the ground where day to day life is also inextricably entwined with 
much more mundane Israeli state and municipal practices. Such daily 
interactions cannot be fully understood within the occupier/occupied binary, but 
must be addressed within the relationship between state and resident. 
Permanent residency status in Israel, as discussed above, falls significantly short 
of citizenship. However, as permanent residents, East Jerusalem Palestinians 
have rights and freedoms within the Israeli state that are not shared by 
Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories. For example, East Jerusalem 
Palestinians have the right to free movement throughout Israel and the occupied 
territories29 and are entitled to live and work in Israel without need of special 
permits. Permanent residents are entitled to vote in Israeli municipal elections, 
though not in national elections to the Knesset, and East Jerusalemites are also 
permitted to vote in Palestinian elections in the West Bank.  
Like all other residents of the Israeli state, East Jerusalem Palestinians over the 
age of 18 are required by law to be covered with the National Insurance Institute 
and to pay regular insurance contributions. In exchange for the proper payment 
of compulsory insurance contributions, Palestinians in East Jerusalem become 
eligible for a broad range national insurance benefits including child benefit, 
disability allowance and age-related pensions. 
                                            
29 This freedom is limited by a range of factors including official Israeli practices that discriminate 
against Palestinians as well self-imposed Palestinian boundaries. For example, I have met 
many East Jerusalem Palestinians who have lived all their lives in the Old City, but who have 
never wandered into the Jewish Quarter. In times of unrest, East Jerusalem Palestinians might 
refrain from making their usual trips to the beach at Jaffa or to shopping malls in West 
Jerusalem, be it out of fear or solidarity. 
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Under the State Health Insurance Law, moreover, as of 1 January 1995 every 
Israeli resident has health insurance coverage. All Israeli residents aged 18 and 
above must pay health insurance contributions to the National Insurance Institute 
together with their national insurance contributions. All insured residents must 
register with one of Israel’s health maintenance organisations (HMOs) known as 
kupot holim, and the HMO is required by law to provide the insured person 
unconditionally with a standard ‘health basket’ of essential services. 
Health insurance and social security benefits are frequently cited, within the 
Israeli media in particular, as material incentives for East Jerusalem Palestinians 
to wish to remain under Israeli rather than Palestinian Authority jurisdiction. 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem do indeed appear to value these services, health 
insurance in particular. For the majority of East Jerusalem Palestinians, access 
to primary health care and the quality of care they receive is equal to that of 
Israelis. Moreover, the quality of primary health care in Israel is significantly 
higher than in the West Bank.30 
While they value the quality of health care they receive, few East Jerusalem 
Palestinians regard this benefit of Israeli residency as anything more than a 
service for which they pay heavily. Despite the economic disparities between East 
Jerusalem Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, all pay equally for health and national 
insurance. The evidence indicates that participation in Israeli insurance schemes 
is broadly regarded as compulsory and unrelated to questions of resistance or 
normalisation. 
                                            
30 Interview with Dr Sharif 
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There are exceptions. George holds a somewhat unconventional view that the 
material benefits associated with Israeli residency negate the right of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians to describe themselves as occupied. During our 
conversations, he seized indignantly on my use of the term ‘occupation’ to 
describe the existing regime in the city.  
“This is not occupation! What occupation gives money to people? You can’t 
describe what is happening here as an occupation. If you want to call this an 
occupation, stop taking money from them, stop driving cars with the yellow 
[license] plates, stop paying your national insurance and your taxes. They can’t 
confiscate everyone’s ID. There are 230,000 Muslims and Christians in this city. 
Tell them to throw out their IDs, to do ‘isyaan madani [civil disobedience]. That 
would be occupation.” 
George’s attitude diverges somewhat from more mainstream views, but it 
highlights the complexities and ambiguities of the relationship between East 
Jerusalem Palestinians and the Israeli state, which is at once occupier and 
provider. Osama also drew attention to the contradictions implicit in the 
relationship between occupier and occupied in East Jerusalem. “Many of those 
old men who call themselves Murabiteen, they sit at al-Aqsa all day to show the 
Israelis that this place is not for the Jewish, to demonstrate that it is for Muslims 
only. But in the mosque, you can hear them complaining about how long they had 
to queue to collect their pension or moaning because it is lower this week than it 
was last week. They take money from Sheikh Raed Salah to resist Israel and 
then they take their pension from Israel too.” 
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Israeli media reports which underline the value East Jerusalem Palestinians put 
on their blue identity cards frequently identify the health and social security 
benefits of residency as decisive issues. The problem, however, is more complex. 
The inferiority of services and infrastructure in the Palestinian administered 
territories compared to those in Israel is undeniably linked to decades of 
occupation and under investment, but East Jerusalem Palestinians do not appear 
to hold Israel solely responsible for this disparity. Many also point to Palestinian 
Authority corruption and mismanagement as significant factors in the West 
Bank’s failing infrastructure and in their determination not to lose their residency 
rights in Israel. 
3.2 Comparisons between Israel and the PA 
The data collected indicates that East Jerusalem Palestinians are critical of 
Palestinian Authority governance in the West Bank and that few would welcome 
unilateral Israeli action or a negotiated settlement of the Jerusalem issue that 
brought them under PA jurisdiction. 
Some commentators have sought to locate these attitudes within the wider 
context of the Arab Spring and movements to throw off the leadership of 
undemocratic regimes in the Middle East.31 There may be some merit in this view, 
but there is also no shortage of justifications closer to home for such opinions. 
While rejection of the PA is not itself an endorsement of Israeli governance, the 
situation of East Jerusalem Palestinians allows for some interesting comparisons. 
In East Jerusalem, corruption within the PA is a key cause of concern. This is not 
                                            
31 This idea was given voice by Raja Shehadeh at a book launch in East Jerusalem in April 
2016. 
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of course a uniquely Arab phenomenon and most East Jerusalemites are aware 
that many of Israel’s leading politicians are themselves also plagued by corruption 
allegations. The difference in Israel, it seems to many Palestinian residents, is 
the recognition that corruption is a problem and the existence of mechanisms to 
tackle it. Sara explained: 
“Why is it that the laws in Israel have the right to ask anyone in the government 
where did you have this money from… We couldn’t find this in the Palestinian 
Authority. You will never hear in the PA that even one is in jail because of this. 
There is no Arab country where you will find this. We don’t know where the money 
goes. We just hear that someone from the Palestinian Authority has a new villa.” 
George, arguing that “the Palestinian Authority is all about corruption even before 
they get a state,” related a joke on a similar theme: 
“There was once a meeting in London for ministers from all over the world. An 
Arab minister was invited to the home of a British minister. It was a large, beautiful 
home, like a palace. The Arab minister asked the British minister, ‘How can you 
afford a home such as this?’ The British minister winked and pointed to a bridge 
in the distance. ‘You see that bridge? We were given £10 million to build it, but 
only spent £5 million on it.’ The Arab minister thought about this and some time 
later, when the British minister visited his country, the Arab minister invited him 
to see his own new home. The Arab minister’s villa was larger and even more 
beautiful than the British minister’s home in London. So the British minister asked 
the Arab minister, ‘How did you afford to build a home such as this?’ The Arab 
Minister smiled and said, ‘Ah, I also took £20 million to build a bridge.’ The British 
minister looked around and said, ‘What bridge?’” 
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The sentiment expressed in this joke was shared by a number of other 
interviewees. Hanan explained: 
“So most of the Europeans and Americans and Arab world they are trying to help 
by giving money, money, money to the Palestinians to repair the Palestinian state 
and their independence but where is the money? You can see only peanuts. And 
most of the money is stolen. How should I believe in our government if they are 
stealing [from] the poor people?” 
I asked Ruby is she supports the demand for a Palestinian state with its capital 
in East Jerusalem. “No! We want to stay with the Jewish people. It is difficult to 
live in Jerusalem and to have Muhmud Abbas in Jerusalem… All the Palestinian 
people know that he brings a lot of money from outside, but nobody sees anything 
from the money. Yanee, they bring money for the Old City, this is money for us, 
for the electricity to help us in the Old City, but nobody knows where this money 
did go… I don’t like the Jewish, but I am born here and I live here with the Jewish 
people. Maybe if a leader comes who is better than Abbas then maybe we could 
live with Palestinians, but I don’t think so, they are all the same. It is better for us 
with the Israelis.” 
3.3 Respect for the Israeli Modus Operandi 
Following on from the contrasts draw between Israel and the PA in the previous 
section, here I explore the respect expressed by many East Jerusalem 
Palestinians for aspects of the Israeli modus operandi. East Jerusalem 
Palestinians may retain oppositional authenticity while allowing that the 
hegemonic culture has something to offer (Ortner, 1995). This issue is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter VI. Here I argue that without prejudicing broader 
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Palestinian objections to Israeli rule, the data collected indicates that those who 
live inside the Israeli state (and who observe the occupied territories as well as 
neighbouring Arab countries from the outside), reject occupation but 
simultaneously approve of aspects of the system it imposes.  
Sara explained: 
“Abu Mazen is not our leader. I don’t know other persons to say this one or that 
one [is better]. In our life in Jerusalem I see that the Jewish leaders, when they 
put a law or decide that they should forbid something, they are successful. They 
have the way to lead the people. I am not 100% with them, but I like the way they 
are ruling the people and they give the people the right to say yes or so no… I 
think it is good to have this in our life, it improves us in our lives.” 
Many East Jerusalem Palestinians are comfortable acknowledging aspects of the 
Israeli modus operandi of which they approve without feeling that this 
compromises or contradicts their rejection of the occupation. Most examples cited 
by Jerusalem residents related in some way to the Israeli niz’aam or system. 
Rana, for example, painted a vivid picture of one aspect of everyday life, banking. 
“At the [Israeli] bank, there is a system, you take a number. But if you go to 
Ramallah, to an Arab bank, they are on top of each other. And if you know 
someone it helps. You can be waiting two, three, four hours, then someone 
comes and he goes in front of you. In an Israeli bank no, thankfully this would not 
happen.” 
Many interviewees expressed approval, even admiration, of Israeli organisation 
and efficiency, contrasting it with their experiences in the West Bank. Ruby said: 
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“In Jerusalem, the life is more easy than in the West Bank. First, we have kupot 
holim and tutmeen al watani; they pay to us money, the Jewish people. Also, we 
have the best water and the electricity, they don’t cut it. In the West Bank, we 
speak the same language, but they won’t help us like the Jewish people. In 
Jerusalem if you pay everything, the electricity and the water, they look after you. 
In the West Bank if someone knows you he will help you, but if he doesn’t know 
you, he won’t help you. You will have to pay him too. But in Jerusalem there is 
the law. You pay, you take. Good electricity, water, phone… There is good law 
here. If you want to cross the street, you wait for green. And the driving is good. 
There is law and this is good for us and for the Jewish people. In the West Bank, 
there is no law… If you cross the road maybe an accident will happen because 
there is no law when they drive. In Jerusalem, it is the best here.”32 
Nasser spends his time between his homes in Jerusalem and France. He is very 
open about his Israeli citizenship and has a great deal of respect for Israel, 
despite his anger and revulsion at Israeli actions towards the Palestinians in 
recent years. 
“Look, the security here, in Israel, it is the best. The security, international 
security, it is very secure here in Israel. But security for the Arab people here, you 
cannot - I cannot - complain at this time. Look at the government here. They have 
a law. If you are going by the law… except these problems, like they kill Abu 
Khdeir or they kill someone like this, still everywhere I think you have these things. 
But we are talking about the security, still there is security here. Security from 
                                            
32 Conversely, West Bankers complain that when East Jerusalem residents (identifiable by their 
yellow license plates), drive in the West Bank, they think that the Palestinian police have no 
authority over them and drive recklessly as a result. 
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international, security from the Jewish, they are good in Jerusalem, in the West 
Bank I don’t know, it’s not so [good], but in Jerusalem… you can feel the security, 
it’s much better than Jordan, much better than Syria, much better than anywhere 
for the Arab people. But there is something, you feel it. You must take care, still 
a little bit afraid… because of the conservatives, fanatic people there is in Israel, 
they do bad things, but security… I feel very secure here…There is law in Israel, 
if you are going by the law its perfect. If you are going with everything, you pay, 
you say, if you be correct in the law, by the law, if you are going with everything 
it’s okay. Except what I told you happens here and there… Look, there is a few 
problems, but still, I say frankly, if they ask me you can live in the Arab countries 
or you can live here in Israel, I prefer to live here.” 
3.4 Personal Encounters with the Other 
Israelis and Palestinians share East Jerusalem’s contested urban space, but 
rarely inhabit the same residential space. Where Israeli settlers have moved into 
Palestinian areas, they live separately within them. A micro level analysis, 
however, makes evident that flows of people, culture and capital are more 
frequent than many other studies allow. 
Cohen (2013a) notes that the overwhelming majority of Jewish-Palestinian 
encounters occur within Israeli space and institutions. He categorises occasions 
of contact as “economically driven encounters that take place in labour-market 
contexts and in shopping centres; encounters in public institutions, for example, 
government offices, the municipality, hospitals and institutions of higher 
education; and encounters at recreation and tourism sites. This is in addition to 
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encounters with security personnel while walking in the streets of West 
Jerusalem” (Cohen, 2013: 137-8). 
Jerusalem is defined as a frontier or a contested city, segregated along ethno-
national lines with clear – if multiple and not always visible - boundaries 
separating Israelis from Palestinians. A number of recent studies, however, have 
sought to emphasise the fluidity of these boundaries and the emergence of new 
spaces of encounter between Israeli and Palestinian (Busbridge, 2014, Dumper, 
2014, Nolte and Yacobi, 2015, Shtern, 2016). For example, Nolte and Yacobi 
(2015) argue that official Israeli representations of the Jerusalem light railway are 
clearly part of a broader hegemonic narrative that seeks to project Jerusalem as 
a modern, unified city. They note, however, that the railway does none the less 
serve both Jewish and Palestinian neighbourhoods, bringing occupier and 
occupied into close proximity are creating a new space of encounter. 
The emergence of neoliberal spaces of consumerism, invested with the potential 
to destabilise the sectarian spatial logic of the contested city and enable 
temporary same status encounters, have also received specific attention (Shtern, 
2016). While uneven power levels between Palestinians and Israelis produce 
inequality in almost all spheres of life, the existence of privatised centres of 
encounter such as retail shopping centres “enables non-violent space sharing 
and temporary same status encounters between consumers that undermine a 
status quo of unequal power relations, political oppression, hate, fear and 
mistrust” (Shtern, 2016). This process can reinforce Israeli occupation through 
partial normalisation on the one hand, and undermine ethnocratic values on the 
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other, by diluting the identity of public space.33 Ultimately, however, these are 
temporary and spontaneous encounters. Moreover, the terms of engagement are 
not always clear. As Shtern notes, the presence of Palestinians in West 
Jerusalem’s parks and malls is not necessarily a sign of voluntary social mixing, 
but possibly a reflection of the absence of facilities in East Jerusalem. 
The focus here is on more fixed encounters and the data collected indicates that 
many East Jerusalem Palestinians are either already engaged in employment or 
educational activities which bring them into far more regular, less spontaneous 
encounters with Israelis or open to the opportunity to do so. These pursuits have 
less to do with actively subverting intended meanings or uses of space and 
significantly more to do with taking advantage of the opportunities available to 
improve lives and livelihoods. 
Yacobi and Pullan (2014) demonstrate that due to their location on the front line 
of contested space, frontier neighbourhoods such as French Hill in Jerusalem, 
enable interactions that undermine the “demographic homogeneity” intended by 
the colonial project. Affluent Palestinians in search of better housing, services 
and quality of life, most of them Israeli citizens with fluent Hebrew, are 
increasingly attracted to Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem that offer easy 
access to neighbouring Arab districts. This phenomenon is less common among 
                                            
33 In some respects, such encounters only temporarily and selectively transform ethnic division 
into a class one since such inclusion is only possible for the middle classes on both sides. For 
more on this, see SHTERN, M. 2016. Urban Neoliberalism Vs. Ethno-National Division: The Case 
of West Jerusalem's Shopping Malls. Cities, 52. 
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Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, but it is an option that many will 
consider.34 
None the less, East Jerusalem Palestinian encounters with the Other are more 
numerous and more varied than macro level analyses generally allow for. Among 
those interviewed for this study, the relationships between Israeli and Palestinian 
were varied, from those between (Palestinian) doctor and (Israeli) patient to those 
between fellow students and (Israeli) employer and (Palestinian) employee.  
Hanan’s account of a remarkable series of meetings between her family and an 
Arabic-speaking Israeli soldier in Ramallah in the late 1960s demonstrates that 
even during those very troubled times, there were positive encounters. More 
importantly, perhaps, Hanan recalls these memories with enormous pleasure, 
despite the bitterness of the circumstances. 
“In 1967, I was seven years old. We had a blue Volkswagen car. When we were 
at home in Ramallah during the war, an Israeli soldier came and he found my 
mother. My mother and my aunt’s houses are close and were all sitting in my 
aunt’s house. He found my mother and he said in Arabic ‘For whom is this car?’ 
She told him, this is for my husband. He asked her to call him and she said, 
‘Farouk!’ And he [the soldier] also started calling ‘Farouk!’ When my father came, 
the soldier asked for the keys and he took the car. They had no military cars to 
go around Ramallah. He took our car, drove in Ramallah and when there was no 
fuel left he switched it off, put it aside, left the keys inside and that’s it. After things 
calmed down, they came, the local people, they told my father your car is in this 
                                            
34 I encountered a number of people who rent or who had considered renting in increasingly 
mixed but less affluent neighbourhoods such as Talpiyot.  
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street. Then, later, another time, he [the same Israeli soldier] came again and 
said ‘Farouk, give me your car!’ My father gave him the car, but this time the 
soldier put fuel back and returned it to our home. Then after a while, we met him 
again. There was a checkpoint at the end of al Bireh, a long, long time ago. This 
is 1968 or 1969. When he saw my father, he treated him so well and usually had 
a joke with him. ‘Don’t you want to sell your car Farouk? I want your car!’ My 
father of course says ‘No, I don’t want to sell my car!’ And one day, my mother – 
because my grandmother lived in Cairo and we would go every summer to visit 
there – we crossed the bridge and we found that a soldier came and carried our 
bag, not letting my mother carry it, and began to joke with us. He reminded us 
that he is the same soldier!” 
The Israeli soldier in Hanan’s story was a Sephardi Jew and she believes that 
their shared Arabic language and culture allowed a degree of warmth and respect 
despite the circumstances. With huge influxes of Jews from other parts of the 
world, however, and the low position of Sephardi Jews in Israel, Hanan believes 
the situation has changed. 
“After that the Israeli policies tried to show up differences between Jews and 
Palestinians. Nowadays, I don’t think it is easy to bridge between the two nations. 
When I was at university in the late ‘70s, early 1980s, I was in Bir Zeit University, 
some of us - majority of us - was believing that at some point we should live two 
nations in one state. Because no way to push out the Jewish people from here, 
Jewish people who their fathers were born here. This is all Palestine with all these 
nations. But now there is no Jewish people, I don’t hear about these Jewish 
people, who can say their grandfather was born here... Now you can feel the 
hatred from their side.” 
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Sara explains that in East Jerusalem, living with Jews is simply a fact of life. 
“We work side by side with them. I don’t have a problem to have Jewish people 
in my life. At least I am born here and he is born here. This is not my problem. 
My life has to pass and his life has to pass. All of my husband’s work is with the 
Israeli soldiers, with Israeli schools. He works with Israelis every day. He speaks 
Hebrew. He studied Graphic Design at the Hebrew University. Years ago, they 
would give students from the West Bank permission to study in Jerusalem. When 
my daughter will be an age to go to university I will send her to study at the 
Hebrew University. I have no problem to do this. They will finish higher education 
with a good certificate from a good university. I don’t care what is the religion of 
the university.” 
The data collected suggests that peaceful, even cordial, interactions with Israelis 
are relatively common and generally unproblematic for East Jerusalem 
Palestinians. Hanan’s family lost everything in 1948 and she insists that no peace 
with Israel is possible until her land is returned to her. She has taught her children 
to remember this injustice and to carry the memory of it with them. Yet she speaks 
proudly of her daughter’s positive experience working in an Israeli office and of 
enduring the friendships she had made there.  
“It’s not easy and yet when you have a human in front of you, you can’t treat him 
bad if he doesn’t treat you bad. We are all human. In the end, forget Jew, forget 
Palestinian, we are human and human.”  
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4. Seeking Normality 
Everyday life in contested urban situations is rooted in praxis, “simply what people 
in cities do” (Pullan and Baillie, 2013). In this section, I aim to demonstrate that 
many East Jerusalem Palestinians are actively pursuing ways to improve their 
lives and livelihoods in the city within the confines of long term Israeli rule. I 
explore the decisions residents are making with regard to education, family and 
employment, consider how individuals understand and frame these choices, and 
seek to locate them within a broader analytic framework that recognises the 
structural limitations on individual agency but which locates the subject inside 
structures of power. Such an approach acknowledges that structural constraints 
shape the space in which identity is constructed, but also recognises that this 
space is itself transformed by that moment of identity construction (Holland, 
2001). In this sense, we must ask how everyday Palestinian actions and choices 
in East Jerusalem are shaped by top down processes and how these in turn might 
reproduce or reinforce Israeli hegemony. 
First, I argue that top down analytic frameworks fail to take account of the 
divergent political landscape inhabited by East Jerusalem Palestinians and the 
disparate challenges of their quotidian experience vis-à-vis that of West Bankers. 
Locating Palestinian subjectivity and struggle within a critical framework that 
recognises the ways in which everyday life is mediated by systems of power and 
inequality, I seek to demonstrate that East Jerusalem Palestinians who remain 
steadfast in the city despite tremendous pressure to leave are also looking for 
ways to improve their lives and livelihoods. I argue that these choices draw them 
into more ambiguous relationships with the Israeli state and potentially help 
shape the space in which identity is constructed. I conclude that everyday 
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Palestinian life in East Jerusalem reflects this constituency’s political and spatial 
isolation, the preponderance of Israeli power in the city and the failure of the 
Palestinian leadership to project an inclusive nationalist narrative. It also 
manifests a straightforward desire on the part of individual East Jerusalem 
Palestinians to lead a ‘normal life,’ which comes at a cost for collective 
mobilisation. The preponderant influence of the domination-resistance binary 
imposes meanings on everyday Palestinian life in the city which, viewed from the 
perspective of those on the ground, are contestable. 
4.1 A Framework for Analysing Everyday Life in East Jerusalem 
Mainstream academic approaches to everyday life in East Jerusalem are typically 
framed by macro-level processes which essentialise identities and impose 
analytic binaries such as occupation and resistance, resistance or normalisation, 
that obscure the complexity of quotidian life in the city. Meanwhile, individual 
adaptations to long-term Israeli rule and the internal politics of this Palestinian 
constituency are broadly overlooked and the extent to which Israeli power limits 
the opportunities for Palestinian agency is underestimated. 
Recent studies of everyday Palestinian life and struggle draw on de Certeau’s 
distinction between the “strategies” of the powerful on the one hand and, on the 
other, the multitude of “tactics” - articulated in the quotidian practice of ‘the other’ 
- which constitute “an art of manipulating and enjoying” (De Certeau, 1984). 
While strategies are “organised by the postulation of power” and privilege spatial 
relationships, tactics are determined by the absence of power; they are temporal 
rather than spatial, operating in isolated actions, taking advantage of 
opportunities and, in turn, depending on them. In short, tactics are “an art of the 
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weak” (De Certeau, 1984). Thus, tactics as defined by de Certeau, “use, 
manipulate or divert a given situation as a means of adapting but not succumbing 
to conditions on the ground… so that life becomes a form of survival or resilience, 
or in some cases, resistance” (Pullan and Baillie, 2013).  
Life as resilience or continuous struggle is manifest in the Palestinian nationalist 
theme of sumud, or steadfastness, which denotes a strong determination to 
remain on the land. The theory and praxis of sumud have evolved and adapted, 
from a refusal to leave the land despite the hardships of occupation during the 
1970s to a more active refusal during the second intifada period to allow 
roadblocks, checkpoints and the separation Barrier to preclude everyday travel 
and the routines of normal life (Hammami, 2005, Richter-Devroe, 2011, Rijke and 
van Teeffelen, 2014).  
In the post-second intifada period, the debate over sumud has centred upon 
whether efforts to lead a normal life under occupation constitute normalisation or 
resistance (Richter-Devroe, 2010). The divergent political reality in East 
Jerusalem, however, produces challenges quite distinct from those facing 
Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories and it follows that the meaning 
attached to signifiers such as normalisation, resistance and sumud is not uniform 
across Jerusalem and the West Bank. The evidence collected strongly indicates 
that Palestinians in East Jerusalem see no conflict between their resistance (for 
many manifest in their struggle to remain in Jerusalem despite pressure to leave) 
and their efforts to improve their lives and livelihoods long term within the context 
of Israeli rule. 
175 
 
Ziad’s framing of his own experience demonstrates that quotidian life for East 
Jerusalem residents is inextricably linked with Israel and that as a result, attempts 
to label everyday practices as normalisation or Israelification are meaningless. 
“My resistance is to be here in Jerusalem and not to melt, not to integrate. On the 
other hand, I live in Jerusalem and if I live in Jerusalem it has to be like this. And 
you should not forget that living in Jerusalem itself is a big thing because Israel 
wants us to leave Jerusalem. I would never work in social security, but I have to 
use it. Education and health are outside of politics. If I am a doctor, I will treat 
every patient equally. If I am a professor, I teach every student equally. These 
things are separate from politics… I am living in Israel. It’s an occupation, but I 
am living here and in every single detail of my life I am dealing with them.” 
Everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem cannot be fully understood through a 
top-down binary analysis that takes insufficient account of the dual marginality of 
residents and their tangential experience inside the Israeli state. A new 
framework for analysing the praxis of everyday life in East Jerusalem must 
therefore recognise the divergent political landscape of East Jerusalem and the 
disparate challenges experienced by its Palestinian residents. It must also 
acknowledge the extent to which the praxis of everyday life in the city is mediated 
by power and inequality and give sufficient consideration to the structural 
constraints on individual agency. Finally, a bottom up framework must take full 
account of the internal politics of this Palestinian constituency, their dislocation 
from mainstream nationalist narratives and their dislocation from the leadership 
in Ramallah. Distanced from the Palestinian Authority and not willing or able to 
engage fully with the Israeli state, East Jerusalem Palestinians remain mindful of 
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the national struggle but intent, meanwhile, on improving their lives and 
livelihoods in the present. 
4.2 From ‘Suspension’ and ‘Affirmation’ to ‘Improvement’ of Life 
In this section I explore the everyday life of East Jerusalem Palestinians in the 
post-second intifada period. De Certeau recognises that there are possibilities for 
even the powerless individual: “without leaving the place where he has no choice 
but to live and which lays down its law for him, he establishes within it a degree 
of plurality and creativity.” Thus, using tactics “one can create for himself a space 
in which he can find ways of using the constraining order of the place or of the 
language” (De Certeau, 1984). Within mainstream academic studies dominated 
by top-down binaries, these opportunities are broadly interpreted within the 
context of and harnessed to the national struggle. I argue, however, that in East 
Jerusalem since the second intifada, the space for agency and creativity has 
been largely used by individuals to improve their own lives and livelihoods within 
the context of enduring Israeli rule. 
Jean-Klein’s 2001 seminal study of everyday activism during the first Intifada 
described the collective Palestinian practice of suspending everyday routines and 
joyful activities as a form of self-nationalisation that affirmed the injustice of 
occupation (Jean‐Klein, 2001).35 In the second-intifada period, the turn back to 
enjoyment of life as resistance and the pursuit of normality demonstrated 
dissatisfaction with earlier narratives regarding the route to national liberation and 
signalled a determination to enjoy temporary pleasures in the present rather than 
                                            
35 This practice is discussed in greater depth in Chapter VI. 
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in a future that might never materialise (Junka, 2006, Kelly, 2008, Richter-Devroe, 
2011).  
This transition from ‘suspension of life’ strategy in the first intifada to ‘affirmation 
of life’ tactics during the second reflects shifting structures of power as well as the 
diminution of collective understandings of resistance as Palestinian territory and 
community fragmented (Richter-Devroe, 2011). Thus, according to Richter-
Devroe (2011), “going to an Israeli settlement to relax, or to Haifa to the beach, 
or across the West Bank to visit friends and family… is, as de Certeau 
demonstrates, a tactic to temporarily subvert established power configurations.” 
In the context, therefore, of Israeli policies of spatial dismemberment and 
enclavisation (Falah, 2005) and the atomisation of Palestinian society, 
“affirmation of life” tactics are “practiced predominantly on the individual (rather 
than collective) and ideational (rather than action-oriented, practical) level” 
(Richter-Devroe, 2011). 
Junka (2006) connects this transition from collective action to individualised 
attempts to temporarily subvert existing power structures with the hybridisation of 
Palestinian subjectivities between the two intifadas. This shift, she claims, is 
indicative of the extent of Palestinian disempowerment. Neither the suspension 
of life strategy of the first intifada nor the affirmation of life tactics of the second 
intifada can be interpreted in straightforward terms as ‘resistance.’ Rather, Junka 
argues, “they must be understood instead as indicative of the changing matrix of 
power relations within which Palestinian subjectivity is constituted” (Junka, 2006: 
423). 
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In the post second intifada period, the evidence from East Jerusalem suggests a 
further shift, away from ‘affirmation of life’ towards an individualised ‘improvement 
of life’ attitude. While East Jerusalem Palestinians continue to seize opportunities 
to visit the beach or to holiday over Eid, these occasions are not demonstrably 
imbued with political significance or framed by East Jerusalemites themselves as 
acts of resistance. Spontaneous and temporary opportunities for enjoyment, 
including those which occur within Israeli space, are regarded by East Jerusalem 
residents as part of normal life and not as a substitute for it. 
The data collected indicates that while East Jerusalem Palestinians have not 
abandoned resistance, they have redefined it (see Chapter VI below). In the 
context of long term Israeli rule, many are using the existing order to improve their 
prospects and situation, rather than waiting for improvements in the national 
condition which seem indefinitely postponed. This mode of struggle represents 
an adaptation to de facto Israeli rule, rather than an attempt to subvert it.  
Summa explains that she has chosen to practice medicine inside Israel, rather 
than in East Jerusalem hospitals or in the West Bank, because her career 
prospects and earning potential are far greater in Israel. “Hospitals in Israel, 
medical education and medical facilities in Israeli hospitals, are much better than 
in the Palestinian ones. Also, they pay more money than the Palestinians. I know 
my friend who works at al-Maqassad, for on call they give them 400 NIS, not 
much.36 In Israel they pay from 800 to 1000 NIS. It doesn’t compare. They give 
much more money… The problem is the Palestinians don’t have money. Because 
of this they don’t have enough CT, MRI, all the equipment they don’t have… And 
                                            
36 Al-Maqassad is a Palestinian hospital in East Jerusalem that is not part of the Israeli health 
insurance scheme. 
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you know, if you want to make a sub-speciality, I want to do now radiology; after 
that I will make a sub-speciality. I have places, I have a chance in Israel. But on 
the Palestinian side they don’t have sub-specialities, they don’t have the quality, 
the ability to do sub-specialities, because they are still building themselves.” 
Summa refuses to integrate socially with Israelis but recognises reluctantly that 
that Israel offers her a far more rewarding career path and much better prospects. 
“Here, like this, that is better for me. Society and culture in the West Bank is 
similar to ours in East Jerusalem but organisation, regulation, rules and 
opportunities are better in Israel. It becomes about best interests. Thinking of 
myself. For my own best interest, I choose to work in Israel.” 
At the isolated margins of two conflicting state projects and in the absence of a 
plausible nationalist narrative, East Jerusalem Palestinians are steadfast in their 
commitment to remain in the city, but are also thinking about their own interests 
and ways to improve their material prospects. Yet even the extent to which this 
might be considered a choice freely made within the limitations of their 
predicament is open to debate. As referenced in Chapter II, Israeli efforts to 
depoliticise East Jerusalem Palestinians in order to minimise the threat they pose 
to Israeli authority there extend to policies which require them to focus their 
struggle on material concerns rather than the national project. 
There is significant debate regarding the extent to which the tactics of the weak 
confer agency on the dispossessed. This will be discussed at greater length in 
Chapter V, but I refer here to Bayat’s thesis that the struggles of the urban 
disenfranchised transcend survival strategies and rather are “surreptitiously 
offensive,” seeking improvement in their own lives. This “quiet encroachment of 
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the ordinary” is marked by “quiet, atomised and prolonged mobilisation with 
episodic collective action – an open and fleeting struggle without clear leadership, 
ideology or structured organisation.” They are not conscious political protests, but 
rather the actions of “structurally atomised individuals” driven by the force of 
necessity – the necessity to survive and live a dignified life” (Bayat, 1997) 
In Chapter II, I discussed the growing atomisation of East Jerusalem Palestinians. 
While challenging the extent to which everyday life is cast as resistance and 
confers agency, I argue below that East Jerusalem Palestinians, isolated, 
insecure and leaderless, are exploring ways to not only survive, but to make the 
most of their circumstances and to improve their lives and livelihoods and those 
of their families. 
Salem (2006) offers a useful approach, focusing on the adaptation of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians to the ‘internal occupation’ of their city during the Oslo 
and post-Oslo periods. With the concentration of power in the Palestinian 
Authority and Orient House, popular participation in resistance weakened and the 
role of Fatah as a source of collective identity in Jerusalem gave way to 
fragmentation and atomisation. In this atmosphere, Salem argues that four types 
of adaption model emerged. First, forced adaption, paying compulsory municipal 
taxes, taking Israeli professional licenses or voting in Palestinian elections 
despite Israeli limitations. Second, voluntary affiliation in order to gain benefits, 
such as joining the Histradut, applying for Israeli citizenship or voting in Israeli 
municipal elections. Third avoidance of the negative influence of Israeli exclusion 
policies, for example, hiring a lawyer to achieve family unification, registering an 
NGO according to Israeli law, or withdrawing from Palestinian politics due to fear 
of the consequences. Fourth, adaptation through rejection, for example by joining 
181 
 
a faction as an activist or through the practices of many East Jerusalem 
Palestinians who struggle to remain in the city despite the pressures to leave.  
For Salem, the first and third adaptation models include all Palestinian 
Jerusalemites, the second is the choice of a minority, while the fourth suffers from 
the absence of national and institutional structures and the atomisation of East 
Jerusalemites who are required to find individual ways to cope with the realities 
of life in the city. 
Adaptation offers a useful framework for analysing Palestinian attitudes and 
behaviours. The deteriorating spatial reality, characterised by shrinkage, 
dismemberment and fragmentation, requires Palestinians to adapt; it offers 
context for the atomised, individual responses of residents to the collective 
problems of East Jerusalem, for the inward orientation of this constituency and 
for the prioritisation of everyday urban concerns over national goals (Yousef, 
2011). One interviewee, Ahmad, gave voice to this feeling that that the occupation 
is “psychological, it’s programmed and designed to make people just focus on 
some things to make people forget what really matters.” 37 
Khalid told me that “the people are thinking now just about the life. They will not 
think about the situation and the politics for the future. The man, he just thinks 
about this day. How much it will cost to feed my family. If you ask anyone in 
Jerusalem, the problem for him is money. They are afraid because if anyone 
writes anything on Facebook now, he will go to jail. In the first intifada, all of the 
people in Palestine took part, from the baby to the old woman. I was ten years 
                                            
37 See also ICG 2012. Extreme Makeover? (Ii): The Withering of Arab Jerusalem. Middle East 
Report. Jerusalem/Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
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old when it started and I was throwing stones and when I was 15 years old I went 
to jail, for one year, for burning a police car. Now I just worry about how much is 
the rent and how much is the food.” 
Though structurally atomised, there is some evidence of collective action of a sort 
among East Jerusalem Palestinians. This is rarely political; in fact, none of my 
interviewees had ever taken part in a demonstration, few had voted in Palestinian 
elections and only one had voted in Israeli municipal elections. It is evident, 
however, in a range of everyday practices. 
The extremely high cost of living in Jerusalem and the limitations of Palestinian 
construction mean that families are increasingly opting to share overcrowded 
accommodation in order to prevent those who could not otherwise afford to live 
in the city from losing their residency rights. George says that this is particularly 
evident in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City. There, he says, “so many people 
just live in one house, crowded, to keep their residency… My friend is a Muslim, 
he lives in the Muslim Quarter and… he has his own family and his extended 
family living with him. I am sorry to say this, I am just giving you an example, but 
he can’t even sleep with his own wife. The family are living too close together, 
the neighbours are too close.” 
It is also common practice for families living in East Jerusalem to allow even 
distant relatives who hold residency but reside permanently in the West Bank to 
be registered for official purposes at the East Jerusalem address. In this way, 
East Jerusalem Palestinians who for one reason or another live elsewhere in the 
occupied territories hope to prove to the Israeli authorities that their centre of life 
remains in Jerusalem. This practice goes beyond the mere formality of listing 
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them at the address. Electricity, water, telephone and arnona bills are often held 
in different relatives’ names, meticulously filed and passed around as required to 
anyone who needs to renew a travel document or change the details on their ID 
card. 
Collective action also includes covering for a neighbour who rents a small 
property in East Jerusalem, but who lives day to day in the West Bank, when an 
official visitor calls; passing word through the streets of the Old City that the Israeli 
tax inspectors are in the market so that shopkeepers can haul in their wares and 
pull the shutters down; telling official callers on the home telephone that a distant 
relative who actually lives in Ramallah has just popped out and will be back soon. 
These everyday practices demonstrate a shared antagonism towards Israel and 
the persistence of joint action against its authority. While significant in their way, 
however, I avoid here overstating the impact these actions or imposing 
intentionally subversive meanings. On the whole, agency is atomised and 
directed towards one’s own self-interest. 
East Jerusalem Palestinians are adapting individually in a multitude of ways to 
the political reality and in many cases these go well beyond a struggle for ‘bare 
life’ or attempts at mere survival. George’s mother came to live with him and his 
family after the death of his father, but the home he rented was not large enough 
for them all. It was important to George to remain close to the Old City where he 
had lived all his life, but he also saw an opportunity to escape the suffocating 
familiarity of the Christian Quarter in which he felt there was no privacy. George 
rented a property from a Jewish landlord and moved into a religious Israeli 
neighbourhood within walking distance of the Old City. He has had no problems 
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at all with his Jewish neighbours. Even during the Gaza war in the summer of 
2014, relations were not strained.  
“When the sirens sounded in Jerusalem, my wife was worried so we took our kids 
and sheltered in the staircase with the other families. We all waited together. It 
was friendly. They have no problem with me, I am a good neighbour.” 
When I asked George if he felt that relations would be so cordial if he were a 
Muslim Palestinian, he was certain that the situation would not arise. His Israeli 
landlord would not rent the apartment to a Muslim. For George this was 
regrettable, but he denied that there was a conflict for him there. 
“Okay, so they won’t rent to Muslims and I know that there are good Muslims who 
won’t make trouble, but how do they know who is good or not? I don’t need to 
justify this decision, even to myself. I have to have a roof over my children’s 
heads, to be safe and comfortable. That is all that I need to worry about.” 
In Chapter II, I also discussed the impact of long term existence in the gray space. 
Leaderlessness and persistent insecurity, combined with Israeli carrot and stick 
policies, have contributed to the atomisation of Palestinian society in East 
Jerusalem. Individuals and families are navigating their own course through 
exceedingly difficult terrain and the result appears to be a focus on individual self 
interest and, indeed, prosperity. 
Israeli journalist Nir Hasson argues that a process of Israelisation is taking place 
in East Jerusalem, the most advanced phase of which appears in Palestinian 
applications for Israeli citizenship. Attorney Amnon Mazar, who specialises in 
citizenship applications, tells Hasson that “the shame barrier has fallen… People 
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have reached the conclusion that the PA will not be their salvation and that Israel 
is a cornucopia. So they do it for their personal benefit.” While some experts see 
the separation Barrier as responsible and others point to the deadlock in the 
peace process, in-fighting among the Palestinian factions or the influence of the 
Arab Spring, “everyone agrees that the driving force behind these developments 
is not love of Israel, but a desire to survive. “It may be simply due to the fact that, 
after so many years of occupation, a generation that was born into the situation 
prefers to look for its material future rather than raise the national flag”, Hasson 
concludes (Hasson, 2012). 
Others agree that the ‘shame barrier’ in East Jerusalem has fallen and that 
residents are either more resigned than previously to long term Israeli rule in the 
city or more willing than previously to admit it. A 2015 poll by the Palestinian 
Centre for Public Opinion found that 52% of East Jerusalem Palestinians would 
prefer to be citizens of Israel with equal rights, compared to 42% who would 
choose to be citizens of a Palestinian state. This result, the Centre claims, 
confirms and extends a trend first observed in 2010, when one third of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians picked Israeli over Palestinian citizenship and repeated 
in 2011 by which time the proportion had risen to 40% (Pollock, 2015). 
Despite their disdain for Israel, it is not unusual to hear East Jerusalem 
Palestinians compare the Palestinian Authority negatively to the Israeli 
government. Ahmad explained:  
“Some of the people I know, they prefer to live under the Israeli authorities, under 
the occupation, because they are allowed to enter any place, they are allowed to 
travel to anywhere, they have health insurance, they see what Israel is doing in 
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its streets and its buildings and its environment, while if they enter the West Bank 
they see the differences. Israel is working on the land and the state, there is no 
doubt about that, but I can’t simply accept that they are superiors... the 
Palestinians have the ability to accomplish something but the self-pity is quite 
bad, that we are under occupation, that we can’t do anything, we just have to 
accept it, they are providing us with what we need, so why bother, why claim our 
rights. No, we must claim our rights from Israel.” 
There is perhaps evidence of a growing understanding among East Jerusalem 
Palestinians that as residents and tax payers they have rights and are entitled to 
demand a minimum level of service provision. However, participation in municipal 
elections or politics in Jerusalem remains extremely low. While the public 
discourse has softened on issues such as citizenship which brings with it tangible 
benefits, there is little interest or support among East Jerusalemites for a greater 
engagement in the electoral process in the city. While some argue that 
participation would imply recognition of Israeli sovereignty, the majority of those 
who are aware of their right to vote (it is evident from this research that in fact 
many are not, see Chapter VI) simply do not believe that anything could be 
achieved. 
In other ways, Palestinians do engage with Israeli institutions and practices, 
though it is clear that these moments often do more to blur the distinction between 
normalisation and resistance than to clarify it. Braier (2013) draws attention to an 
upsurge in Palestinian efforts to legitimise informal housing in East Jerusalem 
through engagement with professional urban planning. In the post-Oslo period 
this “has resulted in a proliferation of independent ‘spot-zoning’ plans submitted 
to the Israeli planning authorities, mostly for the purpose of lifting the threat of 
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potential demolition from existing homes” (Braier, 2013: 2701). In 2011, 163 
independent plans submitted by East Jerusalem Palestinians were reviewed by 
an Israeli planning committee of which 60% were approved. This contrasts 
markedly with only three authorised plans in 1994 and 12 in 2002. Braier 
demonstrates that the multitude of independent plans submitted by Palestinians 
destabilises the pretence of professional neutrality underpinning the committee’s 
rationale. He also suggests, however, that precisely because professional 
planning is embedded within the ethnonational state project, attempts by East 
Jerusalem residents to work within the Israeli bureaucratic system to protect 
themselves or to challenge power relations risk enforcing or reproducing existing 
power structures. Moreover, the proliferation of individual submissions by 
Palestinian residents to save their own homes is indicative of the growing 
atomisation of this constituency and may come at expense of community claims 
and collective political mobilisations. 
On the whole, East Jerusalem Palestinians looking for improvement in their lives 
do not pursue these goals collectively or through political routes, relying instead 
on individual strategies. Crucially, however, this must be understood as a choice 
rooted in the existing power complex and not within a resistance/normalisation 
binary perspective. 
When East Jerusalem residents speak today about what might improve their 
lives, normality and equality are most frequently mentioned, while Palestinian 
statehood is rarely spoken of and an end the occupation is no longer as 
straightforward as it once seemed. Khadija explained her hopes for a better 
future: 
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“Not to have the checkpoints, not to have these fights and they forced on us a lot 
of things, like the border closed and these things. And to live a normal life. My kid 
does not have to see that soldier every time [he goes out]. When we go to see 
my family every day they don’t have to see these soldiers… I would feel 
comfortable if my child can get to an Israeli university and not have that treatment 
that I did. Like, you have something different from others. I would love if they treat 
him equal to others… And when they come to Aqsa mosque, it’s a holy place for 
Muslims. They come inside, why do they do this. This makes us crazy! And things 
like they make it different when they close the roads, and the way they treat us is 
very hard. When you walk in the street and see the kids they search them. I want 
these things to end.” 
Summa’s wishes could not have been clearer. Palestinians, she said, simply want 
to live in peace, but not peace with the Israelis, she was quick to add “Peace with 
themselves. To have a family, to work on the Israeli side and take home a 
respectable salary, to have a house, a car, children, to live in peace.”  
 
5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I set out with four main goals. First, to establish the physical and 
political dislocation of East Jerusalem from the West Bank and to explore how 
this impacts individuals’ framings of their own everyday experience. Second, to 
make clear that Israeli hegemony is shaping the Palestinian political imagination 
in East Jerusalem and orienting East Jerusalem residents away from the West 
Bank, while rejection of the PA is also defining the political horizon for 
Palestinians in the city who can see no end to the occupation. Third, to establish 
that East Jerusalem Palestinians experience complex, often ambivalent feelings 
towards and relationships with Israel which are obscured within dominant 
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theoretical approaches. And fourth, to demonstrate from a ground level 
perspective that power relations in the city are influencing individual choices and 
that within the structural confines of Israeli domination, East Jerusalem residents 
are acting individually to improve their own lives and livelihoods. 
While the separation Barrier enforces East Jerusalem’s physical isolation from 
the West Bank, it is the divergent social and political experience of Palestinians 
on the western side of the Barrier that entrenches this divide. The collapse of 
Palestinian political leadership in East Jerusalem and the failure of the authority 
in Ramallah to project an inclusive nationalist narrative with plausibility for the 
East Jerusalem constituency compounds the sense of isolation and 
abandonment felt by East Jerusalemites who can see no credible, even 
conceivable, way to challenge Israeli power in the city. The Palestinian Authority 
remains deeply unpopular with East Jerusalem Palestinians who question its 
legitimacy and who are in no hurry to see a two-state solution that permanently 
concedes East Jerusalem to Israel or else draws the city into the political orbit of 
an authority they regard as self-interested and corrupt. In this context of 
marginalisation from the Palestinian milieu, East Jerusalem Palestinians are 
acting individually to improve their own lives and livelihoods in the city and to 
establish a ‘normal life’ within the framework of existing power relations. I 
describe this as a move away from the ‘affirmation of life’ position of the second 
intifada towards an individualised ‘improvement of life’ attitude post-Oslo. 
Palestinian residents are by necessity adapting to the reality of enduring Israeli 
rule, learning Hebrew and seeking out employment opportunities that offer them 
better pay and prospects. This circumstance also reflects the atomisation of this 
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Palestinian constituency, for whom mainstream nationalist discourses have lost 
meaning. 
In the next chapter I investigate the other side of East Jerusalemites’ dual 
marginality, this time as residents of the Israeli state who despite their apparent 
readiness to adapt to the conditions of long-term Israeli rule, experience exclusion 
and discrimination inside the Jewish state. Israel’s criminalisation of counter-
hegemonic articulations leaves its Palestinian residents in what appears to be a 
state of suspended political animation. Trapped between an unpopular national 
authority on the one hand and the internal colonial project of the Israeli state on 
the other, East Jerusalem Palestinians are leaderless and atomised and 
increasingly reliant on individual solutions to their collective problems. 
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CHAPTER V 
EVERYDAY PALESTINIAN LIFE IN THE ANNEXED CITY: EAST 
JERUSALEM RESIDENTS AS A MARGINALISED COMMUNITY INSIDE 
ISRAEL 
In Chapter IV, I addressed the marginality of East Jerusalem residents who, as 
an isolated Palestinian constituency, find themselves cut off from the body politic 
and beyond the authority of the national leadership. I examined the deteriorating 
spatial reality in East Jerusalem and demonstrated the alienation of personal 
Palestinian narratives in the city from the official nationalist discourse. I 
addressed the complex and often ambivalent feelings East Jerusalem 
Palestinians hold towards Israel and made the case that spatial and discursive 
dislocation are disrupting orders of meaning for Palestinians in the city. Finally, I 
looked at the ways in which East Jerusalem Palestinians are adapting to the 
reality of long term Israeli rule in the city and discussed how these adaptations 
are interpreted within mainstream analyses. 
I made the case that everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem goes beyond 
‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998, Boano and Martén, 2013, Hanafi, 2009) or a 
straightforward struggle for survival. East Jerusalem Palestinians are subjected 
to a catalogue of spaciocidal policies (Hanafi, 2009) and steadfastness is required 
of all those who remain in the city despite the judaising ambitions of the state. 
However, many Palestinians are also exploiting the education and employment 
opportunities available to them as permanent residents of Israel to advance 
themselves and their families within the existing power structure. The 
resistance/normalisation binary fails to adequately explain everyday Palestinian 
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life in the city and I suggest instead that East Jerusalemite attitudes and 
behaviours are better understood within the context of highly asymmetrical power 
relations and Israeli rule as a hegemonic social imaginary.  
In this chapter, I explore the other side of the East Jerusalem constituency’s 
double liminality, this time as non-Jewish residents inside the Israeli state. 
Despite the territorial annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel and official 
pronouncements on the immutability of the unified city, Palestinian Jerusalemites 
are permanently positioned outside the limits of imagined inclusion in the state 
project (Yiftachel, 2009a). In Chapter VI, I consider the implications of this 
exclusion for Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city. Here, I explicate the 
impediments to Palestinian inclusion within Israel and explore the everyday 
manifestations of otherness and insecurity experienced by residents. I argue that 
East Jerusalemites who seek to improve their prospects within the context of de 
facto Israeli rule are drawn, in various ways, into closer relationships with the 
Israeli state, economy and society, but ultimately find that inclusion, equality and 
security are outside their reach. Together, the dual aspects of their marginality, 
first within the Palestinian milieu, then within the Israeli one, are shaping the site 
of Palestinian identity construction in East Jerusalem that is explored in Chapter 
VI. 
In this chapter, I situate Palestinian exclusion first at a structural level, within the 
context of Israeli ethnocracy and the twin processes of Judaisation and de-
Palestinianisation that constitute a “hegemonic meta-narrative” for Israeli 
ambitions in the city (Yiftachel, 2006, Yiftachel, 2012). As non-Jews within the de 
facto boundaries of the Jewish state, East Jerusalem Palestinians are the outside 
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brought inside, permanently trapped by the ethnocratic regime between territorial 
inclusion and political alienation and oppression. 
Next, I address the workings of state power in East Jerusalem where 
administrative ambiguity, informality and exception combine with more coercive 
and overtly punitive measures to normalise occupation and facilitate Israeli 
objectives in the city. Following on from the discussion in Chapter IV, I challenge 
the view that exception and informality signal the incompleteness of the 
hegemonic project. Rather, I argue, they represent a mode of control which 
becomes a normalised aspect of the system. This facilitates the managed 
exclusion of permanently marginalised groups with minimum friction while 
broader territorial objectives are pursued (Shlomo, 2016a, Shlomo, 2016b). I also 
highlight how frontier construction and the othering of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians ‘legitimises’ the use of various surveillance and control mechanisms 
which also serve to advance the state’s agenda.  
Third, I explore personal Palestinian accounts of everyday life in the city and 
examine how Israeli strategies for the control and management of East Jerusalem 
are experienced by its residents. Repression and discrimination operate 
alongside informality, exclusion and gray spacing, fostering insecurity and a 
sense of transience that places ‘normal’ urban life in full view but ultimately out of 
reach. I do not attempt to provide a thorough survey of the oppressive and 
discriminatory practices of the Israeli state or to catalogue all the abuses and 
degradations experienced by residents. Rather, I aim to construct a sense of 
everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem from the particular perspective of its 
residents who seek to lead ‘normal’ lives within the existing power structure.  
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Finally, I acknowledge the perception that antagonism and distrust are mutual 
and pervasive and ask how this contributes to the exclusion of East Jerusalem 
residents inside Israel. Despite the tangential experience of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians and the complexity of their interactions with Israel, events within the 
wider Israeli-Palestinian arena continue to impact significantly on the way in 
which they understand and narrate their own experience. The frequent cordiality 
of everyday encounters with the ‘other’ in Jerusalem is inconsistent with the 
sense of enmity felt by many Palestinians towards the Israeli state. I examine the 
role of memory as well as ongoing injustices in sustaining this antagonism and 
consider the importance of antagonism in maintaining the essentialised identities 
on which mainstream nationalist discourses are based. 
1 Permanent Exclusion 
In this section I juxtapose the territorial inclusion of East Jerusalem within Israel’s 
de facto borders with the permanent, structural exclusion of its Palestinian 
residents from full participation and equal status within the state. Drawing on 
Yiftachel’s theory of ethnocracy, I argue that as an ethnocratic state, Israel 
positions non-Jewish populations permanently outside the limits of imagined 
inclusion, bringing the outside inside and implementing a range of strategies 
aimed at their transfer, management or control. The ethnocratic nature of the 
state regime provides structural context for the personal narratives of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians (discussed in section three below) who experience 
feelings of temporariness, insecurity and fear.  
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1.1 The Ethnocratic State 
The classification of Israel as an ethnocratic state, driven by the twin logics of 
Judaisation and de-Arabisation, sheds light on the structure of exclusion in East 
Jerusalem and the quotidian episodes of inequality and discrimination 
experienced by Palestinian residents. Ethnocracy implies the rule or government 
by one particular ethnic group, or ethnos, usually in a situation where there is at 
least one other significant ethnic group (Anderson, 2016: 1). According to 
Yiftachel, it is “a type of regime that facilitates and promotes the process of 
ethnicization,” which is defined by expansion and control. Within the ethnocratic 
state, “struggles over the process of ethnic expansion become the central axis 
along which social and political relations evolve.” But the term ethnocracy refers 
to more than the straightforward dominance of one ethnic group over others; “it 
also denotes the prominence of ethnicity in all aspects of communal life.” In this 
sense, ethnicity is legitimised as a tool for “group stratification and 
marginalisation” within the ethnocratic state (Yiftachel, 2006: 295-6). 
Ethnocracy is generally contrasted with democracy, or rule by the demos, the 
people, within a given area (Anderson, 2016: 1-2). An ethnocratic state is neither 
properly democratic nor purely authoritarian (Anderson, 2016, Yiftachel, 2006). 
Rather, it is best defined as a political regime that facilitates the expansion and 
control of a dominant ethnic group within a contested territory. The democratic 
element within an ethnocratic state is not simply “ideological camouflage” 
(Anderson, 2016: 5) since the dominant ethnos demands for itself genuine 
democratic politics and political institutions. Within an ethnocracy, however, these 
democratic elements are “disproportionately and sometimes exclusively available 
to the favoured ethnos.” It is this political cleavage between ethnic groups which 
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defines the state as ethnocratic as opposed to democratic (Anderson, 2016: 5-
6). 
Yiftachel has pioneered the concept of ethnocracy as a tool “for analysing 
national ethnocratic regimes in contemporary national states which claim to be 
‘democratic’” (Anderson, 2016: 3)38. He locates the Israeli state firmly within this 
category and his observations are clearly rooted within a critical Southern 
perspective. This approach challenges the manner in which modern social 
science presents the viewpoints, perspectives and problems of metropolitan 
society as universal knowledge, factoring out those derived from the global 
periphery (Connell, 2008). These are key themes in Yiftachel’s work and I return 
to them below. 
Alternative approaches to Israel, more tolerant of the tension between democracy 
and the state’s self-proclaimed Jewish character, are rejected by exponents of 
the ethnocratic model. The ‘ethnic democracy’ model formulated by Smooha 
(1990), for example, claims that “the democratic and Jewish characteristics of the 
state coexist” (Smooha, 1990: 205).  As an ethnic democracy, Smooha contends 
that Israel extends individuals political and civil rights and minorities certain 
collective rights, while allowing institutionalised dominance over the state by one 
particular ethnic group. 
                                            
38 The concept of ethnocracy has also been explored and expanded ‘downwards’ in terms of 
urban ethnocracy and the ‘ethnocracity’, as well ‘backwards’ and ‘forwards’ in relation to 
imperial ethnocracy and shared or post-conflict ethnocracy. See ANDERSON, J. 2013. Imperial 
Ethnocracy and Demography: Foundations of Ethno-National Conflict in Belfast and Jerusalem. 
In: PULLAN, W. & BAILLIE, B. (eds.) Locating Urban Conflicts: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the 
Everyday. Hants: Palgrave Macmillan;ANDERSON, J. 2016. Ethnocracy: Exploring and 
Extending the Concept. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, 8;YACOBI, H. 2009. The Jewish-
Arab City: Spacio-Politics in a Mixed Community, London, Routledge;YIFTACHEL, O. & 
YACOBI, H. 2003. Urban Ethnocracy: Ethnicization and the Production of Space in an Israeli 
'Mixed' City. Society and Space, 21, 673-693. 
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Shafir and Peled (1998) give support to the ethnic democracy model, expounding 
a theory of simultaneous, competing citizenship discourses which ultimately allow 
the ethnic democratic state to maintain its stability. While endorsing their 
observations on the long-term stratification of citizenship, Yiftachel rejects their 
overall argument on the grounds that Israel does not meet the standards of 
liberalism and republicanism on which their support for the ethnic democracy 
model rests.  
Yiftachel maintains that the nature of Israeli governance, in the territory and 
towards the population under its control, makes evident the fact that Israel is not 
a democracy at all, let alone a liberal one. Rather, he concludes, Israel occupies 
a grey zone, combining democratic and non-democratic structures and practices, 
which are best understood as ethnocratic. Israel had proclaimed itself a Jewish 
state from the outset, but expressed its determination that all inhabitants would 
receive “complete equality of social and political rights irrespective of religion, 
race or sex” (Knesset). It was the state’s ethnic Jewish rather than its Israeli 
character, however, that was enshrined in subsequent legislation and practices. 
By the mid-1960’s Israel’s ‘Jewishness’ had become a constitutional fact and 
revisions made to the Basic Law on the Knesset in 1985 and 2002 ensured that 
“any democratic struggle to change the state’s Zionist character would be almost 
impossible” (Yiftachel, 2006).  
If Israel’s Judaisation project over Israel/Palestine has come to form the main 
basis of the regime, nowhere is Israeli ethnocracy more apparent than in East 
Jerusalem. The Israeli project in the city – to maximise Jewish political, 
demographic, territorial and economic control – is manifest in a range of policies 
and practices deigned to ensure the permanent territorial inclusion of East 
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Jerusalem and long term management of the excluded population. Despite 
Israel’s unified capital rhetoric, Jerusalem has become an exemplar of the 
ethnocratic city (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2002); while Israeli leaders and decision 
makers seek to portray the city as integrated, modern and democratic (Yiftachel, 
2006; Nolte and Yacobi, 2015), Palestinian residents experience discrimination, 
marginalisation and exclusion. 
1.2 Internally and Externally Constructed Minorities 
While Israel’s Judaising impulse in East Jerusalem manifests the ethnocratic 
principles of the regime, ethnic relations within the state are more complex than 
a straightforward Jewish/non-Jewish binary suggests. An examination of the 
broader ethnic challenges facing Israel exposes deeper divisions which also 
make visible the extent of Palestinian exclusion. This analysis provides context 
for the impediments encountered by Palestinian residents who are adapting to de 
facto Israeli rule and seeking to improve their lives and livelihoods within this 
context. 
Yiftachel and Yacobi (2003) adopt a three-tier model of the Israeli settler society 
in which the founding or ‘charter’ group – Ashkenazi Jews – gained dominant 
political, cultural and economic status during the critical formative period of the 
new state. The second group, non-Ashkenazi Jews, are ‘immigrants’ who joined 
the ‘founders’ in the national settlement project but from an inferior economic and 
cultural position. The third group, indigenous Palestinian Arabs, are excluded 
from the process of nation-building, remain permanently ‘trapped’ in their inferior 
status and experience broad discrimination. 
199 
 
This three-tier model offers a useful framework for the critical analysis of ethnic 
relations in Israel’s mixed urban spaces. Yiftachel expands elsewhere on the 
essential differences between minority groups within an ethnocratic state. Within 
the ethnocratic system the dominance of the principal ethnonational group is 
premised upon the exclusion, marginalisation or assimilation of minority 
communities (Yiftachel, 2006). This problem is particularly acute at an urban 
level, which Yacobi describes as a ‘double trap’ for Palestinians in mixed Arab-
Jewish cities. In an ethnocratic state which allocates rights and resources 
according to an ethnic hierarchy, Palestinians are further discriminated against in 
a city that declares itself to be ‘mixed’ but denies Palestinian identity and planning 
needs (Yacobi, 2009: 108). 
Yet it is apparent that not all minorities are treated equally - there are those 
regarded as internal and those which are constructed as external. “A critical 
difference exists between those considered part of the historical, religious or even 
genetic community, and others whose presence is portrayed as mere historical 
coincidence, or as a danger to the security and integrity of the dominant ethnos. 
These discourses strip external minorities of a means of inclusion in to the 
meaningful collective spaces of institutions of the nation” (Yiftachel, 2006). 
East Jerusalem Palestinians appear to recognise that their readiness to 
participate, even at a superficial level, in Israeli society is made more difficult by 
that society’s own diversity and internal stratification. Summa, who struggled 
initially to “fit in” as a junior doctor in an Israeli hospital explained that “with the 
doctors, it isn’t easy, because of different cultures. The Israeli society is not 
Israeli, they are from Russia, they are from Britain, they are from Yemen, from all 
over the world. It’s not a single culture, so it’s difficult to integrate with them. There 
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is not one way you can behave with Israelis that will allow you to integrate with 
them because they are all so different. And in the hospital, there are different 
departments; for example, internal medicine, they are mostly Russian, the ER is 
Russian too. How do I integrate with them? They cannot integrate with each 
other!” 
The first five months of her staj year were very difficult for Summa, travelling from 
the West Bank to Tel Aviv every day. Then, a two-month rotation in a department 
where for the first time she experienced overt discrimination, pushed her to the 
point of quitting. It was eventually this sense that Israelis lacked cohesion or a 
shared sense of belonging, however, that she says convinced her to stick with it. 
“When I said to myself no, I don’t want to continue, I was standing on the ward 
and I looked around and I thought, no, they are not from here. They are not one 
society; they are not one culture. They are not from here. Yanee, we are 
Palestinians, we are typical and the same as each other. They are not, they are 
mixed… This is my place. Okay, I don’t love them, but this is my place, it’s not 
theirs, so I have to continue.” 
Neither are East Jerusalem Palestinians convinced that Israel offers greater 
democracy to its Jewish citizens than it does to others. Ziad argued that Israel 
does not even qualify as an ethnic democracy since there is also division and 
discrimination within the dominant ethnos. 
“No. Let’s talk about the Jews in general. We have Jews from maybe the West - 
Canada and America, Western Europe - and we have Jews from the East. 
Ashkenazi and Sephardi. They do have racism between them, I’ve seen it with 
my eyes. Between the Russian and the American, between the American and the 
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Moroccan. They have racism… There is no democracy here at all. I believe if 
there is no democracy for all society then there is no democracy at all.” 
Ziad highlighted the treatment of minority groups to reaffirm his argument that 
there is no democracy in Israel. “Let’s compare it to Germany or England or 
America or Canada. There is no comparison between them. Okay, no democracy 
is perfect, but the country should be working to be perfect, towards being more 
democratic, all the time, every day, every year. As Germany is working to be more 
and more democratic. Israelis do not work like this. Israel is about separation, not 
just for Palestinians. For example, we have the Ethiopians. They are Jews, but 
they are very racist with them. Very racist. The Palestinian is the highest level 
with no democracy, they tend to be killed. But the Ethiopian they are trying to 
make them a proletariat.” 
The internal stratification of Israeli society is thus recognised by East Jerusalem 
Palestinians who also perceive their position at the lowest stratum of this structure 
as the most vulnerable level to occupy. While non-Ashkenazi Jews encounter 
discrimination within Israel, and many such communities exist at the peripheries 
of society, ultimately their difference is constructed as internal and the barriers to 
their inclusion are not regarded as insurmountable. Palestinian residents, who 
are not without opportunity within Israel, are none the less positioned outside the 
imagined limits of society and find that internal Israeli divisions hamper their 
attempts to make inroads through imitation of the hegemonic culture.  
Postcolonial theory regards mimicry as a central part of the process of creating a 
negotiated “third space” in which the rigid dichotomy between coloniser and 
colonised is subverted (Bhabha, 1994). Yacobi (2009) argues that, while useful, 
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the concept of a third space takes insufficient note of the material dimensions of 
the postcolonial reality and the everyday practices that produce the built 
environment. His conclusion, that the third space challenges hegemonic 
perceptions but fails to transform them, reflects the experience of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians. 
The marginality of Palestinians inside Israel and their consequent vulnerability is 
made evident by the violence experienced by members of other ethnic groups 
when they are mistaken for Palestinians. This threat is particularly pronounced 
during periods of heightened tension between Israel and Palestinians in the 
occupied territories. An article in the Jewish-American magazine Forward in 2015 
claimed that as violence spiralled in the region, the climate of fear was pushing 
Israelis to extremes and that those bearing the brunt of this behaviour, aside from 
the Palestinians, were “the ‘others’ of Israeli society: African asylum seekers and 
Mizrahi (Arab) Jews” whose darker complexions meant they might be mistaken 
for Palestinians (Samuel, 2015).  
In one such mistaken identity case, a Mizrahi Jew was attacked with a knife in 
Haifa in October 2015 by a fellow Israeli who believed him to be a Palestinian.39 
Reporting the crime, the Israeli newspaper Maariv listed several other incidents 
in which Mizrahi Jews had been attacked or come to fear for their safety due to 
their Arab appearance. Days after the Haifa incident, a Palestinian gunman 
attacked the Be’er Sheva bus station.40 A dark-skinned bystander, 29-year old 
Eritrean asylum seeker Abtum Zarhum, was erroneously identified as the 
                                            
39 The victim, Uri Rezken, was stabbed in the back but survived the attack. 
40 The attack took place on 18 October 2015, killing an Israeli soldier and wounding several 
others. 
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Palestinian assailant and was shot then repeatedly beaten by a mob.41 CCTV 
evidence of the attack showed that the critically injured Zarhum was subjected to 
a violent assault by nine bystanders including members of the security forces, 
prison officials and soldiers. A bus driver is seen throwing a chair at him and he 
is spat upon, verbally abused and photographed by passers-by. Members of the 
Israeli prison service are seen also assaulting the injured man with a metal bench. 
Zarhum was not attended by medical personnel until 16 minutes after he was 
shot and died of his wounds in hospital hours later (Ben Zikri, 2015, Lazareva, 
2015, Samuel, 2015). Incidents such as these highlight the marginality of non-
Palestinian ‘others’ in Israeli society, but also importantly underline the fact that 
their vulnerability is greatest with they are mistaken for Palestinians. 
Insecurity and fear mean that many Palestinians inside Israel’s de facto borders 
abstain from resistance activity or political action, but this apparently does little to 
neutralise the perceived threat posed by Palestinians inside Israel. Klein (2008) 
argues that from an Israeli perspective, the demographic problem presented by 
Palestinians persists even if they are not politically active under Israeli rule. In this 
analysis, it is not the actions of Palestinians but their essential otherness that 
threatens Israel by the very fact of their presence and difference. Yacobi and 
Pullan (2014) reach a similar conclusion in their study of internal Palestinian 
migration into Jerusalem's colonial neighbourhoods, established soon after the 
1967 war. In this instance, they argue, the primary factor behind Jewish racism 
towards Palestinian interlopers in French Hill is not their racial difference but 
rather their presence in the urban space of the majority group and their movement 
                                            
41 Around 34,000 Eritreans who have fled persecution are currently seeking asylum in Israel. 
These applications are routinely denied and the Israeli Supreme Court has twice affirmed that 
they treatment violates fundamental laws relating to human dignity and freedom. 
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through social and territorial boundaries. The authors cite a report by the Israeli 
Institute of Democracy examining the extent of Jewish tolerance for neighbours 
who are ‘other’, including Palestinians, foreign labour and gay couples. The 
survey reveals that the most troubling neighbourly relationship for Israelis is that 
with Arabs (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014). Reaching a similar conclusion, Israeli 
philosopher Adi Ophir argues that the Palestinian’s “very presence, let alone his 
attempt to speak back to power, is conceived as a form of resistance. He is not 
punished because he transgresses the law, he is oppressed because he is 
present where he is not supposed to be” (cited in Salem, 2011). 
Fear of the Other is an essential component of the discourse of urban politics 
(Yacobi and Pullan, 2014), particularly in contested cities, and it plays a central 
role in Israeli (and Palestinian) identity construction more broadly. Here, East 
Jerusalem Palestinians pose a threat to Israel’s Judaising ambitions and to its 
self-identification as both a Jewish state and a democratic one. This point also 
lends credibility to the argument, discussed in more detail below, that Palestinian 
resistance and/or violence are anticipated by - indeed essential to – Israel’s 
colonial ambitions and national identity. The hegemonic state project is ultimately 
contingent on the success, not of strategies aimed at the absorption of the 
Palestinian minority, but on those employed to sustain its exclusion and facilitate 
its control.  
2 The Workings of Israeli Power in East Jerusalem 
The praxis of Israel’s colonial project in East Jerusalem manifests the exclusionist 
ideology of the state. Palestinian residents live within the de facto borders of 
Israel’s ‘united capital’ and operate under the legal jurisdiction of the state. None 
205 
 
the less, they experience an assemblage of informalities, exceptional 
arrangements and discriminatory practices which evidence their unassailable 
otherness within the ethnocratic state and perpetuate their exclusion. 
Yiftachel argues for a revised critical urban theory that acknowledges the 
presence of permanently excluded populations which are outside the intended 
reach of hegemonic projects, but whose members live day to day within the 
politics and economy of the city. The traditional concept of the hegemonic state 
project takes for granted the intention of the dominant ethnonational group to 
incorporate the peripheries, but this has limited applicability within urban colonial 
situations such as East Jerusalem. Crucially, the working of power in this context 
is premised on “structural, impregnable, exclusion.” This urban colonial setting is 
thus characterised by “the permanent presence of groups existing outside the 
limits of ‘society’ and hence beyond the nets of imagined incorporation and 
control cast by hegemonic or governmentality projects” (Yiftachel, 2009a). 
East Jerusalem Palestinians represent a demographic impediment to the 
exclusionary Israeli-Jewish national identity and to the successful Judaisation of 
territory under Israeli control (Yiftachel, 2012). As such, they also lay bare the 
tensions within Israel’s ethnocratic political system which represents (and 
perhaps even regards) itself as democratic while actively pursuing the legal, 
spatial and cultural ethnicization of public and civil spheres (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 
2003).  
Israel’s colonial praxis in East Jerusalem manifests these contradictions 
(Jadallah, 2014). Control over the city and realisation of the state’s geopolitical 
ambitions there are pursued through a combination of purposeful actions and 
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practices aimed at the management and manipulation of Palestinian space and 
population. Shlomo (2016a) provides a general conceptual framework for Israeli 
rule in East Jerusalem centred around dual modes of logic that create both a 
‘colonial’ moment and a ‘governmental’ moment. While more punitive ‘colonial’ 
manifestations of state power are well explored in the mainstream literature, 
much less attention is usually given to the urban processes and governmental 
arrangements through which Israeli rule in East Jerusalem is normalised.  
In this section I examine key aspects of the implementation of Israeli power in 
East Jerusalem before moving on in section three below to consider how the 
experience of these practices is framed by Palestinians on the ground. I look first 
at the more pernicious Israeli strategies for control and management of the East 
Jerusalem population as residents of the state, rooted in policies of exception, 
ambiguity and informality. In this context explore the governmentality perspective 
put forward by Shlomo and assess how it might contribute to our understanding 
of East Jerusalem. I then focus in on three key manifestations of the state of 
exception, namely residency, planning and education. Next, I discuss the Israeli 
surveillance and control mechanisms employed in East Jerusalem which form 
part of the process of othering and put normal life out of reach. Finally, I examine 
the use of collective punishment by the state in pursuit of its colonial ambitions. 
Combined, these disproportionate measures reflect - and in turn reproduce - the 
‘otherness’ of East Jerusalem Palestinians on which the success of the colonial 
project depends. 
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2.1 Informality and Exception 
Legal and administrative amendments adopted by the Knesset in June 1967 
facilitated the immediate extension of Israeli law and governance throughout the 
newly expanded Jerusalem municipality.42 Today, Israel asserts its legal 
jurisdiction over East Jerusalem, but despite official representations of the city as 
physically and discursively united under its authority, the state continues to permit 
the operation of institutions and systems which deviate from Israeli norms in 
terms of both method and outcome (Shlomo, 2016b). 
Dumper (1997) has argued that Israel’s simultaneous but contradictory 
approaches in Jerusalem since 1967 arise from its dual aim of entrenching Israeli 
control in the city while seeking to make that control more tolerable by permitting 
anomalies. Thus, “the Israeli government found that it was obliged to accept 
restrictions and ambiguities with regard to the full application of its law and 
administration,” particularly with regard to the administration of the holy places, 
the Sharia courts and the waqf system (Dumper, 1997: 42). 
The functional independence of these systems may have emerged from 
grassroots Palestinian resistance to Israeli domination in the immediate post-
conquest period, but the administrative ambiguities tolerated by Israel also 
facilitated the stabilisation of occupation and continue to serve the colonial 
project. While legal and administrative exceptions are usually ascribed either to 
the strength of Palestinian opposition or to the discriminatory nature of Israeli 
policies, Shlomo argues that “in East Jerusalem we find a different type of 
                                            
42 The amendments were made on 27 June 1967 to the Law and Administration Ordinance 
(Amendment No. 11) Law and the Municipal Corporation Ordinance (Amendment) Law. 
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governmental exception… manifested in the State turning a blind eye to 
adversarial government arrangements in order to achieve the normalisation and 
stabilisation of rule” (Shlomo, 2016a: 428). 
While functional autonomy persists in some areas, these administrative 
anomalies do not reflect the strength of Palestinian resistance or opposition. 
Rather, the consistent deviation of state and municipal practice in East Jerusalem 
from Israeli norms signals the regime’s intention to maintain its rule in the city 
while minimising Palestinian inclusion and opportunity. Exceptional 
arrangements are, on the whole, inferior arrangements which facilitate neglect 
and normalise an impression of otherness in regard to East Jerusalem 
Palestinians. This, in turn, serves the colonial ambitions of the state project in the 
city. 
A governmentality perspective sheds some light on the way in which exception 
and informality in East Jerusalem allow urban systems to maintain their functional 
inertia while serving the geopolitical objectives of annexation. It offers a 
framework for the analysis of urban relations in colonial situations that recognises 
the ways in which state power may be deployed to regulate and control everyday 
life and identity among marginalised populations. Shlomo (2016a, 2017b) 
provides the most thorough interpretation to date of Israeli rule in East Jerusalem 
from a governmentality perspective. Jerusalem, he claims, has been extensively 
investigated and analysed within the framework of the divided, polarised or 
contested city and such accounts offer valid political and spatial interpretations of 
the ethnonational urban context. Less attention, however, has been devoted to 
the governmental modalities that allow East Jerusalem to function under Israeli 
administration. Shlomo’s argument rests on the premise that “the exception of 
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governmental arrangements in East Jerusalem, which lie outside governmental 
and Israeli norms – and in some cases even Israeli law – is a key feature of Israeli 
control over the city, which facilitates the stabilisation of the Israeli project of 
‘unifying’ the city under Israeli sovereignty” (Shlomo, 2016a: 429).  
This analysis combines Foucauldian governmentality with a complex 
reinterpretation of Agamben’s ‘state of exception’. While conventional 
understandings of exception focus on the suspension of legal rights and the 
exposure of the individual to violence, Shlomo defines the governmental state of 
exception as the localised application of state practices and methods which are 
incompatible with the legal, political or administrative norms of the territory. In 
East Jerusalem, exceptional governmentalities are a mechanism for the 
preservation of the pre-occupation urban order with the aim of reducing friction 
with the Palestinians, avoiding the need for significant investment and 
normalising Israeli rule. 
While the annexation of East Jerusalem brought the entire city under Israeli 
sovereignty, the application of Israeli law and administrative norms is in reality 
partial and discriminatory, comprising an essential component of Israeli 
domination in East Jerusalem. Shlomo seeks to examine the resulting regime by 
deconstructing Israel’s ‘colonial governmentality’ in the city into two distinct 
logics, or moments, of rule – colonial and governmental. “The colonial moment 
represents the imperative logic of annexation… mainly through demographic and 
colonisation policies” while the governmental moment is derived from the 
imposition of Israeli law in East Jerusalem and the fact that annexation “requires 
Israel, at least to some extent, to conduct the population’s life” (Shlomo, 2016a: 
432).  
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Shlomo makes clear that how the urban colonial regime operates is contingent 
upon local and geopolitical circumstances. The Oslo-period transition from 
Jordanian influence to Palestinian Authority control over many of these 
institutions and systems marked a shift in the political landscape and posed a 
tangible threat to the colonial project. The challenge to Israeli sovereignty in the 
city prompted a firmer response. The state of informality and exception that he 
describes was facilitated during the first three decades of Israeli occupation by 
Jordanian then Palestinian involvement in the city’s administrative arrangements. 
In the post-Oslo period, the politics of governmental exception in East Jerusalem 
are subject to a new political constellation which lead to an arrangement that 
Shlomo labels sub-formalisation.  
Shlomo (2017b) recognises that the sub-formalisation processes evident in East 
Jerusalem in relation to public transport systems are characterised by extreme 
deviation from the standards and practices applied throughout Israel. While 
formalisation has been analysed as a means of achieving urban rights, Shlomo 
is clear that the mode of formalisation evident in East Jerusalem – what he dubs 
sub-formalisation – offers little potential for a shift in power relations. “Sub-
formalisation is therefore more akin to a problem-solving process in highly 
contested and politicised environments than to a means for marginalised groups 
to mobilise or assert their urban rights” (Shlomo, 2017: 272). 
While the Foucauldian concept of governmentality offers insight into the power of 
elites to assimilate and co-opt the subaltern, it fails to explain colonial settings in 
which subaltern groups are beyond the limits of inclusion in the hegemonic 
project. Yiftachel (2009a) argues that “the mechanisms of co-optation and 
governmentality often lack the intention, will or capacity to incorporate colonized 
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groups.” Shlomo offers a persuasive interpretation of the colonial and 
governmental logics that informed Israeli rule in East Jerusalem during the first 
three decades of occupation and his revised Agambenian approach and colonial 
governmentality perspective do much overcome this limitation. In this analysis, 
governmental exception aims at control and management of the urban colonial 
population rather than its absorption or assimilation, allowing the state to pursue 
its broader objectives while preserving existing power hierarchies. Shlomo’s 
governmentality framework also transcends the border and sovereignty approach 
to East Jerusalem studies that dominates mainstream contemporary research.  
On the other hand, governmentality perspectives on East Jerusalem are 
intrinsically top-down. As such, Shlomo’s powerful and nuanced deconstruction 
of Israeli state power in East Jerusalem offers relatively little insight into the way 
in which these processes are experienced by East Jerusalem residents or how 
they might influence Palestinian subjectivities in the city. In the face of Israeli 
colonial urbanism in East Jerusalem, Shlomo simply states that the Palestinian 
side is “characterised by efforts to resist their forced inclusion within state 
apparatuses and to retain their urban identity by separatism and resistance to 
Israeli rule” (Shlomo, 2016b: 429). 
2.1.1 Residency 
The most overt manifestation of Israel’s exceptional practice in East Jerusalem 
is the national status held by Palestinians in the city. As discussed above, despite 
official tropes pertaining to Israeli sovereignty over the unified city, the vast 
majority of East Jerusalem Palestinians are in fact residents not citizens of the 
Israeli state, a status that is both conditional and inferior. 
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As a result, underlying the relative normality of everyday Palestinian life in East 
Jerusalem is the very real, present and persistent threat of expulsion and exile. 
The revocation of Palestinian residency is a tool of demographic manipulation for 
the Israeli state that facilitates its colonial objectives in the city. It is also regarded 
by East Jerusalemites as a means of criminalising otherwise unexceptional 
practices and behaviours. The Israeli project in the city is spaciocidal, an ongoing 
dynamic between Israel’s ethnocratic ideology and the ability of Palestinians in 
the city to withstand it. For Hanafi, therefore, the situation of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians “is the epitome of exclusion/inclusion: included by virtue of the 
unilateral Israeli annexation of their city and excluded from municipal services, 
master plans, and civil liberties big and small; they live in a segregated city in 
which they are residents, but not citizens” (Hanafi, 2009). 
Despite the fact most were born in the city, East Jerusalem Palestinians 
experience feelings of transience and insecurity that are not imagined. Qudar’s 
parents are both from Abu Tur, but as their family grew, their home there became 
overcrowded and increasingly unsuitable. When they had saved enough money, 
Qudar’s parents purchased land and built a second, more spacious home in al-
Izariyeh, only a few miles away but beyond Israel’s separation Barrier. The family 
came to spend more and more time at their property in al-Izariyeh and they 
believe that someone, probably someone they know, informed on them to the 
Israeli authorities. When Qudar’s younger sister turned 16 and was required to 
come off her parents’ ID cards and apply for her own, the application was refused 
on the grounds that the family did not meet the criteria of residency. Faced with 
the possibility that their residency rights in Jerusalem would be permanently 
revoked, the family returned to their small property in Abu Tur and spent the next 
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two years struggling to prove their residency there in order to obtain an Israeli 
identity card for their daughter. 
Permanent residency is a precarious status that differs substantially from 
citizenship, most notably in the sense that it is conditional. It conveys only limited 
rights to Palestinians and can be revoked by the Israeli Interior Ministry if 
residents are not deemed to meet the appropriate criteria. Essentially, this means 
that East Jerusalem Palestinians are required regularly and repeatedly to supply 
the Israeli Interior Ministry with detailed evidence that their residency in the city 
is a daily reality. Each time a resident seeks to renew a travel document or identity 
card or to register a birth or a marriage, documentation must be supplied 
demonstrating that their centre of life is in Jerusalem, that they have lived there 
for seven consecutive years and that they have not left the city for any extended 
period. 
On these occasions, individuals must provide copies of electricity bills, landline 
phone bills and Arnona payments in their own name registered to a Jerusalem 
address going back several years. The standard of proof is high and if the full 
range of conditions are not met, residency may be revoked, in effect preventing 
Palestinians from remaining in the city of their birth.43 The statistics relating to the 
loss of residency are startling. Between 1967 and 2012, the residency of more 
than 14,500 East Jerusalem residents was revoked by the state, the majority of 
these revocations occurring since 1995. In 2008 alone, 4,577 Palestinians were 
stripped of their residency; between 2006 and 2011, 7,000 out of 293,000 East 
                                            
43 The state also punitively revokes the residency of the family members of East Jerusalemites 
accused of terrorist offences. Give example from 2016/17. 13 Family members lost residency 
status. 
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Jerusalem Palestinians lost their residency rights, as many as in the previous four 
decades combined (ICG, 2012).  
Apologists argue that since Israel captured the city in 1967, East Jerusalem 
Palestinians have had the option of applying for Israeli citizenship. If Israeli 
citizenship is sought, however, all other nationalities, including Jordanian, must 
be forfeited (this is not the case for Jews from overseas seeking Israeli 
citizenship) and the individual must swear loyalty to the occupying state. For 
decades, naturalising as an Israeli citizen has been perceived as an act of 
betrayal, even collaboration, that gives legitimacy to Israel’s occupation of East 
Jerusalem and undermines Palestinian claims to the city. Today, however, there 
is evidence that Palestinian attitudes are shifting. Israeli citizenship offers a 
degree of security to East Jerusalem Palestinians who fear the loss of their 
residency rights and who are distrustful of Israeli ambitions in the city. In the 
absence of a credible Palestinian alternative to Israeli rule, moreover, and with a 
growing sense among East Jerusalemites that the occupation is no longer 
temporary (ICG, 2012), Israeli citizenship seems less an act of betrayal than a 
reasonable option that is available to the individual if their circumstances require 
it. 
This is supported by the data collected, though a degree of ignominy still 
surrounds the issue of citizenship in the public discourse. Nasser does not think 
that the subject should be taboo any longer. He is open about the fact that he, his 
wife and his children all received Israeli citizenship many years ago. This in no 
way diminishes his Palestinian identity he says; it was a pragmatic decision made 
to facilitate the international travel that his occupation required and it was not a 
choice that he has ever regretted or attempted to conceal. He is also convinced, 
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however, that far more East Jerusalemites possess Israeli citizenship than will 
openly admit to it. 
While East Jerusalem Palestinians are still perhaps reticent about publicly 
professing their readiness for Israeli citizenship, there appears to be a broad and 
unreserved consensus that if citizenship was unilaterally imposed on residents 
by the state it would be accepted with little hesitation. For East Jerusalem 
Palestinians, if it came, in future, to a choice between citizenship in a Palestinian 
state without Jerusalem or Israeli citizenship in Jerusalem, Israeli citizenship 
would overwhelmingly prove the preferred option. Among those with misgivings 
on religious or nationalist grounds, there is a discernible sense in which imposed 
citizenship would be defensible, even welcome. The frequency with which this 
argument is given voice is indicative of Palestinian uncertainty over Israeli 
ambitions in the city. More importantly, however, it reflects the absence of an 
inclusive nationalist narrative with plausibility for East Jerusalem and the choices 
individual Palestinians are contemplating as they adapt their own struggle and 
subjectivity.  
Ruby told me that she has never felt the need to apply for Israeli citizenship, but 
that she can see nothing wrong with doing so and that she would readily accept 
it were it imposed on her. In her late 40s and unmarried, she has lived her entire 
life in the same apartment in East Jerusalem and has worked for the same 
Palestinian employer for more than 20 years. She has never felt directly that her 
residency is under threat or had the desire to travel much beyond Jerusalem, so 
her Israeli residency status has never limited her or given her cause for concern. 
If circumstances changed, however, she says that she would have no qualms 
about applying for citizenship. 
216 
 
“It is not wrong. Why wrong? Some people maybe they think so, but whoever 
says it’s wrong, he is the one who has a passport! Believe me, walla. They all 
have it. Why wrong? It’s not wrong. We live here in Jerusalem with the Jewish 
people, it’s not wrong to take the Jewish passport. If I take the passport to make 
my life easy it does not mean that I want the Jewish people to still take my land. 
I have the Israeli hawiyeh and I still feel Palestinian. What is the difference? If I 
take the passport I still am Palestinian, I still feel Palestinian and they still know I 
am Palestinian.” 
The evidence suggests that Ruby’s position is not uncommon. Rana explained 
that she is planning to apply for citizenship. She is divorced, without children and 
she would love to travel more. Israeli citizenship, she says, is the only way to 
make this dream possible. Rana was uneasy about her decision at first and has 
delayed actually making the application, but she feels strongly that she is entitled 
to a normal life and believes that an Israeli passport would facilitate this. Saha, 
meanwhile, is married to a West Banker and has two children. Her husband has 
permission to remain in Jerusalem for now, but she sees complications ahead for 
her children. She doesn’t want to apply for Israeli citizenship, but she is worried 
about the future and the insecurity of her situation takes a heavy toll on her. She 
says with certainty that she will take Israeli citizenship if that is the only way to 
secure her family’s future in Jerusalem, regardless of what the future holds for 
the West Bank.  
However, the acquisition of Israeli citizenship is not as straightforward as the 
official position suggests and many argue that the process is deliberately difficult 
and opaque in order to discourage Palestinian applications. Osama experienced 
the revocation of his Jerusalem residency and the cancellation of his I.D. card 
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after several years living in the United States. He returned to Jerusalem in 2010 
to re-establish his residency and after a lengthy legal struggle his rights were 
restored in early 2015. He applied for Israeli citizenship almost immediately, but 
has received no information about his application since that time. There is no 
official timetable for the processing of applications and no recourse to any state 
body when delays occur or applications are rejected. Osama’s lawyer has 
pursued his application with the Israeli Ministry of the Interior, but to date they 
have only stated that it is pending and that there is no further information.  
Osama’s is by no means an isolated case. The Times of Israel reported in 
September 2016 that 14,629 permanent residents of East Jerusalem had applied 
for Israeli citizenship since 2003 (Lieber, 2016). Between 2003 and 2013, Interior 
Ministry figures supplied to the Israeli newspaper showed that citizenship was 
denied or delayed in about half of applications. In the three years since, however, 
the paper reports that the processing of citizenship applications has come to an 
almost complete standstill. “Between 2014 and September 2016, of 4,152 East 
Jerusalemites who applied for citizenship, only 84 were approved and 161 were 
rejected. The rest of the applications are pending – formally, still being processed” 
(Lieber, 2016). In the first nine months of 2016 alone, 1,102 East Jerusalem 
Palestinians had requested citizenship, while only nine applications had been 
approved. Thrall (2017) also notes that for those who have applied for Israeli 
citizenship, approval has been scarce, recording that in 2015 only 2.9% of 
applications were approved. 
While the processing of Palestinian applications for Israeli citizenship has not kept 
pace with demand, East Jerusalem Palestinians speak by contrast of the ease 
and speed with which they believe foreign Jews seeking to make Aliyah are 
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granted citizenship. The Israeli government website offers a detailed breakdown 
of the process of making Aliyah and acquiring citizenship, the support available 
and the timetable involved. Few Palestinians are in any doubt that the delays, 
prevarications and rejections experienced by East Jerusalem residents seeking 
citizenship, and the opaqueness of the process, form part of a broader strategy 
employed by the state to marginalise Palestinians and wear them down.  
Moreover, East Jerusalem Palestinians are not convinced that Israeli citizenship 
is a panacea for all their problems. While many in Jerusalem accept that 
citizenship offers greater security than residency from Israel’s ethnocratic project 
in the city, there is also a feeling that ultimately it will do little else to improve their 
lives. Jamal claims that citizenship would actually bring him very few benefits; it 
doesn’t bring your neighbourhood better roads or services or speed up the 
queues at checkpoints or prevent soldiers from stopping you. In the end, he says, 
wherever you go in Israel, your name and your face is your ID, not your passport. 
This argument was supported by the views of another Palestinian, a young man 
from Issawiyeh, who told me that it is okay to take whatever you can from Israel, 
to speak Hebrew, to get a passport, to work for them. There is no danger of 
assimilation or integration, he says, because to them he will always be just a 
Palestinian. Even if he was in danger of forgetting who he is, they would not let 
him. Even if the acquisition of Israeli citizenship provides some security, there is 
broad agreement that it addresses only one aspect of the problems facing East 
Jerusalem Palestinians. 
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2.1.2 Planning 
Planning is another field in which deviations from Israeli normative practice in 
East Jerusalem are tolerated to the disadvantage of Palestinian residents. 
Israel’s colonial project in the city has received growing attention in the past 
decade and its deconstruction has benefited hugely from the attention of a range 
of academic disciplines and theoretical frameworks. The analytical perspectives 
introduced by urban planners and political geographers in particular have shed 
light on planning and informality as manifestations of the urban colonial context 
evident in Israel’s mixed cities and in East Jerusalem (Braier, 2013, Jabareen, 
2010, Jadallah, 2014, Legrand and Yiftachel, 2014, Misselwitz and Rieniets, 
2006, Pullan, 2011, Yiftachel, 2009b, Yiftachel et al., 2004, Bollens, 2000). Often 
informed by significant explorations of the concept of urban informality 
undertaken from a critical Southern perspective, these studies have brought into 
focus the political production of urban space and the complicity of planning in 
sustaining inequality and discrimination. Viewed from this perspective, politics 
and space in East Jerusalem, and as such politics and planning, are inextricably 
linked. 
Jabareen (2010) notes that while public planning is typically regarded as a 
positive force in the urban environment, it has a dark side which can be 
harnessed to the geopolitical ends of the regime, producing spaces of risk for 
marginalised groups. Roy (2009) goes further, arguing that planning cannot be a 
solution because “it is itself implicated in the production of planning crisis.” At the 
ethnocratic frontier, therefore, the ‘dark side’ of planning is not anomalous, but 
rather is an integral facet of the colonial project. In unequal urban situations, 
planning becomes an essential regime tool for control of excluded or marginalised 
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groups. The urban fabric created in this way is thus external to professional 
planning and to the rule of law and the preservation of these conditions allows 
the suspension of professional norms (Braier, 2013: 2713).  
This introduces the concept of gray spacing, identified by Yiftachel as the growing 
urban informality in which partially incorporated populations, spaces and activities 
are positioned by a hostile regime between the ‘whiteness’ of legality/safety and 
the ‘blackness’ of eviction/death. For Yiftachel, the combination of relevant spatial 
policies which comprise urban planning are often implicated in both the existence 
and the subsequent criminalisation of gray space. Because these zones are 
neither integrated nor eliminated, they exist partially beyond the gaze of the state 
authorities and municipal planners, but also subject to pejorative, criminalising 
discourses and vulnerable to ‘corrective action’ and violence. The concept of gray 
spacing captures the state of ‘permanent temporariness’ experienced by East 
Jerusalem Palestinians. 
“The disjuncture between actual tolerated reality and its ‘intolerable’ legal, 
planning and discursive framing, puts in train a process of ‘gray spacing’, during 
which the boundaries between ‘accepted’ and ‘rejected’ constantly shift, trapping 
whole populations in a range of unplanned urban zones, lacking certainty, 
stability, and hence development” (Yiftachel, 2009a). This brings into view the 
process by which ethno-national antagonism and social exclusion push residents 
to act ‘illegally’, thereby reproducing patterns of inequality, essentialising 
collective identities and reinforcing otherness. In this way, “the process of marking 
an urban place as ‘ethnic’ and simultaneously classifying it as ‘illegal’ reproduces 
patterns of segregation and inequality” (Yacobi, 2009: 6). The selective absence 
of planning is also itself an aspect of planning and in such settings, planning is 
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harnessed to the management of significant inequality and what has been 
described as a system of “creeping apartheid” (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003). 
Ambiguity, exception and informality are thus part of the planning design which 
sustain difference and reinforce exclusion. Here, I follow Roy’s definition of the 
term informality as “a mode of production of space defined by the territorial logic 
of deregulation. Inscribed in the ever-shifting relationship between what is legal 
and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and unauthorized, informality is 
a state of exception and ambiguity” (Roy, 2009). Informality is not, then, a set of 
practices which exist beyond the reach of planning, but rather a variant of 
planning that designates some activities as authorised while denying legal status 
to others which are essentially no different. It is this ethnocratic planning 
approach which allows the Israeli regime to represent itself as equal and 
democratic while denying Palestinian residents basic rights and services 
(Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003). 
Adopting this Southern, critical perspective, it becomes clear that urban 
informality and gray spacing in East Jerusalem are regime tools which facilitate 
state control and the management of inequality. The official Israeli imaginary of a 
unified Jerusalem has been pursued since 1967 through a deeply partisan 
approach to boundary drawing and urban planning. That planning centres upon 
geopolitical strategies designed to manipulate demography, confiscate 
Palestinian lands and exclude East Jerusalem Palestinians from any strategic 
planning for the city (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014). These three political strategies – 
the politics of demography, the politics of geography and the politics of exclusion 
– are manifest in Israeli public planning in Jerusalem and in particular in the 
Jerusalem Masterplan (Jerusalem Plan No.2000, 2004) and have resulted in 
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dramatic spatial and demographic shifts that have a detrimental impact on the 
lives of Palestinians in East Jerusalem as well as their political future in the city 
(Jabareen, 2010). 
As a result of the planning restrictions on Palestinian construction and housing, 
East Jerusalem residents are faced with the choice of building illegally or moving 
to more affordable residential areas beyond the separation barrier or beyond the 
municipal borders. Both scenarios involve the criminalisation of everyday life for 
ordinary residents of the city and the perpetual sense of insecurity and fear that 
accompanies this. Saha’s parents both work full time and have funded all four of 
their children through their undergraduate studies, two at universities in the West 
Bank and two overseas. When their family was young, they built an additional 
storey for themselves atop the family home in East Jerusalem. Obtaining 
approval for the construction was impossible, but with few options available to 
them, they chose to build rather than move outside the city. The family were 
heavily fined and the new storey was eventually demolished. By this time, other 
relatives had moved into their vacant rooms in the family property below and they 
were left with a choice, to spend all their income on a small apartment in the city 
or move outside where they could live in comfort and save for their children’s 
education. 
Saha’s parents’ situation is unexceptional. Illegal construction is the only option 
for many in East Jerusalem and when the authorities catch up with them and their 
homes are marked for demolition, it is increasingly common to find residents 
demolishing their own homes rather than pay the fee charged for the municipality 
to do it. Illegal Palestinian construction in East Jerusalem is a direct product of 
Israeli urban policy (Chiodelli, 2012). As such it is also a key feature of Israel’s 
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spaciocidal colonial project “that targets land for the purpose of rendering 
inevitable the ‘voluntary’ transfer of the Palestinian population, primarily by 
targeting the space upon which the Palestinian people live” (Hanafi, 2009: 107).  
This sense of the “planned illegality” (Chiodelli,2009) of Palestinian construction 
challenges approaches which emphasise the way in which the users of the city 
are able to manipulate and divert the intended uses of space (de Certeau, 1984 
30). In his study of late nineteenth century Colombo, Perera (2009) identifies a 
process of ‘familiarisation’ through which subordinate populations inhabit, 
reshape and rewrite the spaces of the coloniser. Made possible by the 
incompleteness of formal urban systems, “the act of occupation by the 
subordinates itself changes the (assigned) spaces and subject positions.” The 
occupation of space, therefore, is at once “a form of adaptation, questioning, 
resistance, and transformation.” For Perera, the everyday acts of space-making 
by the subaltern “expose the incompleteness of hegemony of dominant classes.” 
Denied the luxury of open political organisation, the subordinate population is not 
oppositional to existing spatial or social arrangements, but is apathetic or 
compliant with authority while simultaneously seeking to improve their livelihoods 
in ordinary ways. Such ‘resistance’ is different to open anti-colonial struggle, but 
has transformative capacity for the subject. 
Recognising Israel’s informal and exceptional practices as part of the colonial 
project and ultimately subservient to its ambitions, calls into question those 
approaches which seek to emphasise Palestinian agency and seek out 
‘resistance’. Gray spacing, informality and exception are not limited to the 
spheres of urban planning and spatial control. In other realms, particularly 
education which is discussed below, Israel tolerates the presence of Palestinian 
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services and systems which constitute an arena of Palestinian separatism within 
the state (Shlomo, 2016b) but which also expose East Jerusalemites to 
delegitimising discourses and ultimately inferior practices. 
Roy (2009) suggests that to those who favour a Gramscian perspective, it is 
apparent that counter-hegemony is anticipated within the very structures of 
hegemony and that they in their turn rehearse the elements of hegemony. The 
question arises, therefore, of whether exception and informality evidence the 
incompleteness of hegemony or serve to sustain it. Shlomo’s exceptional 
governmentality perspective, discussed in detail above, argues that the exception 
of governmentality arrangements in East Jerusalem facilitates the stabilisation of 
the Israeli project in the city, which centres on ‘unification’ under Israeli 
sovereignty. In Chapter VI, I will address this issue, introducing the concept of the 
constitutive outside and arguing that counter-hegemonic resistance is anticipated 
by Israel’s hegemonic state project and essential to its success.  
2.1.3 Education 
Viewed as a site of political conflict and resistance, Educational provision makes 
clear the competing interpretations of Israel’s exceptional practices in East 
Jerusalem. Dumper’s detailed study of Jerusalem’s competing borders examines 
the incongruence of the Israeli state and municipal borders with the educational 
border in East Jerusalem which follows the Armistice Line of 1949 (Dumper, 
2014). In terms of the curriculum, Palestinian education in Jerusalem mirrors that 
taught to students in the West Bank and Gaza. After fifty years of occupation, 
Dumper argues, this failure to establish a uniform, integrated education system 
throughout Israel, extending to the annexed territory of East Jerusalem, 
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represents a “spectacular blunder by the Israeli political establishment with long-
term implications for Israel’s hold on the city” (Dumper, 2014: 75). 
Drawing on the body of work on urban informalities outlined above, Shlomo offers 
a contrasting interpretation of East Jerusalem’s educational provision in which 
deviation from standard Israeli practices is a technology of control that 
perpetuates social inequality and additionally facilitates the normalisation of 
structural discrimination in service provision. Dumper and Shlomo agree that 
Israel acted unsuccessfully to impose state administration throughout East 
Jerusalem in the early years of the occupation, including in the field of school 
curricula. The Israeli Ministry of Education’s (IME) attempt to replace the 
Jordanian curriculum with an Israeli one already in use in Palestinian schools in 
Israel in 1967, resulted in widespread strike action and a massive drop in 
enrolment levels in municipal schools. Palestinian resistance to the move arose 
both from the conviction that education is essential to the preservation of national 
identity and religious values, and from the practical concern that without a Tawjihi 
qualification, students would be denied access to higher education institutions in 
the West Bank and other Arab states (Cohen, 2011, Dumper, 2014, Shlomo, 
2016b).44 
By 1972, the number of Palestinian children enrolled in Jerusalem’s municipal 
secondary schools had dropped by 65% and by as much as 85% in some of the 
city’s most prestigious municipal schools (Dumper, 2014). Israel eventually 
backed down and in 1974 it formally reinstituted the Jordanian curriculum in 
                                            
44 The Israeli matriculation certificate, bagrut, was not accepted by higher education institutions 
in the West Bank, Gaza or neighbouring Arab states therefore East Jerusalem students would 
not be eligible to apply. 
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municipal secondary schools and extended this policy to primary schools in 1981. 
Shlomo notes that “while Israel saw the enforcement of its curricula and 
educational control as a central manifestation of its sovereignty in the annexed 
areas, the result on the ground was empty schools, throwing the entire 
‘unification’ logic into doubt.” The result was a combination of parallel educational 
systems comprising IME-funded public (municipal) schools as well as Palestinian 
private schools entirely independent of state agencies (including UNWRA and al-
Waqf operated schools). 
In one sense, the existence of private, potentially adversarial schools operating 
beyond state control suggests the incompleteness of the hegemonic project and 
the persistence of Palestinian separatism. From another perspective, however, 
the complexities of school provision in East Jerusalem conceal the 
institutionalised under-development and neglect of the Palestinian educational 
infrastructure in the city (Klein, 2001, Shlomo, 2016b). 
The Jordanian curriculum was replaced by a Palestinian one in 1994 and demand 
for municipal school places continued to rise. By the mid-1990’s, around half of 
all Palestinian school children were enrolled in municipal schools or schools 
recognised by the municipality and by 2011 this figure had risen to 73% (Dumper, 
2014)45 Underfunding and under-development, however, have led to a severe 
shortage of classrooms in East Jerusalem - an estimated shortfall of 1,600 in 
                                            
45 Erection of the separation Barrier prompted a large influx of East Jerusalem Palestinians to 
the city who had previously been resident in the West Bank. This increased demand for school 
places. In addition, growing poverty in the city means there is a higher demand for public school 
places. 
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2015 - and a secondary school dropout rate of 17% compared to 4.2% for Hebrew 
education in Israel itself (Shlomo, 2016b). 
The deviation of East Jerusalem educational provision from Israeli professional 
and administrative norms is determined to a significant degree by the ethno-
national conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and reflects Palestinian 
attempts to resist Israeli occupation and defend an independent national and 
cultural identity. Shlomo notes, however, that while colonial powers have not 
typically imposed their full administrative and judicial systems on colonised 
populations, Israel insists on its full sovereignty over annexed East Jerusalem. 
The tolerated deviation of Palestinian education in East Jerusalem from Israeli 
norms is thus identified as a technology of control intended to convey the unity of 
the city. “On the one hand, this enables the state to continue its offensive policies 
of neglect and discrimination against the Palestinians. On the other hand, partial 
and sub-formal administrative containment may provide a view of seemingly full 
governmental control over both the space and the population” (Shlomo, 2016b). 
Dumper argues that in failing to implement a balanced, respectful Israeli 
curriculum in East Jerusalem schools, Israel has squandered an opportunity to 
draw two generations of East Jerusalem Palestinians into the Israeli worldview. 
An alternative, critical viewpoint, however, allows for the interpretation that 
Israel’s tolerance of this exception conveniently masks sub-standard, 
discriminatory practices and serves to perpetuate the otherness of this 
constituency. Even in recent years when Israeli public opinion has brought 
pressure to bear on the IME to formalise the failing educational system in East 
Jerusalem, the state and municipality have responded with a series of exceptional 
solutions. These include morning and afternoon school shifts, recognised but not 
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formal schools and the rental of sub-standard private or commercial property for 
use as classrooms, all of which continue to deviate from Israeli norms (Shlomo, 
2016b). 
Perhaps most interesting in this regard is the fact that Israel knowingly tolerates 
an alternative educational curriculum which “generates a set of values and 
behaviours perceived as subversive by the Israeli state agencies” (Shlomo, 
2016b). This is consistent with the view that counter hegemony is anticipated 
within the structures of hegemony (Roy, 2009) and that as a constitutive outside, 
is the very condition of its existence (Mouffe, 1992). 
The data presented in Chapter IV indicates that the longevity and entrenchment 
of Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem is fuelling demand for Hebrew language 
tuition post-Tawjihi. Fluency in Hebrew is increasingly regarded as a gateway to 
better jobs, salaries and opportunities. There are a number of factors behind this. 
Physical dislocation from the West Bank, exacerbated by the separation Barrier, 
makes access to West Bank universities more difficult and also cuts East 
Jerusalem residents off from potential employment opportunities there. In 
addition, the Israeli labour market offers higher wages and for graduates in 
professional roles the opportunities for promotion and self-development are 
significant greater. While the West Bank and neighbouring Arab states remain 
popular destinations for undergraduate study, many East Jerusalemites are 
looking for alternatives and while they may not have any ideological objection to 
Israeli higher education, few leave secondary school with the language skills to 
make this a viable option. In Chapter IV, I demonstrated that there is growing 
demand from Palestinians for the opportunity to sit the Bugrut exam as opposed 
to Tawjihi, though the number of places available is limited. The data collected 
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indicates that a small but growing number of East Jerusalem schools are 
switching from Tawjihi to Bugrut to meet demand. In the context of the discussion 
above, therefore, the question becomes how accessible Israeli education is to 
East Jerusalem residents who wish to enhance their employment and career 
opportunities in Israel. 
2.2 Surveillance and Control in East Jerusalem 
In addition to the practices of informality and exception detailed above, Israel 
maintains a matrix of surveillance and control in East Jerusalem that is predicated 
upon the construction of Palestinian residents as an external minority and a threat 
to the security of the state. This discourse relies on and in turn reproduces the 
otherness of Palestinian residents and provides ‘legitimacy’ for the use of invasive 
surveillance and control mechanisms by state institutions. Abujidi (2011) argues 
that the intended effect of the Israeli surveillance network in the occupied 
territories is “to fragment time and space in such a way that it becomes impossible 
to lead a normal life” (Abujidi, 2011: 333).46 As such, these techniques compound 
the marginality of East Jerusalem Palestinians within the Jewish state, but also 
impact everyday life in much more intimate ways.  
                                            
46 Surveillance strategies form part of a broader control matrix which Israeli human rights 
organisation B’Tselem argues demonstrates “sweeping disregard for the lives and security of 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and for their right to maintain a normal life.” During 
confrontations over the installation of metal detectors at al-Aqsa compound, the group says that 
“the Israel Police treated Palestinians as if they were enemy soldiers rather than as a civilian 
population for whose wellbeing and security it is responsible. This conduct is part of the way 
Israel controls East Jerusalem: Israeli authorities view the Palestinian residents as an 
undesirable presence, people who are worth less, with all this implies” B'TSELEM 2017. Playing 
with Fire. Israel's sweeping disregard for the wellbeing and security of East Jerusalem residents 
has led to four fatalities and dozens of injuries, and disrupted the lives of tens of thousands of 
residents. Jerusalem. 
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Surveillance is broadly understood as “the focused, systematic and routine 
attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection 
or direction” (Lyon, 2007: 14) and Israel employs a range of non-technical 
(requiring direct contact) and technical (requiring no direct contact) surveillance 
methods in order to achieve and maintain control over Palestinians (Halabi, 2011: 
200). Braier (2013) notes that “the urban spaces of East Jerusalem are subject 
to tireless surveillance, manifested through various methods of observation and 
documentation, such as mapping, categorizing, photographing and archiving” 
(Braier, 2013: 2713). 
Contemporary surveillance and control mechanisms in Israel/Palestine are 
increasing understood within a colonial or postcolonial framework. Surveillance 
as a feature of power is intricately connected to the process of othering, by which 
the self-identification of the colonial authority is configured through the 
denigration of the other (Zureik, 2016). Thus, according to Ashcroft et al. (2013), 
it is through surveillance that “the identification, objectification and subjection of 
the subject are simultaneously enacted: the imperial gaze defines the identity of 
the subject, objectifies it within the identifying system of power relations and 
confirms its subalterneity and powerlessness” (cited in Zureik, 2016:14). 
Drawing on the extensive literature detailing these methods, I argue here that 
aggressive Israeli surveillance and monitoring strategies penetrate everyday 
Palestinian decision making in East Jerusalem and that, in this way, Israeli control 
is exercised on a quotidian level. As Zureik makes clear, “as a feature of power, 
surveillance in everyday life is involved in the constitution of subjectivities at the 
level of desire, fear, security, trust and risk – all of which ultimately impact human 
dignity and individual autonomy” (Zureik, 2016: 12).  
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Surveillance methodologies in East Jerusalem bear comparison with the 
techniques employed by Israel during the period of military government from 1948 
to 1966, at which time Palestinians within Israel’s state borders were subjected 
to multiple methods of political control (Jiryis, 1976, Korn, 2000, Zureik, 2011). 
According to Korn, the Israeli state made no attempt during its early years to 
influence or alter the attitude of Palestinians now living within its borders and 
nothing was done to encourage them to identify with the state. “The apparatuses 
that specialised in dealing with the Arab population and the use of various 
techniques of control, supervision and manipulation, were designed to ensure 
‘correct political behaviour’ and different types of obedience, dependence and 
cooperation” (Korn, 2000: 168). In the contemporary period, too, I argue that 
Israeli policies are aimed deliberately at the management of control of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians as a ‘constitutive outside’, rather than their absorption, 
which would be damaging to the desired demographic balance in the city and 
counter to the ethnocratic principles of the regime. 
Moreover, according to Korn, various methods of political control were elaborated 
by Israel during the military government period, including the construction of a 
social reality in which the military government was “perceived as an ‘all-seeing, 
all-knowing body’ even when it’s presence was not always evident” (Korn, 2000: 
168). In East Jerusalem, today, though traditional surveillance methods are now 
supplemented by far smarter technologies, the perception remains among 
residents that the state benefits from an extensive network of paid agents and 
informers, much like that on which the perceived panoptic reach of the military 
government was predicated. In the East Jerusalem context, the sense that Israel 
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see’s everything and knows everything influences the choices residents make 
and the level of personal insecurity with which they live. 
Many of the policies detailed earlier in this chapter describe the way in which 
everyday Palestinian practices are criminalised and systems of surveillance 
contribute to this, leading to a general sense of insecurity and even paranoia. 
Indeed, Spurgeon Thompson argues that paranoia “is the inevitable result of 
living with intense state surveillance” (cited in Zureik, 2016: 12-13). The sense 
persists in East Jerusalem that there is very little that residents can do which the 
Israeli authorities will not know about. 
This leads to a significant level of self-censoring. Osama says that he is careful 
on Facebook and other social media platforms not to get involved in politics or 
even to ‘like’ comments made by friends which are critical of Israel. It’s not that 
he doesn’t agree with them, but he is convinced that such conversations are 
monitored; having lost his residency once, he is now especially cautious. Other 
East Jerusalem residents say that they would not participate in demonstrations 
or protest against Israeli actions in the city for fear that the authorities would find 
out. Many residents who live outside Jerusalem’s municipal borders say they 
have no choice, but experience high levels of insecurity and fear as a result, 
which results in sometimes irrational concerns about surveillance and a general 
sense of mistrust. 
One interviewee told me about her sister who is married to a West Banker. He 
has permission to live in Jerusalem, but this must be renewed regularly and each 
time the family must demonstrate that their centre of life is in the city. They are 
unskilled and on low incomes and can’t really afford to live in the city, but if they 
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move to the West Bank, their application for family unification which has been 
pending for several years would be finally refused. So, they rent a small, run down 
property in Wadi Joz at a significantly reduced price because the Palestinian 
landlady is unwilling to declare the income and pay tax on it. This means that 
while the property is cheap, and the family can afford to remain in East Jerusalem, 
they have no bills in their name, no rental agreement and no documentary 
evidence to demonstrate their residency to the Interior Ministry. In order to get 
around this, they use the sister’s address on official documents and the sister 
allows them to keep one of the utility bills in their names. This arrangement 
worked for some time, but on their last visit to the Interior Ministry, officials there 
were fully aware of their situation, knew both addresses and the name of the 
landlady in Wadi Joz. Israeli policies in the city are criminalising ordinary families 
who struggle to cope in exceptional circumstances. In this case, the family lived 
with fear and suspicion for some time and ultimately accepted that the Israeli 
authorities simply know everything that goes on.  
This sense is compounded in the Old City, where hundreds of closed circuit 
television (CCTV) cameras comprise a system known as ‘Mabat 2000’, which 
provides 24-hour surveillance of every street and public alleyway. An Israeli trade 
magazine article described Mabat 2000 as the Israeli Mer Group’s flagship 
project, one of the most advanced and largest of its kind and a showcase for the 
firm’s projects around the world. Mer group owner Haim Mer told the magazine: 
“Mabat 2000 in the Old City in Jerusalem was established at the end of 1999 and 
has been upgraded several times since. It operates around the clock… The police 
needed a system in which ‘Big Brother’ would control and would allow for an 
overall view of events in the Old City area… The project includes hundreds of 
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cameras that have been installed on the streets of the Old City, stations for 
switchboard operators and commanders, online screens and viewings of 
tapes…” (Aharony, 2009). 
CCTV in civilian residential neighbourhoods puts everyday Palestinian life under 
24-hour surveillance. Halabi challenges the extent to which use of the Mabat 
2000 system is properly regulated47 and argues that “CCTV systems, especially 
those operated without regard for policy or limits, can be disconcerting and 
insidious” (Halabi, 2011: 212). Dumper (2013a) notes that cameras near settler 
enclaves in East Jerusalem are operated by private security firms and Israeli civil 
rights organisations have complained that these are often directed towards 
private Palestinian homes or their private spaces (Dumper, 2013: 1256). 
Old City residents also claim that the police are selective in their interventions. 
One interviewee told me that when a fight broke out between a Palestinian 
shopkeeper and a Russian tourist on a busy thoroughfare near Jaffa Gate, close 
to the police station, Israeli police were on the scene within minutes. By contrast, 
he says more frequent violent confrontations between Palestinian shopkeepers 
on the same street have been allowed to continue until serious injuries had 
required a medical intervention at which time the police arrived with the 
ambulance personnel.  
Beyond the more obvious manifestations of surveillance, however, are those 
technologies that facilitate the control of space, the management of mobility and 
                                            
47 Halabi was unable to obtain any evidence of a code of practice specifically relevant to the Old 
City CCTV surveillance system and contrasts this with the detailed code of practice developed 
and published online by the City of Westminster in relation to the extensive CCTV system 
deployed in London’s West End. See HALABI, U. 2011. Legal Analysis and Critique of Some 
Surveillance Methods Used by Israel. In: ZUREIK, E., LYON, D. & ABU-LABAN, Y. (eds.) 
Surveillance and Control in Israel-Palestine. Oxon: Routledge. 
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the collection of information. Lyon (2011) highlights identification systems – 
population registration and identity cards - as a nexus of power in Israel and the 
occupied territories. Paradoxically, they are “both a means of social control and 
exclusion, and a desired means of access and inclusion.” The identity card is the 
foremost surveillance tool available to Israel, regulating mobility and residency, 
without actually bestowing any rights. For East Jerusalem residents, it allows the 
individual a sense of free movement, while facilitating the monitoring of 
movement and the control of space. 
Israel’s control of the Palestinian use of time and space is “legitimised and 
facilitated through surveillance in the form of closures, checkpoints, the so-called 
separation wall, restrictions on mobility, and land use” (Zureik, 2011: 18). Through 
colonisation, “Palestinian space shrinks, time slows, and mobility is constrained” 
while Israelis have “freedom of movement and expansion through space and 
control of time” (Peteet, 2008: 14). This links to Amal Jamal’s concept of 
‘racialised time’ (cited in Zureik, 2011) in which the Jewish experience of time is 
depicted as dynamic and vital while that of Palestinians is static and empty. The 
Palestinian experience of travelling north from Jerusalem along route 90 to the 
Galilee manifests this difference. Despite their Israeli licence plates, Palestinians 
crossing the Jordan Valley checkpoint on this route are stopped for long periods 
and required to empty their vehicles to pass the contents through security checks, 
while Jewish and overseas travellers are generally waved through. The delays 
can be so lengthy that many Jerusalemites prefer to travel along the coastal road 
which adds hours, but can save time. At Ben Gurion too, Palestinian residents of 
East Jerusalem are routinely held for long periods and questioned at length on 
their return to Israel from a trip abroad.  
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2.3 Collective Punishment 
Collective punishment is also employed as a method of control in East Jerusalem, 
underlining for residents their exceptional treatment within the state. The United 
Nations has raised concerns about Israel’s use of collective punishment 
measures, prohibited under Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (ICRC, 
1949), which penalise residents for crimes they did not commit and for which they 
are not criminally responsible (UNOCHA, 2017). While Israel cites the need for 
deterrence and prevention, there are two additional elements to this practice of 
relevance here. First, particular aspects of Israel’s collective punishment practice 
also support the Judaising ambitions of the state. These include the use of ID 
revocation and house demolition as collective punishments for those related to 
someone who has committed a criminal act. Second, collective punishments 
have been recognised as part of Israeli-initiated “friction activities,” designed to 
provoke a response from residents of East Jerusalem. 
On 8 January 2017, Fadi al-Qunbar, a Palestinian from the Jabal al-Mukaber area 
of East Jerusalem, carried out a ramming attack near his home, killing four Israeli 
soldiers and injuring 15 others. The perpetrator was shot and killed at the scene, 
but the following day, thirteen members of his family received notice of 
proceedings to revoke their residency in East Jerusalem with immediate effect 
(UNOCHA, 2017). Since the family holds permanent residency status rather than 
citizenship, they have no right of appeal to Israel’s High Court of Justice. 
Commenting on his decision, Israeli Interior Minister Aryeh Deri said, “Let this be 
known to all who are plotting, planning or considering carrying out an attack, that 
their families will pay a heavy price for their actions and the consequences will be 
severe and far reaching” (Abebe, 2017). 
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In addition to the revocation of residency, the Jabal al-Mukaber neighbourhood 
from which the attacker came was seemingly targeted for collective punishment 
in the week following the attack. Between 9 and 16 January 2017, approximately 
240 households living in 80 buildings in the area received notice from the 
Jerusalem municipality of planning and zoning violations, putting them at risk of 
demolition and forced eviction (UNOCHA, 2017). In addition to deterrence, 
collective punishments of this nature, which target the homes and residency of 
East Jerusalem residents, are understood by Palestinians as a tool of Israel’s 
wider demographic policy in the city. 
East Jerusalem Palestinians are also subjected to disproportionate police tactics 
which they argue are not deployed against Jewish Israelis. During a period of 
raised tensions in October 2014, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) 
complained to the Jerusalem District Commander of Police about the use of 
disproportionate measures in the Issawiya area of East Jerusalem. ACRI pointed 
to the extensive use of stun grenades and tear gas in crowded residential 
neighbourhoods as well as increased usage of ‘skunk spray vehicles’, causing 
widespread damage to property and upsetting the daily routine of thousands of 
residents (ACRI, 2014a). Skunk repellent is a foul smelling, nausea-inducing 
liquid, sprayed with force from police vans over streets and buildings. According 
to the testimony of witnesses in Issawiya, during the summer 2014, “police 
indiscriminately sprayed the skunk liquid towards houses, people, restaurants 
brimming with people and in crowded streets, causing harm to innocent residents. 
Evidence suggests that in some cases the skunk repellent was arbitrarily used 
with no apparent justification and in the absence of any public disturbances” 
(ACRI, 2014b). 
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The unprovoked use of skunk spray links to the findings of an internal Jerusalem 
police department report which revealed that Israeli border police had “initiated 
friction activity” in the Issawiya neighbourhood in 2016 in a deliberate attempt to 
provoke violence in East Jerusalem. The report came to light after the family of a 
12-year-old Palestinian boy, Ahmad Abu Hummus, was shot in the head by police 
with a sponge bullet during riots in Issawiya in January 2016. The police report 
demonstrates, however, that “whatever ‘riot’ Israeli forces were controlling on 6 
January 2016 occurred after Israeli Border Police forces entered Issawiya that 
day. According to Haaretz, ‘the reports indicate that on January 6 there were no 
incidents in Issawiya that day’” (Robbins, 2016) 
According to the Israeli paper, reports made by 10 different police officers present 
at the ‘clashes’ on the day of Abu Hummus’ injury, confirmed that events began 
with a “friction activity” or an “initiated friction activity”. According to one officer, 
“during the afternoon shift we launched an activity in Issawiyah to create friction 
with the residents” while two other policemen said they “were asked to come to 
the Menta gas station in Issawiya for a friction activity in the village” and that they 
were briefed before it began (Hasson, 2016a) 
Collectively, these measures appear to demonstrate first, that the Israeli 
authorities exploit acts of violence by Palestinians to impose collective 
punishments on East Jerusalem neighbourhoods, and to further the Judaising 
ambitions of the state. Second, they lend support to the argument that Palestinian 
resistance or counter-hegemony is anticipated within the structures of Israeli 
hegemony, and essential to preserving the otherness of East Jerusalem 
residents who might otherwise have distanced themselves from the national 
struggle. 
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3 Everyday life from a Bottom-Up Perspective 
So far in this chapter I have focused on the structures of power in East Jerusalem 
and the workings of Israeli domination in a range of contexts. In this section, I 
shift the focus downwards as I seek to understand the daily interplay between 
Israel’s colonial project in East Jerusalem and the residents who exist beyond the 
limits of inclusion but within the everyday politics and economy of the city. I argue 
that this dynamic is not clearly visible from above. Rather, the impact of these 
top-down processes is best observed at ground level and through the meanings 
and framings that individuals attach to their experience of them. Here, the nexus 
between state power and individual subjectivity becomes apparent and the 
potential for new mobilisations and identities is made visible.  
East Jerusalem Palestinians experience Israel’s colonial project in the city in 
myriad ways and no single episode or encounter defines that experience. Rather, 
the evidence suggests an accumulation of individual and collective moments 
which acquire discursive significance and establish a commonality of meaning 
among residents that comes to represent a shared experience of occupation. This 
commonality notwithstanding, the impact of Israel’s colonialist policies and the 
punitive suppression of Palestinian political activity are weakening the social 
fabric of the city, disrupting collective understandings of resistance and eroding 
the opportunities for collective action. The East Jerusalem constituency lacks 
both a plausible vision of Palestinian national liberation and the legitimate, 
organised leadership required to realise one. Distanced from both state projects 
and internally fractured, Palestinian residents are thus navigating East 
Jerusalem’s gray space individually, making the analysis of their everyday 
practices all the more urgent. 
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3.1 Everyday Experiences of Difference and Exclusion 
In Chapter IV, I argued that many East Jerusalem Palestinians are exhibiting an 
individualised ‘improvement of life’ attitude, on the one hand, in which they reject 
the legitimacy of Israeli occupation, but intend to maximise the opportunities 
available to them on the other. In this section, I focus on the experience of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians who, despite their regular engagement at some level with 
Israelis or Israeli institutions, experience feelings of marginalisation and 
exclusion. The standard resistance/normalisation binary is unhelpful in situations 
of domination where the occupied, oppressed or marginalised population is 
neither welcoming of nor in open revolt against the colonial power. ‘Israelification’ 
receives significant media attention, but it has little meaning for Palestinian 
residents who, despite their adaptations, are regularly reminded of their 
otherness and exclusion. 
George is a Christian who lives in a Jewish neighbourhood. Everyone keeps 
themselves to themselves, but he says he gets along well enough with his Israeli 
neighbours. He is clear, however, that integration is not possible. “We can’t 
mingle with Israeli society; they will never absorb us. They have a different way 
of thinking. Carrying their IDs or working with them doesn’t mean you will be 
integrated with them. There is an invisible border that everyone can see.” 
The data collected here suggests that George’s experience is not untypical. 
Viewed from on high, the everyday actions of choices of many residents lend 
credibility to claims that an ‘Israelification’ of East Jerusalem Palestinians is taking 
place. The personal narratives of these individuals, however, reveal a contrasting 
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picture in which even those who are adapting to the reality of long term Israeli 
rule experience discrimination and marginalisation. 
Many interviewees said that they felt uncomfortable using services intended for 
Jewish Israelis. Sometimes it was Israeli citizens also using the service who made 
them feel nervous or out of place, for example when travelling on Israel’s Egged 
bus services. Often, however, East Jerusalem residents seeking to access Israeli 
services are informed by Israeli members of staff that these services are not 
intended for them. Osama says that after many years lived in the United States, 
he appreciates the organisation and efficiency of Israeli administrative systems 
more than he did before. When he returned to Jerusalem and wanted to open a 
bank account, he preferred to go to the Jaffa Street branch, only ten minutes’ 
walk from his home. “They have lots more desks and the queues there are always 
shorter. There are chairs to sit on when you are waiting and it is open longer 
hours. It’s in West Jerusalem, okay, but it is also closer for me than the East 
Jerusalem branch.” When Osama took all his papers along to open an account, 
he was told by the cashier that Arabs have to use the branch on Salah al-Din 
Street. “I asked him if he was for real and said to show me where it was written 
down like this. He said it wasn’t written down, but that Arabs always prefer to use 
the East Jerusalem branch. He told me that anyway, no one in the Jaffa Street 
branch speaks Arabic, even though we were already talking in Hebrew! I said that 
I didn’t prefer to go to the other branch and in the end, when I refused to leave, 
he said okay and we opened the account.” 
Nor does it seem that this was an isolated incident. When Rana’s GP referred her 
to a consultant about a medical problem, she was automatically given an 
appointment at the Beit Hanina clinic. The date was some months off, however, 
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and Rana asked the practice receptionist if there was anything available sooner. 
“The receptionist told me that there might be an appointment before that one, but 
it would be in West Jerusalem and it was unusual to refer Palestinian patients 
there. I asked her to try because I didn’t want to wait, so she called them and they 
also said that I have to go to the Beit Hanina clinic. I asked why and the Jewish 
woman just said that Arabs go to Beit Hanina. I kept asking why and in the end, 
she said she would give me an appointment. There was no reason why, it’s not 
written down anywhere that we can’t use their clinics. They just want to keep us 
away from them.” 
These examples suggest that efforts are made to maintain a separation between 
Jewish Israelis and East Jerusalem Palestinians, reinforcing the argument 
offered above that it is the Palestinian presence where it does not belong that is 
most unpalatable to Israelis. Beyond this, even East Jerusalem residents who 
occupy responsible and respected positions within Israeli organisations or 
institutions, find that once outside of that environment they are subjected to 
discriminatory practices. 
Saha, for example, is an experienced kupat holim dentist who works full time at 
a dental practice in Jerusalem. She has an excellent education, a young family 
and a successful career, yet she says she feels the weight of the occupation 
every day. Despite regular, cordial encounters with Israeli colleagues at 
conferences and on training courses, where she says she is always treated as a 
professional, Saha is adamant that as a Palestinian she can never really feel safe 
in Israel. She tells me that after finishing work one evening, she went to her car 
to drive home, but discovered that her vehicle license plates had been stolen. 
Saha reported the theft to the police immediately, but she says an investigation 
243 
 
was promptly opened in which she was treated from the outset as the suspect 
rather than the victim. She was taken to a police station and interrogated at 
length. “They did not think of me like a dentist or a doctor, as a respectable 
person. Just as a Palestinian. They questioned me, shouted at me. They said 
that I had given the ID plates to a Palestinian to do something bad. I was fasting 
that day and I should have finished the fast at six o’clock, but they did not let me 
drink water for many hours. I was crying the whole time.” Saha’s car was 
impounded and she was only released in the early hours of the next morning. 
After that, she had to return to the police station every day by bus to try to get her 
car back. On the fifth day, she broke down and shouted at the police officer in 
charge of her case, complaining about the treatment she had received. He 
eventually released the car, but told her that it was only because she was a dentist 
with kupat holim that she has not gone straight to prison on the first day. “I was 
the victim, not the criminal! A Jewish person would be treated differently for sure.”  
In divided cities within contested states, where the legitimacy of the state authority 
controlling the city is itself in question, policing and security are considered 
particularly challenging (Dumper, 2013). However, while Israel’s overall authority 
lacks legitimacy in East Jerusalem, both from an international and a legal 
perspective, Palestinian residents in the city rely entirely on Israeli policing for the 
maintenance of order and for their protection under the law. Saha’s account 
demonstrates that while residents recognise the legitimacy of the Israeli police 
and legal system (mainly because they are the only ones available to them) they 
are none the less regarded with suspicion and hostility. 
During demonstrations over the installation of metal detectors at the entrance to 
the al-Aqsa compound in July 2017, B’Tselem reported that Israel had repeatedly 
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shown “sweeping disregard for the lives and security of Palestinian residents of 
East Jerusalem, and for their right to maintain a normal routine. The Israeli police 
treated Palestinian residents as if they were enemy soldiers, rather than as a 
civilian population for whose wellbeing and security it is responsible. This conduct 
is part of the way Israel controls East Jerusalem: Israeli authorities view the 
Palestinian residents as an undesirable presence, people who are worth less, 
with all this implies, including the use of lethal force.” 
East Jerusalem Palestinians experience otherness and insecurity irrespective of 
their individual circumstances or the extent to which they engage with or 
participate in the prevailing system or society. In the following section, I focus in 
depth on Ziad, whose account in many ways exemplifies this exclusion. 
3.2 Case Study: Ziad 
Ziad is a confident, articulate and hard working young man from an educated 
Muslim family in East Jerusalem. His father was an electrical engineer and his 
mother has a BA in Islamic Studies. He is the youngest of four siblings, all of 
whom are educated to Masters level. Ziad is in his late-twenties. He has an 
undergraduate degree from Bir Zeit University and is currently studying for his 
Master’s Degree at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He also works part-time 
at the National Library, housed on the campus of the Hebrew University, and as 
a teacher at a school in East Jerusalem.  
Ziad is a high-achiever with much going for him. He is intelligent and amiable and 
it is difficult to imagine anything other than a bright and successful future for him. 
During our conversations, therefore, I was initially puzzled by the apparent 
disparity between his privileged education, impressive confidence and obvious 
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ambition and the vivid portrayal of himself as vulnerable, disadvantaged and 
oppressed. 
“I literally face death every day. If I walk in the street and put my hand in my 
pocket, maybe I will be shot with five bullets. Not just me. All Jerusalem people 
are facing death every day. If I am going to the Hebrew University institutes, or to 
my job in the Old City, on the road I am facing death. They are directing all the 
politics and all their power to send me away from Jerusalem and away from 
Palestine in general.” 
Despite the heightened tensions in Jerusalem at the time of our meetings, I felt 
that Ziad was talking to me as an outsider, drawing on the familiar narratives of 
occupation and subjugation typically shared with foreigners in order to convey to 
them the bitterness of the Palestinian situation. Peteet (1991) notes that 
interviewees might regard the researcher as “a foreigner to whom by telling their 
story they would be conveying it to the West” (Peteet, 1991: 16). In order to 
surmount the role of external observer conveying their plight, “requires 
persistence in probing” and encouraging participants to go beyond formal 
discourses or those reserved for visitors (Peteet, 1991: 17). 
After some years living in the Old City I felt that this one-dimensional depiction 
did not reflect the full picture of Palestinian life in East Jerusalem. So, I suggested 
to Ziad that in fact he had quite a good life in Jerusalem, that he was a student at 
one of the best universities in the world, that he had good job prospects, that he 
was free to work and to marry and to start a family if he chose. 
“You say that I have some rights here, to work, to have a career and an education, 
but for me in every second I know that all of this can vanish… Just a shout beside 
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me from a Jew and [he shouts in Hebrew and makes the sound of gunfire]. If I 
travel from Beit Hanina to here, there are maybe three barriers where I can be 
searched, where they can take the humanity from me. So, this is not a freedom, 
it’s not a freedom at all. You say that I have some democracy here, but if you look 
at me, I have a residency here and a temporary laissez-passer from Israel and a 
temporary passport from Jordan, not citizenship. What am I? I am nothing. In the 
real world, I am nothing. Everything I have can be lost in a second.” 
Ziad’s views were genuinely held, l felt, and they demonstrate starkly the sense 
of insecurity and fragility that result from the long-term marginalisation of 
Jerusalem residents. And for Ziad, these are problems unique to East Jerusalem 
Palestinians. “There is a difference between me as a Jerusalemite and other 
Arabs in occupied Palestine [Palestinians citizens of Israel living inside the 1948 
borders]. Since they are living in Israeli society from when they are born, they are 
facing the same problem, but with a different colour maybe. But since I am 
Jerusalemite I face the problem without any colouring… The problem is related 
to the area, to Jerusalem… If you are going to Tel Aviv or Haifa or maybe Majd 
al-Krum in the very north of occupied Palestine, they are not facing the same 
problem. They are not. There is no separation between Arab and Jew. There is 
no separation. Maybe they have the same school, maybe they have the same 
building to live in. Just in Jerusalem I felt this problem. Now, when I came to meet 
you here, an Israeli soldier told me ‘Where are you going, open your bag!’ If I 
were in Haifa they won’t tell me like this. He won’t. Maybe he will need to search 
and he will say please, can you show me what is in your bag. Here no, ‘Just do 
it, just do it, because I told you to do it!’”  
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Ziad also spoke from experience of the discrimination Palestinian residents face 
inside Israeli companies. “I was working in Ramallah for a group working as an 
outsourcer for Intel in Jerusalem on the Israeli side. I worked as an outsourcing 
engineer with the Palestinian company for three years. After this I asked Intel 
Israel, should I work with you directly, and they told me no... we haven’t positions 
now, but I know what is the real reason. After this they brought a [Jewish] student 
to be a manager over me. He is a student and he is above me even though I have 
three years’ experience with Intel.” 
“You know, the CEO of Apple, his right-hand man is one of the Nazrut, a 
Palestinian from Nazareth. He studied in the Technion for his Batchelor Degree 
and his Master’s Degree. I know him personally. In Israel, he was working at IBM. 
He was one of the managers, one of the regular managers there. After he went 
to America he became one of the big men in the world. He is the vice president 
of Apple. You can google him. Here we have borders... you will not have a big 
position here to be a manager over a Jew… I am an engineer. Maybe if I am here 
and I have the science and the abilities to be a manager, I won’t be a manager, I 
will be an engineer. But because of my abilities if I was in other countries than 
Israel, maybe in England or the US, I will be a manager… Even if I have a PhD 
certificate they [Jewish Israelis] won’t be happy for me to be their manager…” 
Ziad also works part time as a cataloguer at the Israeli National Library, based at 
the Hebrew University. There is a large team of Arabic speakers (some students, 
others in full time employment) cataloguing books and documents in Arabic, but 
they have a full-time Jewish Israeli manager who doesn’t speak any Arabic. “I 
have been working for about eight or nine months cataloguing many, many kinds 
of books. For the past four months, I have been working with the stolen books. 
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During the second intifada they invaded in 2002 the West Bank, invaded 
Ramallah, Bethlehem, Nablus. Whenever they went to the mosques, the 
universities, the personal libraries, they were stealing the books. How do I know? 
I have the box of the books. I just open the books and see that, oh, this is the 
stamp of the library 1,2,3 from the mosque in the West Bank. I know the mosque 
which was containing this book! But they have stolen them and I am cataloguing 
them! There is a big conflict for me, but I have the hope that I am cataloguing 
these books for us. Not now maybe, but after years. I have the hope that this 
library will be Palestinian one day.” 
Ultimately, it is in this way that Ziad justifies the extent of his everyday 
participation in Israeli society, despite the frequent reminders of Palestinian 
exclusion. “I am paying a small amount to gain the big thing, that is the logic 
here… I am using their tools… I know indirectly I am making something positive 
for Israel, but only indirectly.” 
3.3 Municipal Discrimination 
Beyond a general sense of temporariness, insecurity and fear, East Jerusalem 
residents also experience more tangible manifestations of discrimination. A main 
grievance relates to unequal municipal spending on East Jerusalem 
neighbourhoods and discriminatory practices in regard to housing and 
construction. 
A detailed report published by UN OCHA oPt in 2011 found that East Jerusalem 
had suffered systematic neglect of its basic infrastructure, housing and 
development needs since 1967. More than one third of East Jerusalem had been 
appropriated for Israeli settlement construction and only 13% was zoned by the 
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Israeli authorities for Palestinian construction, thereby offering Palestinians the 
possibility of obtaining a building permit.48 With much of this land already built-
up, the number of permits granted to Palestinians failed to meet the demand for 
housing. 
Moreover, strict zoning in Palestinian areas limits construction density, reducing 
the quantity and size of structures built on a given plot of land. In Palestinian 
residential neighbourhoods, the permitted ‘plot ratio’ is often half (or in some 
cases much less) than that allowed in neighbouring Israeli settlements or in West 
Jerusalem. For example, the settlement of Pisgat Ze’ev has a construction 
density of 90-120%, while the nearby Palestinian neighbourhood of Beit Hanina 
has a construction density of 50-75%. Likewise, the settlement of Ramat Shlomo 
has a density of 90-120%, while Shu’fat has a density of 75%. According to UN 
OCHA, such discrepancies have resulted in situations where Palestinian families 
are unable to legally add an additional storey to a family home while an adjacent 
settlement is permitted to construct multi-storey buildings. 
In addition, the application process was found to be opaque, expensive and 
excessively complicated. As a result, unauthorised Palestinian construction is 
widespread both inside and outside the 13% of East Jerusalem zoned for 
Palestinian construction. Those who build ‘illegally’ face the threat of demolition, 
displacement, fines and possibly imprisonment. This contributes to the 
                                            
48 According to OCHA, of the 70.5km² of land in East Jerusalem, 35% (24.5km²) has been 
appropriated for Israeli settlements. Most of this was previously privately owned Palestinian 
property. A further 35% (24.7km²) has approved planning schemes and the remaining 30% 
(21.3km²) has not been included in any plan. More than half of the lands approved for planning 
(15.5km²) are designated as ‘green’ or ‘open’ areas where no construction is allowed. This 
leaves only 13% of the total East Jerusalem area (9.2km²) available for Palestinian construction 
and much of this is already built-up.  UNOCHA, O. March, 2011. East Jerusalem: Key 
Humanitarian Concerns. Special Focus.  
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criminalisation of East Jerusalem Palestinians for actions behaviours which, for 
those inside the dominant ethnonational group, are entirely legitimate. Jamal 
wanted to build and could afford the permit so he made an application. 
“I applied to build in Beit Hanina. I am almost three years in the system and I have 
paid all money according to that system, but still I have to wait. A Jewish man 
wouldn’t have to wait like this. They are trying to minimise the population of 
Jerusalem in any way. So they make our life difficult by housing, by building, by 
movement. There is a system, you cannot see that system, you don’t see it, but 
it is to make Jerusalem Palestinian people tired… You see how dirty the street is 
here? They don’t clean it. But if you don’t pay to park the municipality come and 
give you a fine. No, first clean the street then come and make me a fine. It’s like 
paying protection [money] and that’s what it is.” 
Jamal admitted that there were material advantages to permanent residency 
status, but he was clear that East Jerusalem Palestinians pay heavily for these 
benefits. “We are first class tax payers. We don’t get this all for free. And what we 
pay we don’t get back the 100% service like our neighbours on the Israeli side… 
Have you been to West Jerusalem? Have you been to King George Street, for 
example? We pay the same rates as King George Street people pay. Go and see 
what is the difference between there and here [Bab al-Zahira]. If you look at the 
services, we have got social security or whatever, we pay for that. It costs a lot. 
The space you are sitting in - I am paying for that. It’s not a favour. A business in 
the West Bank, you know how much less taxation he pays than I do? A lot! Most 
of the schools here they are controlled by the municipality of Jerusalem because 
the education is their responsibility. If you just go across the schools, if you go 
and see a school on the East side and the West side you don’t believe that it’s 
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the same system running the two schools… Here in Jerusalem we are very close 
to the Israelis and we are first class tax payers, but we are second class citizens. 
We don’t get what we pay for, not like the Israelis do.” 
According to Ortner (1995), “the question of the relationship of the individual 
person or subject to domination carries the resistance problematic to the level of 
consciousness, subjectivity, intentionality and identity” (Ortner, 1995: 183) I will 
address this issue in greater detail in Chapter VI. Here, I suggest that the 
individual adaptations demanded by Israeli rule in East Jerusalem evidence the 
value of a ground-level perspective, which makes visible the contingency of 
identity and the contextual nature of agency. With Ortner, I argue that each 
historical moment constructs its own form of agency as individuals act upon and 
within the structures of power (Ortner, 1995). 
4 Israeli-Palestinian Antagonism 
In Chapter IV, I demonstrated that personal encounters between East Jerusalem 
Palestinians and Israelis are frequent and that these encounters are often cordial. 
Many East Jerusalemites, such as Saha and Summa, work day to day beside 
Israeli colleagues with whom they are on good terms. Many others, including 
Osama and Ahmad, have pursued formal Hebrew lessons, taught by Israeli 
teachers, whom they have come to respect and occasionally befriend, at least for 
the duration of the course. Hanan fondly recalled the Israeli soldier who had 
shown her father such respect. 
While occasionally tense, on an individual level such quotidian encounters are 
not, by necessity, antagonistic. However, everyday life in East Jerusalem is not 
immune to the vacillations of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
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Palestinian residents of the city remain mindful of the grievances of the 
Palestinian collective. In this section, therefore, I situate everyday Israeli-
Palestinian encounters within the context of mutual animosity and distrust and 
examine the role of memory and discrimination in perpetuating these conditions. 
Despite their acknowledgement of the need to adapt to enduring Israeli rule, East 
Jerusalem Palestinians find that the wider conflict is never far away. 
4.1 “They hate us and we hate them.” 
Despite the frequent cordiality of everyday encounters between individual 
Palestinians and Israelis, the public discourse in East Jerusalem still to some 
extent reflects the familiar binarised identities of mainstream analysis. In private, 
Palestinians are more open about their ambivalence towards the Israelis they 
meet, but also less guarded about their anger towards Israel. 
Ruby’s account reflects some of the complexities of the situation:  
“We live with the Jewish people and I am happy to live with them yanee, but we 
say in Arabic, the Jewish people are ’adu abui wa jiddi. It means the Jewish 
people are enemies for my father and my grandfather. Okay, they make good 
things for us in Jerusalem, but this is our enemies, I don’t like them. They stole 
our land. We don’t like them… I am afraid to be friends with any Jewish people. 
You know, if the Palestinian people know I am friends with anyone Jewish they 
will think something bad about me, because this is my enemy. No, I can’t. There 
are kind ones of them, a lot of kind, they come to my shop, I help them, I laugh 
with them, but I can’t be friends with them. No. One man, Jewish, he sent to my 
Facebook a friend request, he look very nice, handsome, but I am afraid. He sent 
it maybe three times, saying that he wants to be friends with me. I have a lot of 
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friends on Tango. He saw me through Tango, but it is difficult to be friends with 
him. I can’t.” 
The data collected indicates a reluctance among many East Jerusalem 
Palestinians to allow everyday encounters with Israelis or relationships with 
Jewish colleagues to develop beyond a superficial level. This was voiced by the 
husband of one interviewee, a West Banker married to an East Jerusalem 
woman, as a fear of allowing oneself to become too familiar with them. “I live here 
in Jerusalem now and I am allowed to work here, but I don’t want to work with 
them. If I work with them maybe I will start to like some of them and before I can 
stop it, maybe I will become more like them. When we start to see them as normal 
humans, it will be harder to hate them.” 
Many of these accounts appear to fit the category of identity building described 
by Castells (2010) as ‘identity for resistance’. This important element of identity 
building “constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable 
oppression, usually on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined 
by history, geography, or biology, making it easier to essentialise the boundaries 
of resistance.” Castells names this form of identity construction as “the exclusion 
of the excluders by the excluded. That is, the building of defensive identity in the 
terms of dominant institutions/ideologies, reversing the value judgement while 
reinforcing the boundary” (Castells, 2010: 9). 
Social media presents unique challenges for East Jerusalem Palestinians whose 
work or education bring them into personal contact with Jewish Israelis. For 
some, applications such as Facebook allow the opportunity to preserve and 
sometimes develop relationships arising from real life encounters. Hanan’s 
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daughter, for example, worked for ten months gaining valuable experience at an 
Israeli office in Petach Tikvah before leaving to study Computer Science at New 
York University in Abu Dhabi. “From the beginning, she told them no politics for 
me. She treated them as human beings and they treated her as a human being. 
And she had the most wonderful relationship with them. Except for one, who 
wouldn’t even say good morning to her. But all the rest were normal, Jewish, 
educated people. She had the most great time with them and she has kept them 
as friends through Facebook.” 
For many East Jerusalemites, however, Facebook friendship requests from 
Israelis encountered in in real life are problematic and for some accepting them 
would be out of the question. Summa worked as a trainee doctor for one year at 
an Israeli hospital and got on well with the other stajarim (trainee doctors) who 
were mainly Jewish Israelis. As colleagues, she generally found them to be warm 
and supportive, but when it came to friendship requests, she felt she had to draw 
the line. 
“Okay, you can say I have Israeli ‘friends’ but it’s not like mixing with Arabs. I don’t 
wish to enter Israelis into my society. There were many stajarim, they got together 
on Facebook, but I didn’t accept their friend invites. Because I don’t want them, I 
don’t want friendship. Something superficial, okay, but something deep, no. 
Because different culture, different background, because if we live 100 years with 
them we will not be brothers or friends. You can’t - I can’t - accept this. Not 
because of my religion or anything, but even the Arab doctors [Palestinians from 
within Israel’s 1948 borders] at the hospital, the residents, they seem to be friends 
with the Israelis in front of me and I see that they are integrating in a good way 
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with them, but they don’t accept them on Facebook. It’s only superficial 
relationships.” 
Summa’s experience also reflects the ‘exclusion of the excluder by the excluded’. 
“Sometimes, when every day you are working in a team, sometimes you forget 
that he is an Israeli. He is a doctor; he is my friend. When I sit and think, I try to 
remind myself that he is my enemy, but in the work, no. Sometimes at work he is 
a friend, we are eating with each other, going together to make a tour of the 
wards.” 
Summa also felt that the enmity was mutual. “Their minds are worse than us. 
They don’t love us at all. They don’t prefer to integrate with us. They don’t want 
to see us in the hospital, because sometimes we take their opportunities to make 
a specialism, because maybe we are cleverer than them. So sometimes they 
don’t want us to be there because we take their place.” 
Other East Jerusalem Palestinians have accepted Facebook friendship requests 
from Israelis they have met in person, but subsequently find that access to the 
photos, status updates and comments on each other’s pages puts strain on their 
real-life relationships. Khadija has made Israeli friends, but also sees the 
challenges involved in sustaining these relationships: 
“Some Israelis have no problem to deal with you or to be a friend with you. But in 
the end, whatever friendship you have, there is a point that he knows that we are 
enemies. And the same goes for me, absolutely. They came here, they took our 
land. However much I want to be friendly, in the end I know that all the suffering 
we live is from them.” 
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Khadija was born and grew up in the Old City. She wanted to be a speech 
therapist so after Tawjihi she began the Mechina, or preparation, year at the 
Hebrew University with the intention of pursuing her undergraduate studies there. 
This course is mainly taken up by Jews from outside Israel, many of whom go on 
to make Aliyah.  
“I had a lot of Jewish friends from there [the Hebrew University], but in the end, 
they come here to live in Israel and you can’t change what someone believes. Till 
now I have four good friends from there, Americans. They came to my wedding. 
But the one I am so friendly with, she finished this year and they moved her to 
Ashdod. There she became friends with [an Israeli] man who hates Arabs so 
much. And she told me I can’t talk to you anymore because he told me not to. 
He’s a soldier. We’re friends on Facebook and we chat sometimes on Messenger, 
but last time I talked to her was in Gaza war [2014]. She lives in Ashdod near the 
border. I put on Facebook a post about kids who were killed on Eid in Gaza. This 
was very hard for us. And I posted about this. And she sent me a message saying, 
‘What do you think about that Khadija?’ I said ‘What do I think? They are children. 
They have nothing.’ And she started talking about her side and how they live in 
fear with rockets above their head. And she tried to convince me they also have 
the right to live in peace and that they feel very afraid. We are still friends on 
Facebook, but it’s very difficult now.” 
This type of experience does not seem to be uncommon among those who are 
open to accepting such requests in the first place. Ziad had a similar experience.  
“There was one Israeli student who I met about two months ago. I was in the 
library studying and I was listening to Beethoven. He saw this and we got into a 
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long conversation about classical music. It was good. After this, he added me on 
Facebook and I accepted him. I have no problem with this. But after that I saw 
his pictures on Facebook with the Zahal, the Israeli army. He had been in Gaza, 
he was at Zikim, a military place near the Gaza border. He had been there. You 
are killing my people, so why are we friends on Facebook? No, we are not friends. 
Maybe we can talk together till the morning, maybe we can work together on a 
project to reach Nobel Prize, no problem with me, but we are not friends. We are 
not friends. Because I am pretty sure that whenever you have the opportunity to 
hurt me, you won’t hesitate. That’s the problem. And he knows this.” 
Relations between East Jerusalem Palestinians and Israeli Palestinians from 
within Israel’s 1948 borders are rarely more congenial. East Jerusalem’s de facto 
inclusion within Israel’s 1948 borders distances its residents from Palestinians in 
the West Bank, but also underscores the differences between this constituency 
and Israeli Palestinians. As citizens of the state, Israeli Palestinians enjoy greater 
personal security and are afforded more rights, while their proficiency in Hebrew 
and familiarity with Israeli lifestyles positions them favourably with employers. 
Israeli Palestinian migrants in East Jerusalem are also overwhelmingly middle 
class and disproportionately well educated, comprising a “young, educated, 
modern elite, differing substantially from the typical profile of Israeli Palestinians 
throughout Israel” (Masry-Heralla and Razin, 2013: 1008). 
A considerable number of Israeli Palestinians have migrated to East Jerusalem 
since 1967, many drawn initially to the city’s higher education institutions.49 For 
                                            
49 Masry-Heralla and Razin (2013) estimate that the number of Israeli Palestinian migrants in 
Jerusalem was between 6,000 and 9,000 in 2009. Yacobi and Pullan (2014) suggest that 
around 7,200 Palestinians lived in Jewish neighbourhoods of Jerusalem at the end of 2008, the 
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female graduates in particular, permanent migration to Jerusalem after higher 
education has particular appeal (Arar et al., 2013). However, social interactions 
between Israeli Palestinian migrants and Palestinian residents of the city are 
limited. Masry-Herzalla and Razin (2013) describe Israeli Palestinians in East 
Jerusalem as “being neither part of Jerusalem’s Jewish society nor of East 
Jerusalem’s Palestinian society,” representing “an extreme example of the 
double periphery faced by Israeli Palestinians throughout Israel” (Masry-Herzalla 
and Razin, 2013: 1003). 
They describe the ‘middleman minority’ attributes of Israeli Palestinians in East 
Jerusalem as profound. The middleman concept relates to groups “functioning as 
economic and political intermediaries between the rulers and the population, but 
regarded as outsiders by both” (ibid: 1018) and this marginality is evident in the 
education and residential choices made by Israeli Palestinian migrants in the city. 
“The employment profile of Israeli Palestinian migrants in Jerusalem is of a white-
collar middle class, who highly depends on middleman functions, serving close 
to 300,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians” (ibid: 1013) and Masry-Heralla and 
Razin argue for the centrality of these middleman factions as a pull factor for 
Israeli Palestinian migrants in East Jerusalem. This middleman position, 
however, distances Israeli Palestinians from East Jerusalem residents, facilitating 
their growing movement into Israeli residential areas (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014) 
and defining the nature of the interactions. Weingrod and Manna (1998) also 
emphasise the ‘broker’ role played by Palestinian Israelis in East Jerusalem, 
arguing that particular ‘strategies of identification’ are required in the context of 
                                            
majority of whom were Israeli citizens. Many more, they suggest, may have moved into East 
Jerusalem residential neighbourhoods. 
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their own dual marginality. Not entirely accepted by either Palestinians or Israelis, 
the majority choose to live “along the seam” between Israeli and Palestinian 
Jerusalem (Weingrod and Manna, 1998). East Jerusalem residents frequently 
express negative attitudes towards Israeli Palestinians, arising from the fact that 
their sites of encounter often encompass this middleman function. For many 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem, their primary encounters with Israeli Palestinians 
take place within antagonistic settings such the Israeli Interior Ministry or the 
Jerusalem Municipality. Masry-Heralla and Razin also suggest that tensions 
between educated East Jerusalem residents and Israeli Palestinian migrants 
have grown steadily since the early 2000’s, “with the latter blamed for taking 
potential jobs from the former, particularly in education and welfare.” They 
maintain that “in Palestinian neighbourhoods they are distinct because of their 
adaptation of Israeli behaviours and lifestyles, and are also accused of snatching 
jobs from Palestinians and pushing rents upwards” (Masry-Heralla and Razin, 
2013: 1017). Weingrod and Manna (1998) recognise that the dual marginality of 
Israeli Palestinians in East Jerusalem does have some positive potential, but 
suggest that this could only be realised in circumstances of reduced conflict. Their 
position as part of yet also partially outside of each camp leads to a lack of trust 
on both sides which allows them no mediator role. 
 
 
4.2 Outstanding Grievances 
The data also indicates that outstanding grievances, related in particular to loss 
of land, remain a key source of anger and mistrust among East Jerusalem 
Palestinians. This was most apparent among those whose families had 
experienced dispossession directly in 1948 or in 1967. Many of these informants 
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indicated that the restitution of their family’s stolen land or property would bring 
closure to their grievances with Israel and allow them to live peacefully with 
Jewish neighbours. Among those whose families had not personally experienced 
dispossession, the loss of Palestine as a whole became a primary source of 
resentment and only its full recovery could end the enmity. Memory plays a 
significant role, in this sense, in sustaining Palestinian anger towards Israel. 
In 1948 Hanan’s family lost land and property in both Ramle and Wadi Hineh. Her 
grandfather’s house is now an institution for mentally disabled Israelis. She still 
finds talking about their dispossession very upsetting. Hanan showed me photos 
of her family home in Wadi Hineh, nostalgic images from another time in which 
her grandfather is a young man with his arms folded, leaning proudly against his 
car. In the photos, her father is just a child, standing by his father’s side. 
“We lost everything. We had dignity. They were wealthy, then suddenly they had 
nothing. It’s very painful. My daughters know everything, they always saw these 
pictures.” When Hanan took her daughters to visit the home in Wadi Hineh, they 
were stopped by an Ethiopian security guard who told them that they did not have 
permission to enter. “It’s our home, we don’t need permission!” her daughter told 
him. 
“We used to live in dignity and then suddenly we have nothing. Now everywhere 
on the whole earth you can find members of my family there. My mother now 
can’t go to visit her house in Ramle because she doesn’t have the Israeli ID, but 
I can go because I am a resident. I take my daughters and we go. To remember.” 
Hanan is married to her first cousin and her husband is one of 44 grandchildren 
with a claim to the property. However, of them all, only he has Israeli residency 
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and the right to reclaim the property. Most of his cousins live abroad, in Canada, 
America, Egypt, Switzerland. If her husband claims his share, the remainder 
would go to the Israeli government, confiscated under the absentee property 
laws. So they leave it unclaimed. 
“I am angry. I don’t have any hope that one day this will return to me or to my 
children… As for me I have no hope to return to Wadi Hineh, I am sure 100% that 
the Israelis have no intent to treat us well, as a human, because they want in one 
way or another to kick us out from the country.” 
Nasser lives comfortably in Shu’fat, but his parents were from Katamon and 
Talbieh, now in West Jerusalem. They owned two houses there which were lost 
in 1948 when his parents fled the fighting and took refuge on the eastern side of 
the city. “After 1967, my father showed me where he was born and exactly where 
he bought another house and where he had a grocery store that still he has the 
facture [receipt] for. It’s in Katamon, in West Jerusalem. And still, till now, we go 
to see our house, where my father was born and where he bought the other house 
and shop. They started again here [in East Jerusalem] and they built themselves 
up here and started from nothing. And we grew up and we helped them. And 
that’s the situation. The Jewish they took everything from us." 
Nasser’s family prospered in East Jerusalem and he is more philosophical about 
the property they lost, but still he reminds his children, and their children, about 
what was taken from them. The sadness and anger surrounding dispossession, 
despite the realisation that what was lost is now surely gone for ever, is sustained 
across generations with the result that historical grievances are maintained as 
present day realities. 
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Anderson and O'Dowd (1999) acknowledge that borders are rarely democratically 
produced and that for territorial democracy to work, the undemocratic origins of 
borders need to be ‘forgotten’. They recognise, however, that “[t]he problem with 
contested borders is precisely that ‘origins’ remain a live issue and cannot be 
‘forgotten’” (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999: 596). In East Jerusalem, appeals to 
democracy do not work “precisely because the territorial basis for the exercise of 
democracy is the issue” (ibid. 596), but also, in this case, because democracy 
would not support the ethnic exclusion of Palestinian residents that is essential 
to the preservation of Israel’s Jewish identity. 
4.3 Everyday life as politics 
For many of my interviewees, politics was a surprisingly difficult subject. East 
Jerusalem Palestinians are voracious consumers of news and the political 
situation at large is closely followed and widely discussed. However, without 
lacking in knowledge or awareness, residents often have little to say about 
Palestinian politics in the city or their own views. 
Recent studies have found that the cumulative effect of Israeli policies aimed at 
the depoliticisation and subjugation of East Jerusalem residents has been the 
“virtual eradication of organised Palestinian life in the city” (ICG, 2012). Certainly, 
Palestinians who even a decade ago were openly for Hamas or for Fatah are now 
far more apathetic about factional politics. Disillusionment with Hamas in Gaza 
and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and the absence of a nationalist 
liberation narrative with plausibility for the East Jerusalem constituency, are also 
significant factors. Palestinian Jerusalemites also fear the loss of their residency 
rights or the demolition of their homes if they engage in any kind of opposition 
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activity and even those inclined towards political participation do not find a worthy 
scene of engagement (Cohen, 2011).  
However, depoliticisation was not a concept that interviewees recognised as 
relevant to them. While none were actively engaged in any form of organised 
political activity or participation, many acknowledged that, for East Jerusalem 
Palestinians, politics is not something you choose to opt into or out of. The 
popularity of the factions may have dissipated and few residents may 
demonstrate or take part in elections, but most recognise that politics is none the 
less a part of their daily lives. Dr Sharif explained that there is no Palestinian 
political party or movement for East Jerusalem residents to support, but “whether 
we are interested or not, we are living in politics. I step outside of my home and I 
am in politics. I can’t avoid it, but why vote?” 
Khadija also spoke of the feeling that East Jerusalem Palestinians live politics, 
however much they try to distance themselves from it. “A lot of the time my kids 
ask me questions and I don’t want to show them these things, but you can’t put 
them in cotton wool. A lot of the time, if there is news on the television, I tell my 
husband ‘change the channel, they don’t have to see this,’ they don’t have to see 
it, you know? Not because I’m selfish, not because I don’t want them to know 
about the history, about Filastin, about these things, but because there is time. 
They will know. They will know the whole story. We live it. For me, my family 
always tried to take me apart from this, but you always find yourself in it.” Aisha 
agrees. “I don’t think a normal life is possible actually, because Jerusalem is really 
the point, for the Israelis and the Palestinians also. All of them fight for it.” 
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It is also the case, that the wider conflict impacts on everyday Palestinian life in 
the city and the way in which residents relate to Israel and Israelis. Despite the 
physical dislocation and tangential political realities, East Jerusalem Palestinians 
none the less remain deeply connected to the national cause and events beyond 
the city are often keenly felt. Hepburn (2004) argues that, while local politics are 
also shaped by local factors, Jerusalem remains central to the wider Palestinian-
Israeli conflict to the point that “the city politics of Jerusalem are in an important 
sense an extension of national politics”. 
Cohen (2011) also suggests that “just as events in Jerusalem, especially, but not 
only, on the Haram, affect the entire Palestinian public, so do events in the Israeli-
Palestinian arena affect the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem… the political 
system and Palestinian reality in Jerusalem are not free standing, but rather an 
inseparable part of the overall relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.” 
In addition to quotidian journeys, Palestinian leisure mobility into and through 
‘Jewish’ space is seen as undermining boundaries and Israeli control (Baumann, 
2016). During relatively peaceful periods, East Jerusalem Palestinians make 
frequent use of the superior facilities and resources available to Jewish Israelis 
and often speak in supercilious terms about Palestinian leisure provision in the 
West Bank. During periods of heightened tensions, East Jerusalem residents, out 
of fear or solidarity, are often more hesitant to access Jewish space. 
5 Conclusion 
In Chapter IV, I argued that East Jerusalem Palestinians, physically and politically 
dislocated from the West Bank, are increasingly ambivalent about Israeli rule in 
the city and are acting to improve their prospects within existing power structures. 
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In this chapter, I have made the case that despite this apparent shift in attitudes 
towards Israel, East Jerusalem Palestinians experience exclusion and 
discrimination within the Jewish state. 
The ethnocratic structure of the state combines with everyday manifestations of 
Israel’s colonial project in the city to leave Palestinian residents in no doubt that 
despite their forced inclusion, they are permanently positioned outside the limits 
of ‘society’. Even those who seek to improve their prospects within the context of 
de facto Israeli rule, find that inclusion, equality and security are ultimately beyond 
their reach. I have explored here the ways in which Israel’s Judaising policies, in 
addition to strategies aimed at the managed exclusion of Palestinians, are 
experienced by residents, for whom ‘normal life’ is in full view but ultimately out 
of reach. 
In chapter VI, I argue that the structures and strategies of power detailed in 
Chapters IV and V are shaping the site of Palestinian identity construction in East 
Jerusalem and ask how the dual marginality of residents is shaping the 
emergence of new subjectivities in the city.  
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CHAPTER VI 
SUBJECTIVITY AND STRUGGLE IN EAST JERUSALEM 
Acknowledging the discursive construction of national identity, Bowman (1994) 
argues that the scattered fate of Palestinians after 1948 resulted in “the 
construction of a number of different ‘Palestines’ corresponding to the different 
experiences of Palestinians in their places of exile.” Decades of dislocation and 
dispersion have engendered different senses of what it means to be Palestinian, 
to the extent that these varied communities might no longer recognise another’s 
conception of ‘Palestine’ or each other as allies in the pursuit of national 
liberation. 
This diversity of experience applies equally to those Palestinians whose exile is 
lived out ‘inside’ Israel and the occupied territories and to East Jerusalem 
residents whose social and political milieu has undergone dramatic change over 
the last two decades. Israel’s colonial enterprise in East Jerusalem began 
immediately after occupation, but gathered pace in the mid-1990s, establishing a 
new politics and an altered geography for this Palestinian constituency. 
Inside Israel’s de facto borders but beyond the limits of inclusion in the state 
project, East Jerusalem residents live with a perpetual sense of impermanence 
and the persistent threat of elimination. Their quotidian experience inside the 
politics and economy of the Israeli state diverges from that of Palestinians 
elsewhere in the occupied territories and from that of Palestinian citizens of Israel 
within its 1948 borders. Dislocated from the West Bank and devoid of Palestinian 
leadership or a liberation narrative with any practical plausibility or appeal, East 
Jerusalem residents are doubly marginalised. With little expectation of 
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challenging Israeli hegemony, they are individually engaged in daily, non-heroic 
struggles to survive in the city, to safeguard their existing rights and status, and 
to lead a ‘normal’ life. 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that these factors are shaping the site of identity 
construction in East Jerusalem and engendering a particular sense of what it 
means to be Palestinian that corresponds to this experience. I find that while East 
Jerusalem residents continue to frame their identity within the nationalist idiom 
(Bowman, 2007), key discursive signifiers (for example, occupation, statehood, 
resistance) have lost or changed meaning and that political frontiers in the city 
are not always located between Israelis and Palestinians. The everyday practices 
through which individual residents enact their identity are redefining from below - 
rather than from the political centre - what it is to be Palestinian in East Jerusalem, 
in a process of individual self-nationalisation (Jean‐Klein, 2001) that 
demonstrates this constituency’s distance from the essentialised identities 
privileged in mainstream studies. The bottom-up approach undertaken here 
makes visible this phenomenon, which is generally obscured within a top down 
analytic optic. 
I locate this discussion of identity formation in East Jerusalem within the broader 
context of Palestinian dislocation from the discursive structures through which 
identity was constructed after 1967. The PLO’s success in fixing the wide field of 
Palestinian experience to a single identity rested on the nebulousness of the 
national entity it strived for. It was the common experience of dispossession 
resulting from the creation of the state of Israel and the shared antagonism 
towards that state which gave cohesion to the Palestinian national community 
until Oslo. The PLO’s decision to negotiate a compromise settlement with Israel, 
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and its efforts to transform the abstract concept of ‘Palestine’ into an actual state, 
destabilised the consensus on identity, previously sustainable only because of its 
amorphous designs beyond the restitution of Palestinian land (Bowman, 2007). 
The Oslo agreement in this way destabilised the discursive structures through 
which identity had been constituted in East Jerusalem, while the concessions 
made by the PLO over Jerusalem established the city on a tangential political 
course within which new political subjectivities would be shaped. 
In Chapters IV and V, I detailed the specific structures and strategies of power 
evident in East Jerusalem and explored the terms in which Palestinians in the city 
frame their own experience of dislocation and domination. From the data 
presented, it is already evident that East Jerusalem residents experience more 
ambivalence towards Israeli rule and greater resistance towards the Palestinian 
Authority than mainstream studies typically allow. Meanwhile, they are 
constructed as an external minority inside Israel and excluded from full 
participation and equal status within the state. Here, I ask how this experience is 
shaping Palestinian identity in the city and what it suggests about the multiple 
projects in which residents are engaged and the contracting space in which 
individual agency is meaningful. I investigate how East Jerusalem Palestinians 
are adjusting their subjectivity and struggle within the matrix of power in East 
Jerusalem and suggest that existing scholarly approaches that privilege 
essentialised identities overlook the implications of these adaptations. 
Throughout much of this chapter, I follow a broadly discourse theoretical mode of 
investigation to shed light on the problematic assumptions that underpin existing 
approaches and to frame my own empirical conclusions. Discourse theory offers 
a problem-driven approach that begins with an object of investigation, identified 
269 
 
independently of the theory, and which aims “to produce new interpretations 
either by rendering visible phenomena previously undetected by dominant 
theoretical approaches, or by problematising existing accounts and articulating 
alterative interpretations” (Howarth, 2005). Discourse theory is particularly 
relevant to the constitution of political identities and the establishment of political 
frontiers through processes of othering (Howarth, 2005, Norval, 2000). As such, 
I draw frequently here on its vocabulary and theoretical contours to explore the 
scope for Palestinian agency and the ways in which Palestinian identity is 
adapting to the city’s spatial and political transformation since the mid-1990s.  
I also draw in this chapter on Howarth’s advice with regard to the structure of a 
discourse theory investigation: “A typical discursive study would begin with a 
critique of existing theoretical and empirical positions, from which it would develop 
an alternative framework of analysis with which to problematise and address a 
given object of analysis. This elaboration would involve a deconstruction of the 
problematic assumptions structuring existing approaches and the articulation of 
appropriate concepts and logics from the discursive approach. The study would 
then present the substantive empirical conclusions and arguments produced by 
the application of the theoretical framework to the problem explored” (Howarth, 
2010: 141). 
Loosely following this format, I begin below by developing the critique of 
mainstream scholarly approaches to East Jerusalem begun in Chapter I. 
Focusing on the problematic assumptions upon which many such studies are 
based, I aim to unsettle identities and reintroduce a sense ambiguity to the 
interpretation of everyday life, highlighting in particular the tangential experience 
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of Palestinians in the city and the meanings that they themselves attach to their 
actions and choices. 
Second, I focus directly on the site of identity construction in East Jerusalem, 
arguing that the actions of residents make clear the emergence of new 
subjectivities that are distanced from both the Palestinian political leadership and 
from mainstream nationalist discourses. 
While residents continue to identify as Palestinian, they are shaping the 
composition of that identity from below. Structural constraints limit the 
opportunities for self-direction in the city, but in the contracting space in which 
their agency is meaningful, Palestinian residents are adapting to enduring 
occupation and seeking to improve their future prospects within the context of 
continuing Israeli rule. In this way, residents are articulating their Palestinian 
identity in line with their experience, but in ways that may not be recognisable to 
Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories. I argue that this has direct 
implications for political and scholarly approaches to the wider conflict and its 
resolution. 
Third, I turn my attention to Palestinian struggle in East Jerusalem, arguing that 
modes of resistance there in the post-Oslo period manifest the multiple subject 
positions held by residents as well as their dual marginality, which locates them 
outside the state project of both sides. The way in which East Jerusalem 
Palestinians frame their own struggles reflects the divergence of their political 
experience and their asymmetrical relationship to Israeli power. In the annexed 
city, dislocation and domination are undermining collective understandings of 
resistance and new individualised interpretations are emerging in which the 
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frontiers between ‘us’ and ‘them’ do not necessarily overlap with those between 
‘friend’ and ‘enemy’. 
Finally, I recognise that while discursive dislocations threaten identities, they are 
also the foundations on which new identities are constructed (Laclau, 1990). In 
this context, I consider these new subjectivities and possibilities for future 
mobilisation in East Jerusalem, focusing on the barriers to Palestinian inclusion 
in Israel and the link between oppression and the radicalisation of identities. 
1 Analytic Framework 
In this section, I problematise three of the main assumptions that underpin 
existing explanatory approaches to East Jerusalem and outline an analytic 
framework that supports the discussion below. I take issue with mainstream 
scholarly positions which are concerned less with the particular relationship East 
Jerusalem residents have to Israeli power, than with identifying resistance and 
reading into it the incompleteness of Israeli hegemony or the resilience of an 
objective Palestinian identity.  
Maintaining that structural power limits, but does not determine, the possibilities 
for mediating agency, I argue that the praxis of everyday life in East Jerusalem 
must be understood within the context of complex power relations in which 
Palestinian residents are situated inside, rather than outside and against, 
established structures. I detail the need for an analytic approach which de-
essentialises Palestinian identity, decentres resistance and de-totalises the 
agent, allowing for a discussion of Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in East 
Jerusalem in which identities are understood to be contingent and the praxis of 
everyday life is examined from the perspective of those on the ground and not 
from above. 
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1.1 De-essentialising Identity 
Popular Palestinian (and Israeli) nationalist discourses typically favour 
essentialist representations of identity (Sherwell, 2006) which define the limits of 
inclusivity and give substance to territorial claims. From a Palestinian perspective, 
these binaries help to prevent ‘normalisation’ and to maintain pressure for 
nationalist goals set by the political centre. From an official Israeli point of view, 
the perpetuation of a distinctive self/other dichotomy helps to sustain the 
ethnocratic vision of the state and to facilitate the non-inclusion of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians in the hegemonic project while simultaneously Judaising the urban 
space they inhabit.  
Mainstream academic approaches also rely heavily on dominant discursive 
articulations that privilege top-down issues such as occupation, sovereignty and 
borders, producing a polarisation of identities and locating the future of East 
Jerusalem and its residents firmly within the framework of two competing 
nationalist narratives. These approaches perpetuate an impression of inevitable 
ethnic conflict and objective antagonism, downplaying the historical contingency 
of discursive structures through which identity is obtained and glossing over the 
extent to which everyday practices in East Jerusalem require regular adaptation 
(Pullan and Baillie, 2013). Uncoupling the praxis of everyday life from a top-down 
analytic framework sheds light on the extent of Palestinian disempowerment in 
the city, the alienation of residents from official nationalist discourses and the 
narrowing field of opportunity for agency.  
I argue that the essentialised identities on which ethnocratic and colonial relations 
are constructed are not objective knowledge. A bottom-up approach allows the 
researcher to interpret actions in terms of the subject’s own understanding of 
273 
 
what they are doing and why, demonstrating the way in which identity is 
constituted through everyday social practice. I posit here that systemic power 
relations are internalised at an individual level, thereby influencing the subject’s 
sense of self and of their future possibilities (Maiguashca, 2013). In this way, 
identity is also revealed as strategic and temporary. The shrinking space in which 
agency is meaningful for East Jerusalem becomes the site of subject formation 
in the city. Top-down approaches also understate the manner in which systemic 
power relations are internalised by the individual, shaping their sense of self and 
influencing the strategic construction of new subjectivities. The establishment of 
a ‘them’ and ‘us’ through the construction of political frontiers is an essential 
component of identity formation. The frontier does not overlay a real, natural 
identity, however, but must be regarded as fluid and contingent. Thus, the 
formation of frontiers does not reflect identities, but is constitutive of them (Norval, 
2000). In circumstances of structural dislocation, these identities fall into crisis 
and subjectivities are reconsidered. I suggest below that the political frontiers in 
East Jerusalem are no longer exclusively those between Israelis and 
Palestinians. 
1.2 De-Centring Resistance 
Next, I problematise the over-reliance of mainstream academic approaches to 
East Jerusalem on a domination/resistance framework. I argue that a binary 
analysis which begins with occupation and anticipates resistance underestimates 
the scale of oppression in East Jerusalem, the depth of Palestinian 
disempowerment and the presence of multiple and overlapping subject positions, 
not all of which are oppositional. I suggest instead that the nature of Palestinian 
resistance in East Jerusalem should be approached as a diagnostic of power and 
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the opportunities for Palestinian agency, and that Palestinian framings of their 
own self and struggle should be forefronted. 
Recent decades have witnessed an explosion of academic interest in quotidian 
forms of resistance and the everyday ways in which marginalised communities 
appropriate space and subvert its intended meanings (Bayat, 2007, De Certeau, 
1984, Mitchell, 1990, Perera, 2009, Pullan and Baillie, 2013, Richter-Devroe, 
2011, Scott, 2005, Spivak, 2005). The everyday has become the site of agency 
in politics and particularly so in circumstances of oppression and domination 
(Richmond, 2009, Richter-Devroe, 2011). It is the level at which hegemony 
functions, but also that which it is contested (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015). 
Subaltern studies have sought in this way to reclaim power for marginalised 
groups and to recuperate the urban poor as subjects with unique political agency 
(Roy, 2011). Emphasis on power and the production of space also highlights the 
multiplicity of ways in which its everyday users are able to appropriate or 
challenge meanings (De Certeau, 1984, Lefebvre, 1991). Deeply asymmetrical 
power relations in East Jerusalem have focused scholarly attention on the range 
of temporal tactics employed by the weak, in particular the everyday ways of 
operating by which the users of space manipulate, divert and re-appropriate its 
intended meanings (De Certeau, 1984). In this way, the occupation/resistance 
binary has come to dominate systems of signification for understanding 
Palestinian actions and behaviour and it becomes tempting to read resistance 
into every aspect of Palestinian daily life. 
This politically motivated impulse is often well intentioned and may be felt to 
empower Palestinian residents and invest them with agency. This interpretation 
of everyday Palestinian life, however, often results in one-dimensional portrayals 
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of East Jerusalem residents whose role is vaguely-defined and limited to 
‘resisting’ a complex and exhaustively detailed matrix of Israeli strategies. I offer 
here two examples. First, Shlomo (2016a) describes the occupation of East 
Jerusalem as a form of colonial urbanism, characterised on the Israeli side by a 
complex constellation of legal ambiguities and exceptional governmentalities. 
Palestinians, however, are defined merely by their “efforts to resist their forced 
inclusion within State apparatuses and to retain their urban identity by separatism 
and resistance to Israeli rule.” 
In the second example, Jadallah (2014) describes in detail the colonialist 
construction of urban space in East Jerusalem, paying close attention to the 
state’s attempts to deconstruct and re-narrate the history of the other and to 
eliminate alternative sovereignties. Palestinians, meanwhile, are said to hold 
“competing discourses” and to “consistently resist these attempts at 
reconstructing history,” through quotidian practices that “can be read in the urban 
space” (ibid: 93). These include graffiti and symbolic protests including solidarity 
activism, vigils, lawsuits, marches, and the memorialisation of key figures or 
events in the national struggle (ibid: 82). Nowhere in her analysis does the author 
consider what these informal and largely ineffectual modes of resistance reveal 
about the depth of Israeli power in East Jerusalem or the extent to which it has 
penetrated Palestinian decision-making. 
Over emphasis on resistance to occupation as a framework for understanding 
Palestinian actions prevents a full and thorough exploration of the structures of 
domination in which they are situated. Abu Lughod suggests that those who 
sense something admirable in resistance tend to look for it hopefully as 
confirmation of the incompleteness of systems of oppression. Studies which are 
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motivated more by the urge to identify resistance than to examine power over-
romanticise resistance and give insufficient consideration to the depth and 
complexity of forms of domination (Abu-Lughod, 1990).  
Researchers operating from a Southern critical perspective have also challenged 
attempts to locate transformative agency within spaces of dispossession. Roy 
(2011) calls for a disruption of approaches which “celebrate the habitus of 
‘slumdog cities’ and assign unique political agency to the mass of urban 
subalterns.”50 She also takes issue with academic approaches, such as Bayat’s 
‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ which assign undue agency to subalterns 
who are able to exploit informality to improve their condition. Rather, urban 
informalities should be understood in terms of the “ever-shifting urban 
relationship between the legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorised 
and unauthorised” which is “the site of considerable state power and violence” 
(Roy, 2011: 233). 
I demonstrate below that East Jerusalem Palestinians are engaged in multiple 
daily struggles. A binary analytic framework which essentialises identity and 
seeks out resistance fails to recognise that the process of subjectification takes 
place within complex and overlapping power relations. Following Foucault, I 
argue that power structures the conditions of possibility within which agents make 
choices. An exploration of these choices and how they change therefore reveals 
much about strategies and structures of power (Abu-Lughod, 1990, Foucault, 
2000, Junka, 2006). 
                                            
50 For example, Roy questions the account of one journalist who found the hours spent in 
Mumbai’s Dharavi slum to be among the most uplifting of their life; expecting to find a 
neighbourhood characterised by misery, the observer discovered instead “a bustling 
enterprising place, packed with small-scale industries defying their circumstances to flourish 
amid the squalor” (S. Crerar, The Times, 2010, cited in Roy, 2011). 
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Framing practices in terms of resistance limits the analysis of social practices and 
even reinforces the same forms of power that resistance seeks to undermine. For 
Rose (2002), therefore, the issue is not to discount the effects of power, but to 
reconsider how to conceptualise the experience of it. Without an articulation of 
intent to resist, moreover, Rose argues that the researcher rather than the agent 
identifies the source of oppression as well as the practice enacted to resist it. 
Resistance studies undermine the value of their analysis by seeking to fix it within 
this binary distinction. 
1.3 De-Totalising the Agent 
Finally, I argue that structures of power are multiple and overlapping and that the 
privileging of top-down issues essentialises Palestinians as either passive victims 
of domination or steadfast resistors of occupation, while paying insufficient 
attention to the multiplicity of subject positions they hold. In practice, many studies 
continue to assume that the frontiers, or sites of contestation, in East Jerusalem 
are always located between Israelis and Palestinians. The possibility that 
Palestinian individuals or groups might be engaged in contestations not 
exclusively based on their antagonism to Israel continues to be overlooked.  
I argue here that East Jerusalem Palestinians simultaneously occupy a range of 
subject positions and may be involved in multiple projects. Over-reliance on 
ethnonational motivations to explain everyday actions (and the emphasis on 
everyday practices as a site of resistance) obscure this diversity. There is agency 
beyond resistance even in situations of oppression and the subject positions from 
which agents act do not remain static; as the field of possibility shifts, so too does 
the site of subjectification and struggle. In East Jerusalem, resistance to 
occupation is criminalised, Palestinian politics are obsolete and residents find that 
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there is little to struggle for. In this context, the site of subjectification has shifted 
and Palestinians are enacting their agency in ways that challenge essentialised 
notions of identity and shed light on their complex relationship to the structures 
of power in the city. 
Quotidian practices may possess a multiplicity of meanings and motivations, 
many of which are potentially overlooked within situations of ethno-national 
conflict in which oppression and resistance are assumed to be objective realities. 
Mouffe (1993) asks how we can expect to “grasp the multiplicity of relations of 
subordination that can affect an individual if we envisage social agents as 
homogeneous and unified entities?” Since a multiplicity of subject positions 
constitute a single agent, she argues that it is essential to develop a theory of the 
subject as a “decentred, detotalised agent, a subject constructed at the point of 
intersection of a multiplicity of subject positions between which there exists no a 
priori or necessary relation and whose articulation is the result of hegemonic 
practices.” It is in this sense that identity is never definitely established, always 
retaining instead a degree of ambiguity and openness (Mouffe, 1993). 
I also argue in this context, that Palestinian politics in East Jerusalem and the 
politics of external domination may have points of convergence as well as 
contestation. Ortner suggests that in a relationship of power, the dominant group 
frequently has something to offer and the subordinate may have grounds for 
ambivalence about the resisting relationship. “Subordinated selves may retain 
oppositional authenticity and agency by drawing on aspects of the dominant 
culture to criticise their own world as well as the situation of domination” (Ashi 
Nandy, cited in Ortner, 1995: 190). I make clear in Chapter IV, that residents do 
draw on Israeli governmental and administrative practices to critique the 
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leadership of the Palestinian Authority and that they are disinclined to resist Israeli 
occupation while there is no vision of Palestinian liberation for which they are 
willing to struggle.  
Nor, moreover, is there ever a single, unitary subordinate. Resisters do more than 
simply oppose domination and their own endogenous struggles, political and 
domestic, must be brought to light. “Overall, the lack of an adequate sense of 
prior and ongoing politics among subalterns must inevitably contribute to an 
inadequate analysis of resistance itself” (Ortner, 1995: 179). The urge to 
“sanitise” the internal politics of the dominated, Ortner claims, must be 
understood as fundamentally romantic. “Resistance studies are thin on the 
internal politics of dominated groups… thin on the subjectivity - the intentions, 
desires, fears, projects – of the actors engaged in these dramas” (Ibid: 190). 
There is a reluctance within East Jerusalem studies, perhaps a “failure of nerve” 
(Ibid: 190), to acknowledge that the “urban-geopolitical rupture” (Shlomo, 2017: 
225) experienced by East Jerusalem in the post-Oslo period might equally have 
contributed to the rupture of Palestinian subjectivities in the city. 
1.4 Identity and Subjectivity in Discourse Theory 
In this section I outline the way in which the terms ‘identity’, ‘subjectivity’ and 
‘discursive dislocation’ are understood within the discussion below.51 Following 
the theoretical contours of discourse theory, I posit that the identity of subjects 
and objects is conferred by socially constructed systems of meaningful practices, 
                                            
51 I refer to ‘discursive dislocation’ here to distinguish this discussion from the physical 
dislocation of East Jerusalem.  
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rituals and beliefs that are articulated together into discourse52. This 
understanding of discourse is not limited to language, but involves all social 
practice.53 
Discourse involves the fixing of meanings within a particular domain and the 
removal of ambiguity surrounding those meanings. While discourses are 
presented as a totality in which closure is achieved, these formations are always 
contingent and historically constructed; they never produce a ‘sutured totality’ and 
as such remain vulnerable to forces (and meanings) excluded in their production 
and to the dislocatory impact of events outside of their control. Due to the 
contingency and ultimate unfixity of discourse, identity is always unfinished and 
in process, and at all times ambiguous and open (Howarth, 2010, Howarth et al., 
2000, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, Mouffe, 1993). 
Subjectivity is understood within discourse theory as a sense of self, located 
within the individual before identities become fixed within discourse. It refers to 
the way in which people act. In this sense, subjectivity accounts for the agency 
of the individual, while subject positions capture their positioning within a 
discursive structure. In short, subject positions are located within discourse, while 
subjectivity is located within the individual. 
                                            
52 The following summary of discourse theory is derived from the work of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantelle Mouffe and the development of these ideas by the so-called Essex School of 
discourse theorists. See in particular HOWARTH, D. 2010. Discourse. Concepts in the Social 
Sciences, Buckingham, Open University;HOWARTH, D., STAVRAKAKIS, Y. & NORVAL, A. J. 
2000. Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press;LACLAU, E. 1990. New Reflections on the Revolution 
of Our Time, London, Verso;LACLAU, E. & MOUFFE, C. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso. 
53 This is the main basis of the distinction between discourse theory and discourse analysis. 
See HOWARTH, D. 2005. Applying Discourse Theory: The Method of Articulation. In: 
HOWARTH, D. & TORFING, J. (eds.) Discourse Theory in European Politics. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
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Political subjectivities reflect the decision-making process of the subject and are 
formed by the identification of agents with political projects and their associated 
discourses. Once these subjectivities are fixed into subject positions within a 
particular discourse, they confer identity. Identity might thus been described as 
subjectivity’s singular ‘fixing’ at a particular moment, where identity is an 
ideological construct formulated within various power structures in order to 
provide the individual with a sense of belonging (Anishchenkova, 2014).  
Discourse theory recognises frontier formation as a sine qua non of identity 
formation. (Norval, 2000). Identities are constructed by an externalisation of the 
other through the drawing of political frontiers. However, the construction of 
frontiers is an ambiguous process; frontiers do not exist as the closed, internal 
moments of a political discourse, but, “rather, the constitutive outside, brought 
into being through the drawing of boundaries, functions as both a condition of 
possibility and as a condition of impossibility of identity and objectivity… the 
constitutive outside of any order has the capacity to put into question the very 
identity which is constituted through its externalisation” (Norval, 1994). 
The contingency of discursive structures within which individuals acquire their 
identity is made visible through the process of dislocation. Agents are compelled 
to act, to make choices and to reconsider their subjectivity when dislocations 
disrupt identities and discourses; that is, “when social identities are in crisis and 
structures need to be recreated” (Howarth et al., 2000). Dislocation threatens 
existing identities and “creates a lack at the level of meaning that stimulates new 
discursive constructions.”  Thus, it is a lack of meaning in the structure from which 
new political subjectivities emerge. With discursive structures destabilised and 
social identities in crisis, the political subject is forced to take decisions and to 
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identify with projects that seem capable of mending the structure. It is in this 
process of identification that agents emerge and subjectivities are created which, 
once formed and stabilised, become the subject positions which locate the 
subject within discourse. 
1.5 The Everyday as a Site of Identity Construction 
Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Howarth argues that “if the concept of 
subject position accounts for the multiple forms by which agents are produced as 
social actors, the concept of political subjectivity concerns the way in which social 
actors act” (Howarth et al., 2000). In this section, I make the case that the 
everyday social and political space in which East Jerusalem Palestinians live and 
act is an appropriate site for exploring the articulation of new subjectivities not yet 
captured within discursive structures that are typically predicated on essentialised 
identities and which presuppose antagonism as an objective relationship 
between them. 
Howarth (2010) notes that the multiple qualitative methods used by discourse 
analysts to generate and gather empirical data resemble those employed by 
historical, ethnographic and anthropological researchers. Discourse theorists 
supplement the narrow textual modes of investigation typically associated with 
discourse analysis with “in-depth interviews and ethnographic forms of 
investigation such as participant observation and by investigating the structural 
features of the contexts that limit, but do not determine, social and political 
possibilities” (Howarth, 2010: 140). 
Discourse theory offers a valuable framework for exploring and interpreting the 
articulation of new political subjectivities. Below, I draw on its language and 
theoretical precepts to suggest that the disruption of existing discursive structures 
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through which identity was constructed in East Jerusalem after 1967 and the new 
political landscape that emerged as a result of Oslo, have reintroduced ambiguity 
to once partially fixed meanings, destabilising identity and recreating political 
subjectivities. 
While this approach has not previously been used to analyse the situation of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians, it has been applied to other Palestinian communities, 
such as the Bedouin communities in the Naqab. Yiftachel draws on a range of 
post-colonial theories and Gramscian-inspired approaches54, including the 
discourse theory outlined by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), “to interpret the dynamic 
of oppressive ‘gray spacing’ and identity transformation” within this community 
and to investigate “the development of new political subjectivities among 
excluded groups, particularly in urban colonial situations” (Yiftachel, 2009a: 253). 
He suggests that this complex process of articulation “is composed of dozens of 
practices, movements, discourses and mobilisations” (ibid: 256). 
Müller (2011) maintains that since identities cut across different systems of 
signification, including social practice, micro-contexts and the everyday become 
relevant sites for the discursive construction of identities. While agents are not 
always linguistically able to express the entirety of their social knowledge, it is 
none the less communicated in their daily activities. In this context, therefore, I 
argue that the praxis of everyday life in East Jerusalem and an understanding of 
how Palestinian residents themselves frame their quotidian experience, may offer 
                                            
54 Yiftachel defines these Gramscian-inspired approaches as those which “perceive the making 
of identities as part of a ceaseless political process,” in contrast to Marxian or liberal theories 
which regard identities “pre-political.” See YIFTACHEL, O. 2009a. Critical Theory and ‘Gray 
Space’: Mobilization of the Colonized. City, 13, 246-263. 
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some indication of the articulation of new political subjectivities in the city which 
have not yet become fixed within discourse. 
2 Identity Construction in East Jerusalem After Oslo 
In this section I present, analyse and theorise my main findings with regard to 
identity construction in East Jerusalem and the political dynamics influencing the 
emergence of new Palestinian subjectivities in the city. I draw on the bottom-up 
analysis of everyday Palestinian life presented in Chapters IV and V, and the way 
in which residents frame their own behaviours, to demonstrate that new, creative 
subjectivities are emerging in East Jerusalem in which the us/them relationship 
is more ambiguous than elsewhere in the occupied territories and contestations 
are no longer exclusively Israeli/Palestinian. East Jerusalem Palestinians are 
adapting to their dislocation and to the permanent postponement of national 
liberation and are striving to improve their prospects within existing power 
structures. Exclusion from the Israeli national project, meanwhile, limits the 
opportunities for participation and suggests that more radical mobilisations may 
lay ahead. These new subjectivities are made visible by a bottom-up approach 
which recognises that identity is historically contingent and constructed through 
everyday practices. 
First, I argue that the circumstances of dislocation and domination in the city, 
combined with the PA’s failure to project an inclusive nationalist discourse, are 
re-orienting Palestinian subjectivities away from the occupied territories towards 
Israel. If the PLO’s commitment to a negotiated settlement with Israel shattered 
the consensus on Palestinian identity (previously constituted in relation to 
antagonism with the Zionist state), then the concessions it accepted on East 
Jerusalem set this constituency on its divergent political trajectory, shaping the 
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space in which attempts to suture the discursive dislocation would take place. 
The experience of East Jerusalem Palestinians, inside the Israeli state but 
excluded from full participation, has engendered a particular conception of what 
it means to be Palestinian in the city that is at odds with the essentialised 
Palestinian identity on which mainstream academic approaches typically rely. 
Recognising subjectivity as the way in which people act, and acknowledging that 
identity is constituted through everyday practices, I argue that, in the post-Oslo 
period, Palestinian residents are adapting individually to de facto Israeli rule and 
buttressing their status in the occupied city against any potential encroachment 
of Palestinian Authority jurisdiction over them. 
Next, I highlight the fact that, despite the reorientation of everyday Palestinian life 
in East Jerusalem away from the occupied territories, residents continue to define 
themselves within the nationalist idiom. From a top-down, binarized perspective, 
greater Palestinian engagement with Israel is interpreted within the context of 
normalisation or Israelification. I make the case here, however, that key 
discursive signifiers have lost or changed meaning and that residents are 
reinterpreting collective labels in individual ways. While few in the city experience 
any difficulty reconciling their own actions and choices with their national identity, 
the shared sense that others in the city are losing theirs reflects the dislocation of 
residents from the political centre and from the mainstream nationalist narrative 
that underpins most scholarly approaches to the conflict and its resolution. 
Finally, I suggest that East Jerusalem Palestinians are reshaping the composition 
of Palestinian identity in the city from below through the creative act of 
identification. This transformation is unfinished and part of an ongoing political 
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process. Analytic paradigms which fail to take account of these changes are of 
little value in addressing the challenges that face this constituency. 
2.1 New Subjectivities in East Jerusalem 
I argue here that exclusive Israeli power, the collapse of Palestinian politics in the 
city and an unpopular national leadership, are orienting Palestinian subjectivities 
in East Jerusalem away from the occupied territories towards deeper 
engagement with and participation in Israel. I locate this argument within the 
context of East Jerusalem’s divergent political trajectory, deeply asymmetrical 
power relations in the city and the contracting space in which Palestinian agency 
is meaningful. 
East Jerusalem Palestinians live inside Israel’s de facto borders and within the 
ground politics and economy of the state. Dislocated from the Palestinian milieu, 
residents generally frame the practice of everyday life in the city with reference 
to the situation of domination and the necessity of adaptation. Ziad says that 
health and education are “outside of politics” and that, in most other areas, there 
is simply no choice but to follow Israeli laws and to engage with its institutions. “I 
live in Jerusalem and, if I live in Jerusalem, it has to be like this… I am living in 
Israel. It’s an occupation, but I am living here and in every single detail of my life 
I am dealing with them.” 
Residents agree that some level of cooperation with the state is mandatory and 
unavoidable in the annexed city. Paying arnona to receive municipal services or 
making social security contributions to receive health care, for example, are 
obligatory on all residents and citizens. Rana explains that as Israeli residents, 
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Jerusalem Palestinians are inside, not outside, the legal and administrative 
structures of the state: 
“If you want to open a bank account or have a telephone at home. If you need to 
travel abroad or have an operation. In all these things, there is no choice, you 
have to go through them [the Israeli authorities]. It is the only way to live or to get 
anything done. And not only that. There are consequences if you do not do as 
you have to. It’s the law, we can’t ignore it just because we don’t like them. If we 
don’t do these things we will suffer, not them.” 
Top-down processes significantly impact quotidian practices in East Jerusalem 
and deeply asymmetrical power relations limit the opportunities for individual 
agency. However, it is evident from the data presented above that the praxis of 
everyday life in the city goes beyond a straightforward struggle for survival. 
Notwithstanding the hardships and degradations of occupation and the poverty 
of Palestinian residents relative to their Jewish neighbours, East Jerusalemites 
are looking beyond ‘bare life’ survival strategies towards deeper, non-essential 
and voluntary interactions with the occupation regime to improve their prospects 
within it. 
These interactions also go beyond the surreptitious methods described by Bayat, 
through which the marginalised seek to better their lives and to generate 
opportunity within the context of informal life. In many ways, East Jerusalem 
residents do seek to improve their lives within circumstances of informality, 
through illegal building, for example, or by taking advantage of the lack of 
municipal enforcement in spatially excluded enclaves such as Kufr ‘Aqab, to live 
with West Bank partners without risking the loss of their own residency 
(Baumann, 2016). 
288 
 
However, deeper engagements with and attempts to gain entry to formal Israeli 
life are also apparent. Higher education or professional opportunities inside Israel 
are increasingly permissible to Palestinian residents who regard them as 
necessary and justifiable in the pursuit of a better quality of life. More East 
Jerusalemites are seeking out Hebrew language instruction after Tawjihi in order 
to access education and employment opportunities inside Israel. There is also 
growing demand within East Jerusalem schools for the opportunity to follow the 
Israeli Bugrut curriculum, which allows young Palestinians to leave secondary 
education with a qualification recognised inside Israel and accepted by Israeli 
universities. 
These should be interpreted as strategic decisions, reflecting the reality that, 
to all intents and purposes, East Jerusalem residents live inside the Israeli 
state. Palestinians returning from study ‘abroad’ – even when only as far away 
as the West Bank – experience frustration when their professional 
qualifications are not recognised by Israeli employers and their lack of Hebrew 
language skills places them at a disadvantage to Jewish graduates. Those 
who wish to remain in East Jerusalem are also required to earn a salary 
commensurate with the high cost of living in the city, which employment within 
the Israeli economy is more likely to offer. 
Following Foucault, I suggest that in any relationship of power, the subject is 
always “faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several 
ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are available” (Foucault, 2000: 342). In 
the post-Oslo period, East Jerusalem Palestinians are acting to improve their 
lives and livelihoods within the context and structures of de facto Israeli rule and, 
as a result, they are drawn into non-essential, voluntary relationships with the 
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state, its people and institutions. New subjectivities are emerging as a result of 
these creative adaptations to Israeli rule which, crucially, offer Palestinian 
residents a means of actively participating in complex and dynamic power 
relations in their context (Ho and Tsang, 2000). Residents are responding in 
individual ways to the circumstances of dislocation and domination, making 
decisions that are limited by structural factors, but ultimately intentional and self-
generated. In discourse theoretical terms, this is the site of subjectivity. It is in this 
space that agency is enacted and new subjectivities are formed when 
dislocations occur and individuals are forced to make choices. 
The trend towards ‘improvement of life’ within the context of Israeli rule manifests 
power inequalities in the city, the alienation of this constituency from mainstream 
nationalist narratives and the sense of permanence that the occupation has 
acquired. In one sense, therefore, individual advancement and material concerns 
are filling the vacuum left by the collapse of Palestinian politics in the city. From 
a bottom-up perspective, however, it is also apparent that East Jerusalem 
residents are choosing deeper participation in existing power structures as a way 
of protecting their status and opportunities within them, and, crucially, to buttress 
themselves against any encroachment of PA jurisdiction over their lives and their 
city. This understanding of Palestinian subjectivity in East Jerusalem is at odds 
with the essentialised identity that is imposed within a domination/resistance 
binary. It also raises questions about the ‘Palestinian’ identity of East Jerusalem 
residents. 
2.2 Loss of Collective Understandings of Identity 
Despite changing patterns of behaviour, East Jerusalem residents continue to 
identity robustly as Palestinian. From a top-down perspective, this fact obscures 
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the dislocation that has taken place. It is apparent, however, that while individuals 
experience little difficulty reconciling their own choices with their national identity, 
they none the less believe that others in the city are losing touch with theirs. I 
suggest here that this phenomenon should be explained with reference to the 
dislocation of East Jerusalem from discursive structures, the loss of collective 
understandings regarding identity and the creative space that this has opened for 
individual interpretations of what it is to be Palestinian in the annexed city. 
Several interviewees spoke of their right to a ‘normal’ life to justify their choices. 
Others, said that they are simply using Israeli tools to further their own education 
or to increase their earning potential. Ziad explained that when he catalogues 
Palestinian books for the Israeli national library, which he recognises from their 
markings as stolen from a West Bank home or mosque, he tells himself that one 
day this will be a Palestinian national library, that he is cataloguing these texts for 
a future Palestinian state. Summa intends to pursue her chosen specialism in an 
Israeli hospital and hopes that this will lead to further opportunities to train in a 
sub-specialism of her choosing. She knows that this will take many years and 
that, in the meantime, she will continue to treat Israeli patients in Israeli hospitals, 
but she tells me that this is acceptable because one day she will be able to use 
all this knowledge and training to help Palestinians. 
These accounts indicate that when it comes to non-essential manifestations of 
advanced participation, residents continue to rely on culturally available 
discourses to construct a nationalist rationale for their actions. There could be 
many reasons for this. It may reflect an individual or collective unease with such 
choices or, alternatively, the participant’s perception that I as an ‘outsider’ would 
not understand their motivations or be able to put them in context. 
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Few East Jerusalem Palestinians experience any discomfiture over their own 
identity or nationalist ‘credentials,’ yet there clearly exists a shared concern that 
others in the city are ‘losing’ theirs to varying degrees or that a general diminution 
of Palestinian identity in East Jerusalem is occurring. Despite a shared 
understanding that non-essential engagement is justifiable in pursuit of a better 
quality of life, the atomisation of East Jerusalem Palestinians ensures that there 
are few collective understandings about how far is too far in terms of participation 
and if there is a point at which a line needs to be drawn.  
The circumstances of domination in East Jerusalem are influencing the choices 
made by Palestinian residents, drawing them into relationships with the state that 
are unfamiliar to, and frequently misunderstood by, Palestinians elsewhere in the 
occupied territories. The absence of Palestinian leadership or a nationalist 
discourse with any plausibility or appeal for this constituency is further shaping 
the perception that liberation is indefinitely postponed, leaving residents with little 
to struggle for beyond their own best interests under Israeli rule.  
This pattern of behaviour is often discussed within the ill-defined context of 
‘normalisation’ or ‘Israelification’ among East Jerusalem residents (Bulle, 2009, 
Salem, 2011, Yousef, 2011, Hasson, 2012, Kelly, 2016, Mozgovaya, 2011, JTA, 
2017). It also signals the distance that has emerged between this constituency 
and Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories (Fenster and Shlomo, 
2011). Cohen suggests that a new generation of East Jerusalemites matured 
during the Oslo years that viewed the Palestinian Authority as “a neighbouring 
entity, rather than a source of authority and identity, and regarded its population 
as Palestinians of a different species rather than partners in a common fate” 
(Cohen, 2011: 36).  
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Ziad’s level of non-essential interaction is high in relation to other interviewees, 
yet he is secure in his own choices and says that all Palestinians resist in their 
own way. He is concerned, however, by the trend among young East 
Jerusalemites to leave education to take up unskilled employment in Israeli hotels 
and restaurants. 
“This is the major change. I believe it’s the most important detail in the 
Jerusalemite social life. Because for a guy who can earn a thousand dollars in a 
month, this is very attractive for him. Especially because his father, the educated 
father, is also earning $1,000 in a month. So, the young guy is thinking to himself, 
why should I go to university, study a long time to graduate, to earn $1000 if even 
now I can earn that much… Maybe a guy of fifteen years old can earn $1,000 in 
a hotel. At 15 he does not have the logic to know what is positive and what is 
negative, what is Palestinian and what is Israeli. So, when he is 15 years old and 
dealing with Jews and Israeli society he is going to easily melt.” 
Interestingly, Ziad has no difficulty reconciling his own educational and 
professional interactions inside Israel with his Palestinian national identity, yet he 
questions the behaviours of others whose interactions are different and, arguably, 
driven more by economic necessity than career advancement. As the 
headmistress of an East Jerusalem school, Hanan is also alarmed by the 
perceived decline in the strength of Palestinian identity among young people in 
the city. 
“This is a problem! We [head teachers in East Jerusalem] had a meeting last 
week in the Frere school and we’ve been talking about this, that we are all facing 
students who are lacking for their Palestinian nationality, for their Palestinian 
identity, because they are living in Jerusalem. They are losing it, slowly, slowly 
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every year and every year we are seeing that the students have less and less 
emphasis for Palestine.”  
Hanan explained that the parents of many of her students are employed by 
Israelis. Many educated mothers, for example, are entering the workforce and 
taking up employment in Israeli-funded schools. The children understand from a 
young age that salaries are significantly higher if you are employed by Israelis. 
Hanan explains that as a head teacher in one of only two East Jerusalem schools 
that refuses a relationship with both the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli 
Ministry of Education, and receives no funding from either, her salary has 
suffered. “Since 1995 till now, it’s 21 years, and I have only 7,000 shekels my 
salary. If I am in a school funded by the Israelis, my salary will be more than 12-
15,000 Israeli shekels. So, there is a lot of difference between the two salaries. 
Many of the students their mothers are teachers in the Israeli schools. They know 
that their mother has a big salary. So, they can’t say something wrong about the 
Israelis. They are doing well with Israelis.” Hanan points to further evidence of the 
normative impact of Israeli occupation. “Sometimes, for example, they use the 
word Israel. They say ‘Yeah, we went to Israel to the beach.’ No! I tell them, you 
went to Yaffa! It’s not Israel! It’s a Palestinian occupied country. But it doesn’t 
matter for them.” 
Summa, who works in an Israeli hospital treating Israeli patients, also explained 
that she felt many East Jerusalemites were losing their connection to Palestine. 
“When I finished university [in the West Bank] I went to a school in Jerusalem to 
start learning Hebrew. The students that were with me in the class, I was shocked 
by them. They are from East Jerusalem, but they don’t have relations to 
Palestine. They don’t have relations with their religion, with their Arabic, they have 
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no belonging, yanee, they belong to Israelis. They have low education level. I 
believed at that point in the opinion of the West Bankers, that we are not 
belonging to them… It was the time of the war in Gaza and all the Palestinians 
stopped buying products from Israel, you know, there was a boycott, we stopped 
some things. One time we were talking about this and she said, one girl with us, 
‘Why? No! Yanee, we live with them, we work at their places. Yanee, its normal. 
They are with us.’ No belonging, they lost their relation now. Their relation to 
Palestine.” 
Discourse theory emphasises the contingency of discursive structures through 
which subjects obtain their identity. When dislocations occur, this contingency is 
made visible, identities and discourses are disrupted and a lack is created at the 
level of meaning. While East Jerusalem Palestinians do not struggle to justify 
their own position vis-à-vis the Israeli state and can account for the level of 
engagement they consider acceptable for themselves, their concern is aroused 
when others exhibit similar patterns of behaviour. This unease is indicative of the 
dislocation of this constituency from the discursive structures through which 
identity was previously constructed and demonstrates a loss of meaning and 
collective understandings about what it means to be Palestinian in the annexed 
city.  
The apparent disparity between how East Jerusalem Palestinians perceive 
themselves and how they regard each other is also reflected in the fragmentation 
of Palestinian identity more widely. As indicated above, decades of dislocation 
and dispersion have engendered different senses of what it means to be 
Palestinian (Bowman, 1994). This situation appears to be worsening over time.  
Barakat (2012) stresses that “though we continue to believe the dream of a 
295 
 
unified Palestinian identity, the reality is that this identity has become more 
fragmented among the different statuses that each one of us holds.” 
This problem is mirrored in the attitude of West Bank Palestinians towards East 
Jerusalemites (as experienced by East Jerusalem residents) discussed in 
Chapter IV. It is also evident in the views expressed by East Jerusalem residents 
about Palestinian citizens of Israel within the 1948 borders. Ahmad had 
experienced very little personal contact with Palestinians from inside Israel’s 
1948 borders before he went to university. As he made new friends, he was 
surprised to learn that their lives were not as he had imagined them.  
“The small villages of ’48 are in a very bad situation. Palestinians can’t get the 
right education because they can’t afford it, racism is high there. Every piece of 
the Palestinian community has its sufferings and some of their sufferings they are 
getting from us because we say they are traitors, they stayed, they are dealing 
with Israelis too much and all this crap. But when we talk to them, most of them 
have this sense of Palestinian root that is built in them. My opinion about them 
has changed tremendously.” 
It seems, therefore, that while each Palestinian constituency identifies itself as 
Palestinian, the effect of territorial fragmentation and demographic dispersion is 
that these communities now struggle to recognise each other as such. Each 
group appears to regard its own Palestinian experience as the ‘authentic’ one. 
Moreover, it is evident that in East Jerusalem, where the lines that distinguish the 
occupied from the occupier are present, yet more blurred than elsewhere, 
residents are navigating their paths in atomised ways and identifying individual 
solutions to their collective problems. Existing discourses have lost or changed 
meaning in the East Jerusalem context and new collective understandings have 
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not emerged. While many interviewees agreed that simply remaining in the city 
constitutes a powerful form of resistance, there was less of a consensus around 
how Palestinians who do survive in the city should live their lives there. Individuals 
appear to be secure in their own choices, but there is an apparent lack at the 
discursive level which would allow East Jerusalem Palestinians to locate their 
subjectivity within discourse. On the other hand, this is creating a space for new, 
individual interpretations. 
2.3 Shaping Identity from Below 
In this section, I suggest that the divergent political experience of East Jerusalem 
residents does not threaten Palestinian identity in the city, but rather that it is 
shaping the composition of that identity, from below, through the creative act of 
identification. East Jerusalem residents continue to identify themselves as 
Palestinian, but distanced from the political centre and isolated from the 
Palestinian milieu, they are redefining through their everyday practices what this 
means in the context of the annexed city. 
Laclau and Zac (1994) argue that “an active identification is not a purely 
submissive act on the part of the subject, who would passively incorporate all the 
determinations of the object. The act of identification, on the contrary, destabilises 
the identity of the object” (Laclau and Zac, 1994: 14). From this perspective, the 
essentialist definitions of Palestinian identity privileged by mainstream academic 
approaches are misrepresenting this constituency and denying them the 
particular form of agency they have constructed in relation to their context. I 
suggest here that it is necessary to consider the composition of identity itself as 
continuously being remapped and re-negotiated in relation to the experience of 
being Palestinian in a particular set of circumstances (Sherwell, 2006). In this 
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context, “the everyday becomes a distinguishing element of Palestinian identity 
particular to specific locales” (Sherwell, 2006: 438). 
I make the case, therefore, that the act of identification does not automatically 
impose on the subject all the determiners which comprise that identity; by 
identifying themselves as Palestinian, East Jerusalem residents do not accept an 
external set of identity markers as their own that are unambiguously recognisable 
to others who also accept them. As such, Bowman concludes that “[t]he 
nebulousness of the term ‘Palestinian,’ which enables it to serve as a label of 
identity for all Palestinians, simultaneously renders it incapable of providing any 
sense of the distinguishing characteristics which would allow Palestinians in 
milieu where they suffer from particular antagonisms to recognise their situation 
as ‘like’ that of other Palestinians in different situations.” 
Allowing that the act of identification is always “an individualised interpretation of 
a collective name and not a perfect imitation of a social category” (Ho and Tsang, 
2000) decentres essentialist interpretations of Palestinian identity and 
reintroduces a sense of ambiguity to our understanding of the everyday practices 
through which it is constructed. It also sheds light on the multiple subject positions 
occupied by East Jerusalem residents and the various projects in which they are 
simultaneously engaged. The Palestinian Authority has failed to project an 
inclusive nationalist discourse with plausibility or appeal for East Jerusalem 
Palestinians and their rejection of its legitimacy informs their relationship with 
Israeli power just as their experience inside Israel informs their position on 
internal Palestinian struggles. 
The relationship between East Jerusalem residents and Palestinians elsewhere 
in the occupied territories is complex, as is that between Palestinian residents 
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and the Israeli state. The data already presented highlights the ambiguities and 
ambivalences which are part of everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem. 
Distanced from both national projects, Palestinians in the city none the less 
remain closely connected to both states, often leaving them with a sense that 
their identity is in crisis. Summa says that East Jerusalem Palestinians 
experience a sort of schizophrenia. “I study from Palestinian textbooks, but I live 
in Israel and I work on the Israeli side, but no, I have to take a special licence 
from the Israelis to work with them because I studied in the West Bank which is 
not Israel, so am I with the Palestinians or the Israelis? Really, I feel I have 
schizophrenia… I am a Palestinian, but politically I am not a Palestinian or an 
Israeli. For Israel, I am a resident in this country, but I need citizenship to be 
Israeli. But I am not Palestinian because I do not have their ID and they have no 
power here. I am not Jewish and they want Israel to be recognised as a Jewish 
state so I am not really part of Israel. Abu Mazen wants a state in 1967 Palestine, 
but for Israel, Jerusalem is not part of the 1967 borders anymore, so I am not a 
Palestinian? What can I do?” 
In this important sense, the site of identity formation might constructively be 
regarded as one of indeterminacy, “an open space for considering a variety of 
ways in which the relation between self and other may be conceived. From this 
site, it becomes possible to think of social division in terms other than the 
friend/foe relationship.” (Norval: 2000: 223) While politics and identity remain 
essentially concerned with the formation of frontiers, of an ‘us’ and ‘them’, this 
perspective suggests that these do not have to be friend/enemy relations. For 
Norval, “the relation between ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ is infinitely more complex 
than any dichotomous distinction allows” and, “as Derrida argues, the outside 
infects the inside and vice versa.” 
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East Jerusalem Palestinians continue to identify as Palestinian, but just like 
diasporic Palestinian communities or Palestinians in Gaza or Israel, the different 
circumstances in which they live are engendering different senses of what this 
means in their particular circumstances. This has the negative effect of distancing 
these Palestinian constituencies from each other, but it has also focused some 
scholarly attention on the potential emergence of a unique Jerusalem Palestinian 
identity that is more local than national in character. 
Permanent exclusion is a structural element of most ethnocratic states and 
colonial settings in which the state has no intention or desire to assimilate 
marginalised communities (Yiftachel, 2009a).  The alienation of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians from existing discursive structures and their impregnable marginality 
inside Israel has raised the possibility that national identity might give way to a 
more localised sense of belonging and mobilisation. In some instances, this is 
discussed in relation to the popular ‘Right to the City’ discourse, discussed below, 
while Cohen points to the divergent nature of the Palestinian struggle in 
Jerusalem, more regular contact between Jerusalem Palestinians and Israelis, 
their special legal status and the physical barriers separating them from the rest 
of the territories. He claims that these factors have “combined to create a different 
type of Palestinian, a sort of hybrid between an Israeli Arab and a Palestinian 
from the territories” (Cohen, 2011). 
The data collected here does not support the suggestion that Palestinian 
residents of East Jerusalem are evolving a unique political identity that is more 
local than national in character. There is unmistakable evidence of a distinct East 
Jerusalem Palestinian experience, and this has significance for the articulation of 
new subjectivities. There is also a clear attachment among East Jerusalem 
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Palestinians to the city in which they live. The evidence suggests, however, that 
this attachment is complex and derived from a range of overlapping and not 
mutually exclusive subject positions. 
Many interviewees, for example, stressed the importance of free access to the 
al-Aqsa mosque. There were ties of family, memory and faith. For others, the 
connection was not so much to Jerusalem itself as to the access to all of historic 
Palestine that their residency rights in Jerusalem afforded them. It was in fact the 
broader connection to Palestine that made their Jerusalem residency so valuable, 
particularly for those who had lost land or property inside Israel’s 1948 borders. 
It is impossible to compartmentalise these motivations and they are sufficiently 
numerous and overlapping to cast doubt on any attempt to define a uniquely 
Jerusalem identity. 
Moreover, the influx of Palestinians holding Israeli residency into East Jerusalem 
from the West Bank as a result of the Barrier and the threat to residency, attests 
to the significance of the right to live in Jerusalem when that right came under 
threat, but also indicates that when it was not perceived to be threatened, day to 
day residency in the city sometimes took second place to quality of life. 
2.5 Summary 
In this section, I combined empirical data with theoretical context to offer a 
detailed analysis of the dynamics of Palestinian identity construction in East 
Jerusalem since the end of Oslo, the collapse of Palestinian leadership in the city 
and the construction of the separation Barrier. Existing scholarly approaches 
which fail to recognise the strategic recreation of Palestinian subjectivities in 
response to this new political geography in effect deny East Jerusalem residents 
their own form and moment of agency. 
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I set out first to identify the space in which Palestinian agency is meaningful and 
where subjectivities are recreated through the choices and actions of individuals 
when their identity is in crisis. I made clear the destabilisation of identities in East 
Jerusalem, arguing that this process is made visible by the city’s political and 
spatial dislocation from the West Bank and by the disruption of discursive 
structures through which identity was obtained during the first two decades after 
1967. Physical, political and discursive dislocation are shaping the site of identity 
construction in East Jerusalem, creating a lack of meaning within existing 
discourses and giving rise to the emergence of new subjectivities among East 
Jerusalem residents. In this context, I made clear that East Jerusalem 
Palestinians are pursuing non-essential relationships with Israeli institutions in an 
attempt to secure their status within existing power structures, buttress their 
position inside Israel against PA claims to speak for them, and achieve a better 
quality of life.  
In section four below, I suggest that while dislocation threatens identities, but by 
the same token it is the foundation on which new ones are constituted (Howarth 
et al., 2000). The space of meaningful agency in East Jerusalem is shrinking, but 
within it Palestinian residents are making strategic decisions and acting out their 
identities in new ways that may lead them to identify with alternative political 
projects and the discourses they articulate. First, I consider how Palestinians in 
East Jerusalem are adapting their struggle in the city post-Oslo. 
3 Modes of Palestinian Struggle in East Jerusalem 
I address in this section the impact of dislocation and exclusion on modes of 
Palestinian struggle in the city. I argue that the way in which East Jerusalem 
Palestinians frame their own struggle reflects the divergence of their experience 
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as residents of the Israeli state, the particularities of their relationship to Israeli 
power and the failure of the Palestinian nationalist movement to project an 
inclusive political imaginary with plausibility for this isolated constituency. 
Crucially, I argue that resistance to Israeli occupation is no longer the main 
explanatory paradigm for Palestinian politics in East Jerusalem or even for 
Palestinian struggle in the city more broadly. A fuller understanding of 
‘resistance’, not limited by a binary top-down perspective, requires consideration 
of the overlapping subject positions occupied by East Jerusalem residents and 
the multiple projects in which they are involved. A closer examination of the way 
in which residents frame their own quotidian practices demonstrates that their 
conscious struggles are directed as much against the encroachment of 
Palestinian Authority power in East Jerusalem as they are against Israeli attempts 
to remove them from the city. 
Political and territorial fragmentation, combined with punitive Israeli counter-
measures, have reduced collective acts and understandings of resistance across 
the occupied territories, resulting in a “plurality of competing narratives and forms 
of resistance.” (Richter-Devroe, 2011). East Jerusalem’s isolation and the 
particular relationship of its residents to Israeli power are undermining the 
discursive structures which inform collective Palestinian understandings of what 
to resist as well as of how to resist. This is evidenced by the emergence of a 
separate narrative of struggle in the city, discussed below, that manifests the 
atomisation of this constituency as well as their dual marginality. The de-
essentialisation of identity and reintroduction of ambiguity to our approach to 
everyday life in East Jerusalem facilitates a fresh examination of Palestinian 
struggle in the city.  
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In order to explore the dynamics of power in East Jerusalem, I adopt the term 
struggle here rather than resistance to capture the complexity and ambiguity of 
these relationships and with the aim of distancing this analysis from the 
dichotomising assumptions typical of mainstream approaches to everyday 
Palestinian life. Rejecting depictions of power as a straightforward top-down or 
bottom-up trajectory (Maiguashca, 2006, Maiguashca, 2013) and recognising it 
instead as a connection involving a “mutually implicated interplay” (Spicer and 
Fleming, 2006), I aim below to demonstrate the plurality of structural power and 
its relational aspects. In discussing Palestinian struggle, I hope also to distance 
this analysis from the impression, implicit in dominant discursive articulations of 
Palestinian resistance, of East Jerusalem residents as pre-formed and 
predictable individuals as opposed to agents whose identity is constituted through 
social practice and the process of acting out their struggle. I favour the term 
struggle which allows for antagonism, but also manifests the indeterminacy of the 
site of identity formation. While resistance implies a broadly outward focus and 
implies antagonism, struggle allows for greater complexity and ambivalence as 
well as more adversarial us/them relations.  
Below, I identify three modes of Palestinian struggle evident in East Jerusalem, 
based on the data collected here. First, is the ‘outward’ struggle to remain in 
Jerusalem, despite Israel’s colonial project in the city and the pressure on 
residents to leave. Second, is the ‘inward’ struggle of East Jerusalem residents 
to remain outside the control of the Palestinian Authority. Third, is a personal 
struggle to live a normal life within the context of de facto Israeli rule. 
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3.1 Struggle to Remain in Jerusalem 
East Jerusalem Palestinians consistently define their ‘resistance’ in relation to 
Israel’s Judaisation project and their active resolve to remain steadfast as 
Palestinians (and often as Muslims) in the city despite the hardships this entails. 
This mode of struggle takes account of the multiple strategies employed by Israel 
to undermine the Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem as well as the internal 
colonial (or ethnocratic) regime and discriminatory practices imposed on those 
who remain. It also acknowledges the perceived readiness of the leadership in 
Ramallah to negotiate further concessions over East Jerusalem to Israel, that are 
unacceptable to and unendorsed by its Palestinian residents. East Jerusalem 
Palestinians frame this steadfastness in terms of their nationalist resistance 
(muqaawma) and also, for Muslim residents, with reference to their religious 
obligation to defend the borders of Islam (ribaat). For most East Jerusalem 
Palestinians, it is also a very personal struggle to remain on one’s own land or in 
one’s own home. 
This form of struggle manifests Palestinian resistance to Israel’s Judaisation 
project in East Jerusalem, but it does not embody the discursive struggle to throw 
off Israeli occupation. Crucially, residents who identify this as their mode of 
resistance seek to sustain the Palestinian presence in the city, but do not 
uniformly agree on how to live in the annexed city. Ziad has a clear view of his 
own struggle, but emphasises the individual construction of everyday 
oppositional practices in East Jerusalem. He says that his own mode of 
resistance is to remain resident in Jerusalem despite the pressure to leave, while 
at the same time not ‘melting’ into Israeli society. For Ziad, this refusal to 
assimilate does not preclude regular, voluntary engagement with Israeli 
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individuals and institutions, but he accepts that the struggle of others in the city 
may look different. “I study at the Hebrew University and yes I work there too, I 
have also learnt Hebrew, but I am not integrated socially or politically… Everyone 
resists with his own shape of resistance. I resist occupation by getting a good 
education and by staying in Jerusalem. Others resist by staying in Jerusalem and 
maybe some social resistance not to melt, maybe some do knife attacks, but we 
are all the same level of resistance. We all want to end the occupation. That is 
the first priority for all of us, but we work for it in our own way.” 
It is unambiguously clear to residents that to live in East Jerusalem is, to all intents 
and purposes, to live inside Israel and that, as such, some degree of interaction 
with the state is unavoidable. Ziad believes that it is the responsibility of each 
individual to determine for him or herself where the line between participation and 
normalisation should be drawn. “This is a creation for Jerusalemite people and it 
is different for every person. Maybe this is not scientific or objective, but I believe 
it is different for each person. Everyone knows what is right and wrong for them.” 
Khadija expressed a similar sentiment. “Simply, if I am just here, live here, to be 
here, not to move, not to go to live in the West Bank, not to emigrate, this is my 
resistance. This is first. The second thing, raising my children in a good way, 
making them good people, this is also resistance. I can’t say about kids who throw 
stones or use knives, or about Hamas, I can’t say about them that this is not 
resistance, because I do respect them. Because they resist in their way. Each 
one of us has something they feel is their resistance. My way is being here, to 
show them that I am a Palestinian, a Muslim, to show them that I care about 
Jerusalem, about al-Aqsa, I care about Palestine. This is my resistance.” 
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Khadija explained that having a family has altered her perspective on the course 
of struggle that is most appropriate for her. “We never forget, for me I never forget, 
but there is another life; my children need me. I would love to go and sit everyday 
with the women at al-Aqsa (the Murabitaat), but on another side, I have kids to 
raise, a family to care about. I never forget what they did to us, but you have to 
make yourself not think about it to let life go on. I know it is really selfish to try to 
make yourself forget that people are suffering, but in the end, how can I help 
them? I believe in something inside and there is a time it will show up, but you 
have to wait; everyone has a different way to show what they believe in. Maybe 
if I raise my kids well, care about my family, raise them in a good way, that shows 
them that we exist, that we are here in Jerusalem, that we’re not moving. At the 
end, every one of us wants what’s the best for their family.” 
The Islamic dimension of this mode of struggle is significant. The religious 
importance of the city’s holy sites features heavily in individual narratives of 
Muslim residents’ resistance, while in Jerusalem the obligation to defend the 
borders of Islam raises Palestinian attachment to the land beyond a 
straightforward national struggle. For some, it is also regarded as a duty which 
the Palestinian Authority and many West Bankers have failed to fulfil. Summa 
explains: 
“I can’t accept the Palestinian leaders or their ways of life. The Palestinians in the 
West Bank, they don’t have the same relation say with al-Aqsa, with the religion 
of the land, like we do. In East Jerusalem, many leave school and go to make 
money working with Israelis and mixing with Israeli culture, but somewhere in 
their mind or in their heart they have this relation. They have al-Aqsa. The Israelis 
can take everything, but there are some lines they cannot pass. These lines are 
307 
 
muqadas, yanee, holy. In East Jerusalem, we have this relation with al-Aqsa, with 
this land, with Jerusalem. We know that this is our land. We work on the Israeli 
side because of money, but this land is something in our soul. In the West Bank, 
they have lost this relation. A student at my university [in the West Bank] said to 
me once that it is my responsibility to look after Jerusalem and al-Aqsa. I told him 
no, it’s not only my responsibility. Allah put me in Jerusalem and you in Jenin, but 
Jerusalem is your responsibility also. It is a responsibility for all Muslims. But their 
society and their relation to the land changed after the second intifada. It became 
about money, more money. Money and building. The external appearance of the 
cities changed. Their priority changed. I tell them now that they don’t deserve this 
land. They don’t deserve Jerusalem or al-Aqsa. If al-Aqsa is on the Israeli side, I 
will stay on the Israeli side.” 
Ribaat is a religious duty incumbent on Muslims, but for Christian Palestinians 
the individual’s relationship to Jerusalem is also an important one. George 
explained that many Christians have already left Jerusalem and that their 
numbers will continue to decline, but he was adamant that their bond to the city 
was no less profound than that of their Muslim neighbours. 
“It is definitely not because Christians are having less attachment to the land and 
the city that they leave. The Christians were here for centuries. The Muslims 
came in 637. Only Jesus was from this land, not Muhammad, not Moses. Of the 
pilgrims who come to Jerusalem, 90% of tourists are Christians. So be clear 
Christians are deeply attached to the land, it is our land.” 
Greater numbers of Christians leave the city, he claimed, because Muslims have 
more support from outside to stay and because they are more willing than 
Christian Palestinians, or secular Jews, to accept a lower quality of life in order 
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to remain. “The Christian mentality in Jerusalem is different. When you think 
about the future of your family, safe places to live, jobs, employment, a passport 
just to know who you are at least, then you think about leaving. If a Palestinian 
moves away, he can leave and still visit. He can live elsewhere and still keep this 
attachment.” 
Beyond religious imperatives, this dimension of the struggle in East Jerusalem is 
also linked to the Palestinian concept of sumud, or steadfastness, which 
manifests a robust determination to remain on the land. The meanings attributed 
to the nationalist conception of sumud have varied “dependent on the 
communicative situations in which sumud discourses  circulated as well as the 
larger needs and contexts of the time” (Rijke and van Teeffelen, 2014). It is 
apparent in the contemporary context of internal fragmentation, however, that the 
multiple and overlapping understandings of sumud must be understood not only 
in relation to time, but also to location and the divergent experiences of 
Palestinians within Israel, East Jerusalem and the occupied territories. In the 
annexed city, the struggle is also to resist the normative aspects of Israeli rule. 
This mode of Palestinian struggle, therefore, reflects the particular status of 
Jerusalem’s holy sites in Islam and contemporary conceptualisations of the 
nationalist notion of sumud that require Palestinians to remain steadfast on the 
land and to retain their national identity (Cohen, 2011). Equally, however, it 
manifests the perception of Palestinian residents that the struggle for Jerusalem 
has been abandoned by the national leadership and the sense that this 
responsibility is now theirs alone. It is also valuable as a diagnostic of Israeli 
power in the city in that it reflects the narrowing space in which resistance to 
occupation is possible. 
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Even lawful demonstrations by Palestinian residents of their opposition to Israeli 
sovereignty in East Jerusalem are classified as political subversion which is the 
remit, in addition to intelligence and counter-terrorism, of Shin Bet, the Israeli 
Security Agency, also known as Shabak (ICG, 2012). In this context, Dumper 
(2013a) notes that policing in East Jerusalem “does not tolerate any activities that 
are perceived as ‘subversive’ or threatening to public order, including 
demonstrations of opposition and left-wing movements in East Jerusalem.” This 
has led to a blanket suppression of all forms of Palestinian protest in the city and 
a policing regime which corresponds more closely to an occupying army than a 
law enforcement agency (Dumper, 2013: 1261). Even Palestinian political parties 
that oppose the occupation are considered unlawful as a result of which all 
Palestinian political activity in the city is effectively criminalised (Thrall, 2014, 
Thrall, 2017). 
Like many other East Jerusalem Palestinians, Rana explains that she fears the 
consequences of protesting against the occupation. “I like to stay in the middle. I 
feel afraid from these things, demonstrations. I just want to be safe. I don’t want 
to make anything against them, because I want to feel safe in my life. Not to go 
to a prison or a court. I just want to go to my work and come back to my home.” 
Despite living close to the site of a Muslim cemetery threatened by construction 
of a Museum of Tolerance in the Mamilla district, neither Rana nor anyone she 
knows took part in the protests largely organised by the IM Northern Branch (ICG, 
2012, Reiter, 2014). Fear and apathy appear to form part of the problem. 
 Cohen (2013a) points out that many more Israelis than Palestinian participate in 
‘joint’ struggle against the occupation. Among a range of explanations offered for 
this, including lack of trust in Israeli activists and lack of faith in the ability to effect 
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change, Cohen also highlights the likely absence of a shared agenda. While 
Israeli demonstrators chant that Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah are Palestine, the 
Palestinian residents of these neighbourhoods are themselves far less certain 
that Palestinian sovereignty is what they actually want. This fact further 
demonstrates the distance between East Jerusalem residents and the 
Palestinian nationalist narrative that emanates from the political centre and on 
which mainstream peace efforts are based. 
3.2 The struggle to remain outside PA Jurisdiction 
If the first component of Palestinian struggle in East Jerusalem is to survive as 
Palestinians in the city – as the outside brought inside – then the second element, 
of equal significance to residents, is to safeguard their status as Palestinians 
outside the reach of the Palestinian Authority. To persist as the inside, outside. 
This aspect of the struggle is most overlooked within existing academic 
approaches and embodies the failure of the Palestinian national leadership to 
project an inclusive liberation strategy with plausibility for East Jerusalem 
Palestinians. 
Importantly, it also signals the rejection by this constituency of any future 
settlement, negotiated on their behalf, by a leadership with no mandate to 
represent them, that surrenders their existing rights and freedoms under de facto 
Israeli rule in exchange for a quasi-state that falls far short of both their personal 
and their national aspirations. In this sense, the struggle denies Palestinian 
Authority legitimacy in East Jerusalem and manifests the rejection by residents 
of any strategy that seeks to bring East Jerusalem Palestinians under the 
jurisdiction of the leadership in Ramallah. 
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This component of Palestinian struggle in East Jerusalem also centres around 
the efforts of residents to maintain their current status within the Israeli state. The 
reasons for this are worthy of further exploration. Health care and social security 
are frequently lauded as the perquisites of Israeli residency but, as noted in 
Chapter IV, these are services for which East Jerusalem residents pay amply. A 
more compelling factor is the preference expressed by many Palestinian 
residents for what might broadly be described as the Israeli modus operandi, or 
what is locally referred to as Israeli nizam, or organisation. Cognisant of the 
discriminatory and often exceptional application of Israeli laws and regulations to 
East Jerusalem detailed in Chapter V, none the less Palestinian residents 
frequently express their respect for Israeli organisation and value the rights and 
freedoms that the society offers them. Sara explained: “The Palestinian 
government don’t care about the people, in contrast to the Israeli government. 
Everything they care about is the people. They don’t treat us as Israelis, but in 
the end if I am a Palestinian in the West Bank, I will not have the same good 
treatment there that I have here, now, from the Israel government. The Israeli 
government works in a right way.” 
Aisha is equally clear that she would not exchange her existing rights as a 
resident of Israel for a future, in Jerusalem, under the Palestinian Authority. 
“Staying with the Jewish is much better. Sorry for that, yanee. We say that not 
because we love them, but because we see what’s happened in Ramallah. 
Palestinians have Ramallah, the Surta [Palestinian Authority] has it, but we see 
what’s happened in the West Bank. The life, the society. Everything. The Jewish 
are much more organised. The system, the life is much better here. This is 
because we have Abbas in Ramallah.” 
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As residents of the Israeli state, East Jerusalem Palestinians also retain access 
to all of historic Palestine and this freedom of movement was a recurring factor in 
the statements made by interviewees. It also preserves a vision of national 
liberation that has been abandoned by the Palestinian national leadership. Saha 
was clear that she would never accept a two-state solution with a Palestinian 
capital in East Jerusalem. “Palestine is not only Jerusalem and the West Bank. 
Palestine is all of Palestine… I want to see Jerusalem without Israelis, without 
restrictions, all the people can go to Jerusalem, but I want some restrictions from 
the Palestinians themselves… I want Jerusalem exactly how it is now, but without 
Israelis. I want the system here but without Israelis… but the Palestinians don’t 
like systems… In the end, they [the Israelis] will leave, but when they will leave I 
don’t know… realistically, I think the situation will not change in the next ten, 
twenty or thirty years, you know. I think the situations and the systems [in 
Jerusalem] now maybe they will be suitable for my son more than [life under] the 
Palestinian Authority. This situation will be better for my child, from an educational 
status, from a medical status, from a financial status. From many sides, this 
situation now may be best for my children.” 
Suad is a widow in her mid-fifties. She was born and raised in East Jerusalem 
and retains her blue Israeli-issued identity card, despite the fact that she has lived 
in the West Bank for almost three decades. Her husband was a West Banker and 
her grown-up children have only Palestinian Authority ID’s. Suad’s second son 
was martyred almost two decades ago after Israeli soldiers came to her West 
Bank home to arrest him and he was shot attempting to flee. His younger brother, 
then only a teenager, was arrested and spent much of the following decade in an 
Israeli prison. Suad is deeply religious and her status as the mother of a martyr 
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is one that she and those in her community take very seriously. She has strong 
political views and does not try to hide her loathing of Israel. None the less, she 
is clear that if her hand was forced and she had to choose between her life in the 
West Bank and retaining her Jerusalem ID, she would not hesitate to move back 
to Jerusalem. 
Suad’s attachment to Jerusalem is in part a religious one, but she also laughs 
nervously as she tells me that she would rather live with the Jews than under the 
Palestinian Authority. “The Palestinians, Abbas and those like him, are worse 
than the Jews.” She would even take an Israeli passport if that was what was 
required to remain in the city. “No, it’s not haram. For sure they will never see me 
as equal to them, but I will take it just to come and go easily. May I could travel 
abroad. It will be difficult to live in Jerusalem just because of my children [who do 
not have permission to visit Jerusalem], but my soul is here.” She would also like 
to understand and speak Hebrew better and is planning to study it online. We 
must speak their language to understand everything, she says.  
In any future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Suad is also clear 
that she would reject a two-state solution in which East Jerusalem came under 
the power of the Palestinian Authority. If there is to be two states, she would 
choose to be in Jerusalem under Israeli leadership, not Palestinian. With a 
different leader in Ramallah, she says, perhaps she would change her mind, a 
Hamas leader, for example, but under Abbas and his kind, she would rather stay 
with the Jewish. “Life before the first intifada was better than this. Anything is 
better than the situation now. We used to have lots of Israelis come and visit our 
home. My father had so many Israeli friends. Every Friday we would go to visit 
someone. In the past, there was more communication between Jews and 
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Palestinians. We need like a ceasefire where things go back to how they were. It 
won’t be a permanent solution, nobody would accept it, we cannot allow 
ourselves to become like the Israelis, Muslims but Israelis, but my children used 
to be able to come with me to Jerusalem, to visit their family here, to pray at al-
Aqsa. Now I must come alone and if I want to live in Jerusalem I must live alone.” 
Like many other East Jerusalem Palestinians, Suad wishes for a return to the 
relative freedom of the pre-first intifada period. As discussed in Chapter IV, 
however, this nostalgia must be located within the context of Israel’s 
preponderant power and the hegemonisation of Palestinian political horizons by 
the state. Moreover, Suad’s sacrifice is recognised across the Palestinian political 
spectrum and she retains oppositional authenticity when she draws on positive 
aspects of the occupation regime (particularly in relation to their own, Jewish 
constituents) to critique the Palestinian leadership. 
In this sense, the Palestinian experience in East Jerusalem is informing the 
position that residents take on internal Palestinian struggles and at the same time 
reinforcing the structures of power in which they operate in the annexed city. Their 
resistance to the encroachment of Palestinian Authority influence in East 
Jerusalem is leading them into closer relationships with the Israeli state and its 
institutions, in an effort to consolidate their position within existing power 
structures in a moment of joint production (Holland, 2001).  
3.3 The Struggle For “Normal Life” 
Lastly, I argue that East Jerusalem Palestinians are also struggling in a broader 
sense to achieve a ‘normal life’ in East Jerusalem despite (and in large part due 
to) their political and spatial dislocation on the one hand, and the oppressive 
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policies of the Israeli state on the other. Distanced from both state projects, East 
Jerusalem Palestinians are doubly marginalised. While the first two modes of 
Palestinian struggle make clear that there remains much to struggle against, the 
absence of an inclusive Palestinian political/liberation strategy with meaning for 
East Jerusalem residents, combined with the effective criminalisation of 
Palestinian nationalist activity in the city, ensure that East Jerusalemites find very 
little to struggle for. As Dr Sharif explained, there is no revolution in Jerusalem, 
no great struggle. Residents will continue to fight for their right to remain in the 
city, but beyond that, the doctor asked, what is there to struggle for? Certainly not 
for what they have in the West Bank was his frank conclusion.  
Tamari (2013) has explored the evolving usage and meanings of normalcy or 
normality, terms that he uses interchangeably to describe the routinization of 
everyday life and a “negation of violence and yearning for order in daily life” 
(Tamari, 2013:48). In East Jerusalem, I suggest that the struggle for peace with 
Israel is abandoned or postponed and has been replaced by an individualised 
struggle for a ‘peaceful’ life for oneself and family. As Summa explained, most 
East Jerusalem Palestinians want to live in peace. Not peace with the Israelis 
though, she was quick to add, but “peace with themselves. To have a family, to 
work on the Israeli side and take home a respectable salary, to have a house, a 
car, children, to live in peace.” 
During the ‘affirmation of life’ period, the search for normal life implied resistance 
and an anti-normalisation stance; “that is, living a normal life was seen as the 
sine qua non of resisting Israeli rule” (Tamari, 2013: 59). In the late post-Oslo 
period, this ambition is less imbued with nationalist qualities and reflects a much 
more atomised response to the collective problems faced by East Jerusalem 
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residents. ‘Peace’ is not only elusive; it is also problematic in the sense that 
Palestinian attitudes and aspirations on the ground in East Jerusalem are not 
represented at a discursive level. 
Palestinian residents are increasingly looking for ways to minimise the extent to 
which the occupation encroaches on their everyday life. While observant Muslim 
women are easily identified by their clothing, Osama explained that he and many 
other he knows are actively seeking to look “less Arab” when moving around East 
Jerusalem and into Jewish space, in an effort to avoid encounters with Israeli 
police. Bauman (2015) notes that Palestinians who commute to work through 
Arab areas by bicycle risk being mistaken for Jews since cycling is perceived to 
be an unusual activity for Palestinians. Similarly, Osama says that when he needs 
to travel through Israeli space, he often travels by bicycle, since he is less likely 
to considered Arab and stopped by police in this way. Since 2014, he says, his 
younger friends are consciously wearing Israeli fashions and popular Israeli 
hairstyles in an effort to look less Palestinian.  
There are other, more tangible manifestations of this attempt to normalise life 
under occupation. Like George, East Jerusalem residents are increasingly willing 
to move into Jewish neighbourhoods in search of a better quality of life, better 
facilities and more privacy (Baumann, 2016, Yacobi and Pullan, 2014). As 
demonstrated in Chapter IV, Palestinians in the city are avoiding non-essential 
journeys through checkpoints and across the barrier in order to avoid the delays 
and humiliations that these often entail. In this sense, the desire for normality is 
not synonymous with a willingness to normalise relations with Israel, but it is 
indicative of the absence of a relevant resistance discourse. Tamari suggests that 
the decisive moment in the conflict discourse between normality and resistance 
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was construction of the separation Barrier. “The conditions of creating normalcy 
for the Israeli public, through a regime of segregation and insularity, was 
predicated on making life abnormal for Palestinians through a system of 
separation, confinement, and control. In this process, the vocabulary of 
coexistence and of normalcy itself has been subverted and trivialised” (Tamari, 
2013: 59). Tamari is correct that normality for Israelis has been sought at the 
expense of that available to Palestinians. The data collected here, however, 
suggests that Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are also adapting to the 
regime of insularity imposed on the city by the Barrier to achieve a more normal 
life. 
3.4 Summary 
Grossberg suggests “rearticulating the question of identity into a question about 
the possibility of constructing historical agency and giving up notions of resistance 
that assume a subject standing entirely outside and against a well-established 
structure of power” (Grossberg, 1996). Following Foucault’s assertion that 
resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power, I argue in this thesis that 
identity and struggle are negotiated vis-à-vis power structures and the 
opportunities for agency. In East Jerusalem, the possibilities for resistance to 
Israeli occupation are limited not only by Israel’s hegemonic presence in the city, 
but also by the absence of a plausible Palestinian liberation discourse and, more 
importantly, the rejection by Palestinian residents of the national leadership which 
gives them grounds for ambivalence towards Israeli rule. 
The space of resistance is constructed within complex power relations and the 
struggles undertaken by East Jerusalem Palestinians must be viewed within the 
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context of existing power structures and the points of convergence as well as 
contestation between them and the occupation regime. 
4 Potential Futures 
East Jerusalem’s altered political landscape has implications for Palestinian 
identity and struggle in the city which I have begun to explore above. New 
understandings of what it means to be Palestinian are evident and how residents 
relate to both the Palestinian leadership and to the occupation regime has 
changed. The disruption of identities compels the subject to act and to assert their 
subjectivity in new ways. While dominant articulations of Palestinian identity have 
taken place around the nodal point of ‘occupation’ since 1967, this signifier has 
lost or changed meaning for this constituency as the likelihood of a Palestinian 
capital in the city recedes and the prospect of Palestinian Authority rule loses its 
appeal. 
The new political geography evident in many contemporary cities, characterised 
by ‘gray spacing’ and the proliferation of informalities, is recreating subjectivities 
among excluded groups and distancing identities and mobilisations from the 
centre of power (Yiftachel, 2009a). While the critical literature offers various 
concepts to account for the assimilation of subaltern populations, Yiftachel 
recognises that these “fall short of explaining the development of group relations 
and collective subjectivities, in colonial settings, where subaltern groups are often 
cast as too different, too hostile or too geographically distinct, to be included 
within the limits of societal hegemonic projects” (Yiftachel, 2009a: 255). 
The dislocation of East Jerusalem Palestinians on the one hand, and their 
permanent exclusion on the other, make these situations particularly acute. Most 
recently, it seems that East Jerusalemites, between two centres of power and 
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distanced from both, are using the shrunken space in which a modicum of self-
direction is possible to improve their material prospects through and within 
existing power structures. It is uncertain how long this situation can or will last, 
but the alternatives are worthy of exploration. 
In this section I consider possible futures for Palestinian subjectivity and 
mobilisation in East Jerusalem, grounded in current academic trends and in the 
data collected. First, I consider the self-nationalisation argument put forward by 
Jean-Klein in relation to the first intifada and ask if this has any relevance for the 
post-Oslo period. In what sense might the rearticulation of Palestinian identity at 
the political periphery, described above, influence identity at the centre and how 
could this impact future relations and mobilisations. Second, I highlight the 
growing interest in the Right to the City concept and assess the potential for an 
urban rights discourse in East Jerusalem that recognises the distance of 
residents from both centres of power and the possible emergence of a particularly 
local identity. Finally, I consider the relationship between oppression and 
radicalisation and address the potential for radical mobilisations in East 
Jerusalem, in particular relating to al-Aqsa mosque. 
4.1 Shaping Palestinian Identity from the Political Periphery 
Jean-Klein’s essay on the first intifada addresses the scholarly denial of authentic 
nationalist production in everyday life, where it is assumed that nationalism is 
acted out, but never initiated or co-authored. While resistance studies 
concentrate on locating authentic forms of political activism and transformative 
agency in everyday life, similar investigations into everyday nationalism focus on 
the fundamental inauthenticity of these practices. For Jean-Klein, the message 
of these studies is that practices of nationalism in everyday life are nothing more 
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than “enactments of values and ideas manufactured and manipulated by political 
centres” (Jean‐Klein, 2001).  
Challenging the assumption that everyday political acts are by definition subaltern 
and oppositional, Jean-Klein argues that agency at the everyday level can have 
multiple objectives and effects and can be both oppositional and hegemonising. 
Thus, she concludes that the Palestinian practice of suspending everyday life 
was a form of domestic self-nationalisation as well as a form of resistance, that 
had hegemonic as well as liberatory overtones. This calls for a readiness to 
recognise everyday performances as influential in the collective production of 
identity and in the production of national subjectivities. 
Self-nationalisation, Jean-Klein argues, is a “process wherein ordinary persons 
fashion themselves into nationalised subjects, using distinctive narrative actions 
and embodied practices that are woven into the practices of everyday life.” The 
self-nationalisation of Palestinians during the first intifada, therefore, was 
“nationalist as well as resistant, hegemonic as well as subaltern, and everyday 
as well as orchestrated. It complemented organised efforts and in some way 
acted alongside them, yet it was a self-initiative that was not attributable in any 
simple way to formally organised national centres.” 
What does Jean-Klein’s study of everyday self-nationalisation offer our 
understanding of agency and subjectivity in East Jerusalem? At the start of this 
chapter I noted that  essentialised identities are favoured by mainstream 
nationalist Palestinian discourses emanating from the political centre (Sherwell, 
2006). Having established the disconnect of East Jerusalem Palestinians from 
the dominant nationalist narrative, however, I suggest here that East Jerusalem 
Palestinians, distanced from the political centre, are able to step back from the 
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essentialising discourses manufactured there and shape their own subjectivity 
and struggle. Certainly, East Jerusalem residents enjoy greater freedom than 
Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories to express their rejection of the 
Palestinian Authority and their dissent from the nationalist discourse. While they 
do not necessarily enjoy similar freedoms in relation to their rejection of 
occupation, none the less their ‘outsider’ status with regard to the occupied 
territories affords them a perspective and a position unavailable to Palestinians 
in the West Bank. 
While East Jerusalem Palestinians may appear apathetic from a top-down 
perspective, it is possible that their self-nationalisation could have a significant 
impact on intra Palestinian politics and identity. The fact that East Jerusalemites 
continue to identify as Palestinian despite their dislocation and the colonial 
pressures acting upon them, is potentially destabilising Palestinian identity and 
shaping it from the political periphery by contrast with the essentialised identity 
expounded by the political centre.  
4.2 An urban rights discourse? 
While I made the case above that a unique ‘East Jerusalem Palestinian’ identity 
is not evident, in this section I consider the opportunities for Palestinian 
mobilisation around their municipal rights. Distanced from both the Palestinian 
and Israeli state projects, there is growing academic and civil society interest in 
the potential rallying of East Jerusalem residents around an urban right discourse 
or the increasingly popular concept of the ‘Right to the City.’ One aspect of this 
argument focuses on Palestinian non-participation in Jerusalem’s municipal 
politics and the potential improvement in Palestinian living conditions and urban 
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rights that might be brought about by their involvement. The ICG’s 2012 report 
on East Jerusalem questions the continued wisdom of the “default Palestinian 
strategy, strongly urged by the leadership… to boycott all voluntary contact with 
the Jerusalem municipality.” While this policy made sense in the 1960s and 
1970s, the ICG argues, today this boycott is “a product of inertia” rather than 
deliberation and is now little more than “a symbolic form of politics that covers for 
what in fact is an absence of politics” (ICG, 2012: 29). The report concludes that 
a range of options exist that “potentially would enable Jerusalemites to command 
better services and therefore improve their living conditions – thereby augmenting 
their staying power in the city and not submitting to difficult conditions and fleeing 
– in addition to re-establishing some sense of political community” (ICG, 2012: 
30).  
The ICG makes a strong argument, grounded in the realities of the East 
Jerusalem’s political dislocation. Its recommendation for greater voluntary 
participation in municipal politics, however, is deeply contentious. Dumper, for 
example, underlines the significant strategic costs to the Palestinian community 
of formal engagement with the municipality. Palestinian participation in Israeli 
municipal elections and the potential election of Palestinian representatives, he 
argues, “would both cast a mantle of normality over the occupation of East 
Jerusalem and also loosen the ties which connect East Jerusalem to the West 
Bank and Gaza even further” (Dumper, 2013b). 
On the other hand, Yousef (2011) suggests that a generation of young East 
Jerusalem Palestinians is already emerging whose members have earnt Israeli 
professional qualifications, who understand their rights vis-à-vis the municipality, 
speak better Hebrew than their parents and are confident in their interactions with 
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the Israeli authorities. Excluded from both Israeli and Palestinian politics at the 
national level, the daily urban struggle has taken on greater significance for this 
generation, who are starting to demand their urban rights and the services for 
which they pay heavily. These Palestinians “do not look at participation in the 
municipal elections as a form of normalisation that grants legitimacy to the Israeli 
annexation of East Jerusalem. On the contrary, they re-frame it as a narrative of 
resistance” (Yousef, 2011: 50). Yousef argues that the political and spatial reality 
in East Jerusalem is generating new challenges of Palestinian residents for whom 
“improving living conditions is becoming a vital necessity for a vibrant Palestinian 
presence in Jerusalem.” 
Regardless of the merits or otherwise of such a perspective, there appears as yet 
to be little firm data to support it. While many younger East Jerusalem 
Palestinians appear through their everyday actions and choices to be redefining 
the limits of acceptable engagement or participation, far fewer recognise the 
relevance of municipal politics or are willing to vote in Israeli municipal elections. 
While the incumbent Nir Barkat won 46.9% of the Palestinian vote in 2013’s 
mayoral elections - 90% higher than the Palestinian vote he received in 2008 – 
Palestinian voter turnout of only 0.7% meant that Barkat in fact received only a 
0.3% of the total eligible Palestinian vote. Of 157,382 eligible Palestinian voters 
in East Jerusalem, a total of only 1,101 turned out in 2013 (Seidemann, 2014). 
Despite the potential gains of widespread participation, East Jerusalem 
Palestinians do not, on the whole, vote in local Israeli elections. 
While voter turnout in Jerusalem’s 2013 municipal election was poor overall (with 
only 36% turnout among all eligible voters, 7.2% lower than in 2008), the reasons 
for such minimal Palestinian participation are complex and largely beyond the 
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scope of this thesis. Based on the data collected here, however, I would argue 
that it is far too simplistic to continue to portray Palestinian non-participation in 
Israeli municipal elections as an unambiguous politically-motivated boycott. While 
the official Palestinian position remains that participation in Israeli municipal 
elections would not be in the Palestinian national interest and a political boycott 
may historically explain low Palestinian participation, a ground level perspective 
indicates that not all residents actually frame their non-participation in municipal 
politics as politically motivated.  
While only one interviewee admitted that he had previously participated in Israeli 
municipal elections (and then only once), more than half of participants in this 
study said they were unaware of their eligibility to vote in Israeli municipal 
elections. By the end of our conversations and despite my attempts to persuade 
them otherwise, many interviewees remained adamant that as residents of Israel, 
as opposed to citizens, they were ineligible to vote in municipal elections. Those 
I was able to convince received the news with clear surprise. Notwithstanding 
these differences, respondents were unanimous that there was no point in a 
Palestinian voting in Israeli municipal elections. Osama explained: 
“Okay, maybe we can, vote, but why? Why would I vote? Do you think they would 
allow the municipality to be full of Palestinians? Do you think that anyone we vote 
for can change anything for us? Maybe if it would make any difference I would 
vote, maybe not. But I know it is a waste of time. Nothing can change here, so 
why do it?”  
Within a top-down analytic framework, Palestinian non-participation in Israeli 
municipal elections lends credibility the sense of a united Palestinian position 
against Israeli domination in East Jerusalem and an official boycott that finds 
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support at grassroots level. From a ground level perspective, however, the view 
is quite different. Certainly, few East Jerusalem residents wish to confer 
legitimacy on a system in which their participation is considered pointless. The 
crucial factor here, however, appears to be the perceived futility of participation 
by Palestinians when they recognise that their exclusion is an inherent feature of 
the structure. Unfamiliarity with their rights as Israeli residents in some cases, 
combines with extreme apathy arising from the sense that nothing can change. 
This may constitute a boycott of sorts, but it is not indicative of a politically 
principled abstention arising from a collective rejection of the regime. 
Critical urban theorists are developing the Lefebvrian concept of the Right to the 
City as an exigent demand by the oppressed and alienated for a just and 
equitable urban space (Marcuse, 2009). Alkhalili et al. (2014) ask how applicable 
the concepts expressed in ‘the right to the city’ are in “a context of territorial 
occupation where the elements of space and citizenship are in constant 
alteration?” (Alkhalili et al., 2014: 259). In the context of East Jerusalem’s 
peripheral neighbourhoods, such as Kufr ‘Aqab, the authors are sceptical that a 
space of such lawlessness and continuous abuse of power could be a place in 
which residents were empowered to claim their right to the city. Yacobi also asks 
if it is possible “to establish a liberating urban project within a planning and civil 
system that operates under an ethnocentric national logic” (Yacobi, 2009: 108), 
concluding that “conflict and struggle for the right to the city are phenomena 
inherent in the production of urban space” (ibid: 116). Yiftachel draws on the 
concept, but takes it further, arguing that “the right to the city should be buttressed 
by more materialised and politicised notions such as ‘planning citizenship’, urban 
sovereignty and group’s self-determination” (Yiftachel, 2009b). Recognising the 
planning process as a powerful governing tool with which the authorities can 
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“legalise, criminalise, incorporate or evict (Yiftachel, 2009b: 96), Yiftachel argues 
that to have any value the right to the city must “respond to the very material 
deprivations and exclusions experienced in gray space, against which a rights-
based approach may not suffice” (Yiftachel, 2009a). 
4.3 Radicalisation and Insurgent Identities 
Adopting a neo-Gramscian inspired approach, Yiftachel argues that new 
mobilisations and insurgent identities are articulated when marginalised groups 
resist subordination and oppression. Conceptualising the process of radicalising 
identities as “oscillating between agonism (the articulation of difference within the 
leading value system) and antagonism (the articulation of difference outside the 
main value system)” he claims that “when marginalised groups become politically 
aware of the impregnable barriers to their equality and inclusion, and when they 
can marshal enough resources to act, their agonistic opposition is likely to shift 
to antagonistic radicalism” (Yiftachel, 2009a: 254). 
This links to Yiftachel’s call for a revised critical urban theory that recognises the 
development of new subjectivities within colonial situations in which excluded 
groups are beyond the intended reach of the society’s hegemonic project. In such 
cases, it is not the intention of elites to assimilate minorities (or ‘governmentalise’ 
them), but to sustain their exclusion through gray spacing and informality, while 
subjecting them to delegitimising, derogatory and criminalising discourses and 
violence (Yiftachel, 2009a, Yiftachel, 2009b). However, “communities subject to 
‘gray spacing’ are far from powerless recipients of urban policies, as they 
generate new mobilisations and insurgent identities” (Yiftachel, 2009a:25) and 
“use their territorial and/or political exclusion to develop a strong sense of identity 
and mobilise persistent struggles” (Yiftachel, 2009b: 96). In this sense, 
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communities which become aware of their permanent, structural exclusion, can 
be expected to undergo a “gradual, yet conspicuous process of radicalisation” 
(Yiftachel, 2009: 256). 
I have argued above that Palestinian subjectivities in East Jerusalem are being 
recreated in response to the circumstances of dislocation and domination in the 
city in the post-Oslo period. How evident is it, however, that these identities and 
their attendant mobilisations are radicalising? The upsurge in violent acts against 
Israelis in Jerusalem from mid-2014 has not materialised into a full-blown intifada 
as many observers anticipated. It has, however, challenged perceptions of East 
Jerusalem residents as passive and detached from the national struggle. More 
importantly, it hints at the sense of injustice and frustration experienced by 
residents. However, the absence of leadership or coordination behind these 
attacks also reflects the atomisation of this constituency and the failure of the 
national leadership to project a plausible national liberation strategy. 
In this sense, Yiftachel’s distinction between counter-hegemonic and anti-
hegemonic radicalisation is helpful. Inside Israel, he argues, “Bedouin 
radicalisation appears more as anti-, than counter-hegemonic, principally 
because this peripheral community has no ability to imagine challenging, let alone 
replacing, state hegemony.” Certainly, the sporadic and disorganised nature of 
violent Palestinian ‘resistance’ in the post-Oslo period suggests that this too is 
more anti- than counter-hegemonic as a consequence of this constituency’s 
inability to imagine genuinely challenging the state’s authority. 
Thrall (2014) argues that what the rise in protests and violent attacks since mid-
2014 most closely resembles is not the first or second intifadas “but the surge in 
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uncoordinated, leaderless violence that preceded the outbreak of the First 
Intifada.” Tamari (2013) describes a dramatic rise in the mid-1980s in knife 
attacks perpetrated by politically-unaffiliated militant youths against Israeli 
settlers and business interests in Palestinian urban centres. “This campaign,” he 
claims, “was the enraged, raw violence of a subdued and disarmed society” 
(Tamari, 2013: 52). 
Thrall draws a number of comparisons between the knife campaign of the late 
1980s and that of 2014 onwards. “Then, as now, such violence was blamed 
wrongly on the PLO leadership. Then, as now, that leadership appeared defeated 
and in decline. The PLO had been ousted from Lebanon, Israeli settlements were 
expanding, and Palestinians didn’t see how their leaders could achieve the 
national movement’s goals. As in 2006, local nationalist leaders in the West Bank 
came to power in 1976 in elections whose results Israeli sought to undo. These 
legitimate leaders were toppled and deported, and more compliant, unelected 
figures were put in their place. Then, as now, with no organised leadership in the 
West Bank and Gaza offering a clear strategy of national liberation, sporadic 
assaults on Israelis, not attributable to any political faction, were on the increase.” 
The crucial difference between the mid-1980s and 2014-2015, Thrall concludes 
elsewhere, is that “Palestinian civil society had become much weaker, and so, 
too, had the likelihood of coherent political organisation of the kind that emerged 
soon after the First Intifada began. The groups that were active then have been 
supplanted, either by the institutions of a Palestinian Authority whose existence 
is premised on close cooperation with Israel, or by NGOs whose foreign funders 
make assistance conditional on the pursuit of apolitical projects or vague peace-
building strategies” (Thrall, 2017: 155-6). 
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The collapse of Palestinian leadership and institutions in East Jerusalem has 
significant impact on the mobilising potential of this constituency. However, East 
Jerusalem residents also face an additional complication, rooted in their dual 
marginality. In the absence of a credible liberation discourse, and more inclined 
to protect and preserve their current status inside Israel than to give support to a 
Palestinian national project from which they are excluded, the position assumed 
by residents in relation to one naturally informs their attitude towards to the other.  
Palestinian Jerusalemites are constantly negotiating their sense of agency vis-à-
vis Israel’s hegemonic reach in the city and their rejection of the Palestinian 
Authority. The reignition of tensions in 2014 amply demonstrated this process. 
The prolonged period of instability that followed gave pause to those who might 
argue that East Jerusalemites have abandoned the national struggle, but in the 
opinion of most commentators, there was no organised political involvement, 
stemming instead “precisely from the absence of Palestinian political leadership, 
unified or otherwise” (Thrall, 2014). Certainly, there is little to suggest that 
Palestinian acts of resistance today manifest any commitment to the PA’s 
resistance paradigm. A close associate of President Abbas, former Religious 
Affairs Minister Mahmoud al-Habash, was roughly attacked by crowds of 
worshipers at the Aqsa mosque in late June 2014. Analysts described it as an 
internal Fatah attack on the presidency of Mahmud Abbas as well as a broader 
demonstration of the dissatisfaction of East Jerusalem Palestinians with the 
national leadership. In a further demonstration of East Jerusalemite anger, a PA 
governor was shouted out of the mourning tent of the family of the murdered 
Palestinian boy Muhammad Abu Khdeir the following month. East Jerusalem has 
witnessed sustained unrest since June 2014, but the failure of this anger to 
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translate into organised popular resistance reflects the absence of leadership in 
East Jerusalem. 
4.3.1 Mobilisation around al-Aqsa 
Even those studies which emphasise the acquiescence of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians to Israeli rule, their political passivity in the post Oslo period or the 
absence of leadership in the city, recognise the political and religious symbolism 
of the Haram al-Sharif and the potentially incendiary dimension that the 
perception of interference by Israel adds to the conflict. Thus, Cohen notes that 
“if indeed passivity is the central characteristic of political life in East Jerusalem, 
al-Haram al-Sharif is the exception” (Cohen, 2011: 71). It’s sanctity, he claims, is 
able to mobilise even those who seek otherwise to avoid political confrontation. 
In the context of modern Burma (Myanmar), Thawnghmung (2011) argues that 
religious spaces provide a platform to subvert legal restrictions on associational 
activity, leading marginalised communities to capitalise on exemptions for groups 
with purely religious functions and  to open their places of worship to clan 
associations and educational services. “Quotidian efforts to negotiate official legal 
barriers are significant forms of politics because they bring to view complex 
aspects of social life and legal manoeuvres typically occluded by macro-political 
concerns” (Thawnghmung, 2011). 
While the space offered by the Haram has been used for political mobilisation, 
the shared sanctity of the site itself between Israelis and Muslim Palestinians 
adds an additionally incendiary dimension to any perceived transgression of the 
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status quo.55 Larkin and Dumper (2012) explore the growing politicisation of al-
Aqsa compound within the broader context of Israel’s Judaisation project in East 
Jerusalem and as “a dynamic symbol and site of Israeli-Zionist domination and 
Palestinian-Muslim resistance.” The vacuum created by the collapse of secular 
Palestinian political authority in East Jerusalem is increasingly filled by an 
“emphasis on ‘sacred resistance’ and Islamic discourses as a means of protecting 
the Palestinian presence and their rights within the city.” The authors focus in 
particular on the emergence of the Islamic Movement in Israel’s Northern Branch 
as a key actor in East Jerusalem, which has employed al-Aqsa as a symbol of 
political empowerment and a focus for religious renewal.56 
The ICG’s 2012 report on East Jerusalem offers four reasons for the growing 
significance of al-Haram in the politics of the city. In addition to the exploitation of 
the site for political gain by individual politicians such as Islamic Movement in 
Israel’s Northern Branch leader Shaykh Raed Salah, the authors identify the Aqsa 
complex as one of the few venues where Palestinians can gather in significant 
numbers and where they retain a degree of control. With Jewish Temple Mount 
activism on the increase, they also regard Muslims in the city as reacting to a 
perceived threat, while finally “controversial archaeological and restoration works 
conducted by Israel around the Esplanade, and by the Jordanian Waqf on it, have 
fuelled tensions” (ICG, 2012: 15). 
                                            
55 For a full explanation and history of the status quo, see DUMPER, M. 1997. The Politics of 
Jerusalem since 1967, New York, Columbia University Press;DUMPER, M. 2002. The Politics of 
Sacred Space: The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Conflict, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers;ICG 2015. The Status of the Status Quo at Jerusalem's Holy Esplanade. 
Jerusalem/Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
56 Shaykh Raed’s subsequent arrest and imprisonment by Israel defused rising tensions to 
some extent. 
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The ICG report emphasises the individual dimension of the religious duty to 
protect al-Aqsa and this reflects the findings of my own research. It is not 
uncommon for Palestinian residents to prioritise their religious affiliation before 
their national identity when asked to consider their sense of self. This is 
unsurprising, particularly in a city such as Jerusalem in which religion occupies 
such a central position and where both Christians and Muslims, in divergent 
ways, feel that their connection to the city is under threat. Both religious and 
national identity here invest the individual’s connection to Jerusalem with a 
significance that elevates it beyond a simple local identity. All of the Muslims 
interviewed in the course of this study expressed their commitment to protect the 
Haram from perceived threats from Israel. Most believed that these threats were 
real and were sceptical that they might be used by one or both sides to serve 
their political ends. Equally, however, participants were clear in their own minds 
that this was a religious duty; the overlap with sites of political contestation was 
obvious, but not the mobilising potential was strongly religious. 
 The ICG (2015) report on the status quo at Jerusalem’s holy esplanade rightly 
notes that “there is no quicker path to major conflagration than violence there” 
(ICG, 2015: i) and this was amply demonstrated by upsurge in public protest in 
East Jerusalem surrounding the installation of metal detectors at an entrance to 
the Haram al-Sharif in 2017. The sense of closure to these protests, however, 
once the Israeli authorities were perceived to have conceded to their demands, 
supports the disconnection between this struggle and the nationalist one. On the 
one hand, there was no leadership in place to re-channel the momentum 
achieved once the immediate objectives had been achieved; on the other hand, 
neither was there a cause to harness it to. Between both state projects, East 
333 
 
Jerusalem residents appear broadly convinced that there is currently nothing 
worth struggling for that improves on what they have now. 
5 Conclusion 
In chapters IV and V, I highlighted the dual marginality of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians, described how residents are adapting to the new political landscape 
and shed light on the way in which they frame their actions. Together these 
factors shape the site of Palestinian identity construction in East Jerusalem. In 
this chapter, I set out to explore this space and to investigate the ways in which 
it is influencing Palestinian subjectivities and struggle in the city. 
First, I drew attention to the assumptions which underpin existing approaches to 
East Jerusalem and how these limit our understanding of the everyday, where 
subjectivities are created. Next, I outlined a discourse theoretical approach to 
identity construction and applied this to the data collected from East Jerusalem. 
I concluded that residents continue to identify as Palestinian, but that they are 
reshaping the composition of that identity from below in ways that are not 
necessarily recognisable to other Palestinians as similar to their own. Next, I 
discussed how Palestinian resistance in the city is also adapting to the dislocated 
environment, outlining three modes of struggle which reflect the multiple subject 
positions occupied by East Jerusalemites and the way in which they inform each 
other. Finally, I addressed some of the most popularly cited futures for Palestinian 
identity and mobilisation, concluding that East Jerusalem residents lack a 
plausible national liberation discourse which makes their struggle – and the 
sacrifice of their existing status – worthwhile. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
I began this thesis by recognising the divergent political trajectory of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians who live as residents, but not full citizens, inside Israel’s 
de facto borders, beyond the reach of the Palestinian Authority. The PLO’s 
decision to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel disrupted the discursive 
structures through which Palestinian identity had been constructed since 1967 
while the concessions it was willing to make on the issue of East Jerusalem 
established the city on a tangential path that distanced residents from the political 
leadership in the West Bank and from the Palestinian milieu. 
I made the case that the East Jerusalem constituency is doubly marginalised, first 
as a result of its dislocation from the occupied territories, then as an excluded 
minority, inside the politics and economy of the Israeli state but permanently 
positioned outside the intended reach of the national project. I found that 
dislocation from the occupied territories has contributed to the reorientation of 
Palestinian subjectivities away from the Palestinian centre towards inclusion in 
Israel, but that even Palestinian residents who seek to improve their lives and 
livelihoods within the context of Israeli domination, are confronted by structural 
barriers and everyday manifestations of their otherness and exclusion.  
Within this context, I set out to address the opportunities for Palestinian agency 
in the city, the way in which identity is constructed and the potential for 
mobilisation. I asked how these factors are shaping the site of Palestinian identity 
construction in East Jerusalem and explored, within this space, how residents are 
adapting their subjectivity and struggle. I made the case that dislocation and 
335 
 
domination are engendering a particular sense of what it means to be Palestinian 
in East Jerusalem that corresponds to this experience. While East Jerusalem 
residents continue to identify themselves within the nationalist lexicon, the 
everyday practices through which individual residents enact their agency are 
redefining from below - rather than from the political centre - what it is to be 
Palestinian in East Jerusalem, in a process that demonstrates this constituency’s 
distance from the essentialised identities privileged by mainstream studies. I 
suggested that the bottom-up approach undertaken here makes visible this 
phenomenon, which is generally obscured within a top down analytic optic in 
which the praxis of everyday life is interpreted from a binarized perspective that 
objectifies antagonism and anticipates resistance. 
In Chapter IV, I make clear the physical and political dislocation of East Jerusalem 
residents from the West Bank and discussed the implications of this liminality for 
Palestinians in the city. I argued that East Jerusalem residents no longer 
experience the occupation as temporary and that few can imagine challenging, 
let alone replacing Israeli hegemony. I made clear that residents are increasingly 
ambivalent towards Israeli rule, in large part connected to their disconnection 
from and disillusionment with the Palestinian political leadership. In this context, 
I make the original argument that East Jerusalem residents are pursuing 
individualised ‘improvement of life’ tactics which reflect the contracting space in 
which their agency is meaningful. 
In Chapter V, I addressed the other side of the East Jerusalem constituency’s 
dual marginality, this time as an excluded minority within the Israeli state. Even 
residents who seek to improve their prospects within existing structures of power 
in the city, find that the ‘normal life’ they seek is outside their reach. First, I located 
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Palestinian exclusion at a structural level, emphasising how East Jerusalem 
residents are trapped by the ethnocratic regime between territorial inclusion and 
political alienation. Next, I described how Israel uses informality and exclusionary 
strategies to reinforce the otherness of Palestinians inside the state and further 
its colonial objectives. 
Finally, in Chapter VI, I outlined a robustly anti-essentialist conception of identity 
construction to consider the ways in which power shapes the opportunities for 
Palestinian agency in the city and how residents are adapting their subjectivity 
and struggle to long term occupation. I problematised three of the main 
assumptions which underpin existing analytic approaches to East Jerusalem and 
set out how discourse theory can be applied to shed light on the emergence of 
new political subjectivities and the process of identity construction within the 
context of discursive dislocation. I found that the actions of residents in the city 
make visible the emergence of new subjectivities that are distanced from both the 
Palestinian political leadership and from the mainstream nationalist discourses 
on which existing academic approaches to conflict resolution are based. 
1 Theoretical Implications 
Throughout this thesis, I have drawn on a range of critical theories, in particular 
the theoretical contours of discourse theory, to examine the impact of dislocation 
and domination on Palestinian subjectivities in East Jerusalem. Adopting a 
qualitative, bottom-up approach, I have tried to make visible the way in which 
dominant discursive articulations of Israeli-Palestinian relations depend on binary 
distinctions which essentialise identities on both side, objectify antagonism and 
anticipate resistance. 
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The discourse theoretical approach does not anticipate my findings, but is 
intended to compliment then and to ground them within an analytic framework 
that emphasises how new interpretations of phenomena are possible when we 
make visible the assumptions that underpin dominant approaches. Every view is 
the view from somewhere, and the ground level perspective I have offered here 
is simply one more among many. I argue, however, that it is an under-explored 
position that has much to add to our existing understanding of East Jerusalem. 
The ground-level, bottom-up approach adopted here is compatible with discourse 
theory in that this theory is ‘problem’ driven, rather than ‘theory’ driven and is best 
used to shed light on a problem that is specified independently of the theory. 
In one way, the emergence of a particular sense of what it is to be Palestinian, 
rooted in the specific experience of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, simply adds 
one more to the many ‘Palestines’ described by Bowman (see Chapter VI). On 
the other hand, Jerusalem’s unique significance to the ethno-nationalist project 
of both sides makes an exploration of this specific manifestation of Palestinian 
identity particularly relevant. Since the theoretical conception of identity 
construction on which I rely emphasises the ultimate contingency and fluidity of 
identities, however, I must also emphasise here that while this thesis highlights 
an ongoing process of identity construction in East Jerusalem, that is resulting in 
subjectivities which distance Palestinian residents from the occupied territories, 
this is of course vulnerable to external factors and is not static. Indeed, while 
residents were openly ambivalent towards Israeli rule, this attitude is very much 
related to the absence of a credible, plausible Palestinian alternative. The 
emergence of such a force will have a potentially dislocatory effect on processes 
of identity construction in the city. 
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2 Political Implications 
I have made the case here that the view from the ground is an under-explored 
perspective in the existing literature on East Jerusalem and I hope that I have 
gone some way towards addressing this gap. I also suggest that a bottom-up 
approach to the impact of geopolitical processes sheds light on the distance that 
has emerged between the nationalist discourse espoused in Ramallah and the 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem whose quotidian experience locates 
them squarely within Israeli power structures. 
Israel and the international community recognise the Palestinian Authority as the 
only body with legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people, but the 
PA is prevented by the terms of the Oslo Accords and by Israeli law from 
operating in East Jerusalem or extending its jurisdiction there57. East Jerusalem 
Palestinians are permitted to vote in Palestinian legislative elections, but in 2006 
their democratically elected representatives were jailed by the State of Israel and 
their residency rights in the city were revoked. 
Israel’s systematic assault on Palestinian political institutions and political life in 
East Jerusalem, combined with the failure of the PA to assert its authority in the 
city and the absence of an organised local leadership, have left East Jerusalem 
Palestinians isolated and disempowered. They are not adequately represented 
by the PA which, though empowered to negotiate on their behalf, in fact has no 
jurisdiction over them, is not in reality accountable to them, and has ultimately left 
                                            
57 At the end of 1994, the Knesset passed the ‘Implementation of the Agreement on Gaza and 
Jericho Areas (Restriction of Activity)’ law designed, its first paragraph reads, “to prevent 
Palestinian Authority or PLO diplomatic or governmental activity or anything similar within the 
borders of the state of Israel that was not consistent with respect for the sovereignty of the state 
of Israel.” COHEN, H. 2011. The Rise and Fall of Arab Jerusalem: Palestinian Politics and the 
City since 1967, Oxon, Routledge. p27-8. 
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many feeling abandoned. There is of course significant international interest and 
involvement in efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict and in the 
East Jerusalem question in particular. The United Nations and its member states 
have been consistent in their refusal to recognise Israel’s annexation of the city 
and in their commitment to Jerusalem as a final status issue in a negotiated 
settlement.58 However, without due consideration of the ground level perspective, 
that locates East Jerusalem, to all intents and purposes, firmly inside Israel, 
negotiations over sovereignty will be rooted in a single Palestinian nationalist 
discourse that has lost or changed meaning for the East Jerusalem constituency. 
Throughout this thesis, I have sought to capture the view from the ground in East 
Jerusalem, investigating the way in which residents act and the meanings which 
they attach to their social practice. From this perspective, I demonstrate that 
Palestinians in the city are more ambivalent and their motivations more 
ambiguous than a top-down optic allows. The bottom-up perspective adopted 
here makes clear that, to all intents and purposes, East Jerusalem Palestinians 
live inside the de facto borders of the Israeli state and as part of the ground politics 
and economy of the city. I have also demonstrated above that Palestinian 
residents are adapting their subjectivity and struggle to this reality in ways that 
deepen their dislocation from the occupied territories. 
This choice of perspective has political implications. Once we stop structuring our 
analytic approaches to East Jerusalem around the nodal point of occupation, 
which ‘brackets out’ the situation as temporary and unresolved, and begin to 
                                            
58 Australia’s decision in June 2014 to stop using the term ‘occupied’ when describing Israeli 
settlements in East Jerusalem caused an international backlash, causing Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott to offer assurance that there had been no change in Australian policy.  
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consider East Jerusalem as part of Israel, the state regime starts to look less like 
ethnocracy and more like apartheid. Several respected scholars in the field have 
begun to address this controversial issue (Anderson, 2016, Yacobi, 2016, 
Yiftachel, 2009b). Urban apartheid, Yacobi claims, is not a chance occurrence, 
but a product of ideology and policy. The emerging apartheid regime in East 
Jerusalem, he concludes, “is a result of intentional policies that aim to secure 
Jewish control in the vast majority of territory and resources in the Jerusalem 
metropolitan area, restricting Palestinians to small parts of the city and denying 
them their future” (Yacobi, 2016: 112). 
Yiftachel has argued that gray spacing results in a process of “creeping apartheid” 
in which “membership in the urban polity is stratified and essentialised, creating 
a range of unequal urban citizenship(s)” (Yiftachel, 2009b: 93). This is not simply 
about discrimination, but “the consequence of deeply embedded institutional, 
material and spatial systems which accord unequal ‘packages’ of rights and 
capabilities to the various groups, as well as fortify the separation between them” 
(Ibid: 94). Yiftachel describes this process as ‘creeping’, however, because Israel 
retains substantial democratic elements (Anderson, 2016: 8). However, if we let 
go of East Jerusalem’s de jure status and base our analysis on its de facto 
position, as an integral part of the Jewish state as Israel claims it to be, then we 
start to see Israel as an apartheid state. In this way, as I made clear in the 
introduction, our efforts to maintain East Jerusalem’s separateness from Israel is 
in fact obscuring the Palestinian experience in the city and the extent to which 
Israeli domination is limiting the opportunities of Palestinian self-direction.  
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3 Limitations and Possibilities for Further Study 
This thesis is undertaken very much from a Palestinian ground level perspective 
in East Jerusalem and while, in this sense, I hope to have made a valuable 
contribution to an unexplored aspect of the literature, the ideas presented here 
are intended to build on existing works rather than contradict them. Jerusalem is 
in many ways a divided city. What I have sought to do here is to emphasise the 
contingency of identities and to acknowledge the possibility that, in trying highlight 
an injustice, it is possible to underestimate its most serious implications. 
I locate the divergence of East Jerusalem and the West Bank within the context 
of fragmentation across the occupied territories, as a result of both intentional 
Israeli practices (including settlement construction and mobility regimes) and 
internal Palestinian divisions. In highlighting this separation, I have focused on its 
impact on everyday Palestinian life and identity construction in East Jerusalem 
only. A similar study, that shed light on the attitudes of West Bankers or Gazans 
towards East Jerusalem and the implications of Palestinian territorial and political 
fragmentation on identity and national cohesion across these areas would make 
a valuable contribution to the existing literature. Travelling myself between a 
besieged Gaza and the relative tranquillity of Jerusalem on more than one 
occasion, underlined the vastly different experiences of Israeli rule and of being 
Palestinian that these two constituencies endure. 
It is also important to note here, however, that it is possible to overstate difference 
between East Jerusalem attitudes and those of West Bankers, particularly in 
regard to the Palestinian Authority and the prospects of a two-state solution. 
Without a similarly detailed ground-level study of opinion elsewhere in the 
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occupied territories, it is impossible to know how far attitudes diverge. What is 
clear, is that beyond the political jurisdiction of the Palestinian leadership, East 
Jerusalem residents have more freedom to express dissent. 
A recent survey of Israeli and Palestinian opinion indicated broad scepticism on 
both sides regarding the prospects for a satisfactory settlement of the conflict. 
The public perception among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza was that 
the viability of a two-state solution was waning due to settlement construction. 
The poll also demonstrated widespread distrust of the Fatah leadership (58% in 
Gaza and 51% in the West Bank) and growing support for armed resistance. 
Interestingly, only 28% of Palestinians polled said that continuation of the 
occupation and settlement activity was the most serious problem confronting 
Palestinian society today, compared to 31% who believed that poverty and 
unemployment were most pressing (2017, Hoffman, 2017, Research, 2016).  
This data points to certain parallels between public attitudes in the West Bank 
and the opinions of East Jerusalem Palestinians who contributed to this research. 
What is evident from the discussion of subjectivity and struggle below, however, 
is that East Jerusalem Palestinians, politically and spatially disconnected from 
the Fatah leadership and PA rule, are in a potentially more powerful position than 
West Bankers to act upon their disapproval of the Palestinian Authority, for 
example, and to consolidate their position away from it. In short, they have an 
alternative which their compatriots in the West Bank do not and for many in East 
Jerusalem, it appears that this alternative may currently be the lesser of two evils.  
The bottom-up approach adopted here also means that I have paid little attention 
to the complexities of Israeli party politics and their impact on national policy 
towards the occupied territories in general and East Jerusalem in particular. While 
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right wing Israeli governments have, on the whole, given more support to 
settlement activity and more proactively pursued residency revocation as a 
means of ‘quiet transfer,’ it remains that that the spatial-demographic struggle 
continued, and perhaps even increased, during the Oslo period. While some 
procedures perhaps changed during Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s second term 
in office between 1992 and 1995, the state none the less continued to support 
aggressive ideological settlement activity in East Jerusalem during this period 
and through the incumbency of Binyamin Netanyahu and his successors (Cohen, 
2011). While East Jerusalem residents are aware of and often follow the Israeli 
political process, few are of the opinion that a ‘dove’ as opposed to a ‘hawk’ in 
the Prime Minister’s office has any bearing on their own status or security. For 
this reason, participants in this study made no reference to Israeli party politics 
and they receive very little attention here.  
This thesis relates to everyday Palestinian life and identity construction in East 
Jerusalem within the context of dislocation and exclusion that exists there. It is 
rooted in my deep immersion in a Palestinian setting over a number of years and 
in the in-depth interviews conducted with Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem 
in 2016. Nowhere in this work, therefore, do I examine the views of Israelis or 
attempt to consider these phenomena from an Israeli perspective. This was not, 
and could not have been, within the scope of this study since I had neither the 
space nor the access to trusted informants to make this possible. 
Existing works have begun to address these areas of study. Yacobi and Pullan 
(2014) consider the attitudes of Israeli residents of French Hill, for example, who 
find that increasingly numbers of middle class Israeli Palestinians and now East 
Jerusalem Palestinians, are looking to their neighbourhood for a better quality of 
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life. Baumann (2015) notes that the settlements were conceived as an exclusively 
Jewish space, but suggests that an estimated 4,500 Palestinians (mainly, though 
not solely from within 1948 Israel) are seeking to overcome restrictions on the 
sale or lease of land to Palestinians to seek a better quality of life there. These 
phenomena would benefit from a thorough analysis from both perspectives. 
In Chapter VI, I drew substantially from discourse theory to construct an analytic 
framework within which it is possible to locate the site of identity construction in 
East Jerusalem and trace the emergence of new Palestinians subjectivities in the 
city. I have only skimmed the surface of the theoretical potential of East 
Jerusalem as a case study for discourse theorists and I strongly recommend that 
further study in this direction is undertaken by a more expert political theorist. As 
I made clear in Chapter VI, the everyday is a suitable site for considering the 
discursive construction of identity and qualitative interview data offers much for 
the discourse theorist to work with. Discourse analysis, as distinct from discourse 
theory, requires greater concentration on all forms of discourse, including written, 
and would require a better grasp of Arabic than I have. 
Following Edward Said, I suggest in conclusion, that “the construction of 
identity… involves establishing opposites and ‘others’ whose actuality is always 
subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences 
from ‘us’” (Said, 2003: 332). The dislocations experienced by East Jerusalem 
Palestinians have contributed to this continuous process of reassessment and it 
is clear that subjectivities are being recreated. With them, the differences 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’ are revealed to be strategic, fluid, and not necessarily 
antagonistic. A ground level perspective makes visible these phenomenon, but 
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also requires that the researcher acknowledge the changes that are already 
underway as a result of Israel’s asymmetrical power in the city. 
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